

THE
MILITARY & POLITICS IN
PAKISTAN

1947-1997

HASAN ASKARI RIZVI



THE MILITARY & POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 1947-1997

Hasan Askari Rizvi

Iqbal
Book Corner



SANG-E-MEEL PUBLICATIONS
25, Shahrah-e-Pakistan (Lower Mall) Lahore.

320.95491 Hasan Askari Rizvi

The Military & Politics in Pakistan
1947-1997/ Hasan Askari Rizvi.-Lahore:
Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2009.

382pp. : Tables.

Index Included.

1. Politics. 2. Pakistan - Military &
Politics. I. Title.

2009

Published by

Niaz Ahmad

Sang-e-Meel Publications,
Lahore.

ISBN-10: 969-35-1148-4

ISBN-13: 978-969-35-1148-2

SANG-E-MEEL PUBLICATIONS

Phones: 7220100 - 7228143 Fax: 7245101
<http://www.sang-e-meel.com> e-mail: smp@sang-e-meel.com

25 Shahrah-e-Pakistan (Lower Mall), Lahore-54000 PAKISTAN
PRINTED AT: HAJI HANIF & SONS PRINTERS, LAHORE.

CONTENTS

*Dedicated to the memory of my Grandfather
Late Justice SYED JAMIL HUSSAIN RIZVI*

Preface	11
INTRODUCTION	15
THE MILITARY IN BRITISH INDIA	20
Status of the Military in British India	
Military as an instrument of policy	
Military and Politics	
Conclusion	
TRANSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES	25
Status of the Military in the New Pakistan	
Military and Politics	
Conclusion	
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN THE POST-1947 PAKISTAN	30
Status of the Military in the New Pakistan	
Military and Politics	
Conclusion	

CONTENTS

	Preface	11
1.	INTRODUCTION	15
2.	THE MILITARY IN BRITISH INDIA Pattern of Civil-Military Relationship in India Military as an Instrument of Policy Military and Politics Conclusion	26
3.	DIVISION AND NATIONALIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES Politics of the Division of the Armed Forces Nationalization and Re-organization The Armed Forces and the Communal Riots of 1947 Conclusions	35
4.	THE MILITARY AND POLITICS: THE FIRST PHASE Defence Problems and Political Leaders The Armed Forces and Public Opinion Political Conditions The Armed Forces and Politics Conclusions	51

5.	THE MILITARY REGIME : 1958-62	82
	Political Crisis	
	The Declaration of Martial Law	
	The Nature of the Military Regime	
	The Military Regime	
	Reforms in the Society	
	Economic Reforms	
	Political Framework for the Future	
	The Nature of the Reforms introduced by the Military Regime	
	Conclusions	
6.	THE MILITARY AND POLITICS : THE SECOND PHASE	125
	The New Political System	
	Defence Policy	
	Indo-Pakistan War (1965)	
	The Armed Forces and Society	
	Conclusions	
7.	EAST PAKISTAN AND THE ARMED FORCES	149
	British Recruitment Policy	
	Post Independence Period	
8.	THE CHANGE OF THE HORSEMAN	160
	Factors Responsible for the Political Crisis in 1968-69	
	The Collapse of the Ayub Regime	
	Transfer of Power to General Yahya Khan	
	Conclusions	
9.	SECOND MILITARY REGIME : 1969-71	181
	Nature of the Military Regime	
	Martial Law Administration in Action	
	Towards the Civil War	
	Civil War and Dismemberment	
	Conclusion	
10.	THE TURN OF THE TIDE	208
	The Military Under Fire	
	Rehabilitation of the Military	
	The Military's Response	
	Civilian Institution Building	
	Conclusions	

11.	THE RETURN OF THE MILITARY	232
	General Elections	
	Mass Movement	
	Resurgence of the Military	
	Third Military Regime	
	Elections and Accountability	
	Islamization	
	Political Orientations	
	Political Strategy	
	New Horizons of the Military's Role in the Polity	
	Civilianization of Military Rule	
12.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS : PAS INFLUENCES AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS	267

Appendices

A.	A Memorandum written by General Ayub Khan, C-in-C of the Army : 4 th October 1954	282
B.	Proclamation made by Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan : 7 th October 1958.	288
C.	General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan's First Broadcast to the Nation : 8 th October 1958.	292
D.	Text of Letter sent on 24 th March 1969 by Field Marshal Ayub Khan to the C-in-C of the Army, General Yahya Khan	296
E.	Field Marshal Ayub Khan's Last Address to the Nation : 25 th March 1969.	299
F.	General Yahya Khan's First Broadcast to the Nation : 26 th March 1969.	302
G.	Excerpts from Z. A. Bhutto's Address to the Nation : 4 th March 1972.	304
H.	General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's First Address to the Nation : 5 th July 1977.	306

I.II	Higher Defence Organization (White Paper)	311
J.	Coup D'etat and the Supreme Court of Pakistan	320
K.	Names of Persons Occupying Key Positions in Pakistan	325
	SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	346
	INDEX	371

Tables

I	Machinery for the Reconstitution of the Armed Forces	39
II	Division of the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan	40
III	Control of the Army During the Reconstitution Period	41
IV	Muslims and Non-Muslims in the Higher Commissioned Ranks of the Indian Army in 1947.	45
V	The Approximate Percentage of Various Communities in the Army	47
VI	Defence Expenditure 1947-59	57
VII	A : Martial Law Administration (October 8-27, 1958) B : Martial Law Administration (After October 27)	90 90
VIII	Inquiry Commissions and Committees set up by the Martial Law Regime	93
IX	The Officials Against Whom Punitive Action was taken	100
X	Basic Democracies' System	117
XI	Number of Councils and Committees under the Basic Democracies' System	118
XII	Retired Commanders in Civil Offices	129
XIII	Presidential Elections (1965) Results	132

XIV	Party Positions in the National Assembly	133
XV	Defence Expenditure 1958-62	138
XVI	Defence Expenditure 1965-70	139
XVII	Estimates of Gains and Losses during Indo-Pakistan War, 1965.	141
XVIII	East Pakistan's Representation in the Armed Forces	152
XIX	Recruitment to the Army	154
XX	Officers' Recruitment in the Navy	155
XXI	Allocation of Seats to Provinces in the National Assembly	188
XXII	Composition of Provincial Assemblies	188
XXIII	General Seats Won by Different Political Parties in the National Assembly	190
XXIV	Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the Political Parties	191
XXV	Senior Military Officers Retired from Service	212
XXVI	Defence Expenditure 1970-77	219
XXVII	Law and Order Operation of the Army 1972-77	222
XXVIII	National Assembly Elections, 1977	233
XXIX	Changes in the Military Regime's Political Priorities and Goals	241
XXX	Defence Expenditure 1977-86	258
XXXI	The 1985 General Elections : Candidates	262
XXXII	The General Elections : Voters' Turn-out	262

Preface

The military is the most formidable and autonomous political actor in Pakistan, capable of influencing the nature and direction of political change. It acquired such a centrality to the political process over time which represented a shift from the disposition it maintained at the time of Pakistan's independence. Though the military was integral to the British imperial rule in South Asia and served as its ultimate shield, the military functioned within the parameters set out by the civilian authority and stayed out of active politics. These traditions were accepted as the cardinal principles of military organization in Pakistan. However, with the passage of time, the military expanded its role and established its primacy to the political process which manifested in different forms, i.e., active role in policy making from the background, direct rule under the cover of martial law, establishment of civilianized regimes which relied on the generals for their survival, and penetration into the civilian institution and processes.

These developments warrant a critical appraisal of the factors and conditions that contributed to the changes in civil-military relations. Other important issues that need to be looked into include the performance of different military regimes, efforts of the military rulers to civilianize their regimes, and implications of the expanded role of the military for the polity and the military itself. No thorough and independent study of these issues was available until the seventies, although most articles and books dealing with Pakistan's politics and society discussed the military. The Pakistani scholars within the country were especially hesitant to study the military because of the weak or non-existent democratic environment and a poor tradition of independent scholarship. They often found the bureaucracy to be non-cooperative and they could hardly have access to the military establishment, i.e. the senior commanders and military institutions, for research on military. The situation began to change after the withdrawal of the third martial law in December 1985 and especially after the full restoration of the democratic process in 1988.

An important development that helped the study of the role of the military has been the publication of memoirs, autobiographies and commentaries on the Indo-Pakistan wars and other military related issues by retired officers since the late sixties, more so since the seventies. The prominent among them include Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General Mohammad Musa, General K.M.Arif, Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhury, Lt.-General Gul Hassan, Lt.-General Faiz Ali Chishti, Lt.-General Rahat Latif, Major General Muhammad Akbar Khan, Major General Shahid Hamid, Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, Major General Rao Farman Ali Khan, and Brigadier Siddiq Salik. Some have written on military profession and strategy, important military expeditions of the Muslims and regimental histories. The books by Lt.-Generals Attiqur Rehman and A.I. Akram deserve to be mentioned. A number of retired officers contribute articles to English language Pakistani newspapers on foreign and security policies, the military, society and politics. An important monthly *Defence Journal* (Karachi), being published since 1975, carries insightful articles by retired officers and civilians on all major aspects of foreign and security affairs, including defence production. The Army puts out various publications, essentially for in-house circulation. *The Pakistan Army Journal* and *Pakistan Defence Review* which are available to civilian readers, contain informative articles. These books and articles provide valuable data but most memoirs and some articles on the Indo-Pakistan wars are written in an involved style and are tainted with personal biases.

Among the academicians, Khalid Bin Sayeed, Hamza Alavi, Lawrence Ziring, Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Asaf Hussain, Billal Hashmi, Omar Noman, Ayesha Jalal, Samina Ahmed, and Shireen Mazari have offered scholarly analysis into various aspects of the role of the Pakistan military. Several books make a detailed and in-depth study of the military as an institution and its role in the political system. Saeed Shafqat's *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan* (1997) focuses mainly on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto but places the discussion in the historical and theoretical framework emphasizing how the military was able to establish and sustain its hegemony in the policy. Iftikhar H. Malik's *State and Civil Society in Pakistan* (1997) does not exclusively cover the military but his analysis of the interaction between the state and the society offers useful insights into the expanded role of the military. The book entitled *The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality* (1996) by Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi examines the efforts of the military, especially the Army, for its image-building against the backdrop of its expanded role in the polity and the Indo-Pakistan wars. The most interesting discussion pertains to the period when the author was heading the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate. Veena Kukreja

combines the theoretical writings on civil-military relations with political history of Pakistan in her book *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan* (1985). There are gaps in data, especially on the working of the military regimes. However, the author makes a good use of whatever material was available in New Delhi. Kukreja's later work *Civil-Military Relation in South Asia* (1991) devotes one section to Pakistan.

Stephen P. Cohen's *The Pakistan Army* (1984) stands out as the only study based on a detailed field work in Pakistan, that is, visits to the military institutions and interviews with the serving and retired officers. While discussing the defence and security problems of South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular, he examines the professional character of the Army, the socio-economic background of the officers, including the generational changes, and offers insights into the senior officers' perceptions of the military as an institution and its role in the polity, and the defence and security environment. It is also advisable to consult his book *The Indian Army* (1971, 1990). Raymond A. Moore's *Nation Building and the Pakistan Army* (1979) has a limited scope as it deals with the Army's civil construction work, especially road building, relief operations, educational and sports activities and management of industry. Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan's *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (1963) is a pioneer work on the Army history, although it is a semi-official narrative which needs updating. The first edition of Hasan-Askari Rizvi's *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (1974) was the first independent study of the military published in Pakistan. A reference may be made to a 10 volume collection of articles on Pakistan entitled *Political System of Pakistan* compiled by Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, published from New Delhi in 1995; its fifth volume includes several dated but useful articles on the Pakistan military published in different journals and newspapers.

This book undertakes a comprehensive and documented study of the role of the military in Pakistan's society and politics with a view to explaining why and how a professional military can acquire political disposition. The book begins with an overview of literature on civil-military relations and especially the salient causes which encourage the military to assume political power. The problems of the military regimes and their efforts to re-structure the politico-economic order have been examined. Two chapters focus on the development of modern military in British India, its division between Pakistan and India in 1947, and the steps taken by Pakistan to establish a strong military force out of what it inherited at the time of independence. This serves as the background for the study of the changing patterns of civil-military relations in Pakistan and the rise of the military to power. The major themes discussed in the book include the

leading causes of the expansion of the role of the military, the military take-overs, various military regimes and their policies, the efforts of the military regimes to civilianize themselves, the legitimacy issue and the civilian institution building by the military, civilianization of military rule and the return of the military to barracks, civil-military relations in the post-withdrawal period, ethnic imbalances in the military, and the impact of military rule on the society and the polity. The appendices provide useful support material for the study of the military in Pakistan.

These major themes have been studied with reference to three clusters of factors: the dynamics of the civil society and the working of the political institutions and processes; the military establishment and its organizational resources and professional and corporate interests; and the interaction across the functional boundaries between the military and the civil and its implications for the power balance in the polity. The weaknesses of the civilian/political institutions and their inability to cope with diverse demands on the political system make it convenient for the senior commanders to expand their role and even assume power. However, military intervention is not necessarily an enduring remedy but it is a part of the overall problem of weak civilian institutions and political decay.

This book was first published in 1974 and revisions were made in 1976 and 1986. The present edition includes some changes. Table 30 and the last section of chapter 11 have been revised. Chapter 12 has been rewritten and Appendix "K" has been updated. The author thanks Sang-e-Meel Publications for publishing the book which was out of print for the last several years.

April 1998

H.A.R.

1 Introduction

Asian politics has shown two major characteristics over the last twenty years. These are the erosion of democracy and the vast and significant influence of the military on the course of political change. The military has either actually assumed political power or it is playing political role in collaboration with political elite. Out of twenty independent states of Asia there have been successful coups in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand and Turkey and insurgencies and uprising in most of the remaining Asian countries. When we look at the African map, the picture is not very different from that of Asia. Even the smallest armies have carried out successful coups, though their ability subsequently to administer is inhibited by the number of trained men available. Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Upper Volta have witnessed successful coups. The military has also been playing a vital political role in a number of Middle Eastern countries. Military intervention in the politics of Latin America has become endemic. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru are amongst those Latin American countries which have suffered coups and counter coups at one time or the other. In Europe, Greece and Portugal have undergone military rule.

Praetorianism is not entirely a new development. The Praetorian States have existed in the past and many political philosophers recognized this phenomenon. Out of 51 states existing in or before 1917, all but 19 witnessed the rise of the military to political power. Out of 28 states established between 1917-55, 13 suffered from coups.¹ What is significant about the role of the military in politics in the 1950s and the 1960s has been flurry of coups and the emergence of numerous patterns of civil-military

¹ Finer, S.E., *The Man on Horseback*; (Paperback edition; London: 1969), p. 3.

relations in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

There is a difference of opinion amongst scholars about the impact of military rule on politics and society in the Third World states. A large number of scholars interpreted the assumption of political power by the military as a positive development that would create necessary conditions for the protection and promotion of liberal democratic institutions and facilitate economic development, social change and national integration. One political scientist described the ascendancy of the military to power as an opportunity for effecting a "breakthrough from present stagnation into a genuine developmental take off".² Another writer talked about the important developmental role of the military elite.³ However, a number of scholars are critical of military's direct or indirect indulgence in politics. A study of the role of the military in Latin America concluded that the armed forces were the single "most serious impediment" to development of democracy.⁴ One study indicates that military regimes hardly differ from non-military regimes from the perspective of "economic performance criteria".⁵ Another study, comparing data on 77 Third World states during 1960-70, concluded that the military is not necessarily an agent of social change. Its performance in the field of modernization and change was not very different from that of the civilian regimes.⁶ These writers underlined the social, political and professional constraints which adversely affected the performance of military regimes and pointed out the political implications of military's modernizing role for the future disposition of the military as well as the post-coup society.

Despite the diversity in the impact of military intervention in politics, most political scientists agree that there is a great similarity in the political culture and socio-economic conditions of the states witnessing the rise of the military to political power. Most of these States fall in the category of

² Pauker, G. J., "Southeast Asia As a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, Vol. 11 No. 3, April 1959, pp. 325-345; See also Kennedy, G., *The Military in the Third World* (New York: 1974), p. 59; Lerner, D. & Robinson, R.D., "Sword and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army As a Modernizing Force," *World Politics*, Vol. 13 No. 1, October 1960, pp. 19-44.

³ Daalder, H. *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), p. 19.

⁴ Porter, C.O. & Alexander, R. J., *The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America* (New York: 1961), p. 46.

⁵ Cohen, A. S. & Minkinlay, R.D., "Performance and Instability in Military and Non-Military Regime Systems" *APSR* Vol. 70 No. 3, September 1976, pp. 850-864.

⁶ Jacjman, R.W., "Politicians in Uniform: Military Government and Social Change in the Third World," *APSR*, Vol. 70 No. 4, December 1976, pp. 1078-1097; Khan, D. Shah, "Role of Armed Forces in National Affairs," *Defence Journal*, Vol. 8, Nos. 8, Nos. 10 & 11, October-November 1982, pp. 15-29.

the poor and the developing nations. The 1963 statistics indicated that out of 73 States with *per capita* income below 330 dollars, 45 faced coups. 25 States had *per capita* income from 330 to 899 dollars. Only 5 out of these 25 States suffered from the military intervention in politics. Out of 19 States with *per capita* income above 900 dollars, there were only 2 casualties.⁷

These nations are marked by horizontal and vertical cleavages in their social structure. On the horizontal level, linguistic, ethnic and regional diversities create problems for the political system. On the vertical level, there is a wide gap between the westernized elites and the illiterate masses, between the rich and the poor. The people living at the margin or below the level of subsistence are either indifferent or have negative disposition towards the political system. The pre-independence dream of the glorious future does not come true. What they see around is widespread poverty, disease and misery.

The lack of unity in the new nations manifests itself in a number of ways: Certain sections of population refuse to submit to the authority of the central government or they demand special safeguards to protect their rights. There is also a demand for maximum autonomy or independence. These manifestations reflect mutual distrust and lack of national identity which raises its head once nationalist sentiments developed in the last phase of independence movement start disappearing. The basic objective of the leaders of the new nations is not to convert these diversities into a uniformity but a congruence of diversities leading to a unity in which both varieties and similarities are maintained. The lack of unity challenges the hold of the government over certain regions. On occasions the government has to resort to force to keep the fabric of the state intact. Such actions do not always produce the desired results. Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and number of other nations have been seriously threatened by ethnic, regional and linguistic challenges. Pakistan's experiment in nation-building unique in the history of the new nations, failed in 1971, when East Pakistan broke away and declared her independence under the name of Bangladesh.

The new nations have weak democratic traditions and a limited experience of running democratic institution. The indigenous political culture has been authoritarian in its content. Ascriptive status, rural kinship system and the socialization process in the family produce authoritarian norms. Such developments stand in the way of the ordinary man's becoming a citizen of a nation-state. Democratic institutions which gradually developed especially after the Industrial Revolution in Europe were, thus, alien to the Asian and African soil. The westernized elite based their demand for independence on the western notions of democracy, liberty, equality and

⁷ Finer, S. E., *Comparative Government*; (New York: 1971) pp. 532-3.

right of self-determination. But they had very limited opportunity to actually run democratic institutions. The British Government gradually introduced self-government in India and made a half-hearted attempt to introduce responsible government in the provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935. The experience which the political leaders acquired was negligible as compared with the responsibility which they had to shoulder after independence. To the peasantry, however, both the idea and the institutions of democracy were alien.

In the pre-independence period, opposition to the government and agitational politics was considered an act of patriotism. Some of the political leaders tend to carry the traditions of the pre-independence politics to the post-independence politics. A number of political leaders who do not see eye to eye with the government do not hesitate to use all those methods of opposing the government which they had employed against the colonial government. What strengthens their hands to oppose the government is the gap between the expectations aroused during the pre-independence period and the output of the government. This problem is particularly serious in those states which have achieved independence through armed rebellion and guerrilla warfare. The habit of resorting to violence formed during the pre-independence period overshadows the post-independence period. Political armies and armed bands created during the struggle for independence have been a constant source of trouble in Burma and Indonesia. Several groups refuse to submit to the authority of the government or like freedom of action, which, if granted, creates the problems of national integration and law and order.

The political leaders who hold the levers of power after independence want to build up a modern organization of the state to ensure political stability and development. They may follow different routes to modernisation or may not pursue all the constituent elements of modernity with equal vigour, but all of them aim at modernisation. Their model is invariably, western society. Modernisation does not merely involve industrialization or modernizing tools of production but calls for such basic changes in attitude towards life which can ultimately lead to the transformation of life. It means to be "dynamic, concerned with the people, democratic and egalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign and influential".⁸ This also requires the institutionalization of operational political and social values, their legitimacy in culture and the weakening, if not supplantment, of primordial allegiance.

⁸ Shills, E. "The Military in the Political Development of the New States", in Johnson, J.J. (ed.), *The Role of the Military in under-developed Countries*; (Princeton, 1962), p. 9.

This is a hazardous path. The obstacles to modernization are many. There are always people who wish to preserve the old order which is undergoing rapid change under the influence of modern technology and communications. They either cling to it or show reluctance to accept the new notions. Some of them are ideologically opposed to modern technology and modern practices. They emphasize the traditions and the 'glorious days of past' to the extent of making the existing society a stagnant society. Others oppose it because it strikes at the roots of the traditional power and prestige. Therefore, the ruling elite talk of integrating the traditional pattern with the elements of modernisation. Every culture can absorb some values and patterns of an alien culture but soon there comes a stage when the traditional ethos come in conflict with the forces of modernisation which create stresses and strains in the existing social and political structure. At this stage the role of the political leadership and the ability of the government to pursue a particular course of action is very important. But the new nations, with a few exceptions, suffer from a dearth of well-organized political parties and competent political leadership.

The nationalist parties and movements have been built around personalities, whose charisma is their greatest asset. These leaders serve as the national symbol and focus of loyalty of the common men. Jinnah in Pakistan, Gandhi and Nehru in India, Nkrumah in Ghana, Sukarno in Indonesia and Sekou Toure in Guinea are the prominent examples of the role of personalities in the nationalist movements. If the leader passes away or fails to transfer charisma to the party and the political system, the newly born nation faces political vacuum. The gap of leadership at the top encourages factionalism and personal jealousies in the party which had led the freedom movement. Regional leaders and sectional political parties come up. Since their power base is some region, tribe or community, they have parochial approach and narrow outlook. In case the government is dominated by the people of one region, clan or religious group, the people of other regions, clans, or religious groups view the government as an instrument in the hands of one section or population to exploit the others. The feeling of distrust and hostility between various regions and groups is aggravated by economic disparities between different regions and classes and the uneven impact of modernisation. These regional and parochial forces reduce the effectiveness of the government to tackle the problems arising during the transitory stages of modernisation. Dankwart A. Rustow has summarized the problems of the new nations in these words:

... Disagreement on constitutional procedures, inexperience with government by discussion, a precarious feeling of national identity, lack of technical qualifications among civil servants, a general dearth of educated personnel, atrophy of political parties, diffuseness of

economic interest groups—all these reduce governmental capability⁹.

These factors contribute to disillusionment and frustration in the society which increases alienation of the masses from the government, decreases the efficacy of the government thereby encouraging political instability and undermining economic development and social change to the extent that political leaders find it hard to improve the conditions of the masses. This in turn, adds to frustration in the society. The vicious circle goes on.

The military occupies a distinctive position in the new nations. It maintains a national outlook, more oriented to western practices and technology and controls the instrument of violence. The armed forces are more organized than most civilian institutions and are characterized by "their centralisation, hierarchy, discipline, inter-communication and *esprit de corps*."¹⁰

The military has three major features which make it distinctive and dynamic. First, most of the organizations except the military operate within the context of their own society. The military constantly looks outside the country—towards developed military powers. The contact with other military powers makes it aware of international standards and the latest developments in military strategy. The recruits, coming mostly from the rural areas, are educated, trained, and disciplined in particular skills. The officers are trained in military institutions of western countries or training institutions established by the colonial power. They study and learn technology and principles of warfare of the industrially developed nations. In this sense the military in the new nations may be interpreted as "one of the key mechanism which a nation possesses of receiving, and sometimes amplifying signals from its external environment — these signals include ideas, values, skills, techniques and strategies of political changes"¹¹ This makes them conscious of the relative backwardness of their society.

Second, the political leadership of the new nations recognizes the need of maintaining strong and efficient armed forces to defend and protect the territorial integrity of the state from the actual or potential internal or external threats.¹² The liberal allocation of funds enables the armed forces to acquire modern equipment and technological skill. Military aid by the developed countries accelerates the pace of modernization of the armed

⁹ Rustow, D.A., *A World of Nations*; (Washington D.C., 1968), p. 177.

¹⁰ Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback*; [London, 1969, Paperback Edition], p. 10.

Lovell, J. P. & Kim, C.I.E., "The Military and Political Change in Asia", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XL Nos. 1 & 2, Spring and Summer, 1967.

¹² Four tiny States of Africa, Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho and Swaziland do not maintain regular army and rely on para-military elements in the Police for security purposes. Gambia is surrounded by Senegal and the other three, by the Republic of South Africa.

forces. They learn to make use of comparatively modern instruments of violence and technology, which no other institution in the society possesses. Thus, they represent a modernized organization in a relatively less developed society.

Third, military is not merely a profession, it is a way of life. Its acculturation process is so thorough that it replaces parochial and particularistic orientations of its members and inculcates identification with the national symbols and military's professional and corporate identity. This contributes to discipline and cohesion in the military which is reinforced by keeping the military at a distance from the rest of the society.

Organizational resources and technological know-how at the disposal of the military make them the main agent of technological-administrative revolution. They contribute to national reconstruction by constructing roads, bridges and dams and by the provision of necessary help to the civil government in case of natural calamities. They establish and run their educational and training institutions, ordnance factories, which also produce goods for civilian consumption, and other industries mainly to absorb retired military personnel. This enables the armed forces to accumulate managerial ability which makes them the largest pool of skilled manpower. This managerial ability can be used to handle civil affairs. Janowitz observes:

Changing technology creates new patterns of combat and thereby modifies organizational behaviour in the military. The more complex the technology of warfare, the more narrow are the differences between military and non-military establishments, because more officers have managerial and technical skills applicable to civilian enterprise.¹³

Thus, in a fragmented and undisciplined society the armed forces (and the civil service) maintain an integrated organization, a national outlook and knowledge of comparatively modern technology. As they stay at a distance from the civil society, their public image is high. They are considered honest, patriotic, firm and symbol of national sovereignty and represent "something over and above the passing regimes."¹⁴

The civil government, confronting the problems of modernization and change, looks towards the military for assistance in what may be termed as the 'non-professional' field—maintenance of law and order, help in case of natural calamities, and execution of development projects. The use of the military in the 'non-professional' field has three major consequences. First,

¹³ Janowitz, M. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago & London, 1967: Phoenix Edition), p. 27.

¹⁴ Feit, E., "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria", *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 2, January 1968.

it gives the military experience to handle what is considered to be the responsibility of the political leaders. Second, it arouses the suspicion in the mind of the military about the government's efficacy and they acquire first hand knowledge of the depth of popular antagonism against the civil government. Third, an impression is created in the society that the armed forces have the power and ability to handle a situation when it goes out of control of the civil government.

If the government continues to use troops to quell public demonstrations, and the economic, political and social crisis deepens in the society military intervention is, often, what Janowitz terms 'reactive' rather than 'designed', a gesture of self-interested or public spirited despair against the inadequacies of politicians.

Finer suggests that there are four levels of military intervention in politics, influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment. These levels of intervention are attained by various methods, alone or in conjunction with one another. According to him, influence is a perfectly legitimate and constitutional method of convincing the rulers to accept their point of view. This is done through persuasion. When the military leaders threaten to use some sanction, i.e., threat of violence or non-co-operation, should their advice not be followed, influence changes into blackmail. Displacement of one civil government by another civil government or supplantment of civilian regimes is achieved by threats to revolt, refusal to defend the government against its foes and refusal to defend the government against civil disorder. The supplantment of civil government can also take place through military take over with or without violence, commonly known as coup.¹⁵ The latter mode of intervention is very common in the new nations. The military has, therefore, become "crucial institution and power block."¹⁶ In many of the new nations coups succeed because "the public is relatively narrow and is weakly organized."¹⁷ and public attachment to their political institutions is so fragile that they hardly question the legitimacy of the take-over.¹⁸

A coup is followed by a fresh series of problems. As technocrats, the military leaders dislike political bargaining and compromises which are very frequently resorted to by the political leaders. They firmly believe that political problems can be solved if the dirty politics is checked and discipline and regimentation of the type that marks the organization of the military is enforced in the society. They believe that "all problems can be

¹⁵ Finer, S. E. *op. cit.* pp. 140-162

¹⁶ Janowitz, IL *op. cit.* p. vi.

¹⁷ Finer, S.E. *op. cit.* p. 89.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 118.

overcome if the right orders are given."¹⁹ Once the orders have been issued, these should be obeyed rather than debated. Apparently this strategy looks like a correct solution but in the long run it proves counter productive and hampers the growth of other mechanisms of social and political change.

The first consideration for the military after the take-over is to see that a firm control has been established all over the country and the decrees issued by them are effective. If it is not able to consolidate its position, it cannot take measures to fulfil the promises made at the time of the takeover. The military enters either as a care-taker government or to introduce far-reaching changes in the political, social and economic structure of the society and give what they consider suitable form of government. The military intervention in Burma in 1958 can be cited as an example of the former. General Ne-Win assumed power to hold the ring for a short period of time and organize elections. The promise was fulfilled and the power was transferred to a newly elected civil government in 1960. The care-taker nature of the military regime is no guarantee of its political posture. It, in fact, is a warning signal and keeps doors open for intervention in politics later on. In less than two years, General Ne-Win was back in power due to what he described as the failure of the politicians to sort out their problems. He decided to introduce far-reaching changes in the Burmese society.

The military leaders who assume power with broader objectives, introduce a programme of "reforms". It comprises:—

- (a) Steps to eradicate corruption, nepotism in civil service and black marketing, smuggling and similar evils in the society.
- (b) Measures to ensure economic development, industrialization and better standards of living for the people.
- (c) A viable political system for the future.

The real test of the capabilities of the military to run the civil administration and the extent to which the military regime is better than the previous regimes run by the politicians, comes when it adopts measures to achieve the above objectives. Though political activity is curbed, some of the political leaders are under arrest, freedom of speech and press is restricted or completely curbed, the military leaders soon realize that they alone cannot run the administration of the country. The realities of politics make them conscious of the fact that they cannot run administration smoothly unless they make compromises. The first such compromise takes place between the army and the civil service. Initially the military leaders express their determination to eradicate corruption and nepotism from the

¹⁹ Pye, L.W., "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", in Johnson, J.J. (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 80.

civil service and do take steps in this direction. Soon they realize that if such measures are taken to their extreme, the future of the military regime may be jeopardized.

The military and the bureaucracy belong to the most westernized sectors of the developing nations and maintain a national outlook. They are organized in relatively rigid hierarchies and have a special interest in political stability and modernization. The military, due to its strategic position in the society, displaces the civil government, alone or in collaboration with the bureaucracy. The military lacks expertise and men to run the administration of the state without the help of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, cannot overthrow the military government or work against the wishes of the military leaders all the time. Both need each other. This develops into a 'marriage of convenience' between the two and 'the friend in need' becomes 'the friend indeed.'

The military regimes face problems while adopting measures to ensure economic development, industrialization and reforms in social structure. The socio-economic back-ground of the senior military officers and the bureaucracy has a profound impact on the nature of the reforms introduced by the military. If most of the officers come from the upper and upper middle classes, they are reluctant to adopt radical measures to 'reform' the social structure. Any effort to introduce radical reforms will hit themselves or the class which has provided a large number of officers and civil servants. If most of the officers come from the middle and lower-middle class, there is a possibility of introduction of relatively radical reforms. But even these military leaders realize that they may introduce alterations in the society but they cannot change it altogether or eradicate the influence of the traditional occupants of power in the society.

Military regimes are transitory. The internal problems of the military and political pressures make it imperative for the military rulers to either civilianize their regime or transfer power to a civil government. The group of officers which executes the coup disintegrates. There may be differences on policies and the exercise of power between the governing group of officers and those on purely military assignments. The officers in active service may find the ruling generals adopting the same tactics which were employed by the predecessor political regime. The military government's image of incorruptibility may also be undermined. The initial success of the military regimes in checking corruption, smuggling and black-marketing is due to the fact that the military stayed away from the civil society in the past. Once the gap between the civil society and the military is bridged, the military finds it hard to keep its officers free from evils which characterize the civil society. Moreover, the extended military rule evokes opposition

from different sections of population and the political elite who find themselves excluded from the political process and confronts the military with a host of problems, i.e. the crisis of legitimacy, inability to create self-sustaining political institutions, the continued reliance on the coercive machinery of the state, and widespread political alienation.

There are different courses of actions available to the ruling generals to civilianize their regime or establish a civilian regime of their choice. First, the ruling generals sometimes resign their military rank and civilianize their regime by coopting civilians. They may also establish partially representative institutions. Second, the military commanders can transfer power to those who share their political perspective or establish a puppet civil government. Third, they may keep an eye on the civil government after withdrawing to the barracks from which they can pressure the civilian leaders to adopt policies of their choice. Fourth, the military may favour a permanent legal guarantee for supervisory power over the civil government.

The military leaders want to evolve a political framework reflecting these principles or a combination thereof because they maintain interest in the post-military rule political system. This is done to ensure continuity from the military regime to the post-military rule period, make sure that the major policies introduced during the period of military rule are not done away with, and their corporate interests are adequately protected. A civilianized regime or a civilian government established after the return of the military to the barracks faces a paradox: On the one hand it must establish its credentials as a civilian and popular government that enjoys a widespread legitimacy. On the other hand, it must not alienate the military and other powerful interest groups in the polity. In case such a regime begins to face the problem of political management either due to its internal problems or because of its inability to maintain a balance between various political social and economic forces in the polity, it may have to depend on the support of the military for its survival. This state of affairs reverts political initiative to the military commanders who can, if they wish, pressure, blackmail, displace or overthrow the government. Thus, the story of military intervention in politics does not end with one coup. Once the tradition of civilian supremacy is eroded and the military assumes a direct political role, it cannot adopt an apolitical posture.

The Military in British India

The Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent provides an excellent example of the changing pattern of civilian-military relations. The military was organized on the modern lines by the British. It was in 1895 that the three armies of the Presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were amalgamated and put under the C-in-C of India. The Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force were reorganized as independent forces in 1928 and 1933 respectively. These were smaller services in comparison to the Army and were inadequate for the defence of India except in collaboration with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. Much of their expansion took place during World War II. The British emphasized the principle of civilian supremacy over the military. The ultimate control of the Indian military was with the British Government in London. In India, the military and the government of British India were more of equal partners. The civilian authority in India, being the administration of a colony, was responsible to the British Government, as was the military.

The Pattern of Civil-Military Relationship in India:

The Governor-General-in-Council exercised executive authority over the C-in-C, Army, who under the Charter Act of 1833, was responsible for the superintendence, direction and control over the civil and military affairs in India. The C-in-C was the head of the Army (later the Navy and the Air Force also) and *ex officio* member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. In addition to the C-in-C, the Executive Council had a Military Member, who was adviser to the Governor-General (Viceroy) and was in charge of the Military Department. The Military Member, though junior in rank to the C-in-C, could suggest amendments and criticise the proposals put forward by the C-in-C, and G.H.Q. This pattern worked smoothly until Lord Kitchener became the C-in-C of India in 1902. He was averse to the system of dual control of the military affairs and the C-in-C's proposals

being criticised by an officer of junior rank¹. He pleaded for the abolition of the post of the Military Member. Lord Curzon did not see eye to eye with the proposal. This resulted in a bitter controversy between the two. The British Government tried to resolve the dispute by adopting a compromise formula. The powers of the Military Member were reduced and he was re-designated the Supply Member. In 1909, the post had to be abolished altogether and the C-in-C assumed the full control of the Defence Department.²

The Government of India Act, 1919 brought about no change in the control of defence affairs of India. The Governor-General-in-Council, responsible to the British Parliament through the Secretary of State for India, had the control over the military and the defence affairs. He was assisted by the C-in-C, who was also member of his Executive Council and was entitled to attend the meetings of both the houses of the Indian legislature established by the Government of India Act, 1919. The Indian legislature had no control over defence and defence expenditure. It only served as a platform where the Indian political leaders reviewed the Government policy of no control of legislature over defence; the use of the Army to control political agitation; its use outside the sub-continent and the pace of Indianization of the Commissioned Ranks of the Army. They could not compel the government to accept any particular demand.

The Indian political leaders frequently demanded that the legislature should be given control over the defence expenditure and transfer the Defence Department to a Minister responsible to the legislature. This demand was repeated in the Nehru Report and the First Round Table Conference. But the British Government was not willing to depart from the existing pattern of military administration. The Esher Committee (1920), appointed by the government to examine the administration and organization of the Army in India, emphasized that the Army in India must play its part as one unit of the co-ordinated whole the British Empire; and its administration could not be considered otherwise than as a part of the total armed forces of the Empire.³ The C-in-C Field Marshal Sir W. Birdwood, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, stated:—

The Army in India is one link in the Imperial chain of defence of the Empire and naturally, therefore, no alterations in its organization, which might in any way effect its efficiency can be taken without the

¹ Magnus, P., *Kitchener: The Portrait of an Imperialist*, (London, 1958), pp. 201-02.

² For a detailed discussion of the Kitchener-Curzon Dispute, see Cohen, S. P. "Issue, Role and Personality: The Kitchener Curzon Dispute," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. X, No. 3, April, 1968.

³ *India in 1920*, pp. 16, 17 & *India in 1921-22*, pp. 13-14.

fullest consideration of His Majesty's Government, which is ultimately responsible for Imperial security.⁴

The Simon Commission observed:

India and Britain are so related that Indian defence cannot, now or in any future which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of the Imperial Government.⁵

The Simon Commission further observed:

It seems to us that the only possible method would be to recognize that the protection of the frontiers of India, at any rate for a long time to come, should not be regarded as a function of an Indian Government in relation with an Indian legislature, but as a matter of supreme concern to the whole empire which can only be effectively organized and controlled by an Imperial agency.⁶

The Government of India Act, 1935, made no change of any consequence in the organization and administration of the military of India. The administration of defence and external affairs was included in the list of the subjects to be administered by the Governor-General with the help of his Council, which was not responsible to the Legislative Assembly in India. The defence expenditure could not be submitted to the vote of the legislature. It was during World War II that the British Government felt the need of associating Indian political leaders in the prosecution of war. But the government was again reluctant to accept all of their demands. In September 1946, for the first time, an Indian was appointed Defence Minister and he replaced the C-in-C in the Executive Council. Before the implications of this change could be discovered, the British Government decided to grant independence and partition India.

Military as an Instrument of Policy:

The British Indian military pursued the policies laid down by the civil government—the government in London through the civil authorities in India. It performed four major functions:

Throughout history India faced a series of intrusions by foreign invaders through the passes of the North-West Frontier. The British Government was taking all necessary precautions to face such an assault in the future. They did not consider the North-West Frontier merely a frontier

⁴ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, October 1927, pp. 1930-31.
⁵ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930*, Vol. II, p. 174.
⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

of India, but an important frontier of their Empire. The Simon Commission remarked, "The North-West Frontier is not only the frontier of India, it is an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire".⁷ A defeat on this frontier, the British thought, would not only endanger their rule in India but also affect the foundation of the British Empire as a whole. Thus the Indian troops remained concentrated in the North-West of India. Relations between the Governments of Afghanistan and India did not always remain cordial. Although a border agreement was signed in 1893 by the two governments, yet the mounting influence of Russia in Afghanistan and the possible extension of Russian Railways, were a source of anxiety for the Government of India. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 removed the danger of Russian attack over India when she agreed to treat Afghanistan out of her sphere and equal commercial facilities were provided to both the parties in Afghanistan. In spite of the fact that the King of Afghanistan did not like this convention, he remained silent and there was no trouble till 1919, when, after the assassination of the King, a war started between his successor and the British. Afghanistan lost the war and a Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1921 at Kabul between the Afghan Government and the British Government. This followed a phase of more or less cordial relations between the two Governments as Afghanistan did not want another defeat similar to that in 1919, and political chaos and the civil war for succession to the throne had weakened her.

The Pathan tribes were another source of anxiety for the British Government. These tribes lived on both sides of the Durand Line from Chitral in the North to Baluchistan in the South. These tribes living in the tribal area, though under the British suzerainty, governed themselves and freely crossed the Durand Line. The tribesmen used to come down and attack the inhabitants of fertile lands; sometimes kidnap and kill people. Inter-tribe feuds also created the problems of law and order. When the British Government came in contact with these tribes after the annexation of the Punjab, it continued with the policy of 'the closed border' of the Sikhs. Troops were maintained along the border and action was promptly taken to crush any disorder. From 1850 to 1922 there had been 72 expeditions against these tribes—an average of one expedition every year.⁸ Lord Curzon revised the policy of 'the closed border' and separated frontier province from the Government of the Punjab. The province was divided into two areas; the settled areas of Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan; the areas between the administrative frontier and the

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 94.

Durand Line, known as the unsettled area. The latter was put under the direct control of the Government of India and a degree of freedom was given to the tribes of these areas. A tribal militia consisting of the loyal tribesmen was created. Financial assistance in the form of subsidies was also paid to the loyal tribal chiefs by the Government.⁹ Since 1919 the British Government started maintaining strong garrisons at strategic points and a network of road was spread to link different areas to enable the authorities to send re-inforcements, whenever necessary. The tribal uprising continued and on many occasions the government had to despatch strong contingents to control them. The Air Force was also called upon to assist the military operations in the tribal belt of the North-West Frontier Province. The serious clashes in the tribal areas were the risings of the Waziris tribe (1919), the Mahsuds (1925), the rioting of the Waziris, the Mahsuds and the Afridis (1930-31), the Mohmand outbreak (1933), the Tori Khael uprising (1936-37), and many others. The Government made an extensive use of the Army and the Air Force during these troubles. The external Threat and the troubles in the tribal belt necessitated the maintenance of a strong army, always ready to strike. What perturbed the British Government most was a fear that tribal outbreaks might coincide with an armed conflict with Afghanistan.

The provision of assistance to the civil government in India to maintain internal security and law and order was another important function of the military. Owing to the diversity of races, religions and languages, there had always been outbreaks of disorder beyond the control of the normal civil administration. Whenever the administration showed the signs of weakness, communal riots occurred between the Hindus and the Muslims. This pattern of communal tension and riots continued throughout the period of British rule in India. There was not even one single year when the military was not called upon to help the civil administration to restore law and order. As the Muslims became conscious of being a nation, distinct from the Hindus, and asserted their separate identity, communal riots occurred more frequently. The communal situation was very tense during the last ten years of the British rule in India because of the clash of the national aspirations of the Muslims and the non-Muslims. The Army had to be called out to restore law and order.

With the spread of the nationalist movement in India, agitation against the British Government also started. On certain occasions both the factors—communal tension and political agitation—used to combine

⁹ Keith, A.B., *A Constitutional History of India: 1600-1935* (London, 1936), p. 197.
Spain, J.W., "The Pathan Borderlands" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XV, No. 2, Spring, 1961.

together and posed a serious threat to law and order. The non-violent and passive resistance movement launched by Mr. Gandhi and the Congress always resulted in violence. After the conclusion of World War I, the Khilafat Movement and the Non-Co-operation Movement had spread all over India. Political agitation was especially strong in the Punjab. The Army opened fire without warning in the Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, where a public meeting was being held in defiance of the government orders on 13th April, 1919. The official sources claimed that only 379 persons were killed.¹⁰ Two days later Martial Law was imposed in Amritsar and Lahore. Later on it was extended to Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur district, where the civil administration and the police had failed to control agitation against the government. The Army was again used during the Moplah rising (1921) and the civil disobedience movement (1930-31) to help the civil administration to maintain law and order. Another very serious challenge to the authority of government came during World War II; when the non-violent movement of the Congress took a violent turn. Riots and looting of public and private property followed. Mob rule was strong in Bihar and Bengal. The supply to the troops fighting in the various theatres of war was threatened, and the means of communications were disrupted by the rioters. The troops were rushed to restore law and order in the troubled areas.

The Indian troops were used by the British Government in military expeditions outside India. Prior to 1914 the Indian Army units had fought Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Burma, China, Egypt and East Africa. During World War I, its formations participated in the war in France, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Persia and East Africa. The story of World War II was not much different. The Indian Army rendered outstanding service in Italy, North Africa, Abyssinia, Syria, Iraq, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong.

Military and Politics:

Various social, political and educational reforms introduced by the British Government created a class of people orientated to western ideas. The growth of the Anglo-Indian press, the introduction of local self government and the railways brought about a mental revolution amongst this class of the people. With the turn of the century various other influences entered the Indian mind. The influence of the extremist leaders, i.e. B.G. Tilak and his Revivalist Movement the rise of the German Naval power, the rise of Japan; the defeat of Russia by Japan and the Young Turks

¹⁰ *Punjab Administration Report, 1921-22*, vol. I, p. 20. The unofficial sources claimed that the number of those killed ran into thousands and no medical assistance was provided to the wounded.

Movement had a profound impact on the new mind of India. The Muslims, who were recovering from the mood of depression which overtook them after 1857, also reorganized themselves in the political field. The experience of World War I and the ambition for Dominion status made the political leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League give a serious thought to the problem of national defence. They stressed that their goal of Dominion status for India could not be realized if defence was permanently left in the hands of the British Government. They demanded control over defence, resented the military expenditure which constituted the largest single item in the budget and demanded a speedy Indianization of the Army. But despite their continuous efforts, Indian influence on defence matters remained minimal until the end of the British rule and they had no direct experience of handling the affairs of the military.

After the 'Mutiny' of 1857, the British Government never ruled out the possibility of similar uprising and remained very cautious in handing the affairs of the military. They kept the Indian politicians away from the military and most of the recruitment was done from the Punjab, the NWFP and the independent State of Nepal, where political consciousness was dormant in comparison with other parts of India. From time to time attempts were made by the agitators to infiltrate the ranks of the Army but to little effect. The Army stood by the civil government. The seditious attempts following the partition of Bengal, the Non-Cooperation Movements, the Khilafat Movement and the activities of the Communists did not alienate the loyalties of the officers and men of the three services of the military. The only exceptions were the formation of the Indian National Army (INA) and the Indian Navy strike of 1946.

This was a very critical period so far as the personnel of the Armed Forces were concerned. On the one hand was the call of duty and the oath of allegiance. On the other hand was the impact of the freedom movement, which had become very strong during and after World War II. It was the charismatic personality of Subhas Chandra Bose and the slogan 'liberate India' which contributed towards the organization of the I.N.A. It mainly comprised the Indians living in South-East Asia and the Indian soldiers captured by Japan during World War II. The INA co-operated with the Japanese forces when they attacked Burma and India. It soon collapsed after the defeat of Japan. The Government of India decided in October 1945 to try the captured officers and men of the INA on charges of treason and waging war against the 'Emperor-King.' Various political parties capitalized the issue of the INA trials and the officers and men of the INA were given heroes' status. The agitation became widespread with the beginning of the trials at the Red Fort, Delhi.

The tense political atmosphere and strong nationalist movement coupled with their grievances about their food and service conditions affected the loyalties of the Indian Navy. In February 1946 about 3000 men from sloops, mine-sweepers and shore establishment at Bombay went on strike against their higher authorities and replaced the White Ensign by the flags of the Congress and the Muslim League and some of the ship hooters in code sounded "Jai Hind" (Long Live India).¹¹ The situation in Bombay became so serious that British tanks patrolled the city.¹² The strike spread to Karachi, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi. The Air Force and the Army personnel at some stations went on strike in sympathy with the personnel of the Navy. In Jabalpur, about 2500 Indian troops came out of their barracks and paraded through the street carrying the Congress and the Muslim League flags.¹³ The British troops were rushed to the trouble spots to restore law and order. After a week of tension and riots, the strikers went back to their work and the government promised to appoint an inquiry committee to look into their grievances.

These incidents, though confined to a small section of the personnel of the armed forces, made the British Government realize that the nationalist movement had influenced the strongest institution of their Raj. They felt that the time was fast approaching when they would have to grant Independence to India because unnecessary delay would strengthen the hands of the nationalist leaders and politicize a greater number of the personnel of the armed forces. The officers had kept themselves aloof from the 1946 strike, but in view of the mounting politicization and the nationalist movement, it was difficult to say how long they could withstand these pressures.

Conclusions:

The most outstanding contribution of the British rule in India in the field of military administration was a theory of civil-military relations which emphasized an over-all civilian control and the military's aloofness from politics. But the military in India was subordinate to the civil authority in London. Its relation with the civil authority in India was marked by 'separate sphere' of military and civilian influence. It was more of an equal partner rather than subordinate to it. The control of the military in India was vested in the Governor-General-in-Council, who was responsible to the Secretary of State for India. The C-in-C was the member of the Governor General's Executive Council and was entitled to attend the meetings of both

¹¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 20th February, 1946.

¹² *The Observer*, 24th February, 1946.

¹³ *New York Times*, 28th February, 1946.

the houses of the Indian legislature.

The military performed four major functions: the defence of India against external aggression particularly from the North-West, the control of the Pathan tribes, participation in the military expeditions of the British Government outside Indian territory, and the provision of assistance to civil administration (if asked by the civil administration) to maintain law and order and restore its authority.

Unlike the armed forces of some of the Asian countries, the Indian Armed Forces did not take place in the struggle for the independence. The British Government kept the political leaders away from the armed forces and did not let the political influences significantly undermine professionalism in the military. The formation of the INA and the strike of 1946 could not be considered concerted attempts to dislodge the British Government as these were confined to a section of the personnel of the armed forces and took place under exceptional circumstances. The armed forces generally remained loyal to the government. The strike of 1946 did, however, make it clear that the nationalist leaders had succeeded in securing the sympathies of a section of the personnel of the armed forces.

3

Division and Nationalization of the Armed Forces

The year 1940 stands as a landmark in the history of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. It was in this year that the Muslim League formally adopted the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India as its objective. This was an expression of the desire of the Muslims to preserve and promote their culture and civilization and safeguard their national identity. The movement gained such a momentum that by the end of 1946 the creation of Pakistan became inevitable. This raised the question of the future of the armed forces of British India: Whether the Sub-continent would continue to be treated as one unit so far as defence was concerned and the new states of India and Pakistan would have a joint control of the armed forces or these would be divided along with the division of the Sub-continent? The British officers generally regarded the idea of the 'reconstitution' of the existing structure and organization of the armed forces as painful. They delayed it until the political conditions compelled them to change their mind. Not only the preparation of the formula for the division of the military but also the actual division had to be carried out in a period of 72 days.

Politics of the Division of the Armed Forces:

When the Muslim League put forward the idea of the division of the Indian Armed Forces, the British Government did not welcome it. The military high command was of the opinion that the division of the armed forces would be suicidal for an institution which they and their predecessors had established with the hard labour of about two centuries. They argued that the armed forces of India and Pakistan would not be able to attain the degree of efficiency which marked the organization of the British Indian Armed Forces. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (C-in-C) was particularly opposed to such a move. He believed that the Indian Army must be maintained as an undivided and over-all defence force. These officers were of the view that the division would put both India and

Pakistan on a road of administrative chaos and leave the Sub-continent defenceless. The broken and confused units might start killing the followers of the opposite religion.¹ A section of the British press supported the views of the Military High Command and the Government of India. Glasgow Herald commented on the possible division of the Indian Army:

.... If any attempt is made to divide the Indian Army, it is bound to disintegrate in a welter of blood. This will be the beginning of the real civil war law, order, communication, industry, trade and even farming will cease and India will be back in the days of the break up of the Moghal Empire from which she were rescued by the British.

The staunchness of the Indian Army is all that stands between India and chaos. If it is broken up it will mean the start of famine, disease and probably the most terrible civil war that the world has ever seen.²

The British-owned English language paper of India, the *Statesman*, editorially commented that such a step would prove disastrous for an institution like the Indian Armed Forces. The *Statesman* wrote:

... Asia, for several decades, had had only three first class armies, the Russian, the Indian and the Japanese ... the first and second of the three emerged victorious from the recent Great War, the third was beaten. Should the second now for communal reasons fall to pieces, lowering India's two parts, Hindustan and Pakistan, to the military level perhaps of Siam or Iraq. The global strategic balance would be disrupted and repercussions in power politics be felt in every continent.³

The Muslim League leadership was firm in their demand for the division of the armed forces alongwith the partition of the Sub-continent. They were conscious of the fact that the new state of Pakistan would be dangerously enfeebled if she did not possess her own armed forces. The reason for the Muslim League being more anxious than the Congress to get the armed forces divided was that it did not want to be dependent in any way on the Congress and to maintain its identity. Nawab Ismail Khan (President of the U.P. Muslim League), the only non-official member of the Nationalisation Committee appointed by the Interim Government in 1946 to recommend measures to nationalise the armed forces, in his note of dissent,

For the views of the Military High Command and the Government of India, see Irwin, S.F. "The Indian Army in Partition," *The Army Quarterly*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, July, 1948. Campbell-Johnson, A., *Mission with Mountbatten* (London, 1957), p. 58, Sherwani, L. A. (Ed.), *Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940-47* (Karachi, 1969), pp. 220-221. Connell, J., *Auchinfleck* (London, 1959), pp. 874-75.

² Glasgow, 22nd May, 1947.

³ "Into Armed Chaos" (Editorial), *The Statesman*, 14th May, 1947.

objected to the Committee's approach to the problem of nationalisation which took no cognizance of the issue of partition.⁴ Malik Feroze Khan Noon, a prominent Muslim Leaguer from the Punjab (later Prime Minister of Pakistan) demanded the division of the armed forces, ordnance factories and military equipment between India and Pakistan before the day of independence "because," he said, "whosoever gets the army will get India".⁵ Liaquat Ali Khan, Finance Minister of the Interim Government and General Secretary of the Muslim League addressed a letter to the Viceroy suggesting that a plan be prepared for the re-organization of the armed forces so that these might be readily available to the new states at the time of independence.⁶

Opposition to such a step was quite strong. The main reason being that the preparation of such a plan, the British maintained, would jeopardise the prospects of settlement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which remained the official policy of the British Government till June 2, 1947. The acceptance of the Muslim League standpoint about the division of the armed forces would have meant that the British Government had agreed to the partition of India.

The Congress shared the British perspective on the Muslim League demand for the formulation of a plan to divide the armed forces. However, the Congress leadership maintained that in case India was partitioned, the armed forces would also be divided.⁷

All efforts to keep the armed forces united proved useless. The British Government not only agreed to the partition of India but also decided to divide the armed forces between India and Pakistan. A last minute effort to preserve the unity of the armed forces was made by a few senior officers of the Army. Brigadier K.M. Cariapa (later General) contacted the Muslim officers to secure their support for the proposal to keep the armed forces united but the response was not encouraging.⁸ Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a former President of the Congress, firmly supported the move to keep a joint control of the armed forces.⁹ But both the Muslim League and the Congress did not agree to the proposal. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah threatened to decline to assume power on 14th August 1947 if Pakistan did not have her armed forces under her operational control.¹⁰ The

⁴ *Ibid*, 22nd May 1947.

⁵ *Ibid*, 4th April 1947.

⁶ Campbell-Johnson, A., op. cit. p. 58. Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (London, 1969), pp. 131.

⁷ Connell, J., op. cit. p. 878, Sardar Baldev Singh's Statement: *The Statesman*, 26th May, 1947.

⁸ Khan, M. Ayub, *Friends Not Masters* (London, 1967), p. 19.

⁹ Azad, Maulana, A. K., *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta, 1960), p. 201.

¹⁰ *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (London, 1960), p. 428.

communal and political situation had deteriorated to such an extent by 1947 that any attempt to keep the military united would certainly have failed.


Once the political leadership decided to divide India into two states on the basis of the 3rd June 1947 Plan, Field Marshal Auchinleck carried out the orders to 'reconstitute' the armed forces. On 2nd July, 1947, he handed down the principles which governed the reconstitution of the armed forces. The guiding principles can be summarized as follows:-

1. The Union of India and Pakistan would have, by 15th August 1947, within their own territories and under their operational control, armed forces composed predominantly of their subjects, i.e., the Muslims in the case of Pakistan and non-Muslims in the case of India.
2. Single administrative control of the existing armed forces would continue until the process of 'reconstitution' was completed and the two governments were in a position to manage their armed forces.
3. The process of 'reconstitution' would be completed in two phases. The first phase would be a more or less rough and ready division of the existing armed forces on a communal basis. All Muslim majority units, that might be out of Pakistan territory, would be moved to Pakistan. Similarly all exclusively non-Muslims or non-Muslim majority units at present in Pakistan would be moved to India. The second phase would involve sorting out Muslims and non-Muslims. Every Indian officer and other ranks were to be asked which of the two States they wished to serve. There was one exception to this principle. A Muslim from that area which became Pakistan would not opt for India and a non-Muslim from the rest of India could not opt for Pakistan. There was, however, no objection to non-Muslim officers and men from the Pakistani area and the Muslim officers and men from rest of India selecting to serve the armed forces of Pakistan and India respectively.
4. Except as demanded by the process of reconstitution there were to be no change in the basic organization and nomenclature of formations, units, establishments and installations and the class composition of the units until the 'reconstitution' was complete.
5. The liability for non-effective charges in respect of pensions, gratuities, annuities etc., earned by Indian officers and other ranks of the three services prior to 14/15th August 1947 would be

undertaken by the new government.¹¹

The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, headed by the C-in-C, was set up to supervise the work of 'reconstitution'. It was to work in consultation with the Steering Committee, acting under the orders of the Partition Council. There were three sub-committees, one for each of the three services. Each of the sub-committee had a British Chairman and equal representatives of the Muslims and the non-Muslims. Table I shows the organization of the machinery for the reconstitution of the armed forces.

TABLE I
Machinery for the Reconstitution of the Armed Forces.



The division of the troops was complete without much difficulty. By 15th August 1947 the future of the units had been decided. The units under the Punjab Boundary Force and the troops overseas temporarily escaped the division on a communal-cum-territorial basis. These units were divided between India and Pakistan later on. Table II shows the share of India and Pakistan:

TABLE II

Division of the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan.

THE ARMY	India	Pakistan
Infantry Regiments	15	8
Armoured Corps	12	6
Artillery Regiments	18½	8½
Engineering Units	61	34
Signal Corps	The then existing static layout remained unchanged in each Dominion	
Supply Units (RIASC)		
Electrical & Mechanical Eng. Units		
Indian Pioneer Corps		
	10	4
	Group	2 Coys.
	H Qrs. & 9 Coys.	
Animal Transport Regiment	4	3
Mechanical Transport Units (RIASC)	34	17
Ambulance Platoons	15	7
Indian Army Medical Corps Hospitals	82	34
	11,713	4,037
	beds	beds
Military Farms	29	20
Mountain Regiments	2	1
THE NAVY		
Sloops	4	2
Frigates	2	2
Fleet Mine-Sweepers	14	4
Corvettes	1	Nil
Survey Ship	1	Nil
Trawlers	4	2
Motor Mine Sweepers	4	2
Motor Launch	1	Nil
Harbour Defence Motor Launches	4	4
Landing Crafts	All Existing Crafts.	Nil
THE AIR FORCE		
Fighter Squadrons	7	2
Transport Squadrons	1	1

As Pakistan could not be a party to the division of Gurkha troops, a tripartite agreement was signed by the Government of Nepal, India and the United Kingdom. Four regular battalions of the Gurkha troops were transferred to the British Army and the remaining six to the Indian Army.


The British Government was entitled to recruit up to 8 battalions or their equivalent of the Gurkhas.

On 15th August 1947, the Joint Defence Council was created. It consisted of:

- The Governor-General of India as an independent Chairman.
- The Defence Ministers of India and Pakistan.
- The C-in-C of the undivided India. (No designated as the Supreme Commander to distinguish him from the C-in-Cs of India and Pakistan.

The Supreme Commander had no operational control over the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan and was not responsible for the maintenance of law and order. He was responsible for general administration of pay, clothing, equipment, food and military law; control of military establishment serving both the Dominions; command and control of all British officers and men; movement of the reconstituted troops, men, stores and weapons. The moment the units, troops or equipment reached their destination, the control of the Supreme Commanders ceased to exist. The Supreme Commander was responsible to the Joint Defence Council. The office of the Supreme commander and the Joint Defence Council was to be closed down on 1st April 1948, when, it was expected, the task before the Supreme Commander would come to an end.¹²

Table III explains the control mechanism of the Army during the period of reconstitution.

TABLE III
Control of the Army during the Reconstitution Period.

¹² For the text of the Joint Defence Council Order, See, Poplai, S.L. (Ed.), *India 1947-50 Internal Affairs*, Vol. 1, (Bombay, 1959), pp. 42-5.

The Supreme Commander, right from the beginning, faced difficulties in carrying out his duties and completing the work assigned to him. The main difficulty was to divide the ammunition and stores and ordnance factories. Most of the arms and ammunition was stored in India and the 16 ordnance factories were within the Indian territory. It was decided that Pakistan would get one-third of the military stores and equipment, but difficulty arose when the plans were put into practice. The Government of Pakistan was trying to acquire as much as possible, whereas the Government of India was determined to give Pakistan as little as possible. As a result of these opposite approaches the meetings of the Joint Defence Council were marked with sharp exchanges between the representatives of India and Pakistan. On certain occasions, the decisions of the Joint Defence Council were not carried out by the junior staff responsible for despatching military stores and equipment. Field Marshal Auchinleck came under strong criticism from the Indian Government. Although he had no operational control over the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan, the Indian leaders interpreted the presence of such a senior officer in the capacity of the Supreme Commander as a negation of their sovereignty and accused him of being pro-Pakistan. Sardar Patel said that Auchinleck's office "may think that they are acting impartially, but as they are all mentally pro-Pakistan, they are in fact out to help Pakistan at every turn".¹³ In his letter dated 26th September 1947, Lord Mountbatten wrote to Field Marshal Auchinleck:

....Alas! my hopes were very soon shaken. Scarcely had the new set-up come into force, when a volume of criticism started not only in the papers (which I managed to get stopped) but in the cabinet itself. I am sure you have been aware of this criticism but I doubt whether you realize its extent of its persistency. The complaint of the Indian leaders is that the previous Commander-in-Chief in India and his subordinate Commander-in-Chief have merely been converted into Supreme Head quarters containing senior staff officers; which towers over their own Navy, Army and Air Force Commanders. They say that this is a derogation of their sovereignty and is impeding the autonomous development of their armed forces, and so on and so forth.

It is not, however, only the title to which exception is taken. There is also no doubt in my mind that Indian Ministers resent the fact that at the head of the Supreme Commander there should be a man of your very high rank and great personal prestige and reputation—one so immeasurably superior in those respects to their own Commander-in-Chief... One of the most balanced and level headed ministers complained recently that you seemed to regard yourself as the cham-

¹³ Hodon, H. V., *The Great Divide, Britain, India, Pakistan* (London, 1969), p. 508.

pion of Pakistan's interests; such is the reward of strict impartiality....¹⁴

In his report sent to London on 28th September 1947, Field Marshal Auchinleck remarked:

....So open and obvious are these attacks that there is no one of the officers of Supreme Commander's H.Q., senior or junior who is not imbued with the greatest disgust for and dislike of the creators of this state of affairs....The Governor-General has done his best to check this campaign but with little result. The authors of it are too strongly imbued with the implacable determination to remove anything which is likely to prevent their gaining their own ends, which are to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything of the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores etc., held in the arsenals and depots in India. This is an open secret. This being so, it is becoming increasingly impossible for myself and my officers to continue with our task. If we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets in the shape of movable stores belonging to the former Indian Army.¹⁵

Referring to Pakistan's attitude, Field Marshal Auchinleck wrote:—

....The attitude of Pakistan, on other hand has been reasonable and co-operative throughout. This is natural in the circumstances, as Pakistan has practically nothing of her own and must obtain most of what she wants from the reserves of stores, etc., now lying in India.¹⁶

The Indian Government persistent attacks on Field Marshal Auchinleck led the British to wind up the Supreme Commander's office ahead of the scheduled date—something India wanted from the beginning. An Inter-Dominion Committee, known as the Executive Committee of the Joint Defence Council was set-up to complete the unfinished work of the Supreme Commander's Office.

The Indian Government promised to send Pakistan's share of the military assets to Pakistan, but the Government of Pakistan claimed that her due share of the arms and ammunition was not sent to her by India. Whatever it received, it was claimed, was broken and useless. Even this supply was stopped during the Kashmir fighting of 1947-48.¹⁷

The division of ordnance factories was another delicate problem as all of these factories were situated in India. After protracted deliberations in

¹⁴ Connell, J. *op. cit.*, pp. 915-19.

¹⁵ Connell, J. *op. cit.*, p. 921.

A few extracts of the report may also be seen in: Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 922.

¹⁷ Prime Minister Suhrawardy's statement: *Parliament Debates, National Assembly of Pakistan*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 22nd February, 1957, p. 916.

the Inter-Dominion Council and the Joint Defence Council, the Government of India agreed to pay Pakistan a sum of Rs. 60 million to enable her to establish her first security printing press and ordnance factory.¹⁸

Nationalization and Re-organization of the Armed Forces:

It was not until 1917 that the British Government agreed to grant King's Commissions to Indians. Ten vacancies a year were reserved for Indians at the Royal Military Academy (RMA), Sandhurst. Though the British Government could grant a Commission for extra ordinary service, an Indian aspiring to join the commissioned ranks had to complete a course at the RMA. The lack of adequate educational background and the high expenses of training at Sandhurst discouraged Indians from making use of this opportunity. The British Government was also very cautious in nominating Indians for training at the RMA. They preferred the sons of politically docile families or those whose fathers served in the army. As a result, the reserved seats were not filled for several years after the British decision to grant King's Commission to Indians.¹⁹

The Indian commissioned officers were posted in eight units selected for Indianization. This was known as the Eight Unit Scheme.²⁰ No Indian officer was allowed to be posted in artillery, engineering, signals, tanks and the air units of the army. The British policy of restricted induction of Indians to the commissioned ranks stemmed from their fears (subsequently proved unfounded) that a rapid Indianization would undermine the efficiency of the army.

A committee appointed in 1925 under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of the General Staff, criticised the Eight Unit Scheme and the pace of Indianization. It recommended, among other things, the establishment of a military college in India on the lines of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the abandonment of the Eight Unit Scheme. The Government increased the number of seats for Indians at the R.M.A. Sandhurst and also provided seats at Woolwich and Cranwell

¹⁸ *Pakistan News*, 10-16 December, 1947.

¹⁹ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930*, Vol. 1, p. 101.

²⁰ The eight units selected for complete Indianization were: 7th Light Cavalry (Late 28th Light Cavalry); 16th Light Cavalry (late 27th Light Cavalry); 21st Madras Pioneers (late 64th Pioneers); 4-19th Hyderabad Regiment (late 98th Infantry); 5th Maratha Light Infantry (late 117th Royal Marathas); 1-7th Rajput Regiment (late 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Light Infantry); 1-14th Punjab Regiment (late 19th Punjabis); 2-1 Punjab Regiment (late 66th Punjabis).

but did not implement the above mentioned two recommendations.²¹ The issue of setting up a military college in India was raised in the Defence Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference. On the basis of its recommendation, the government decided to establish a military academy at Dehra Dun in 1932 on the lines of the R.M.A Sandhurst.²²

The pace of Indianization improved slightly after 1932 but by 1947 only a few Indians attained the substantive rank of Lieut-Colonel. During World War II, a large number of Indians were given Emergency and Short Commissions to meet the need of rapid expansion of the Army. Table IV shows the position of Indians in the higher commissioned ranks of the former Indian Army.

TABLE IV
Muslims and Non-Muslims in the Higher Commissioned
Ranks of the Indian Army in 1947

Substantive Rank	Total Number of Officers	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Field Marshal	3	0	0
General	3	0	0
Lieut-General	3	0	0
Major-General	13	0	0
Colonel	109	0	0
Lieut-Colonel	634*	4	5
Major	833	42	61
Captain	1003	114	218

* Including 10 in the Supplementary Lists.

Notes:

1. Since the religion of the officers was not mentioned in the Army List, figures have been compiled on the basis of their names (whether a particular name is Muslim or non-Muslim). There were a few Anglo-Indians, whose names have not been taken into the non-Muslim category as these could not be distinguished from the names of the British Officers.
2. These figures do not include the officers of the Medical Corps.

²¹ *India in 1927-28*, pp. 303-308.

Field Marshal William Birdwood's statement: *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, Vol. IX, No. 3, July 1928, pp. 821-2, 825-6.

²² *India in 1931-32*, p. 81.

During the war period Short Service and Emergency Commissions were also granted but none of them attained the rank above that of Major. They have also been excluded from this Table. The grant of permanent commission was suspended during World War II.

3. During World War II, quite a number of officers were promoted to the higher ranks in temporary, and acting capacity. For instance, out of four Muslims Lieut-Colonels, one was appointed temporary Colonel and one acting Brigadier. A few days before independence the Acting Brigadier was promoted to the rank of Major-General. Besides these, one Muslim Lieut-Colonel (Supplementary List) had joined the political service of the Government of India. Later on he became the fourth Governor-General of Pakistan and the first President under the 1956 Constitution. His name was Iskander Mirza.

Out of five non-Muslim Lieut.-Colonels, two were appointed Acting Colonel and temporary Colonel for a limited period of time. Three became Acting Brigadiers. One of these three became a permanent Brigadier, who alongwith one Acting Brigadier was promoted to the rank of Major-General, a few days before independence. They were Major-General K. M. Cariappa and Major General Maharaja Shri Rajendra Sinhji. Both of them opted for India and served as the C-in-C of the Army.

Promotions on similar lines were given in the ranks below that of Lieut-Colonel.

In order to meet the requirements of nationalization and reorganization of the armed forces after independence, the Government of Pakistan took the following steps: First, it appointed a Nationalization Committee in February 1948 to examine the problems of nationalization and reorganization and other allied matters and to make recommendations for the complete nationalization by the end of December 1950. Second, keeping in view the recommendations of the committee, a good number of British officers were retained in the three services especially in the higher and technical ranks. Pakistan retained a greater number of British officers and for a longer time than India. The reason being that the number of the Muslims in the commissioned ranks of the three Services was smaller than the non-Muslims. Table V gives the approximate percentage of the officers in the Army:

TABLE V

The approximate percentage of the various communities in the Army

Community	Officers	Other Ranks
Hindus	47.8	55.7
Muslims	23.7	33.8
Sikhs	16.3	7.5
Others	12.2	3.0

The Muslim officers lacked staff experience. Out of all the Muslim officers four decided to stay in India. But a few non-Muslims who opted for Pakistan, went to India soon after independence. Third, competent Officers in the lower ranks were given accelerated promotions. Non-commissioned officers of the three services were promoted to the commissioned ranks. The accelerated pace of promotion can be demonstrated by the fact that the first Pakistani C-in-C of the Pakistan Army (Mohammad Ayub Khan) was promoted from the rank of Lieut-Colonel to that of General in a period of less than four years. Fourth, a limited number of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the three services were sent to England, the United States and some of the Commonwealth countries for specialized and technical training. Fifth the released personnel, not in government or essential services, were asked to offer themselves for enlistment. A good number of them were taken back. The government also decided to stop all the releases from the armed forces except in certain special cases.

The nationalization of the Navy and the Air Force took an even longer period of time. The Navy and the Air Force of the pre-Partition India were designed as a force subsidiary to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force respectively.

At the time of independence only four Muslim officers of the Navy had 8 years' experience and all the 50 Muslim officers of the Navy had joined the service during the 2nd World War. Almost similar was the position of Air Force at the time of independence. It was not before January 1948 that a Pakistani attained the rank of Air Commodore. As the required number of officers became available, they replaced British officers. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force had Pakistani C-in-Cs in 1953 and 1957 respectively. The Army had its first Pakistani C-in-C in 1951.

Reconstitution of the old Indian Armed Forces necessitated the reorganization of the armed forces. The problem of re-organization was more acute in Pakistan as there was not a single exclusively Muslim battalion, so the non-Muslim elements had to be subtracted from them. Almost all the battalions and regiments had to be re-grouped. Two methods

were adopted to re-organize the Army. First, the regiments with common traditions, common class composition and common recruiting areas were amalgamated. Second, the gaps were filled by fresh recruitment. Therefore, one could find such soldiers and officers in one regiment who had never seen or met each other before, and thus, certainly lacked *esprit de corps*.

Soon after the creation of Pakistan the training institutions of the three services of the armed forces had to be doubled. The initial proposal was that till 1st April 1948, the training institutions would be jointly used. But the political situation necessitated the abandoning of the plan and the cadets were asked to go to their respective countries and these institutions were handed over to the country in whose territory these were situated. Both India and Pakistan had to establish new institutions for those which they lost to the other.

Alongwith nationalization and reorganization of the armed forces, the modernization of arms, equipment and the establishment of training institutions was also to be tackled. The problem of modernisation was more acute in the case of the Navy and the Air Force, which consisted of outdated training crafts, over age bombers and frigates, mine sweepers and destroyers. Pakistan purchased arms and ammunition and other military equipment from Britain and a few other Commonwealth countries to tide over the initial problems. Missions were sent to various European and North American countries with shopping lists. Since Pakistan had no ordnance factory, plans were rushed to erect one. By the end of 1951, the first ordnance factory was inaugurated at Wah in West Pakistan.

The armies of the princely states were also gradually absorbed into the armed forces of India and Pakistan. Only 10 states (excluding Junagadh) opted for Pakistan. None of these had very large armies. But in the case of India, out of over 500 states, which opted for India, a few had fairly large armies (i.e. Jammu & Kashmir, Kolhapur, Patiala, Baroda and Hyderabad). Suitable personnel were taken in the ranks of the national army. Others, who were either unfit or unwilling to serve, were relieved with various concessions admissible under law.

The Armed Forces and the Communal Riots of 1947:

While the armed forces of India and Pakistan were undergoing the process of reconstitution and nationalization, communal situation deteriorated and the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent witnessed horrors and tragedies which were enacted in an attempt to gain political aims by violence and murder. The armed forces had to be called out in various places to maintain law and order and to save the lives of the victims of the riots and restore the authority of the civil administration.

The situation worsened especially in East Punjab and Delhi area after the announcement of the partition plan. The wave of killing, looting, arson, rape and torture enveloped the whole of East Punjab. The reaction to the Muslim massacre in the East Punjab, where the Muslims were in minority, was the worsening of the communal situation in the West Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. Here, to a lesser extent non-Muslims were killed.

A special military command named the Punjab Boundary Force was created by the Central Government on 1st August 1947 to safeguard peace in the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Jullundur, Ferozepur and Ludhiana. It consisted of 50,000 troops of the 4th Indian Division (less the 7th Brigade), the 14th Parachute, the 53rd Lorried and 14th Infantry Brigades. The Command had mixed composition with the Muslim and Non-Muslim ratio of 35:65²³. The communal situation deteriorated to such an extent that the task grew out of proportion to the responsibility originally placed on its shoulders. The Joint Defence Council had to abolish the Punjab Boundary Force from the night of 31st August/1st September 1947. The riot-affected areas were handed over to the Dominion concerned, each having full control of the area within its territory.

The two governments handed over the evacuation of refugees and their protection to their armed forces. The troops provided protection to refugees convoys of their co-religionist moving across the frontier on foot, carts, buses and trains; established, managed and protected camps in co-operation with the civil authorities and provided shelter, food, clothing and medical facilities to them. They also maintained law and order in the disturbed areas by clearing them of the raiders. In Autumn 1947, the floods which swept across the Punjab, further worsened the conditions under which refugees were living. The Army Engineers and the Sappers came forward to help. The Navy and Air Force also helped in moving refugees and troops by sea and air.

The task before the armed forces was even more difficult than it appears. The lack of co-operation between the governments of India and Pakistan, the disruption of the means of communications which became an obstacle in the way of movement of the troops from one trouble spot to another, and enormous number of refugees were the main hurdles their way. On many occasions there were pitched battles between the troops and

²³ Khan, Fazal Muqeen, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi: 1963) p. 64. One study of the Punjab Boundary Force pointed out that its strength did not exceed the figure of 23,000. It never approached the projected figure of 50,000. Jeffrey, Robin, "The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problems, August 1947" *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 8, Part 4, (October 1974), pp. 491-520.

the raiders and, on certain occasions, the army arrived when the raiders had disappeared after killing almost the whole population of a village. The general morale of the troops was not of the best because many of them were worried about the fate of their families.

No exact figures are available about those killed in the riots. Various unofficial estimates differ from each other. But one thing is quite clear: India had never witnessed such a large scale massacre and the subsequent exodus. No doubt the armed forces could not totally control the situation but they did their best under the circumstances to fulfil the responsibility forced upon them by the civil government. In fact, the armed forces had no option but to take up this role as the civil authority was not properly organized and it hardly exists in some regions. Nationalist feelings were so strong that the armed forces seemed determined to help their co-religionists. In the past, they had come to the rescue of the colonial administration. Now, they were assisting the civil administration which was their own.

Conclusions:

Contrary to the fears expressed by different quarters, the division of the armed forces between India and Pakistan did not result in administrative chaos. While the armed forces were undergoing the process of reconstitution, they helped the civil administrations of India and Pakistan to settle down by providing assistance to maintain law and order and keep peace in the riot-stricken areas immediately before and after independence and the division of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent. The armed forces could not totally control the situation but had they remained silent spectators, the havoc caused by communal riots would have been greater and the number of those killed would have been many times higher.

The non-cooperation of the Indian Government on the matters relating to the division of the armed forces and their assets multiplied the difficulties facing those responsible for the division of the armed forces. It strengthened the feeling of distrust and animosity between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan inherited comparatively less organized armed forces. There was greater shortage of the commissioned officers in Pakistan than in India. The Muslim officers particularly lacked staff experience. That was the reason that Pakistan retained a large number of British officers and, as compared with India, took a longer period of time to nationalize her armed forces. Pakistan did not inherit ordnance factory and India declined to transfer all of Pakistan's share of the assets, arms and ammunition of the Armed Forces of British India.

4

The Military and Politics: The First Phase

A nation enters a new phase after the attainment of independence. But the circumstances leading to independence and what happens immediately after the establishment of the new state, have a profound impact on the future course and outlook of a nation. Pakistan was no exception. The emergence of Pakistan as a separate state was the culmination of the idea of Muslim nationhood and contradicted the claim of the Congress Party that it represented all the people of undivided India. It ran counter to the ideals set out by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru and proved that the conception of a secular state had failed to win the confidence of the majority of the Muslims of India. The demand for Pakistan was bitterly opposed by the Congress. This gave rise to the feelings of distrust and hostility between the Congress and the Muslim League. The pre-independence distrust transformed itself into distrust between India and Pakistan and the Indian leadership considered Pakistan as something which ought not to have happened. The relations between India and Pakistan became further strained because of the allocation of some Muslim-majority areas to India under the Radcliffe Award and the problems which the new state of Pakistan faced in her formative years. Some of the complex problems were the influx of refugees, communal riots, the dispute over the division of the assets of the former Indian Army and the Indian Government, the problems of minorities, the canal water dispute, the evacuee property question and the concentration of the Indian troops on the Punjab border in 1950-51. In 1949, India devalued its currency. When Pakistan declined to do the same, the Indian Government suspended trade with Pakistan which adversely affected Pakistan's economy.

The bitterness caused by these developments was reinforced by the mutually hostile statements of the leaders and the press of the two countries. Several Congress leaders talked about the re-unification of India and Pakistan. The Congress President, Acharaya Kripalani, remarked on the Independence Day, "Let us henceforth bend all our energies to the

unification of this land of ours".¹ While accepting the Partition Plan of June 3, 1947, the Congress Committee stated, "...When present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded."² The echo of such statements was heard in India even after the creation of Pakistan. Sardar Patel, in a speech in November, 1950, said, "A time might come when India and Pakistan both, realising the untold harm caused to them by partition, would be reunited."³ The Hindu Mahasabha in its election manifesto of 1951 declared that it will strive its utmost to bring about re-union of India and Pakistan into "Akhand Bharat."⁴

The Kashmir dispute, India's military action in Junagadh (1947) and the annexation of Hyderabad (1948) seemed to have convinced the Pakistanis that India would use force to re-unite the sub-continent. Pakistan's strong fears of India can be illustrated by quoting an excerpt of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's letter, dated December 30, 1947, to the Prime Minister of India (Pandit Nehru):

1. "India has never whole-heartedly accepted the partition scheme but her leaders paid lip service to it merely in order to get the British troops out of the country".
2. "India is out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself."
3. "The systematic sabotage against the implementation of partition, the stoppage of such essential requirements as coal and rail transport, the deliberate with-holding of Pakistan's share of funds and arms and equipment, the wholesale massacre of Muslim population, are all designed towards one aim, namely, the destruction of Pakistan."
4. "India's forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavader and other states in Kathiawar, which had acceded to Pakistan as well as the fraudulent procurement of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State are acts of hostility against Pakistan whose destruction is India's immediate objective."⁵

The occupation of Goa by the Indian Army was interpreted in Pakistan as a warning signal. One of Pakistan's leading dailies, editorially

¹ *The Statesman*, 18th August, 1947.

² *The Indian Annual Register* (1947), Vol. I, pp. 122-23.

³ Cited in: *Indian's War Propaganda against Pakistan* (White Paper of Government of Pakistan), p. 2.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th June, 1951.

⁵ *White Paper on Jammu Kashmir* (Government of India), p. 85.

commented on the invasion of Goa:

...Pakistan faces exactly the same danger as Goa did and as soon as India feels strong enough to do so she will try to wipe out Pakistan because Indians in their heart of hearts still regard the areas now forming Pakistan as basically parts of Akhand Bharat (United India).⁶

The fear of Indian domination thus became a very important factor in Pakistan's internal politics and foreign relations. The extent to which this fear was justified was another question, but the fact was that, at the time when Pakistan needed help to put her house in order, India did take steps which strengthened Pakistan's fear of India.

The occupation of Kashmir was noted with grave concern by Pakistan because of its vital importance for Pakistan's defence. Kashmir is so strategically situated that it can be used to cripple Pakistan economically and militarily. Two of the important rivers flow from Kashmir. The Mangla Headworks on the river Jhelum is only a few miles inside the Azad Kashmir border. The presence of Indian troops in Kashmir could constitute a direct threat from the rear to the North West Frontier Province and parts of the Punjab including Rawalpindi—Islamabad. Kashmir can therefore be used for offensive strategy against Pakistan, whereas the possibility of a Pakistani attack on India via Kashmir is very remote.

Pakistan's defence problems did not end here. The split of the new state into two wings separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory, created serious problems for the defence planners. The split brought Pakistan in direct contact with two diverse regions—The Middle East and South-East Asia. Each wing had to maintain such a large standing army that could hold back the invading armed forces sufficiently long for reinforcements to arrive. This underlined the need of a strong and efficient navy to maintain and protect the supply line between the two wings. The navy which Pakistan inherited in 1947 was small and inadequate for this difficult task. The geographical conditions in the two wings were so different that the same war tactics could not be used. The West Pakistan terrain is either without many natural barriers or it is mountainous in the north and north-west. The East Pakistan terrain is not suitable for armour movement as it is full of jungles, marshes and rivers.⁷ The biggest problem facing Pakistan has been that the main communications in East and West Pakistan run parallel to the frontiers. The important rail-road links in certain parts in East Pakistan are at a distance of few miles from the Indian borders. The position is not much better in West Pakistan. The main surface arteries

⁶ *Dawn*, 20th December, 1961.

⁷ For the details of the defence of East Pakistan and allied problems, see Chapter 7.

which link Peshawar and Karachi, are, at various points within 30 miles from the Indian part of Kashmir and India. Once this link is disrupted, the military operations of Pakistan will be seriously affected.

Pakistan also inherited the traditional frontiers of north-west and the Pathan tribes living in the tribal area. Pakistan started with the initial advantage of being a Muslim state. This single factor helped Pakistan to pacify a great number of Pathan tribes who often clashed with the former Indian Army in the pre-independence period. The first sign of change in the attitude of the Pathan tribes was visible in 1947, when, a few months before independence Nehru visited the area along with the Khan Brothers. He did not receive a cordial welcome and in certain areas his car was stoned.⁸ In the subsequent referendum, the frontier Province opted for the Islamic state of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan revised the British policy towards the tribesmen and decided to pull back all regular troops from the military posts in the tribal areas. The control of these areas was handed over to the civil armed forces composed of the locals. The government also promised to respect tribal traditions and autonomy. However, the British policy of paying subsidies to the tribal leaders was continued. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan toured the province extensively and instilled a sense of loyalty to Pakistan. Later events indicated that Pakistan had succeeded in winning over a large number of tribes, but still a few, particularly the Fakir of Ipi's tribe and his supporters, frequently defied the authority of the government and created trouble in the area.

Afghanistan began to manifest interest in the future of the Pathans living east of the Durand Line when it became quite clear to her that the British were leaving India. The Afghan Government, realizing that the new state of Pakistan would lack the resources which were at the disposal of the British Government, put forward the proposal of creating an independent state comprising all those areas where the Pukhtoons or Pathans lived (the N.W.F. Province and certain parts of Baluchistan). Afghan Prime Minister, Hashim Khan, went to the extent of saying in 1947 that "if an independent Pukhtunistan cannot be set up, the Frontier province could join Afghanistan".⁹ The interesting side of the episode was that Afghan authorities did not talk of incorporating the Pathan areas on their side of the Durand Line in Pukhtunistan. There was a constant campaign against Pakistan on the issue of Pukhtunistan. The campaign reached its climax during the Jashan-i-Kabul in 1950, when Pukhtunistan 'flags' were hoisted and anti-Pakistan leaflets were dropped by the Afghan Air Force.¹⁰ This

⁸ Hodson, H.V., *op. cit.*, p. 280.

⁹ *The Statesman*, 22nd June, 1947.

¹⁰ *The Times*, 9th October, 1950.

was followed by large scale Afghan raids on Pakistani territory in September 1950.¹¹

The demand for Pukhtunistan had the blessings of the Indian and the Soviet leaders. When the Indian leaders realized that the N.W.F. Province would join Pakistan, they supported the Afghan move of Pukhtunistan and continued to do so after the establishment of Pakistan.¹² The Soviet Government, annoyed by Pakistan's participation in Western defence pacts, supported Afghanistan and radio Moscow advocated the Afghanistan case on the Pukhtunistan question.¹³ Afghanistan could not evoke large scale support to her cause in the Frontier Province except amongst 'the Red Shirts' who were the camp followers of the Congress and had opposed the creation of Pakistan. The Fakir of Ipi tribe and certain other tribal chiefs played into Afghan hands and demanded an independent state of Pukhtunistan.¹⁴ Pakistan and Afghanistan troops and militia clashed and the Pakistan Army and the Air force took action against the Afghan-inspired tribesmen. Twice in twenty-five years diplomatic relations were broken and Pakistan withdrew transit facilities to Afghanistan. The first diplomatic rupture occurred in 1955 when Afghanistan seriously objected to Pakistan's decision to merge the N.W.F. Province in the One Unit Scheme of West Pakistan. Public demonstration in Afghanistan culminated in attacks on Pakistan's Embassy and Consulate in Kabul and Jalalabad and the Pakistan flag was torn to pieces. The Afghan Government demanded that Pakistan could not integrate the frontier Province into the One-Unit scheme. Pakistan described this as a clear interference in her internal affairs. Relations deteriorated to such an extent that the two countries withdrew their ambassadors and the Afghan Government ordered 'general mobilization' but fortunately war was averted. Diplomatic relations were resumed in 1957. The second crisis in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations occurred in 1961. This followed raids by the Afghan Lashkars on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line and the strong propaganda against Pakistan launched by the Afghan authorities. Pakistan withdrew its ambassador in Kabul in September 1961. These relations were restored in May 1963 as a result of mediation by the Shah of Iran. Since then there has never been such a

¹¹ *The New York Times*, 7th October, 1950.

¹² *The Roundtable*, No. 205, December 1961, and Curtis, G., "The North-West Frontier of Pakistan — An old problem in a new setting," *The Army Quarterly*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, July 1948.

¹³ See the joint communique signed by the Prime Ministers of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: *Dawn*, 6th March, 1960.

¹⁴ See the resolution of the Grand Jirga of the Pathan Tribes held at the headquarters of the Fakir Ipi tribe: *The Hindu*, 6th June, 1952.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 5th, 6th May, 1955.

serious crisis but Afghanistan has been making claims on Pakistani territory time and again.

In view of the complex defence problems outlined above, it was not surprising that Pakistan became very security conscious. The political leaders of Pakistan were convinced that Pakistan was surrounded by such forces (particularly India and Afghanistan) which were out to destroy the new state. They were more perturbed by India's posture as India was more powerful than Pakistan. It made them very sensitive on the question of independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

Defence Problems and Political Leaders:

The hostile regional environs shaped the political leaders' perspective on defence and security affairs. Most of them assigned a high priority to defence so that Pakistan could meet the challenges to its independence and territorial integrity. They were also of the view that a weak and militarily vulnerable state could not effectively undertake socio-economic development. What perturbed them most was the military disparity between India and Pakistan to the advantage of the former, and the fact that Pakistan lacked adequate industrial base to sustain defence efforts.

Pakistan had seven prime ministers and eight cabinets during 1947-58. They belonged to different political parties and bitterly criticised each other's policies but all of them attached equal importance to the maintenance of strong armed forces. As early as 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, said, "The defence of the state is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other governmental activities."¹⁶ Speaking at a military parade in Dacca, he again reiterated that Pakistan had been achieved after "wading through rivers of blood ... that was a tremendous sacrifice and it should be enough to make you realize constantly, that, dearly as we won Pakistan it will cost us dearly to preserve it."¹⁷ Five years later, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali (Bogra) declared in his defence policy statement that he would much rather starve the country than allow any weakening of its defence. No expediency, he continued, could be considered too high and no sacrifice too heavy in ensuring the country's defence.¹⁸ President Iskandar Mirza said in 1957 that it was the "foremost duty of every Pakistani to strengthen our armed forces so that the country can live in peace."¹⁹

¹⁶ *Newa Chronicle*, 9th October 1948.

¹⁷ *The Statesman*, 29th November, 1948.

¹⁸ *Dawn*, 17th August, 1953.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 1 August 1957.

The policy of every government that the defence of Pakistan must be strengthened at any cost enjoyed the support of the National Assembly. The members of the National Assembly reviewed the defence policy in the background of the potential Indian threat. Their speeches reflected their deep anxiety over the Indian and Afghan postures towards Pakistan. They repeatedly emphasized the urgency of adopting effective measures to counter these threats. The Kashmir dispute, the Indian refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, the occupation of Manavadar, Junagadh and Hyderabad, the border clashes between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the communal riots and anti-Pakistan propaganda by India and Afghanistan were frequently cited in the National Assembly to point out the external threat facing Pakistan. There were frequent crossings of the floor and the political leaders did not mind changing their stand on other problems and issues, but they agreed to the need of strong defence for Pakistan. The Government came under heavy fire in the National Assembly in 1953 when it introduced certain measures of retrenchment in the armed forces. The government had to reverse the policy and stopped all the retrenchments in the armed forces because it "decided not to take the slightest risk in the matter."²⁰

The budgetary allocation for the military reflected the liberal attitude of the political leaders towards the armed forces. The following Table gives the details of the defence expenditure for the period 1947-59.

TABLE VI
Defence Expenditure 1947-59

Year	Defence Expenditure (in Million Rs.)	Percentage of the total Government Expenditure
1947-48*	236.0	65.16
1948-49	461.5	71.32
1949-50	625.4	73.06
1950-51	649.9	51.32
1951-52	792.4	54.96
1952-53	725.7	56.68
1953-54	633.2	58.7
1954-55	640.5	57.5
1955-56	917.7	64.0
1956-57	800.9	60.1

²⁰ Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra's statement, *Dawn*, 2nd September 1953.

1957-58	854.2	56.1
1958-59**	996.6	50.9

* : 15th August 1947 to 31 March, 1948.

** : Covers the period of 15 months from 1st April 1958 to 30th June 1959.

If we exclude defence expenditure for 1947-48, as this period was less than one year and the circumstances were exceptional, on average Pakistan spent 59.51% of the total expenditure on defence during the period 1948-59. The rise of defence expenditure during the same period was approximately 116.0%. Moreover, till 1962, the railways had no separate budget. If we exclude that amount from the total expenditure, the percentage of the defence expenditure would rise. It cannot be denied that Pakistan was spending more on defence than its resources could afford. But if we compare it with the amount spent by India on defence, Pakistan's defence expenditure does not appear to be very large. India was spending more than double the amount spent by Pakistan on defence.

The major portion of Pakistan's defence expenditure was spent on two types of activities of the armed forces. First, the day to day requirements of the armed forces. It included consolidation, re-organisation and expansion of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and building up their reserves, the taking over of the control of the forces of various princely states which acceded to Pakistan, training exercises of the three services, an increase in the pay and allowances of the armed forces, the renovation of airfields and the purchase of defence stores, equipments, weapons, from abroad to modernize the three services. Second, movement of troops from one place to another to meet the possible external threat or to maintain law and order in the country. It included the operations in Kashmir and various defensive measures against the concentration of Indian troops on the international border, anti-smuggling measures, organization of relief works in connection with the evacuation and resettlement of refugees and flood-affected people, rehabilitation of the families of the soldiers, various measures to help the civil government to maintain law and order, especially during the anti-Ahmadi disturbances in 1953.

These measures left comparatively little to spend on defence oriented industries. The meager resources at their disposal were used to erect ordnance factory at Wah, a naval dockyard (including a dry dock and floating dock) for repairing and refitting naval vessels, setting up of repair facilities, provisions of modern equipment like radar and other equipment to the Air Force, and the establishment of a number of training centres for

the three services. The consequence was that in spite of high defence expenditure, Pakistan could not be self-sufficient in defence production. The main reason was that the partition of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent left Pakistan with limited and disorganized armed forces. This, coupled with troubles in Kashmir and tension on the borders, necessitated immediate attention to the re-organization of the armed forces. Hence defence expenditure on the capital side remained insignificant and Pakistan was compelled to import a large quantity of military equipment, arms and ammunition.

The Armed Forces and Public Opinion:

The idea that a country has an external enemy is easy for the people to understand. It can also provide a powerful stimulus to national unity. For Pakistan this role was filled by India. The general public did not understand the intricate defence problems but they supported any effort which they thought would preserve and protect Pakistan and enable her to face the 'threat' from India and Afghanistan and secure the Kashmir Valley. There was a realization amongst the educated people that Pakistan was spending more on defence than her resources could bear. But they also realized that in the face of India's hostile attitude and her unwillingness to settle the Kashmir dispute, there was no alternative but to keep the defence of the country strong. The strong religious fervour coupled with nationalism helped to maintain the image of the military as an institution dedicated to a sacred cause. Pakistan was established to defend and promote the Islamic culture and civilization. Its survival, it was generally claimed, was essential for the survival of Islamic culture and civilisation in the Sub-continent. If she perished or India succeeded in extending her hegemony over Pakistan, repercussions would also be felt in other Islamic countries. Therefore, the political and religious leaders claimed, the defence of Pakistan was the defence of Islam. The Sind Provincial Muslim League urged the government that "every pie (pie was the smallest unit of Pakistan currency) of the Government coffers should be saved to strengthen the defence of the country to which the people of Pakistan assign the highest priority."¹

There was a section of public opinion in Pakistan which pleaded for military action to settle the Kashmir dispute. They argued that India did not want to settle the Kashmir dispute so as to weaken Pakistan's defence and threaten her agricultural prosperity. When a political solution was not forthcoming, it was said, the military solution became inevitable. They were generally convinced that in the case of war, Pakistan armed forces would inflict a defeat on India. This unrealistic view of the military capacity was

¹ Dawn, 24th September 1953.

due to the initial successes of the army in Kashmir. Naqi Shamsi, General Secretary, All Pakistan Refugee League, said: "We assure the Government that all the refugees in Pakistan are impatient to take part in Jihad (holy war) and we are prepared to serve the holy cause with body, heart and wealth. It is imperative that the government should realize their duty and settle the unpleasant dispute with the help of sword".²² Maulana Ragib Ehsan, Vice-President of the East Bengal Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam expressed similar views and called upon the people of Pakistan to prepare themselves for a life long holy war in the cause of Kashmir's freedom.²³ Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, said during the debate on Kashmir in the North-West Frontier Assembly. "If India was not agreeable to having a free plebiscite, there was no alternative except war and both the Provincial Government and the Pakistan Central Government shall have to respect the wishes of the people of Pakistan."²⁴ A prominent Kashmiri leader, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, declared, "...We must start mobilising all our forces for a Jihad today and build up a strong army backed by a living political force to strike at the enemy in right earnest. Our mobilisation campaign may take some time, say four or five years, but we must start today."²⁵

The government always acted with restraint and did not pay heed to the calls of Jihad against India and avoided a head on collision. As early as 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan, while visiting Kashmir immediately after the cease-fire, explained his policy to the soldiers. He said that some soldiers might feel that had Pakistan not accepted the UN call for cease-fire, they would have captured more territory in Kashmir. The cease-fire was accepted, he stated, to show that the policy of the government was not to settle the fate of Kashmir by guns. Pakistan wanted that Kashmiris should decide their future by the exercise of right of self determination.²⁶ The government faced a serious challenge to its policy in 1958, when, the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference decided to organize marches to violate the cease-fire line in Kashmir. A few volunteers, in fact, succeeded in violating the cease-fire line. This could develop into a serious crisis but the government arrested the leaders and the volunteers.²⁷

Political Conditions:

The internal political conditions of Pakistan were not satisfactory.

²² Cited in 'Pakistan's War Propaganda against India' (White Paper of the Government of India), p. 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁶ Khan, Fazal Muqem, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, (Karachi, 1963), pp. 117-18.

²⁷ *Asian Recorder* (1958), p. 2148.

Perhaps only a few states started their career as independent state under such serious initial problems as Pakistan did. The most difficult problem facing the leaders of the nation was to evolve a viable political system out of the limited resources, paucity of trained personnel to run the administration, economic chaos, lack of adequate means of communication, cultural and regional diversities and a relatively small middle class. As long as a strong leader with an all Pakistan standing was at the helm of affairs, the country seemed stable. After the death of such a leader, factionalism, regionalism, and opportunism characterized the politics of Pakistan and the political system came under heavy strains from all sides.

Unlike the Congress Party of India, the Muslim League failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party which could lead the nation on the road to democracy, stability and prosperity. The reasons can be traced back to the pre-independence days. The rise of the Muslim League as a mass party was rather quick. Although founded by a group of enlightened Muslims in 1906 to protect the rights and interests of the Muslims, it never became a mass party until 1939-40. The Congress began its career in 1885 and the long struggle for independence and Mr. Gandhi's role after 1920 made it a mass party. It provided an umbrella for diverse interests and opinions, ranging from those who believed in non-violence to the Communists and Socialists. The struggle for independence enabled them to evolve patterns to resolve internal conflicts and aggregate diverse interests. This threw up a class of leaders who could work together in difficult times. The Muslim League lacked the procedures of internal discussion and collective leadership. Its claim as the spokesman of the Muslims was often challenged by a number of other Muslim organizations, which were working for independence but did not favour the idea of a separate state for the Muslims. It was only after 1937 that the Muslim League reached the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. Some of the Muslim political leaders restrained themselves from opposing the idea of Pakistan after they realized that the creation of Pakistan could not be stopped.²⁸ A large number of political leaders who occupied important position in Pakistan, had joined the Muslim League during 1937-47, particularly during 1944-47. Therefore, they had a very limited experience of working together in the political field. The towering personality of Mr. Jinnah overshadowed all other Muslim Leaguers. He alone led the Muslims on the road to independence. The first year of

²⁸ The role played by the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab is a good example to illustrate this point. They opposed the Muslim League till early 1947. When they realized that their efforts would not succeed, they withdrew from the political scene. Some of their members joined the Muslim League during 1945-46, while others kept quiet and watched the political situation.

independence was marked by dependence on the charismatic personality of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He was the Governor-General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. This was not at all surprising. The nation naturally looked towards the father of the nation in the extremely difficult conditions which Pakistan faced after independence. Even if he had not occupied any of these offices, his influence would have been profound because he was the Quaid-e-Azam first and anything else afterwards. His leadership was a source of strength for the new nation. The unfortunate thing was that he passed away one year after independence and thus, could neither transfer loyalty of the people commanded by him to the Muslim League nor develop some principles for the aggregation of diverse interests in the Muslim League.

The Muslim League stood for the creation of Pakistan and directed all its efforts to achieve this objective. It did not indicate the outlines of the political and economic action to be followed after independence. Its leader merely claimed that "the Muslims of the sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today."²⁹ No two definitions of how "to build their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam", agreed with each other. Thus, when the main objective of the party was achieved and the Quaid-i-Azam died, the Muslim League lost the momentum and vigour which characterized its movement before 1947. The internal conditions of the Muslim League were not different from its conditions during 1931-33. Since Mr. Jinnah had decided to stay in England in 1931, factionalism and personal rivalries made the Muslim League ineffective. Just as in 1927-28, the Muslim League was again divided into two factions in 1933 and the two factions held two different annual sessions. The hopeless state of affairs was controlled when Mr. Jinnah agreed to come back to India and resumed the leadership of the Muslim League. In 1948, the Muslim League had no leader of standing similar to that of the Quaid-i-Azam. Liaquat Ali Khan tried hard to fill the vacuum of leadership but he was assassinated in 1951. There was none to keep the Muslim League together.

The role of the opposition is very important for the successful working of liberal democratic institutions. Its constructive criticism can promote democratic values in society. The party in power in Pakistan deliberately discouraged the growth of opposition parties and any opposition to the Muslim League was regarded as tantamount to opposition to Pakistan.³⁰

²⁹ Khan, Liaquat Ali, *Pakistan: Heart of Asia* (Cambridge, 1950) p. 2.

³⁰ Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said, "The formation of new political parties in opposition

This internalized factionalism and the Muslim League failed to present an inspiring programme to the people. With the passage of time and the disappearance of strong leadership, various factions started breaking away and formed new political parties. This was not the result of ideological conflicts but was caused by personality clashes, jealousies and the desire to gain power. The parties were mainly vehicles for personal political advancement. Factionalism was not confined to the Muslim League only, the opposition parties also lacked organizational cohesion. In 1954, the United Front succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Muslim League in the elections of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly but it could not maintain its unity after winning the elections. The political parties constituting the United Front quarreled with each other on the question of distribution of ministerial offices.

Political parties were shifting combinations of political leaders. Their loyalties to a particular party were not based on principles but on political and ministerial gains. The history of Pakistan is replete with examples of political leaders who sacrificed previous commitments and the interests of their party to obtain personal advantages. They changed their loyalties from one leader to the other; from one political party to the other, without giving any thought to the consequences of their actions on the working of the political system. Keith Callard was right when he observed that the politics in Pakistan was made up of "a large number of leading persons, who with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make a politician less available for office. Those who lacked fixed ideas but who control legislators, money or influence have tended to prosper."³¹ In April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Nazim-ud-Din's ministry, which a few days earlier had the budget passed in the National Assembly. For a successor, the Governor-General turned to Muhammad Ali (Bogra), who was at that time Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. He was called back and asked to assume the office of the Prime Minister. The Muslim League did not object to the dismissal of its leader, and six members of the outgoing cabinet joined the new cabinet. Muhammad Ali (Bogra) was also elected President of the Muslim League. In 1954, the Central Government decided to integrate various provinces of

to the Muslim League is against the best interests of Pakistan. If the Muslim League is not made strong and powerful and the mushroom growth of parties is not checked immediately, I assure you that Pakistan which was achieved after great sacrifices, will not survive". *The Statesman*, 28th October, 1950.

Kh. Shahaabuddin, Interior Minister said in Lahore that in "the absence of fundamental ideological differences against various sections of the people of Pakistan, there was no scope for opposition parties in Pakistan" *The Hindu*, 13th January, 1951.

³¹ Callard, K. *Pakistan A Political Study*, (London, 1957), p. 67.

West Pakistan into One Unit. Sind Chief Minister Pirzada Abdus Sattar was opposed to the idea of One Unit. In a written statement 74 out of 110 members of the Provincial Assembly of Sind pledged their support to his campaign against the One Unit Scheme. He was dismissed by the Central Government and Mohammad Ayub Khuhro was appointed in his place. After the appointment of the new Chief Minister, the same Assembly reversed its previous decision and M. A. Khuhro was supported by 100 votes to 4 on the One Unit Scheme. In 1955-56, the Muslim League and the Republican Party were in favour of retaining the integrated province of West Pakistan. The National Awami Party of Sind and some of the political leaders of the N.W.F. Province were inclined to support any party which would plead the reconstitution of the four provinces of West Pakistan. The Muslim League, in order to bring down Dr. Khan's Ministry (Republican Party) in West Pakistan decided to support the move to dismember the integrated province of West Pakistan. The result was not surprising. Dr. Khan's ministry ran into trouble and section 193 of the Constitution was imposed by the President. (Section 193 of the Constitution authorised the President to assume direct rule of province under certain special circumstances). When section 193 was lifted, the Republican Party had gained the support of the National Awami Party by promising to support the proposal to divide West Pakistan into former provinces. In September 1957, the West Pakistan Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the reconstitution of four or more provinces of West Pakistan. The Muslim League changed its policy and decided to remain neutral on the issue. Another interesting example is that of H.S. Suhawardy. He, along with 20 Awami League and the Hindu Congress members from East Pakistan, staged a walk out from the Constituent Assembly at the time of final vote on the 1956 Constitution and declared his party's dissociation from the Constitution because, in his opinion, East Pakistan was not given a fair deal in the Constitution and 'due' autonomy was not guaranteed.³² Six months after the introduction of the Constitution, he assumed the office of Prime Minister under the same Constitution and declared that the Constitution guaranteed "98 per cent of Provincial autonomy".³³

The Government which held office by the support of these political parties and politicians was liable to be overthrown with every change in the loyalties of the politicians. The party in power adopted various methods to retain the support of its members or to make the members of the opposition cross the floor. Three methods were very frequently resorted to: First, the

³² Dawn, 1 March 1956.

³³ Choudhry, G. W., *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London, 1969, Revised Edition), p. 106.

government did not encourage the growth of healthy opposition. Repressive measures were adopted to crush opposition. Political opponents were arrested and put behind the bars. Public meetings and processions were banned. It would be quite pertinent to refer to the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949, popularly known as the PRODA. It provided for the debarring from public life for a specified period of time, persons guilty of "misconduct" in any public office or representative capacity. The Governor General or the Governor of a province was authorised to refer to a special tribunal any charge of misconduct against any representative or a person in public office. If the tribunal found the person guilty of misconduct, the Governor-General or the Governor of the province could debar the person from public office for the period not exceeding ten years. Charges could also be brought by any five persons on deposit of Rs.5,000 only. The Governor-General and the Governor was then under obligation to refer to the case for preliminary inquiry. If the findings of the preliminary inquiry established the case, it was sent to the special tribunal.³⁴ It cannot be denied that corruption and nepotism was rampant in the body politic of Pakistan but the unfortunate aspect of the PRODA was that it was used as a political weapon as it provided an excellent opportunity to those who could afford to lose Rs. 5,000 to harass the ministers by framing charges and referring their cases for the preliminary inquiry. The party in power also used the PRODA to eliminate or discourage party rebels and other political opponents in the national and provincial assemblies. In 1948, the Khuhro ministry (Sind) was dismissed on charges of corruption and misconduct. Three years later, he was appointed Chief Minister of Sind for the second time. But he was again dismissed by the Central government after a few months and proceedings were instituted against him under the PRODA. When in 1954, he agreed to toe the line laid down by the central government, the ban under the PRODA was lifted and he was appointed Chief Minister for the third time. This was not the only occasion when the Central Government adopted "undemocratic" methods to achieve its political objectives. In 1954, the United Front had won the elections in East Pakistan. Fazal ul Haq was sworn in as Chief Minister. A few weeks later he was dismissed by the Muslim League government in the Centre for allegedly making a statement in Calcutta against the integrity of Pakistan. In 1955, the same Prime

³⁴ During five years' life of the PRODA, 7 cases were referred to the Tribunal. Four political leaders were convicted. They were: M. A. Khuhro (Sind), Kazi Fazlullah (Sind), Ghulam Nabi Khan Pathan (Sind) and Hamidul Haq Choudhry (East Pakistan). The other three were: Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (Punjab), he was not found guilty; Mr. Ghulam Ali Talpur (Sind), the Tribunal made adverse remarks but did not declare him guilty and Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana (Punjab), proceedings against him could not be completed.

Minister requested Fazal ul Haq to nominate a member of his party to form government in East Pakistan and he was appointed Interior Minister in the Central Government. On 5th March 1956, he was appointed Governor of East Pakistan. Fazal ul Haq reciprocated by promising his party's support to the Prime Minister at the Centre.

Second, financial and material gains were offered to gain support. Import permits and various kinds of licences were issued on political considerations. The politicians could sell the import permits to those dealing in import/export business and thus make large amounts of money. At the district level, licences to keep arms were given on the recommendation of the party in power. The members of the ruling parties used this power to extract political support or make money. Third, ministries were unduly multiplied in order to gain support. When Martial Law was imposed in October 1958, twenty-six out of eighty members of the National Assembly were ministers. If we take into account provincial cabinets, thirty four out of these eighty members were holding ministerial posts.³⁵ A few hours before the imposition of martial law on October 7, 1958 two new ministers were appointed by the then Prime Minister Malik Feroze Khan Noon.³⁶ The offer of ministerial posts proved the most useful device to keep a majority in the National Assembly.

The display of strong ambition to gain political objectives, the lack of decorum and sense of sobriety, the frequent crossing of floor by the members of the National Assembly, accusations and counter accusations and scuffles in the house, very brief sessions of the National Assembly and the desire of the members to be always on the winning side tarnished the image of the National Assembly as a representative body. The role of the National Assembly as the rule-making agency was reduced to the minimum and it failed to exercise real control over the cabinet. Traditionally Prime Minister and cabinet are responsible to legislature in the Parliamentary form of government and the cabinet can remain in office as long as it commands the support of the majority of the members of the legislature. But in Pakistan, the National Assembly played no significant role in the making and un-making of cabinets. No government was removed by a vote of no-confidence on the floor of the National Assembly. The decision to form a ministry used to be taken behind the closed doors and resulted from the re-alignment of political factions. The National Assembly merely endorsed it.

The weak political leadership and ceaseless struggle for power shifted

³⁵ Sayeed, K. B. "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, Autumn 1959.

³⁶ *The Pakistan Times*, 8th October 1958.

the real political power from the National Assembly to the head of the State (Governor-General and, since 1956, President) and a strong tradition of violation of the norms of parliamentary democracy was established. The politicians were divided in so many camps that they could not adopt united stand to restrict the greater concentration of powers in the hands of the head of the state. He could always find some politicians willing to support him. This enabled him to play the politicians against each other and compel the cabinet not to work against his wishes. There are numerous examples in the political history of Pakistan to show that the head of the State was not a titular head but an active participant in the political drama: In April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Kh. Nazimud Din's ministry which had got its budget passed by the National Assembly a few days ago. In 1954, when the Constituent Assembly attempted to curtail the powers of the Governor-General by repealing the PRODA and rushed a bill without the prior knowledge of the Governor-General to amend the government of India Act, 1935 (as adopted in Pakistan³⁷ to make sure that the Governor-General did not use the Act in any way to dismiss any other ministry, the Governor-General reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly.³⁸ The action of the Governor-General was a big blow to the weak democratic structure in Pakistan and caused a serious political/legal/constitutional crisis. This was not the end of the story. The under-nourished plant of democracy had to bear several other unbearable shocks. Concurrently with the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, the Muslim League cabinet headed by Mohammad Ali (Bogra) was also dismissed. The Governor-General appointed a new cabinet, described by him as the 'cabinet of talents' and Mohammad Ali (Bogra) was asked to serve as Prime Minister. The Cabinet included among others, one serving General (Mohammed Ayub Khan), one former General and civil servant (Major-General Iskander Mirza); one former civil servant (Ch. Mohammad Ali), and one industrialist (Mr. M. A. H. Isphani). They held the portfolios of Defence, Interior, Finance and Industries respectively. Two of these appointments, namely, General Ayub Khan besides being the Minister of Defence, remained the C-in-C of the Army. Major-General Iskander Mirza was the Governor of East Pakistan before the assumption of the office. He was through and through an administrator and had little, if any, regard for

³⁷ Since Pakistan had no Constitution of its own ready on 14th August, 1947, it was decided that the Government of India Act, 1935 (with certain necessary amendments) and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, will serve as the Interim Constitution. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan took nine years to frame a Constitution, which was implemented on 23rd March 1956 and Pakistan became 'the Islamic Republic.'

³⁸ The Governor-General, while dissolving the Constituent Assembly, took the plea that it failed to produce a constitution in seven years and had transformed itself in a perpetual body, which had lost the confidence of the people.

democratic institutions. The Governor-General, who was also an ex-civil servant, presided over the meetings of the cabinet. From the last week of October 1954 to July 1955, the Governor-General ruled the country in a semi-dictatorial manner and the democratic institutions remained suspended. One commentator remarked that the new arrangement reminded him of the pre-independence Viceroy's Executive Council. Indeed, there were some similarities.³⁹

The new Constituent Assembly was indirectly elected in July 1955. With the inauguration of the Second Constituent Assembly, the semi-dictatorial regime of the Governor-General came to an end. No single party commanded majority in the second Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League was still the largest group with thirty-five members, followed by the United Front (16 seats) and the Awami League (12 seats). Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was elected the leader of the Muslim League, who formed a coalition ministry, comprising the Muslim League and the United Front.

The damage caused to democratic values in Pakistan by the Governor-General was so severe that it cast its shadow over the later events. The legislature and the political leaders could not regain their lost power and prestige. The head of the state continued to play a significant role in the politics of Pakistan. No Prime Minister could work against the wishes of the head of the state. The political situation in Pakistan did not improve after the introduction of the Constitution on 23rd March 1956. The Constitution provided for a parliamentary system with a titular President, unicameral legislature and a federal system. It neither established liberal democratic institutions nor restricted the direct intervention of the President in politics. In September 1956, Suharwardy replaced Chaudhri Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister. Suharwardy relied on the support of the Republican Party and his own party (the Awami League). Later developments made it clear to him that the Republican Party was loyal to the President rather than the Prime Minister. In October 1957, when the Republican Party withdrew its support to the Prime Minister, Suharwardy asked the President to summon the National Assembly in order to judge whether he still enjoyed the confidence of the house. The President refused to summon the National Assembly, and, to quote Suharwardy, the President said, "He knew about the position of the parties and called on me to resign by 11'0 clock in the morning otherwise he would be dismissed."⁴⁰

During the lifetime (31½ months) of the 1956 Constitution, Pakistan had 4 Prime Ministers. All of them headed coalition ministries, comprising the political parties having no common ideological basis or political

³⁹ *The Times*, 29th October 1954.

⁴⁰ Quoted from: Good now, H. F., *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (Karachi O.U.P., 1969), p. 50.

programme. Therefore, the coalitions were feeble and shortlived. On average every ministry lasted for less than 8 months. One of the ministries, headed by I. I. Chundrigar remained in office for 55 days. His coalition government comprised the Muslim League, the Republican Party, Krishak Sramik and the Nizam-i-Islam Party. Under these circumstances no government could pay due attention to the problems facing the nation.

The provincial political scene was no less discouraging and disappointing. National and Provincial politics was so interlinked that a re-alignment at the centre had a direct impact on provincial politics. Although the Provincial Governor was required to appoint a Chief Minister who enjoyed the support of the majority of the members of the legislature of the province concerned, yet he could dispense with both the Chief Minister and the legislature if he had the blessings of the central government. Article 193 of the Constitution provided that upon receipt of the report from the Governor that the province could not be administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President could instruct the Governor to assume the direct control of the government after dismissing or suspending the provincial cabinet. The Provincial legislature could also be temporarily suspended and its powers transferred to the President. This proclamation, known as the President's Rule, could remain in force for two months only. The National Assembly could, however, extend its life. This provision of the Constitution enabled the centre to dominate the provincial governments by the threat of the imposition of President's rule. The centre, on many occasions, dismissed the provincial cabinets and virtually nominated the chief ministers. Even when a new set of representatives had just been elected by an overwhelming majority, the President's rule could be imposed. The United Front secured an overwhelming majority in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly Elections of 1954, and a new cabinet, headed by Fazal ul Haq assumed office. Soon after the centre dismissed the cabinet and asked the Governor to assume the responsibilities of the government. This arrangement continued till June 1955, when A. H. Sarkar's government took over. However, the Provincial Assembly did not meet until May 1956. The Provincial budget was approved by the President's executive decree. The story of the provincial politics of West Pakistan was not much different from that of East Pakistan. Both before and after the integration of the Province of West Pakistan, the centre unnecessarily intervened in the provincial politics. The cabinets were dismissed, democratic institutions were suspended and the chief ministers were imposed. These conditions did not encourage the growth of democratic institutions at the provincial level.

Thus, the political system of Pakistan was functioning contrary to its professed principles. Political intrigues and opportunism and the lack of

discipline in political parties led the country from crisis to crisis. The politics pursued in these years was "thoroughly inimical to social change and national consolidation."⁴¹ Under these circumstances, even genuine believers in democracy and the rule of law found it difficult to defend a system which was rapidly impairing the moral fibre of the nation. It made mockery of the parliamentary system. The Constitution Commission (1961) rightly attributed the failure of the parliamentary system in Pakistan to the following three causes:

1. "Lack of proper elections and defects in the late Constitution".
2. "Undue interference by the heads of the State with ministers and political parties, and by the Central Government with the functioning of the Governments in the Provinces".
3. "Lack of leadership resulting in the lack of well-organized and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in the politicians and their undue interference in the administration."⁴²

The Armed Forces and Politics:

Imbued with the British military tradition, the civil and the military authorities in Pakistan emphasized the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and non-involvement in active politics as the cardinal principles of military organization. The political leaders, including Jinnah, underlined the primacy of the constitution and the civilian authorities working thereunder. The military's role in the early years of independence was limited to the professional field of defence and security and the provision of assistance to the civil authorities, if and when called upon by the civil government to do so.

When General Muhammad Ayub Khan took over the command of the Army in January 1951, he advised the troops to keep out of politics, he said:

Keep out of politics. By saying this I do not mean to imply that you should not take an intelligent interest in the affairs of your country. In fact, as citizens of Pakistan you must do that. But, what you must avoid is taking any active part in party politics and propagation of any such views. As I said before, we are the servants of Pakistan and as such servants of any party that the people put in power.⁴³

⁴¹ Myrdal, G., *Asian Drama*, Vol. I (Penguin Books, 1969), p. 315.

⁴² Report of the Constitution Commission (Karachi, 1961), p. 6.

⁴³ The Pakistan Times, 23rd & 24th January 1951.

General Ayub Khan declared on another occasion:

I always told my people that our [army] major task is to give cover to the country behind which it could build a sound democratic system and lay the foundation of a stable future.⁴⁴

The Army was not favourably disposed towards the use of troops for police duties in law and order situations beyond the control of the civil authorities. The senior commanders were of the view that such assignments kept the troops away from their training and regular chores, adversely affected the morale of the soldiers, and over a period of time undermined the goodwill that existed between the soldiers and the society. The Chief of Staff wrote to the Joint Services Commanders Committee on 31st July 1950.

In a homogenous country such as Pakistan, the use of troops, which it maintains for its defence against external aggression, to enforce law and order on the people is always resented and leads to antagonism between them. The Army, therefore, rightly expects that the civil administration will take every means in its power, by wise government and maintenance of adequate and efficient police forces, to prevent this contingency from arising.⁴⁵

The military commanders' reluctance to step into the political field was manifested from General Mohammad Ayub Khan's refusal to Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's offer in 1954 to take over the administration of the country. There is no evidence other than Ayub Khan's own statement to substantiate his claim,⁴⁶ but given the political situation that obtained in 1954 and the temperament of Ghulam Mohammad, there was every possibility of General Ayub Khan being invited to assume power. Despite the hesitancy on the part of the commanders, the military's role had begun to expand in the non-professional field and it was gradually emerging as an important actor in the decision-making process.

There were many factors responsible for the expansion of the role of the military in the 'non-traditional' field. First, from the first day of its inception, Pakistan led a precarious existence. In addition to the normal problems of setting up a new government, it confronted the horrors of communal riots, undefined border, strained relations with India, war in Kashmir and the maintenance of law and order in the early years. In such a difficult situation, the military proceeded with determination to escort and resettle the refugees, consolidate the nation's borders against aggression

⁴⁴ Khan, Fazal Muqeem, *op. cit.* P. 178.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁴⁶ General Ayub Khan's address to the nation: *Dawn*, 9th October, 1958.

and maintain internal peace. R. D. Campbell says: "Political organization cannot exist in social chaos and something very near to social chaos marked the advent of the new state."⁴⁷ To prevent total breakdown the central government depended upon the military. Second, the weak social base, the disarray of political leadership and political parties and the lack of organized political support resulted in the weakening of the political institutions. The ruling elite were unable to pursue the clear policies aiming at social and economic advancement of the people. Third, the military inherited the high standard of British training and rich experience of the two World Wars. The military (and the bureaucracy as well) was disciplined and cohesive and perhaps the most organized institution in Pakistan. Fourth, the military is also a pool of skilled man-power. Their training and experience to run training institutions, ordnance factories, their knowledge of modern technology and managerial experience can be of great use in the civilian sector especially in a developing country like Pakistan suffering from a shortage of such experience. Fifth, the public image of the military was high and it enjoyed respect of the people. It was considered outside and above political involvement. The people as well as the political leaders regarded the military patriotic, dedicated to nation's cause, firm and fair. The image of military was re-inforced by its role in the non-military field to help preserve, stabilize and build the new nation.

The role of the military in the non-military field can be divided into three categories:

1. Help to fight natural calamities.
2. Help to fight particular problems.
3. Help to civil administration to maintain law and order.

Floods and cyclones often caused serious loss of life and property. East Pakistan was especially hard hit by these calamities. The Army and the Air Force undertook rescue operations, the supply of food, the provision of shelter, medical assistance and other essentials of life, and the repair and restoration of the means of communication. They helped the rehabilitation of the destroyed and damaged network of canals and dams. The Army also came forward to help fight locusts invasion in the N.W.F. Province in 1951. Similar assistance was provided to fight locusts in Sind and Quetta in 1952 and 1954 respectively. In 1958 an anti-salinity and water logging operation was conducted in Sind and in 1962 Operation Wild Boar was carried out near the Indian borders. Wild boars caused heavy damage to the standing crops. When this menace went out of control of the local zamindars/tenants and administration, the Army was asked to kill the wild boars.

⁴⁷ Campbell, R. D., *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy* (Princeton, 1963), p. 33.

The assistance provided by the Army in connection with particular problems included three "Operations" conducted by the Army to deal with smuggling and food shortage. All these campaigns were conducted in East Pakistan. These were 'Operation Jute' (1952-53), 'Operation Service First' (1956) and 'Operation close door' (1957-58). The main objective of the 'Operation Jute' was to stop the smuggling of jute to India which had defied all solutions. The Army was asked to work in collaboration with the civil authorities in a five-mile broad belt along the one thousand miles border.⁴⁸ The Prevention of Smuggling Ordinance authorised all officers, junior commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Army to arrest, detain or take into custody any person and to seize the notified commodity in the border areas.⁴⁹ The second campaign the 'Operation Service First' was launched in the middle of 1956 to overcome the food shortage in parts of East Pakistan. The problem was aggravated by widespread hoarding and black-marketing of what was available. The Provincial government brought its stock of rice in the market but the supply did not reach the consumers especially those living in the remote corners of East Pakistan. When the situation went out of control, the Governor handed over planning and distribution of food to the Army on 30th June, 1956. Major-General Jilani, G.O.C. East Pakistan was appointed Chief Food Administrator. He was authorised to appoint Army officials at division, district and sub-division headquarters to look after the movement and distribution of food. These officers were granted magisterial and executive powers to deal with all aspects of food distribution. The civil officials dealing with the supply of food, were put at the disposal of the Chief Food Administrator.⁵⁰ The 'Operation' was a big success. In a very short period of time the Army succeeded in bringing down the prices of foodstuff and supplied rice and wheat to all the parts of the province. The last of these 'Operations' was designed to stop the smuggling of food, jute and medicine and the flight of capital to India. The large scale smuggling to India had adverse effects on the economy of East Pakistan. The border police and the East Pakistan Rifles failed to check this. When the government could not round-up the anti-social elements involved in the dirty game of smuggling, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan requested the Army to take over the anti-smuggling duties. With the permission of the civil authorities the G.O.C., East Pakistan moved swiftly and sealed the East Pakistan-India border. This 'Operation' was no less success than the other two.⁵¹ A large

⁴⁸ *Dawn*, 4th September 1952.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11th September 1952.

⁵⁰ *Dawn*, 1 July, 1956.

⁵¹ For the details of these operations, see: Khan, Fazal Muqem, "In service of the country as soldiers", *Dawn*, 8th January 1961 (Armed Forces Day Supplement).

quantity of foodstuff, medicine gold and silver bullion were seized and the smugglers arrested and punished.

The Army was prepared to support any government determined to maintain law and order. There were several instances of political agitation, student and labour troubles, and religious-cum-ethnic violence beyond the control of the civil administration during 1947-58. As economic conditions deteriorated and political instability became rampant, agitation and riots based on regional and linguistic parochialism became more widespread. The major riots included, inter alia, riots in Karachi (1949), Dacca (1950), the language riots in East Pakistan (1952), the anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab (1953), and labour troubles in East Pakistan (1954). On all these occasions the Army was called out to maintain law and order and restore the authority of the civil administration.

The Army got the first chance to run civil administration directly in 1953 after the outbreak of the Anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab. In the first two months of 1953, the Ahrars (an orthodox Muslim organization) launched an agitation in support of their demand that the Ahmadis should be declared a minority on the ground that they did not believe in the finality of prophet Mohammad. They also demanded that Sir Zafarullah Khan, the then Foreign Minister and other Ahmadi civil and military officers should be dismissed. The hesitancy on the part of the Punjab Government to control the situation encouraged the agitators who were joined by other orthodox religious leaders. Political opportunists availed of the opportunity to put the provincial and central governments in an embarrassing position by subverting law and order. Public and private property was damaged and the agitators attacked the houses of the Ahmadis. In the last week of February, 1953, the Council of Action of the Movement decided to launch "direct action" in pursuance of their demands about the Ahmadi community.⁵² All the eleven members of the Action Committee were arrested under the Safety Act.⁵³ This led to serious troubles. The situation in Lahore worsened. The mob forced the shopkeepers to close their shops. Public and private property was looted and burnt. Violence spread so rapidly that the provincial government could not protect the life and property of the people. The Army was called out and Martial Law was imposed in Lahore on March 6, 1953.⁵⁴ Major-General Azam Khan was

⁵² Dawn, 27th February, 1953.

⁵³ Ibid., 28th February 1953. For details of different aspects of the Anti Ahmadi agitation: *Report of the Court of Inquiry (The Munir Report)* (Lahore: The Government of Punjab, 1954).

⁵⁴ See the press note about the declaration of Martial Law: Dawn, 8th March 1953. The Chief Minister of the Punjab stated in the Provincial Assembly: "Lahore had to be handed over to the Army when it was fully realized that any further control of the situation

appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the city of Lahore was divided into six sectors. Each sector had one Martial Law Administrator.⁵⁵ The sector commanders were given necessary powers to restore and protect life and property of the citizens, including the powers to impose collective fines where looting, arson or murder occurred.⁵⁶ The Army successfully brought the situation back to normal within a few days. After the restoration of law and order, the Army authorities launched 'the Cleaner Lahore Campaign' to give a better look to the city, improve health and sanitation conditions and widen streets and pavements. Martial Law was withdrawn on 14th May 1953 and the city was handed over to the civil administration.

The brief period of Martial Law gave the Army a valuable experience of performing the duties of civil government. It also created an impression in the minds of the public that the Army could restore peace and effective government when all other devices had failed. Daily Dawn commented:

... Memories of the Army rule in Lahore will linger for a long time to come and the new look that Lahore has acquired and the sense of discipline among its people inculcated by the Army will bear eloquent testimony to the good work done by Major-General Azam Khan and his men.⁵⁷

The political leaders were so busy with their power politics after the assassination of the first prime minister that they hardly had time to reinforce the tradition of civilian supremacy which they inherited from the British and that was also accepted by the military commanders. They did not assert their leadership over the military; rather they looked towards the

by police would involve a heavy loss of life and property."

⁵⁵ Dawn, 22nd March 1953.

The sectors were:

- Sector A : Area bounded by Railway line, North Circular Road in East and South extending along Gandhi Mori Road; Administrator : Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. Aleem. Later Brigadier Bakhtiar Rana.
- Sector B : Area bounded by Circular Road in North, Mayo Road in East, Durand Road, Egerton Road and Upper Mall in South; Administrator: Brigadier Malik Haq Nawaz.
- Sector C : Area North of Mayo Road, West of Lower Bari Doab Canal; Administrator: Brigadier Atiqur Rehman.
- Sector D : Area bounded by Upper Mall, Mayo Road and Lower Bari Doab Canal; Administrator: Lieutenant-Colonel Azizur Rehman Khan.
- Sector E : Lahore Cantonment area South of Sector C and East of Sector D; Administrator: Lieutenant Colonel Amanullah Khan.
- Sector F : Model Town Area; Administrator: Lieutenant-Colonel Fazal Muqem Khan. Soon afterwards Sector E was merged into Sector F.

⁵⁶ Dawn, 22nd March, 1953.

⁵⁷ Dawn 16th May, 1953.

military for support. Pakistan had seven prime ministers⁵⁸ during 1947-58 (six prime ministers during 1951-58) but one C-in-C of the Army; General Ayub Khan got two extensions. This continued stay in office not only gave him a chance to watch the polarization of politics from very close quarters but also consolidated his position in the Army. Except for a short period, the defence portfolio was held by the Prime Minister, which provided an opportunity to the C-in-C of the three services, especially that of the Army, to remain in touch with him, instead of communicating through the Defence Minister.⁵⁹ This was in complete contrast to the Indian political scene. The Congress Party proved a more stable ruling party than the Muslim League. The towering personality of Mr. Nehru enabled the political system to consolidate itself and institutionalize its practices. This firmly established civilian control over the military in India during the first decade after independence. The Army was deliberately down-graded. The title of C-in-C was abolished in favour of the Chief of Army Staff. The politics pursued by Krishna Menon (Defence Minister) weakened the military establishment in the period prior to the Sino-Indian conflict, 1962. The term of the Chief of the Army Staff was four years. It was reduced to three years in 1966. Similarly the tenure of the Naval and Air Force Chiefs was reduced to three years. No Chief of Army Staff was given extension. Two of them served for two years each.⁶⁰ After the coup d'état in Pakistan in 1958, the Indian Government tightened its vigilance of the Army. A question was put to Krishna Menon by a correspondent that in view of the shortage of food in India, could the Army be engaged to step up food production? The reply clearly showed the desire of the government to keep the Army away from political scene to reduce the chances of a coup d'état in India. He said "I fundamentally differ from such proposals because you will encourage

⁵⁸ The tenure of the office of Prime Ministers:

Liaquat Ali Khan: August 1947-October 1951 (4½ years)

Kh. Nazimud Din: October 1951-April 1953 (1½ years)

Mohammad Ali (Bogra): April 1953 - October 1954.

October 1954-August 1955) 2-1/3 years

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali: August 1955-September 1956 (13 months)

H.S. Suhrawardy: September 1956-October 1957 (13 months)

I.I. Chundrigar: October 1957-December 1957 (55 days)

Feroze Khan Noon: December 1957-October 1958 (10 months)

⁵⁹ Moreover, General Ayub Khan, himself served as the Defence Minister from October 1954 to July 1955 in Mohammad Ali (Bogra's) second cabinet. He also retained the post of the C-in-C of the Army during this period.

⁶⁰ They were: General Maharaj Rajendrasinghi (1953-55) and General S. M. Shrinagesh (1955-57), 18 months after assuming the office of the COAS, General Thaper was granted long leave on the grounds of health. This followed the reverses of the Indian Army on the Sino-Indian border in 1962.

dictatorship to be established in this country straightaway."⁶¹ These efforts of the political leadership undermined the status of the military, especially the Army, in India. It therefore, could not play as much important a role in the decision-making process of India as did its counterpart in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the ruling elite began to cultivate the military for strengthening their position in the body-politic. Ghulam Mohammad (Governor-General: 1951-55) and Major-General Iskander Mirza (Governor-General: 1955-56, President: 1956-58) relied heavily on the civil service and the Army. Had Ghulam Mohammad not enjoyed the support of the Army, he could not have dismissed the first Constituent Assembly. The inclusion of Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan in the cabinet after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly clearly indicated that the real political power had shifted to the Governor-General and the Civil Service who enjoyed the support of the Army.

The available evidence suggests that the political leadership attached great importance to the opinion of the Military High Command. The decision to accept U.S. military aid and join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) was a joint decision of the Military High Command and the political leadership. It was as early as 1951 that General Ayub Khan had become convinced that Pakistan must have "a strong and reliable friend" to strengthen her defence.⁶² The biographer of General Ayub Khan, Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, claimed that the military aid programme with the U.S. was negotiated through the initiative and efforts of Ayub Khan. He also claimed that the U.S. officials were happy to have the Army on their side.⁶³ General Ayub Khan took part in negotiations on defence pacts with the U.S. He accompanied the Governor-General when he visited the U.S. in 1953. Later, he accompanied the Prime Minister who had gone to the U.S. for talks on military aid. General Ayub Khan was of the opinion that one of the imperatives of Pakistan's defence and security problems "was to have a strong and effective friend, whose interests should be to see that Pakistan remained a free country and was not subjugated by another country."⁶⁴ Another instance which showed the influence of the military in the decision-making process was the integration of the provinces of West Pakistan in 1955. The proposal for the abolition of various provinces in West Pakistan and the creation of an integrated province of West Pakistan was prepared by General Ayub Khan in his memorandum written in 1954.⁶⁵

⁶¹ *The Hindu*, 8th March, 1959.

⁶² Khan, Fazal Muqeem, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁶³ Ahmad, M., *My Chief*, (Lahore, 1960), pp. 73-76.

⁶⁴ General Ayub Khan's statement: *Dawn*, 18th January 1955.

⁶⁵ The full text of the memorandum is published in: Khan, M. Ayub, *Friends No Masters*.

The influence of the military on decision-making increased during the presidency of Iskander Mirza who had a military background, served as Defence Secretary, and maintained close and personal relations with the Military High Command.⁶⁶ During 1957, when the Army was engaged in anti-smuggling drive (Operation Close door) in East Pakistan, some persons whose interests were badly affected by the anti-smuggling drive, pressured Prime Minister Malik Feroze Khan Noon through the Awami League members of the National Assembly, to curtail the powers given to the military in the border areas. The G.O.C. East Pakistan informed the C-in-C of the Army about the move of the politicians. The C-in-C communicated the information to the President and suggested that he should restrain the politicians. The President directed the Prime Minister not to interfere with the anti-smuggling drive launched by the Army.⁶⁷

The above evidence shows that by the mid-fifties the military had become an important actor in the decision making process of Pakistan, but it did not assume a direct political role. The only instance which showed the direct interest of a section of the military in politics was 'the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case' (1951). It was confined to eleven officers and three civilians with leftist leanings. The officers included, among others, one Major-General and one Air Commodore. A mystery surrounded this case as the details were never made public. Their trials were held in camera. Every one concerned with the trial was under an oath not to reveal the proceedings of the court. The only source of information was the statement made by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, which was brief and vague. According to the statement of the Prime Minister "the aim of the conspiracy was to create commotion in the country by violent means, and, in furtherance of that purpose to subvert the loyalty of Pakistan's defence forces." The conspirators had planned to arrest the top military officers and the civil officials (i.e. Prime Minister and the Ministers) and seize effective power to establish dictatorship on communist-line. For this purpose economic and constitution-making missions were to be invited from the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

(Lahore, 1967), pp. 186-191.

⁶⁶ One of the main reasons for Ayub Khan's reluctance to ask Iskander Mirza to quit the office of the President after he (Ayub Khan) assumed power and declared Martial Law, was his close and friendly relations with him in the past. See: Khan, M. Ayub, *op. cit.* pp. 75-6.

⁶⁷ Khan, Fazal Mueqem, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

⁶⁸ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1951), p. 11396 and 11494-*The Pakistan Times*, 10th March 1951 and *New York Herald Tribune*, 22nd March 1951.

Twenty-one years after the conspiracy, Major General Akbar Khan, in an article published in an Urdu monthly, admitted that the final plans to overthrow the then Government were prepared on 23rd February 1951 at his residence. According to his disclosure, the civil Government was to be overthrown and a military council consisting of Generals set up in its

Major-General Akbar Khan, leader of 'the conspirators' disagreed with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on his policy on Kashmir and believed that a military solution of the problem was possible. He made no secret of his disagreement with the government policy. Although he was in service he openly advanced his views and developed ties with the communists.⁶⁹ The communist movement in Pakistan was narrowly based; limited to a small section of intelligentsia. They thought that cooperation with some politicized officer, might enable them to assume power. However, the 'plan' was uncovered before it could be launched.⁷⁰

'The Rawalpindi Conspiracy' confirmed that the civil government at that time was in a position to assert its authority and the military leaders believed that they must abide by the decision of the civil government. A few officers thought that they could disregard the decision of the civil leaders. The Army as a whole remained loyal to the government. The trial of 'the conspirators' was completed in about 18 months,⁷¹ and they were sentenced from 1 to 12 years's rigorous imprisonment.⁷² It had no effect on the morale of the armed forces. Some of the convicts had their relatives in the Commissioned Ranks of the Army. One of them was related to the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan. There appeared to be no sympathy with their cause; though a half-hearted attempt was made by some Muslim Leaguers and the opposition parties to launch a campaign to secure signatures for the release of the convicted persons.⁷³ But the movement did not catch on. In 1955, the Governor-General quietly remitted the unexpired portions of the

place. The new Government was to implement its policy on Kashmir and hold elections on the basis of adult franchise for the Constituent Assembly. The Army was to supervise these elections. He denied that they had any plan of arresting or killing anybody in pursuance of their objective. He accused General Ayub Khan of concocting the story that they were planning to use violent means to replace the then Government.

Khan, Akbar, "Pahli Jang-i-Kashmir Ki Fire-Bandi or Pindi Sazish Case." *Monthly Hikayat*, Vol. 5, No. 1, September 1972.

It must be pointed out here that Major-General Akbar Khan was Minister of State for National Security in Mr. Z. A. Bhutto's Government at the time of Publication of this article. This was his first appointment in a responsible Government post since his conviction in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case.

The present author wonders how 'the conspirators' could replace the legitimate civil government without arresting the Prime Minister and those senior military officers who did not see eye to eye with them.

⁶⁹ See General Ayub Khan's statement: *Daily Herald*, 12th March, 1951.

⁷⁰ *The Guardian* (Manchester), 11th May 1951 and *Pakistan News*, 26th May, 1951.

⁷¹ The accused were tried under: 'The Rawalpindi Conspiracy (Special Tribunal) Act, 1951' and the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (Special Tribunal) (Amendment) Act, 1952.

⁷² *Dawn*, 6th January 1953.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 28th October 1953.

sentence and all of them were-set free.⁷⁴

Throughout these years the military leadership concentrated its energies on maintaining a high standard of the three services. Particular attention was paid to the Army to make it a highly mobile and hard hitting force. Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the U.S. in May 1954 and joined the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The latter was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 after Iraq's withdrawal from the pact. The major reason for Pakistan's participation in these pacts was her desire to strengthen her defence *vis-a-vis* India. The pacts contributed towards achieving this goal. A military survey team headed by Brigadier General Henry F. Myres arrived in Pakistan in March 1954 to study the requirements of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. This was followed by the arrival of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (U.S.M.A.A.G.) to assist and advise the defence authorities of Pakistan. An enormous construction programme was carried out to improve air, sea and land defence. Pakistan created one full armoured division and one independent armoured brigade with the assistance of U.S. It also got equipment to bring seven infantry division to full strength. The assistance programme also included the building up a reserve strength of various arms of the Army. The airfields were improved to handle high-performance jets. The Air Force was equipped with modern aircraft, *i.e.* Sabre F-86, B-57 and F-104 Starfighters. The Karachi naval base was modernized and equipment was provided to build a new naval base at Chittagong; the size of the Navy was enlarged and new ships were obtained.

As a part of the modernization process, due attention was given to training and exercises of the troops. Military exercises were organized after regular intervals and new experiments were made in the techniques of warfare. Some of these exercises were supervised by the military experts of the U.S., the U.K., Iran and Turkey. Special attention was paid to the in-service educational and refresher courses for the officers. The Navy and the Air Force took part in the joint exercises of the SEATO and the CENTO. These exercises with the Navies and the Air Forces of the U.S., the U.K., Iran and Turkey enabled the Pakistan Navy and the Air Force to acquire the modern techniques of warfare. This made their experience rich, gave them greater confidence and increased their striking power and efficiency.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 7th October 1955.

Conclusions:

The political machinery in Pakistan degenerated rapidly after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah (1948) and Liaquat Ali Khan (1951). Pakistan suffered from the lack of clear and competent leadership and well-organized political parties capable of articulating and aggregating interests in a national political framework. The rise of regional and parochial forces, political corruption and open defiance of the norms of parliamentary democracy caused instability which undermined the efficacy of the governmental machinery. On the other hand the military was gaining strength. The strained relations with India and Afghanistan, troubles in the tribal areas of the North-West, and the fact that Pakistan had inherited comparatively weaker armed forces as well as the hostile regional environment in the early years of independence made Pakistan very security conscious. There was a general consensus in the country for maintaining a strong defence posture. The generous budgetary allocations for the military, Pakistan's participation in the SEATO and the CENTO and American military aid enabled the armed forces to acquire modern arms, equipment and aircraft which increased its efficiency and striking power, thereby giving greater confidence to the military.

The chaotic political conditions shifted the real political power from the representatives to the Head of the State. The Head of the State and the cabinet depended on the Civil Service to run the administration and on the Army to fight natural calamities, particular problems and to maintain law and order. The Army being well organized and disciplined, showed its willingness to assist any government determined to maintain law and order. Their role in the 'non-military' field gave them experience to handle civilian problems and exposed the incompetence of the civil government. With the passage of time the dependence of the civilian government on the military increased. This limited but continued participation of the military in the civilian affairs made the military an important actor in the decision making process at the national level and precipitated the decline of the civilian political institutions.

The Military Regime : 1958-62

The *coup d'état* in Pakistan in 1958 was the most striking example of how an apolitical military could slowly be drawn into the political field due to the failure of the political leaders to run liberal democratic institutions. The military which had the tradition of aloofness from politics, took no part in the attainment of independence, remained loyal to civil authority after independence and helped every government to maintain law and order, slowly became an important actor in the decision-making process and ultimately displaced the civil authority. The *coup d'état* did not modify the major objectives of the preceding governments. The goal of modernization, industrialization and democracy continued to be the objectives of the new regime; the approach to these goals was changed.

It was not until 1957 that the Army High-Command started thinking in terms of overthrowing the civil government in order to put an end to political malpractices. There were two instances which indicated that General Ayub Khan had realised that the Army might have to assume power in the country. He toured both East and West Pakistan extensively in 1957 and met the officers and men of the Army. Second, during Ayub's tour of East Pakistan, Major-General Umrao Khan (G.O.C. East Pakistan) arranged interviews with several political and local leaders to give him first hand information about the political situation. General Ayub Khan was reported to have said "if the people want me, I shall not shirk my duty." The senior commanders realized that they might have to step into the political field to salvage the situation but they did not want to be accused of premature overthrow of a civilian regime. They therefore watched the degeneration of politics and at times expressed their concern. In early 1958, few correspondents referred to political instability and asked General Ayub Khan how he proposed to defend Pakistan under such conditions if some hostile neighbour suddenly attacked. He replied, "Do not worry about the defence of the country. That is my business. Attend to your leaders who are

Khan, Fazal Muqem, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

wrecking the country. Do not talk of external dangers. The real danger is within the country. Cannot you see it?"²

Political Crisis:

The final stage of the collapse of parliamentary system was set in East Pakistan in March 1958. Chief Minister Ataur Rehman Khan (Awami League) failed to get his budget passed in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly. The Chief Minister requested Governor General Fazlul Haq, who belonged to Krishak Sramik Party, to prorogue the Assembly. The Governor did not accede to his request and dismissed his ministry on 31st March 1958. Abu Hussain Sarkar, leader of Krishak Sramik Party, was asked to form the ministry. Ataur Rehman approached Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon and asked him to remove Governor Fazlul Haq. On 1st April, Governor Fazlul Haq was dismissed and a civil servant was appointed Acting Governor.³ The Acting Governor dismissed Abu Hussain Sarkar's ministry. Thus, within a period of two days, one Governor and two Chief Ministers had been dismissed. Ataur Rehman was reappointed Chief Minister but his ministry was defeated on the floor of the House because the National Awami Party decided to abstain from voting. Abu Hussain Sarkar was recalled to form government. A few days later his government was defeated on the floor of the House because the National Awami Party decided to support the Awami League and voted against the Sarkar ministry. By that time the budget was still to be passed. The President imposed the President's Rule in the province which lasted for two months. Once again Ataur Rehman took over as Chief Minister but political conditions were as chaotic as ever. When the Provincial Assembly met on 21st September 1958, the party in power moved a vote of no-confidence against the Speaker because they suspected him of supporting the opposition. Before the motion could be passed, scuffles broke out between the government members and the members of the opposition parties in the Assembly chamber. The Speaker was assaulted. Two days later, the drama was repeated in the Provincial Assembly on a bigger scale. There was hand to hand fight and the members used furniture, microphone rods and whatever they could get, to throw at each other. Police was called to control the situation. The Deputy Speaker who was in the chair, and thirty members were injured. The Deputy Speaker later died in hospital.

² Ahmad, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 102-3.

³ Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon feared that if he did not do so, the Awami League might withdraw its support to him in the Centre.

Political conditions in West Pakistan were not so chaotic, but these were not satisfactory either. Dr. Khan formed the Republican Party with the blessings of President Iskander Mirza. The new party was a tool in the hands of Iskander Mirza. Most members were the deserters of the Muslim League, who were offered ministries and other rewards by the founders of the Republican Party. However, in the first election of Speaker, the Republican Party was saved from defeat by the casting vote of the presiding officer. Thereafter, it could stay in power only by manipulating a majority by hook or crook. Elections were promised but were never held. Corruption and political bargaining had become the order of the day. In March 1958, Dr. Khan Saheb was assassinated in Lahore. One writer described Pakistan's political condition in these words:

Pakistan was very much like Hobbes' state of nature where every political or provincial group fought against every other group. It was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power. Most of the leaders thought of themselves, their families, or at best their provincial groups and did not give a second thought to Pakistan. Pakistan needed a desperate remedy for this malady.⁴

Pakistan was in the grip of the severe economic crisis in 1958. "The scarcity of consumer goods, the rising prices, the shortage of food, large scale deficit financing by the government and financial indiscipline, were all unmistakable indications of a declining economy."⁵ The government Treasury was empty and foreign exchange reserves were down to Rs. 240 million, of which about Rs. 140 million were not negotiable. The country was incurring foreign exchange liability to the extent of Rs. 30 million every month.⁶ Though uncertain weather conditions and crop failures played their part, the main reason was the widespread political confusion in the country. No government could give serious thought to the economy and evolve practical and lasting solutions of the economic problems of Pakistan. The First Five-Year Plan (1955-60) was not prepared until one year after the commencement of the Plan period and was published two years later, i.e. 1958. Smuggling, black-marketing and hoarding had penetrated deep into the economic life of Pakistan. There was widespread industrial unrest and strikes became common.

The impotence of the political leadership and general corruption in the society as compared with the well integrated and disciplined organization of

⁴ Sayeed, K.B., Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIII No. 4, Autumn, 1959.

⁵ *Years of Progress: 1958-61*; (Karachi, 1961), p. 2.

⁶ The figures about foreign exchange reserves and the liabilities have been taken from: Khan, M. Ayub, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

the armed forces and their role in the maintenance of law and order, led to a perception amongst the higher military command that it was they who had to maintain law and order and keep the state intact. General Ayub Khan was under constant pressure from different circles in the Army to do something to check political turmoil in the country. He came to know that "a coup d'état of the kind which had brought General Kassim into control of Iraq, was being prepared."⁷ The danger at this stage was that if the senior commanders did not react to the worsening political situation, the younger officers might become impatient and attempt a coup or take sides with some politicians. The politicians were aware of the fact that the armed forces were the only institution free of intrigues of the type which characterized the political system. They had started establishing contacts with the officers and issuing statements to bring the armed forces into the political arena. The government issued an ordinance to deal with actions and statements tending to impair the discipline of the armed forces to check the attempts of the politicians to win support in the armed forces.⁸

The coupe in Egypt (July 1952), Iraq (July 1958) and Burma (September 1958), which were passing through a period of political instability, and the political developments in France, had an impact on the minds of the Generals and the people of Pakistan who were perturbed by the degeneration of politics. There was a general feeling amongst the educated people that there was no possibility of the politicians changing or reforming their methods. The only way out of this turmoil, it was said (though in a low tone) was the replacement of the parliamentary system by an appropriate system of government" which could ensure political stability and economic development. The people had started looking towards the Army to provide strong leadership. An impression of frustration and disillusion with the existing conditions could be gathered from the political commentaries appearing in various Pakistani and foreign weeklies and monthly magazines and daily newspapers. Some of the magazines and journals and the people had started talking about 'the Army take-over' to clean up the mess created by the politicians.

The Declaration of Martial Law.

It was after the death of the Deputy Speaker of the East Pakistan Assembly in the last week of September 1958 that the Army finally made up its mind to displace the civil government. The Chief of the General Staff was asked by the C-in-C to prepare a plan for the take-over of the civil

⁷ Williams, L.F.R., *The State of Pakistan*; (London, 1962), p. 182.

⁸ *Dawn*, 10th June, 1958.

administration. By 3rd October the plan was ready. The plan envisaged the take-over in the middle of October but the political conditions changed so rapidly that the C-in-C decided to advance the date.⁹

In the first week of October, the Muslim League threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement.¹⁰ Its National Guards had started parading the streets of many cities in defiance of the government ban on the maintenance of military and para-military organizations. On 6th October the Muslim League organized such a big demonstration in Karachi on the arrival of its President, that the police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd. Another serious crisis developed when the former ruler of Kalat State, in view of the political confusion in the country, announced the secession of Kalat from Pakistan. He refused to visit Karachi on the invitation of the President to discuss the constitutional position of Kalat. He removed the Pakistan Flag from the Miri Fort (Kalat) and hoisted his old Kalat State Flag. The Army moved in swiftly and arrested the former ruler of Kalat.¹¹

The military take-over and the declaration of Martial Law was completed in two phases. The first phase began on the night of 7th October, 1958. President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution, the central and provincial assemblies were dissolved, the central and provincial cabinets were dismissed, political parties were also banned and General Ayub Khan was appointed Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Martial Law was declared throughout Pakistan. In his proclamation, President Iskander Mirza explained the circumstances which forced him to take this step. He said that the pathetic political conditions and the growing corruption in the society and the inability of the politicians to change their ways had left him

⁹ Khan, Fazal Muqeem, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

¹⁰ *Dawn*, 5th October, 1958.

The Pakistan Times, 5th and 7th October, 1958.

Kalat acceded to Pakistan on 31st March 1948. There was least interference of the Government of Pakistan in the internal affairs of the State. The Chief Minister was the head of the Government. He was appointed by the Khan of Kalat in consultation with the Government of Pakistan. There was a semi-representative legislature of the State in 1952 Kalat alongwith Makran, Las belia, and Khara formed the Baluchistan States Union (B.S.U.) as federated unit of Pakistan. The administration of the B.S.U. was directed by a Chief Minister who was appointed by the Council of Rulers. But he could not be dismissed without the permission of the Government of Pakistan. According to the Instrument of accession the Ruler of the B.S.U. (The Khan of Kalat) ceded "his sovereignty and all his rights, authority and Powers" to Pakistan. The rulers, their families and children were entitled to all personal privileges and titles enjoyed by them within or outside their states before this merger. The Government of Pakistan was to ensure the succession according to the law and custom of the state concerned. In 1955, the B. S. U. was absorbed in the integrated province of West Pakistan.

with no alternative but to take this step.¹² General Ayub Khan addressed the nation on 8th October, 1958, and explained that the Army entered politics "with great reluctance but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country."¹³ He asked the people to cooperate with the new government to put the things right. His statement concluded with a note of warning for the political leaders, smugglers and black-marketeers and disruptionists:—

The soldiers and the people are sick of the sight of you. So it will be good for yourself to turn a new leaf and begin to behave, otherwise, retribution will be swift and sure.¹⁴

The whole affair was conducted with great caution and secrecy. Only the President, the Commanders-in-Chief of the three services and a few senior Generals knew about it. The Prime Minister and his cabinet did not know anything. A few hours earlier, the Prime Minister had redistributed portfolios and included new ministers in the cabinet. On the next morning the news about the declaration of Martial Law and the re-allocation of the portfolios and new appointments could be seen in the newspapers. The decision to impose Martial Law was taken by the President on the initiative of General Ayub Khan.¹⁵ The Prime Minister was communicated the decision by a letter of the President to him on the same night. Other ministers and political leaders came to know about it when they looked at the morning newspapers on 8th October, 1958. The troops which had been kept at the outskirts of Karachi to help the civil administration to maintain law and order in the city, moved in to take the control of the government buildings and key points in the city.

Twenty days later the second phase started when the Army Generals forced Iskander Mirza to resign the office of President. The nature of the relationship between the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator during these days (7th to 27th October 1958) was difficult to determine. With the abrogation of the Constitution and the declaration of Martial Law, the real political power had slipped into the hands of the Army. The Army Commanders made it explicitly clear that the authority rested with them and

¹² For the full text of the Proclamation, see, Appendix "B".

¹³ For the full text of his statement, see, Appendix "C".

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ In an interview with Patrick Sergeant, General Ayub Khan, said, (President Iskander Mirza was also present there at the time of the interview). "We both came to the conclusion that the country was going to dogs and I said to the President, 'Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your responsibility to bring a change about. If you do not, we (the Army) will force a change....' The plans had been ready sometime but it was the President's decision when to put them into action." *Daily Mail*, 10th October, 1958.

not with the President.¹⁶ President Iskander Mirza himself realized that he could not continue as the head of the state for a long period of time as his post had become meaningless and he could not totally dissociate himself from the political turmoil of the past. General Ayub Khan and his Generals became convinced that Iskander Mirza had to go so that the new regime could delink itself from a person who was closely connected with the conditions which led to political confusion in the country. Three Generals went to see the President on behalf of General Ayub Khan on the night of 27th October 1958, and asked him to resign. Iskander Mirza silently obliged. He was moved to Quetta the next day. Later he was flown to London 'on his own request'. General Ayub Khan combined in himself the offices of the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Thus he became the undisputed leader of the country. He relinquished the office of the C-in-C of the Army and appointed General Mohammad Musa as the C-in-C of the Army.

The Nature of The Military Regime.

The Military authorities did not face opposition in consolidating their position. Not a single shot was fired and not a single person lost his life at the time of the military take-over. The people were worried about the future, but there were few who shed tears on the replacement of the parliamentary system by the military regime except those whose interests were directly threatened. In fact, there was a feeling of relief amongst the general public with the hope that the Army might succeed in providing clean and stable government. On the first day of Martial Law, life was normal in all the major cities of Pakistan. Educational institutions, government and semi-government offices were open. The Army moved in all the major cities and took control of the key points and the government buildings but tanks and armoured cars did not appear in the streets. It was due to the reason that the Army was "conspicuously efficient and conspicuously incorrupt. It was small army—no larger than eight divisions—and this had helped in maintaining its morale. It was tightly knit and well disciplined. It took pride in maintaining the traditions derived from the British Army. It was competent because it lived by a time-table, and nobody else in Pakistan dreamed of doing so".¹⁷ One writer commented:

¹⁶ In his interview referred to in the earlier footnote, General Ayub Khan said: "The Army has the ultimate responsibility. If the president does not react to a situation or if his successor (Mirza) does something useless—I will act and decision will be mine". President Iskander Mirza, who was also present there, agreed that having abrogated the Constitution, he had no right to be in office at all. He said, "My authority is the revolution." *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Wint, G., *The 1958 Revolution in Pakistan*; *St. Antony's papers* No. 8, 1960.

The military leaders who seized the government enjoyed over the predecessors an increment in the capacity to coerce.... The rigorous discipline of the troops improved prospects of implementation. Perhaps more important, the military leaders also enjoyed an increment in the capacity to persuade. The Armed Forces were genuinely popular. Their past record of protecting Muslim lives and property during the post-partition massacres and in Kashmir inspired confidence. In general, soldiers were exempted from the resentment which had crystalized against the deposed government. Their reputation for integrity was untainted. The Army, it was widely hoped, would be more responsive to popular aspirations and more effective in improving the standard of living.¹⁸

A glimpse of public re-action to the new regime can be observed from the comments of the editor of the *Pakistan Observer*, Dacca:

From the tone of the letters we are receiving daily, it would appear that the common man is much more optimistic in airing his complaints and grievances now-a-days than he has been in the past. Previously they added in riders saying such things as, 'Of course, nothing will be done about it', or 'it is probably waste of time for me to bring this matter to the attention of the authorities through your columns' etc. . . . It remained a fact, however, their pessimism was justified since, in almost every case, no action whatsoever, was taken to rectify them.¹⁹

The Army largely depended on the civil administration to run the country. It set up a unified command of the civil and military organization. The Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan, who was a civil servant, was appointed Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. The Chief Martial Law Administrator was assisted by an advisory council consisting of the Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan, and Central Secretaries of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Industries, Commerce, Economic Affairs and Works, Irrigation and Power. The country was divided into three zones: Zone A consisted of Karachi Federal area; Zone B comprised the rest of West Pakistan and Zone C comprised East Pakistan. Zones B and C were further divided into sub-zones. The administration went so far as the civil districts. Each zone and sub-zone had a Martial Law Administrator and Sub-Martial Law Administrator respectively. There were a slight change in upper organizational structure on 28th October, 1958 after President Iskander Mirza had resigned. A Presidential cabinet was appointed and the Commanders-in-chief of the three services were appointed Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators (originally there were four Deputy Chief

¹⁸ Von Vorys, K. *Political Development in Pakistan*; (Princeton: N.J. 1965), pp. 146-7.

¹⁹ *The Pakistan Observer*, 12th November, 1958.

Martial Law Administrators). The lower organization remained unchanged. Table VII lays out the chart of Martial Law Administration.

TABLE VII

Part A.

MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION

(October 8-27, 1958)

1. President
2. Chief Martial Law Administrator

Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator
(Secretary General Government of Pakistan)

Advisory Council

Chairman: Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Members: Secretary General, Government of Pakistan; Secretaries of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Industries, Commerce, Economic Affairs and Works, Irrigation and Power.

Zone A
(Karachi & Malir)
Martial Law
Administrator

Zone B
(West Pakistan
less Zone A)
Martial Law
Administrator

Zone C
(East Pakistan)
Martial Law
Administrator

Part B.

MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION

(After 27th 1958)

President and Chief Martial Law
Administrator

President
Cabinet

Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators
1. The C-in-C of the Army.
2. The C-in-C of the Navy.
3. The C-in-C of the Air Force.
4. Secretary General, Government of Pakistan (*).

Zone A
(Karachi & Malir)
Martial Law
Administrator

Zone B
(West Pakistan
less Zone A)
Martial Law
Administrator

Zone C
(East Pakistan)
Martial Law
Administrator

(*) He relinquished the post on October 30, 1958. After that only three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators were left.

Notes:- Martial Law Zone B and C were further divided into sub-Martial Law Zones with Sub-Martial Law Administrators. Each Sub-Martial Law Zone comprised one or two civil divisions.

The civil administration of the provinces was headed by two Provincial Governors (one for each province) directly responsible to the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The Chief Martial Law Administrator issued the Continuance in Force Order, 1958, which declared that till the promulgation of a new constitution Pakistan would be governed as nearly as possible in accordance with the abrogated constitution. The Supreme Court, High Courts, and the lower courts were allowed to function but the fundamental rights were suspended and no order of Martial Law and no decision of the Military Courts could be challenged in any court of law. The regular courts also did not come in the way of the New Regime. On 27th October 1958, the Supreme Court of Pakistan put its stamp of approval on the military regime. In a judgement, the Chief Justice of Pakistan observed:—

If the attempt to break the Constitution fails, those who sponsor or organise it, are judged by the existing Constitution as guilty of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the person assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the New Regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success... Thus a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a Constitution.²⁰

The dependence of the Army on the civil administration to run the

²⁰ The State v. Dosso and another P.L.D. 1958, Supreme Court, pp. 533-70.

In April 1972, the Supreme Court overruled this judgement in : Asma Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab and others, P.L.D. 1972, Supreme Court, pp. 139-270.

country was partly due to the limitation of the military to run the civil administration exclusive of the civil servants and partly due to the fact that the Army consolidated its position without any difficulty. The civil servants, who had in fact, run the country in the past, happily shifted their loyalties to the new leaders because they released them from the handicaps and inhibitions from which they were suffering in the past. It, as a matter of fact, simplified the line of command and provided them the cover of Martial Law. The composition of the President's Cabinet reflected a mixture of civil and military leadership. Excluding General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan, the Cabinet included three Lieutenant-Generals, two of whom were Sandhurst trained and one, who belonged to the medical corps, took his M.D. at St. Andrews University (the U.K.). Three members of his Cabinet were former public servants. The Cabinet also included a businessman, an educationist, a former diplomat and two lawyers. One of the lawyers hailed from Lahore and the other belonged to Larkana (Sind). One of the eight non-military members of the Cabinet, was related to a former President of the Muslim League. One of them was the member of the First Constituent Assembly and had been an active Muslim Leaguer for a number of years.

The operation of Martial Law through the Civil machinery did not mean that the real power was in the hands of the civil service. The Army served as the brain and the civil servants as the hands of the new regime. The Army was conscious of the fact that it needed the help of the civil servants to run the administration. The civil servants knew that they could not continue in service if they worked against the wishes of the new leaders. The Martial Law authorities had dismissed and retired a good number of civil servants. The other civil servants knew that they could also be dismissed on the charges of mal-administration and treason. The compromise suited both. The Army authorities wanted their decisions to be implemented and the civil servants took the opportunity to exercise greater powers under the protection of Martial Law. Had the civil servants attempted to sabotage the plans of the Army authorities, the Army would have certainly reacted to control the situation.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan was convinced that Pakistan's problems could be solved if these were properly investigated, and the right decisions were made and enforced. This reflected his experience as the C-in-C of the Army. Whenever there was some serious problem concerning the re-organization of the Army, he appointed an expert committee to study the problem. After the receipt of the report, necessary orders were issued in the light of the recommendations. He adopted the same method to eradicate the evils of the political system of Pakistan. He appointed various commissions/committees to report on different matters. Their recommendations were implemented through Martial Law Orders. The

Following Table includes the expert commissions appointed during 1958-

TABLE VIII

**Inquiry Commissions and Committees set up by the
Martial Law Administration**

Commission	Date of appointment	Date of submission of report	Chairman
Land Reform Commission	30-10-1958	20-1-1959	Akhtar Hussain, Governor of West Pakistan
Maritime Commission	19-11-1958	8-4-1959	Admiral H. M. S. Choudhry, C-in-C of the Navy.
Administrative re-organization Committee	2-12-1958	25-4-1962	G. Ahmad, A Senior Civil Servant.
National Education Commission	30-12-1958	26-8-1959	S. M. Sharif, Secretary, Ministry of Education.
Federal Capital Commission	21-1-1959	12-6-1959	Major-General A. M. Yahya Khan, Chief of General Staff.
Provincial Administration Commission	6-2-1959	Not Known	Akhtar Hussain, Governor of West Pakistan.
Credit Inquiry Commission	24-2-1959	10-9-1959	Abdul Qadir, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan.
Rate Inquiry Commission	8-6-1959	24-12-1959	Zakir Hussain, Governor of East Pakistan.

Scientific Commission	15-7-1959	8-9-1960	Abul Kassim Khan, Minister of Industries.
Food & Agric. Commission	8-7-1959	29-11-1960	Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, Governor of West Pakistan.
Pay & Services Commission	31-8-1959	1-6-1962	Justice A. R. Cornelius, Judge, Supreme Court.
Law Reform Commission	23-11-1958	27-12-1961	Justice S. A. Rehman, Judge, Supreme Court.
Company Law Commission	15-10-1959	27-12-1961	I. I. Chundrigar, later Sharif-ud-Din Pirzada.
Medical Reform Commission.	19-11-1959	16-4-1960	Not Known.
Committee on Sports, Youth Movement & Art.	10-12-1959	6-8-1960	Habibur Rehman, Central Education Minister.
Police Commission	2-1-1960	19-5-1961	Justice G. B. Constantine, Judge, High Court of West Pakistan.
Constitution Commission	17-2-1960	6-5-1961	Justice Shahbuddin, former Chief Justice of Supreme Court.
Commission on Price Structure.	18-2-1960	3-7-1960	I. I. Chundrigar, a former Prime Minister.
Film Fact Finding Committee	10-3-1960	28-4-1961	N. M. Khan, Secretary and Director, Project Division.
Surplus Manpower Commission	18-10-1960	7-7-1961	Major General Fazal Mueqem Khan.
Commission on Eradication of Social Evils.	13-1-1961	18-6-1963	Maulvi Ghulam Mohy-uddin Khan Kasuri; later Prof. A. B. A. Haleem.

Power Commission	12-5-1961	8-8-1962	Not Known
Finance Commission	12-12-1961	15-1-1962	H. A. Majid, Secretary, Finance (Economic Division).

The following commission were appointed before the Army took over the administration of the country but their reports were implemented by the New Regime.

Marriage and Family Laws Commission	4-8-1954	1-6-1956	Justice Abdul Rashid, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Sugar Commission	30-9-1957	4-8-1959	Mian Afzal Hussain, Vice Chancellor, Punjab University.
Press Commission	5-9-1958	4-5-1959	Justice H. B. Tyabji, former Chief Judge, Sind Chief Court.

Only in the first few weeks of the Martial Law the Army showed their strength to the people. The junior officers searched private houses for hidden gold and extracted information about black marketers and hoarders with threats of arrest or fines. Some of the prominent politicians were arrested on the charges of corruption and misuse of office. Ayub Khan soon realized that an excessive display of force by the Army officers might cause the loss of the goodwill that existed between the armed forces and the public. In the second week of November 1958, the troops were withdrawn from all over Pakistan as the civil administration was "now functioning effectively."²¹

The military regime did not face a real challenge and no organized attempt was made to dislodge it from power. An isolated effort was planned by an ex-civil servant and eight others to create trouble on 14th August 1959 (12th Anniversary of Independence). The plan envisaged the distribution of anti-government posters, which read: "Due to mounting tyranny and atrocities of the government, Miss Fatima Jinnah (Mader-i-Millat) has

²¹ Dawn, 11th, 12th November 1958.

Jinnah to leave the country at any cost and that we will establish democratic administration based on republican constitution which was in accordance with the wishes of Mr. Jinnah." The plot was uncovered before it could be implemented. Seven persons were sentenced to 10 years' hard labour and two received sentence of 7 years each by a military court. In February 1961, President Ayub Khan remitted their sentences and all of them were set free.²² Another challenge, though not a very serious one, came from the students of East Pakistan in the last five months of Martial Law. This was partly due to their grievances against the educational system and the report of the Education Commission and partly because of the fact that Pakistan was about to have a new Constitution. The political leaders of East Pakistan, especially Awami Leaguers attempted to use the students to press the Martial Law Regime to make a constitution of their liking, guaranteeing 'full autonomy' to East Pakistan. There were widespread disturbances in East Pakistan in February and March 1962. Ayub Khan accused the political leaders of exploiting the students. Some of the prominent Awami Leaguers, including H. S. Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, were arrested. This spread student agitation to various cities including Dacca, Barisal, Khushia, Chittagong, Sylhet, Khulna and Noakhali. The police and the Army used force to disperse the students many times during these months. A large number of students were arrested and classes at Dacca University were suspended. The students demanded the release of students and political detainees, withdrawal of warrant of arrest still unexecuted, and guarantee of civil liberties. The tense situation continued until a month before the withdrawal of Martial law when all the arrested students were released and the pending cases against them were withdrawn.²³ The fear of reprisal, severe punishments, the general respect which the military commanded and the weak democratic traditions were the main factors responsible for the smooth running of the Martial Law Regime in Pakistan.

Though it was a military regime, the military leaders built up public support for the regime and gave the impression of civil government. The ministers toured both the wings of Pakistan extensively and explained the intentions and programme of the regime. Ayub Khan himself toured both the wings of Pakistan and tried to secure public support. His one week 'whistle stop' tour of West Pakistan in a train called "Pak Jambhuriat Special" in December 1959 and a similar tour of East Pakistan in January

²² Miss Fatima Jinnah was not associated with the plot. Her name was used by those involved in the plot. For the details of the case see: *New York Times* 13th August, 25th October, 1959, *The Times*, 25th October 1959, *Dawn*, 28 October, 1959, 26th February, 1961.

²³ For the details of the important incidents see, *Dawn*, 10th, 12th, 13th February, 1962; 25th, 31st March, 1962 and 17th, 18th April 1962.

1960, helped to build Ayub's image as a popular leader.

Ayub Khan decided to hold a referendum through the Basic Democrats to obtain their confidence and authority to formulate a new constitution.²⁴ The referendum was held on 14th February 1960. The voters could express their opinion by marking 'Yes' or 'No' on the ballot papers. Out of 78720 votes cast, 75282 expressed their confidence in him. Three days later he was sworn in as the President of Pakistan. After the referendum he was often referred to as 'the first elected President of Pakistan'. Freedom of speech and press was curbed and political parties were banned, but the government, unlike many military governments of other developing countries, was generally tolerant of criticism. The lawyers were particularly critical of the military regime. The establishment of the military courts had hit their income. On many occasions, Ayub Khan expressed his indignation on the expensive and delayed justice and expressed the desire to simplify the system. The Bar Associations, on the other hand, often criticised the Martial Law Administration in carefully chosen words for suppressing liberties and fundamental rights. When, in 1960, the Constitution Commission was appointed, a dialogue started between the supporters of the parliamentary system and the presidential system. Some of the former politicians availed of the opportunity to make their views known to the public. A few of them published their replies to the Constitution Commission's questionnaire. The government disallowed public discussion of the issues under the consideration of the commission because the government feared that public debate may cause political controversy before the Constitution commission could complete its work. Moreover, the regime also did not want the former politicians to mobilise support for their view point.

The Military Regime

After the assumption and consolidation of power, it is essential for the military rulers to justify their action. This is done by two methods. First the military rulers must convince the people that they were not interested in politics, but the conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that they could no longer sit and watch the ruination of the country as silent spectators. It was their ultimate responsibility to defend and protect the country from external enemies and such elements within the state who might threaten to disrupt social, political and economic order of the society. Second, they take certain steps to 'reform' the social and political structure and introduce measures to improve the living conditions of the common

²⁴ Presidential (Elections and Constitution) Order, 1960. *The Gazette of Pakistan*, 13th January, 1960.

man. The military leaders of Pakistan found ample material available to justify their assumption of power. They successfully created the impression that they had assumed power to eradicate the evils which had crept into the economic, social and political life of Pakistan during the last eleven years, and that they wanted to introduce a system of government which suited the peculiar conditions and circumstances of the country. If we carefully examine the statements made by Ayub Khan and his ministers, we can find three themes running throughout. First, the selfish and opportunist politicians had brought the country to the brink of a serious disaster. The lack of character amongst the politicians had encouraged dissension rather than unity in the country and the people were torn apart by provincial bickerings. Second, the 1956 Constitution was an unworkable document; parliamentary system of government did not suit the circumstances and conditions of the people. It gave free hand to the politicians who were responsible for the political crisis in Pakistan. The military regime intended to give a constitution which would provide guarantees against the repetition of the 1947-58 story, and ensure stability and continuity. Third, the various steps taken by the new regime were calculated to improve the lot of the people and would ultimately ensure economic development and political stability. They were determined to solve the problems facing the political system of Pakistan.

The military leaders of Pakistan introduced a number of measures, which can be described as follows:

- (a) Steps to eradicate corruption, nepotism in civil service, black marketing, smuggling and similar evils in the society.
- (b) Measures to ensure economic development, industrialization and better standards of living to the people.
- (c) A political framework for the future.

Reforms in the Society

The Army authorities moved very quickly to check corruption, black-marketing and hoarding. The Army and police raided suspected hoarders and smugglers and recovered a large quantity of foodgrain. During the first few days after the declaration of Martial Law, contraband goods, other than foodstuff, bales of cloth and imported luxury goods to the value of Rs. 835,500 (£ 62,625) and imported cloth the value of Rs. 529 lakhs (£ 3,967,500) were recovered from various parts of Pakistan.²⁵ Later, when the regulations were issued for the declaration of stocks of foodstuff, medicine,

²⁵ Feldman, H., *Revolution in Pakistan* (London, 1967), p. 7.

imported goods and cement etc., a spectacular amount was brought to the notice of the authorities. 36,79,767 maunds of foodgrain including wheat and rice were declared surplus by 31st October 1958.²⁶ Martial Law Regulations fixed the prices of a number of commodities which appeared in the daily budget of the common man.²⁷ Punishments ranging from 14 years' rigorous imprisonment to death could be awarded for violating any of the Martial Law Regulations dealing with hoarding, black marketing and adulteration or selling consumer goods at a rate higher than the fixed rate. This resulted in a downward trend in the prices of essential commodities. Prices of many goods including "ghee" went down by 25 per cent. Various trade associations and manufacturers voluntarily reduced prices and advertised these in the newspapers for general information.²⁸ The streets of major cities were thronged with people, who, for the first time, could buy goods like crockery, cloth and other essential commodities at reasonable prices. To check the smuggling of goods to India and Afghanistan security measures were tightened on the international borders. The effectiveness of these measures was obvious by the fact that the prices of various essential commodities in border district of East Punjab rose and Calcutta faced a serious shortage of fish.²⁹

The economic conditions of Pakistan were aggravated by the illegal possession of foreign exchange, the submission of false tax returns, the evasion of taxes and the sale and purchase of import permits. The Martial Law authorities issued strict orders to check these illegal practices. All of these were declared offences under Martial Law Regulations. The military authorities ordered the surrender of foreign exchange and the payment of unpaid taxes within a prescribed time. The amount of foreign exchange voluntarily surrendered was quite substantial. Foreign exchange surrendered locally amounted to Rs. 40.6 million while unauthorised foreign exchange held abroad by Pakistani nationals was to the extent of Rs. 42 million.³⁰ The government collected Rs. 240 million (£ 18,000,000) as tax on excess income and hidden wealth worth Rs. 1340 million (£ 100,500,000) was detected.³¹ The sale and purchase of import permits was declared illegal with a maximum punishment of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.

The military authorities moved against the corrupt officials or those

²⁶ *The Pakistan Times*, 9th November, 1958.

²⁷ See, for example, *Ibid.*, 13th October, 1958.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 12th October, 1958 and *Dawn*, 14th October, 1958.

²⁹ *The Pakistan Times*, 30th October, 1958 and *The Times of India*, 2nd November, 1958.

³⁰ *Pakistan Under the New Regime*; (Karach, n. d.), p. 7.

³¹ Feldman, H., *op. cit.*, p. 52.

who had the reputation of being corrupt. A large number of screening committees were set up both in the centre and the provinces to look into the past conduct of the government servants. These committees were first constituted in January 1959 and were reconstituted in April 1959. The details as to how these committees conducted their business were not known, but one thing was quite clear that these committees completed their work very quickly. On the recommendation of these committees the central government took action against 1662 officials on the charges of misconduct, corruption, reputation of being corrupt, inefficiency and insubordination. The action against them ranged from dismissal and compulsory retirement to demotion. These civil servants included thirteen officers who belonged to the Civil Service of Pakistan, three to the Foreign Service and fifteen to the Police Service of Pakistan.³² Table IX gives the details of the officials of the central government against whom punitive action was taken.

TABLE IX

The officials against whom punitive action was taken

Nature of Action	Class I (Top Grade)	Class II (Intermediate Grade)	Class III (Clerical Grade)	Total
Dismissed	84	14	110	823
Compulsory Retired		68	547	
Reduced in rank		31	163	194
Put on special Report	25	88	362	475
Increment stopped	1	5		6
Warnings issued	27	14	121	162
Government displeasure communicated to the Officer	1	1		2
Total:	138	221	1303	1662

³² Dawn, 28th June, 1959 and The Pakistan Times, 3rd July, 1959.

Ayub Khan wanted to eliminate the influence of the politicians from the body-politic because he considered them responsible for the past ills of the polity. To keep these politicians out of offices of responsibility, two orders, namely, Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) were promulgated in 1959. The terms of the former Order were not much different from the PRODA. It applied to all those who held public offices and were found guilty of misconduct and corruption. It was applied with retrospective effect from 14th August 1947. Anybody found guilty by a tribunal consisting of not less than two persons, one of whom had to be a serving or former Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, could be disqualified from holding any office of responsibility for a period not exceeding fifteen years. He could also be ordered to make good any loss to the public revenue, or forfeit any gain to himself, arising from his misconduct. The main difference between the PRODA and the PODO was that under the latter Order, the members of public could apply for investigation against any former public servant without any cash deposit. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order 1959 (EBDO) was an extension of the PODO. It was issued to simplify the procedure of inquiry under the PODO and to call to book those persons who never held a public office but were merely members of legislature. It was thought that the PODO was inadequate to deal with the cases of such persons. It authorised special tribunals to try the former politicians for 'Misconduct'. The term 'Misconduct' covered bribery, corruption, nepotism, favouritism and wilful mal-administration. The former ministers, deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries and the members of the legislative bodies charged for 'Misconduct' had the option to retire from public life for a period of six years beginning from 1st January 1960 or to take the case to a special tribunal constituted under the EBDO. Three tribunals were constituted — one for the Centre and two for the two Provinces. The Central Tribunal was presided over by a Judge of the Supreme Court. It also included one former civil servant and a Lieutenant-Colonel. Each of the Provincial tribunals was presided over by a former Judge of the High Court of the Province concerned. It also included one former civil servant and a Lieutenant-Colonel. If the tribunal found the charges true, the person was automatically debarred from public life till 31st December 1966 (Six years). Except a few, H. S. Suhrawardy, C. E. Gibbon and Makhdoom Hassan Mahmood, all of them decided to retire and did not take their cases to the tribunal. The exact number of the politicians including ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries, who were served with the notices and later disqualified, was not known. Unofficial sources claimed that approximately 5000 to 6000 persons were

excluded from public life.³³ These figures appear to be highly inflated because the number of the members of the two Constituent Assemblies and all the Provincial Assemblies from 1947 to 1958 was not more than 1600. The government announced that it would publish a white paper about the 'misdeeds' of the EBDOed politicians.³⁴ Since the white paper was never issued, one cannot help quoting the inflated figures.

Another reform which had far-reaching impact on the social set up was the imposition of the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, to regulate the number of wives and the pattern of divorce. It was based on the report of the Marriage and Family Laws Commission, originally appointed on 4th August, 1954. The Commission submitted its report on 1st June 1956. It recommended that there should be compulsory registration of marriages and divorces, the second or subsequent marriages could not be contracted without permission from a court, and divorce could be effective through courts. The commission recommended a minimum marriageable age limit for males as well as females and the provision of maintenance allowance for the divorced women and their children. The then government did not implement any of the recommendations of the Marriage and Family Laws Commission. The Martial Law Regime gave a careful consideration to the report and issued the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and West Pakistan Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1962. The Family Laws Ordinance provided that every marriage solemnized was to be registered with the Union Council/Union Committee (lowest tier of the Basic Democracies system) of the concerned locality on the payment of a nominal fee. The Union Councils/ Union Committees were to appoint Nikah Registrars (Marriage Registrars). The Ordinance also provided that nobody was allowed to contract second or subsequent marriage without reference to Union Council/Union Committee. The Union Council/Union Committee could grant permission only under certain special circumstances—if permission has been obtained from the first wife, the applicant's financial

³³ The Guardian, dated 18th February, 1960, puts the figures as 5000. Karl Von Vorys claims that approximately 7000 persons were excluded from political life. See: Von Vorys K., op. cit., p. 190.

Herbert Feldman in *Revolution in Pakistan* (p. 81) considered the figure 6000 as high. Incomplete information was provided by the Pakistan Press, Director General, Anti-Corruption Department, disclosed that investigation was being conducted against 150 provincial ministers and 600 members of Legislature in west Pakistan. (The Pakistan Times, 11th August, 1959). No final figures were released. It was also not disclosed officially as to how many central ministers and members of the National Assembly were EBDOed. A news item appearing in the Pakistan Times, 17th January, 1960 pointed out that over 300 persons were said to have been EBDOed. It did not give any details and thus could not remove the confusion.

³⁴ Dawn, 28th December, 1960.

conditions enabled him to support more than one wife, and the first wife had no objection, the previous wife is dead or any other special reason, i.e. no issues etc. A person intending to divorce his wife must give notice to this effect to the Chairman of his Union Council/Union Committee with a copy to his wife. The Chairman constituted an Arbitration Council, consisting of three persons with himself as the head. Both husband and wife nominated one member each. The Arbitration Council tried to bring about a reconciliation. If the reconciliation was not achieved, divorce became effective after 90 days from the day notice was given. In case the husband did not provide maintenance to his wife, she could make a complaint to the Union Council/Union Committee of the area and she could also apply for a divorce. The minimum marriageable age for girls was raised from 14 to 16 years. All these measures were calculated to improve the status of women in society and to restrict the powers of males to contract marriage and give divorce under the traditional principles of Islam. The Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, also introduced an amendment in the Sunni Muslim Laws of inheritance. According to the Sunni Laws of inheritance, a grandson could not inherit the property of his grandfather, if grandson's father died in the lifetime of his father. Now grandsons were made eligible to inherit such property. The Ordinance did not face opposition at the time of its introduction but immediately after the restoration of constitutional life in 1962, a bill was introduced in the National Assembly to repeal the Ordinance.³⁵ Some of the orthodox Muslim organizations and religious leaders regarded it un-Islamic. The women organizations agitated against the bill and the Government expressed its determination to keep the Family Laws on the statute book. Thus the attempt to repeal the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, failed. The opposition to the Ordinance by the Jamat-i-Islami and certain other orthodox groups continued.

The Martial Law Regime appointed Law Reforms Commission in December 1959 to suggest improvements in the legal system inherited from the British. The terms of reference of the Commission included:

"To suggest how justice may better and more speedily be done, and to that end to examine":

1. the hierarchy of the courts and their powers;
2. the making of judicial appointments;
3. the standard and content of legal education and qualifications for

³⁵ Dawn, 4th July, 1962.

Another attempt to repeal the Family Laws Ordinance was made in 1972. A resolution to this effect was moved in the National Assembly. After a long discussion the National Assembly rejected the resolution. See: *The Sun*, 22nd September, 1972.

practice at the Bar;

4. the structure and discipline of the legal profession;
5. the law of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the law of Evidence;
6. the Jirga and the Panchayat systems and their extension to suitable areas;
7. the cost of litigation, and any other relevant matter.³⁶

The recommendations of the Commission covered a wide field and their implementation was only feasible over a number of years. The objective of the recommendations was to make available the speedy and less expensive justice. Ten Ordinances were issued during 1962-63 to streamline the administration of justice. Necessary amendments were made in the Civil Procedure Code. The practice of granting adjournments in the lower courts on flimsy grounds to suit the convenience of the lawyers and parties was to be discouraged. The method of investigation was to be made more scientific. Petty cases arising in local areas were to be tried by the Union Council/ Union Committee. 'Jirga trial' was also introduced in parts of Pakistan. The government also set up Company Law Commission in 1959. On the basis of its recommendations, it was decided to re-enact the existing Company Law and to replace the present Companies Act.

The implementation of the recommendations of these two Commissions, no doubt had some healthy effects on the legal/judicial system of Pakistan, but the ideal of "speedy and less expensive justice" was too high to be achieved through the steps taken by the military regime. The differing notions of an ideal legal system created political controversies about the law reforms. The trial by Jirga was greatly objected to by the legal circles. It was claimed that the Jirga Courts were harsh in their treatment and these were used by the police to dump a case where it could not marshal enough evidence. The introduction of the Family Laws Courts was a good sign, but local influence, bribery and corruption defeated its purpose. The persistent demand of the lawyers to bifurcate the Judiciary completely from the Executive, especially at the district level, was not implemented by the regime.

The beginning of Martial Law was marked by the imposition of ban on strikes and agitation in educational institutions, public utility works and installations. Any violation of this Order was liable for punishment of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.³⁷ Later, the military regime expressed its desire to improve labour-management relations. A new labour policy was

³⁶ *Twenty Years of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1967), p. 733.

³⁷ Martial Law Regulation No. 29.

announced. It aimed at increased production and equitable distribution of wealth, better working conditions for the labour. It was based on the following major principles:

- (a) Sound relationship between the employers and employees as a prerequisite for increased productivity.
- (b) Labour-Management disputes should be resolved by joint consultation, voluntary arbitration, conciliation, mediation and adjudication.
- (c) All workers should be provided social amenities in the fields of health, education, recreation, housing, wages and other needs.
- (d) Efforts must be made to reduce unemployment. The government will continue to maintain a non-fee charging employment agencies and develop employment services.
- (e) The above mentioned objectives cannot be achieved without the growth of healthy trade-unionism.
- (f) Government will attach due importance to research and collection of information concerning working and living conditions of the workers.
- (g) Private industries and organizations will also be encouraged to provide social welfare amenities in a co-operative manner; welfare cesses may be imposed on establishments for this purpose.
- (h) Technical assistance in the field of labour will be welcomed from friendly countries.
- (i) While framing the Labour Policy, the Government will keep in mind the ILO Conventions and other recommendations ratified by Pakistan.³⁸

Keeping in view these principles, the government enacted a number of laws, some of which were enacted after withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962.³⁹ The Industrial Dispute Ordinance, 1959, set up an entirely new machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes. The objective of the new set-up was to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes. It provided for the establishment of Works Committee at the factory level, representing

³⁸ *Twenty Years of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1967), p. 488.

³⁹ Some of the major labour laws were: The Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959; The West Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1969; The Coal Mines (Fixation of Wages) Ordinance, 1963; The Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961; The Tea Plantations Labour Ordinance, 1962; The Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1962; The West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965; The East Pakistan Factories Act, 1965; The East Pakistan Inland Transport (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1965; The East Pakistan Trade Unions Act, 1965; The East Pakistan Shops and Establishment Act, 1965; The East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 and The Factories (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1966.

both workers and management, to resolve petty disputes by mutual consultation. If the dispute could not be resolved through this method, recourse could be made to the Industrial Court, set up by the government. The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1960, and the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965, laid down the framework within which the terms of employment and conditions of work of the labour were to fall. The Trade Unions Act, 1926, was amended with a view to enforcing compulsory recognition of trade unions and to impose penalties for "unfair" practices.

Eleven years had elapsed but the government had not been able to solve the problem of rehabilitating the refugees. At the time of independence about nine million abandoned their ancestral homes and left for new surroundings.⁴⁰ The Muslim refugees outnumbered the Hindu refugees. The refugees constituted 10 per cent. population of Pakistan.⁴¹ The flow of refugees into Pakistan continued until the late 1950s. On many occasions there was heavy eviction of Indian Muslims from Assam and West Bengal and from the Indian part of Kashmir to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation was created soon after independence but no substantial steps were taken for their systematic resettlement. A large number of them were living in miserable conditions in bamboo huts. Their conditions were particularly bad in the major cities, especially Karachi, where there was a heavy concentration of refugees. The refugees were used as a tool of political exploitation by the politicians to achieve their objective—to put the government in an embarrassing position or to demand its resignation. Malik Feroze Khan Noon, who later became Prime Minister in 1957, was reported to have said before assuming the office of Prime Minister: "The refugees are still knocking about the country like stray sheep, hungry and thirsty. If a man goes to provincial minister, he is told to go to the Centre and if he goes to the central minister, he is told to go back to the provincial minister."⁴²

The military regime appointed Lieutenant-General Mohammad Azam Khan as the Rehabilitation Minister.⁴³ He took up the problem in the spirit of a General cleaning up a poor state of affairs in a cantonment. The refugees whose claim for the immovable property left in India had been certified in the past or after the establishment of the military regime, were dealt with under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)

⁴⁰ Campbell-Johnson, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 355-56.

⁴¹ Myrdal, G., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 241.

⁴² Ahmad, M. *Government and Politics in Pakistan*; (Karachi 1970), p. 201.

⁴³ Later in April 1960 he became Governor of East Pakistan and his portfolio went to Interior Minister Lieut-General K. M. Sheikh.

Order, 1959. By the time Martial Law was withdrawn, out of a total amount of Rs. 1,950 million compensation payable to the claimants, Rs. 1,230 million had been adjusted against the price of the property transferred to the refugees and Rs. 70 million had been paid as cash compensation.⁴⁴ Besides adjusting compensation, the military authorities launched a scheme of provision of low cost houses for the displaced persons. The construction of Korangi Township (Karachi) of 15,000 dwelling units was the most outstanding achievement in this connection. The foundation stone of the township was laid in December 1958. The first batch of two hundred refugee families moved into the colony in August 1959. It was very carefully planned with its own market, shopping centres, schools, health centres, mosques, community buildings and open spaces. The Karachi Development Authority also built about 18,000 quarters in New Karachi and 7,000 quarters were provided in the Malir Extension Scheme. Both Korangi Township Scheme and New Karachi Scheme catered to population of 500,000 and 35,000 respectively. In other parts of West Pakistan, the government planned to build 42 satellite schemes. The East Pakistan Government prepared 15 housing schemes to provide permanent shelter to the displaced persons; over 23,900 houses, 2000 flats and 809 shops were built at a cost of Rs. 201.24 million.⁴⁵ It must be pointed out here that a good number of these schemes were completed after the withdrawal of Martial Law and the restoration of constitutional life.

It would be pertinent to refer to the shifting of capital from Karachi to Islamabad. The Federal Capital Commission recommended that the new capital should be constructed on the Potwar plateau. This recommendation was accepted in June 1959 and the government departments started shifting to Rawalpindi which was made the provisional capital. In February 1960, the new capital was named ISLAMABAD by the Presidential Cabinet. A master plan for the new capital was prepared and approved in October 1960. The question of the location of capital had been agitating the mind of the previous governments. However, it was believed that the new capital, whenever built, would be near Karachi. Ayub Khan's decision to shift the capital to the Potwar plateau (Islamabad) was motivated by his desire to keep a close contact with the G.H.Q., which was in Rawalpindi. It created misgivings as the site was close to his native town and it created new job opportunities for the people of the area. The owners of the land resumed by the Capital Development Authority received a handsome price which they would not have otherwise got. The commercial and industrial circles of

⁴⁴ *Pakistan 1962-63*; (Karachi, 1963), p. 91.

Later the amount of cash payments to the claimants rose to Rs. 261.62 million. *Twenty Years of Pakistan*; (Karachi, 1967), p. 531.

⁴⁵ *Twenty Years of Pakistan*; (Karachi, 1967) p. 530.

Karachi were particularly unhappy because the shifting of capital caused them great inconvenience. There was a criticism on the ground that a poor country like Pakistan, where a large number of the people live below the level of subsistence, could not afford the cost of a new capital. The funds allocated for the construction of the capital should have been used in the agricultural or the industrial sector.

Pakistan inherited the British-Indian system of education based on Lord Macaulay's minutes written in 1835. Such a system of education could not suit the requirements of the independent State of Pakistan. Slight adjustments were made by the government but the instable governments were so pre-occupied with their problems that they hardly had time to overhaul the system of education. The need for expansion of educational facilities was also felt due to the tremendous urge among the people for education in the post-independence period. There was a need of extending the facilities for education, particularly in rural areas, and making sure that enough trained persons were available to guide and train the young minds.

The military government appointed a commission on National Education in December 1958 to review the existing system of education, methods of examination and suggest re-orientation of the educational system:—

- (a) "To develop among the people a sense of public duty, patriotism and national solidarity and to inculcate among them the habits of industry, integrity and devotion to service
- (b) "To provide facilities for the development of talent and to produce men of character and ability required for the development of the country in different fields."
- (c) "To introduce modern methods of selection for determining intelligence and aptitude so as to obtain the diversion of students at appropriate levels of technical, agricultural and vocational institutions in accordance with the age, ability and aptitude of the children."
- (d) "The Commission shall examine the role of education in the community and suggest measures which may enable the universities, colleges and schools to fulfil this role effectively."⁴⁶

The report of the Commission, submitted in August 1959, recommended a re-orientation of the curricula at all levels, especially at the primary and secondary levels; free and compulsory education upto Class V and, later on upto Class VIII; separation of Intermediate classes from colleges and their inclusion in Secondary education. It also recommended a

⁴⁶ Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959; Appendix I, p. 347.

three-year degree course; change of syllabi to raise the standard of education and promote character building; opening of technical colleges and emphasis on religious education. The Commission emphasized the need of gradually replacing English as the medium of instruction by national languages and the improvement of service conditions of teachers.⁴⁷

The military regime implemented most of the recommendations. The Bachelor Degree course was extended to three years and a system of monthly tests administered by the college concerned was also introduced. 25 per cent. marks were allocated for these tests and class-work in the annual examination at the degree level. Engineering and agricultural universities were opened and a number of Polytechnic institutes were set up in the major cities of Pakistan. It was decided to make primary and secondary education compulsory in two phases. In the first phase compulsory education was to be introduced from Class I to Class V by 1970. The second phase would make it compulsory from Class VI to Class X by 1975. An ambitious scholarship programme was also planned to assist the intelligent but poor students.

These reforms met with disaster after the withdrawal of Martial Law. The student community generally did not welcome the introduction of three years Degree and Law courses and the system of monthly tests. These complaints coupled with several other grievances i.e. expensive textbooks, high tuition fees, lack of adequate facilities in the educational institutions and a number of political demands which had nothing to do with academics resulted in widespread student agitation in September and October 1962. In order to pacify the students, the government withdrew the three year B.A./B.Sc. scheme. A large number of students who had passed B.A., Second Year Examination, became graduates overnight.⁴⁸ A year, later, the Dacca students demonstrated and demanded that the Commission's report must be scrapped altogether.⁴⁹ The monthly test system was also not a success. The students were unhappy about it and there were reports of misuse of the marks granted on the basis of performance in the monthly tests and class-work. It was alleged that teachers awarded these marks on the basis of their likes and dislikes rather than the performance of the students. It was also observed that some of the students secured 90 to 96 per cent. marks in the monthly tests but failed to get through the examination conducted by the University. Therefore, the scheme of monthly tests was also withdrawn.

A Scientific Commission was appointed in 1959 to suggest methods to

⁴⁷ Twenty Years of Pakistan, (Karachi, 1967), p. 427 & pp. 721-22.

⁴⁸ The Pakistan Times, 1 October, 1962.

⁴⁹ Dawn, 18 September, 1963.

promote and integrate scientific research and make the career prospects attractive in scientific research. The report recommended far-reaching methods to encourage scientific research and education. A large number of its recommendations were implemented in the period after the withdrawal of Martial Law. Some of the steps taken by the government included liberal grants to the universities for scientific research, the setting up of a separate division in the central government for scientific and technological research and a separate organization for defence related research. The Food and Agricultural Council was replaced by the Agricultural Research Council in November 1964. The Medical Research Council was reconstituted and Medical Research Institutes were set up in Lahore and Karachi. An institute of Nuclear Science and Technology was set up with the help of Canada. Later on, the first Atomic Reactor was installed. Pakistan National Scientific and Technical Documentation Centre (PANSDOC) established its branches in Lahore and Dacca and separate research councils were set up for works and housing, irrigation, drainage and flood control.⁵⁰ It must, however, be admitted here that but for assistance and financial help from the advanced countries, Pakistan would not have made these strides in the field of science and technology.

Economic Reforms:

The military regime took steps to improve the standard of living of the people and to ensure economic development and industrialization. These measures did not solve all the problems but these Policy measures contributed positively toward their solution.

In order to boost export earnings, the government introduced a Bonus Voucher Scheme on 10th January 1959. The scheme covered all items except the primary exports viz., raw jute, raw cotton, raw wool, hides and skin, tea and some varieties of rice. According to the Scheme any person or business organization remitting foreign exchange or earning foreign exchange by exporting goods from Pakistan was given a voucher, equivalent to a fixed percentage of the amount of foreign exchange earned. This voucher could be used to import goods from abroad or sold in the open market. These vouchers were quoted on the Stock Exchange and commanded a high premium. The items which could be imported on Bonus were also fixed by the government. Initially the scheme was introduced for one year but later it was extended to the end of 2nd Five Year Plan.⁵¹ It was

⁵⁰ *Twenty Years of Pakistan*: (Karachi, 1967), pp. 432-33 and 727-29.

⁵¹ The Bonus Voucher Scheme was revised from time to time but there was no change in the basic features of the Scheme. The revision included the alterations in the list of goods importable on Bonus and the rates of Bonus. Prior to 1964, Bonus rates ranged from 10 per cent, to 40 per cent. In June 1964, the rates were reduced from 7 to 2. The new rates were 20 per cent and 30 per cent for manufactured goods and all other goods respectively. In

extended further at the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan and continued till May, 1972, when the government of Z. A. Bhutto devalued Pakistani currency and withdrew the Bonus Voucher Scheme. This scheme strengthened Pakistan's economy by boosting exports, discouraged illegal transaction of foreign exchange and facilitated a smooth inflow of necessary and indispensable goods including heavy machinery and equipment and raw material. Its adverse effects were also conspicuous. It resulted in not less than three foreign exchange rates. The undue protection under the scheme resulted in inefficiency and the exporters did not bring down the cost because Bonus Voucher provided them extra earnings. It was alleged that the Scheme had resulted in the inflow of luxury goods. The goods imported on Bonus Voucher Scheme were so expensive that very few could afford them. The Bonus Voucher Scheme was, in fact a short term measure, but the government made it a permanent feature of their economic policy.

Since independence the need for land reforms was frequently emphasised but no step was taken to break the large holdings. As early as May 1949, an Agrarian Reforms Committee was appointed by the Punjab Government to submit its report within a period of three months. It suggested fairly radical reforms. The Committee recommended to prohibit 'ownership of more than 150 acres of irrigated and 450 acres of non-irrigated land by landlords. All jagirs and 'inams' conferred by the British Government in return for services rendered to the cause of imperialism were to be expropriated, and occupancy tenants were to be made owners on the payment of a nominal price.⁵² The report also recommended the payment of compensation for the resumed land only as a 'gesture of goodwill'. The landlords were not allowed to eject their tenants without the permission of the relevant authorities. It proposed that ultimately the 'batai system' should be replaced by cash rents paid in a definite proportion to the land revenue.⁵³ These recommendations were not implemented. The Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1952, and the Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1952, did not solve the main problem—the unequal distribution of land. These Acts were merely face saving formulas. The story of other provinces of West Pakistan, especially the N.W.F. Province and Sind, was not very different. East Bengal (East Pakistan) was, of

November 1965 additional Bonus at the rate of 10 per cent was allowed on export of cotton cloth (mill made), sports goods, surgical instruments and cutlery. 'Lighterage Work' was also entitled for Bonus at the rate of 20 per cent. as a service industry. After the devaluation of British Pound in November 1967, Bonus rates were raised from 20 per cent. to 30 per cent and from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. In July 1970, the rates were further raised from 30 per cent. to 35 per cent. and 40 per cent. to 45 per cent.

⁵² Ahmad, M. op. cit., p. 182.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

course, ahead of West Pakistan in the field of land reforms. A good number of Hindu land-lords skipped to India at the time of, and after the independence. In 1950, the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act was passed which abolished all rent-receiving interests between the tenants and the State. The tenants were assured full occupancy rights with the right to transfer to *bona fide* cultivators. In West Pakistan, as noted earlier, conditions were just the reverse. In the Punjab more than 50 per cent., in the N.W.F. Province a little less than 50 per cent. and in Sind over 80 per cent. of the available land was in the possession of a few thousand landlords.⁵⁴

The military government appointed a land reforms commission in 1958 to "consider problems relating to the ownership and tenancy of agricultural land and to recommend measures for ensuring better production and social justice as well as security of tenure for those engaged in cultivation".⁵⁵ The Commission produced its report in a period of three months and within a week of its submission, Ayub Khan announced land reforms for West Pakistan. The reforms were moderate in nature. The main features of these reforms were as follows:

1. No person would own or possess more than 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. Present owners would retain land upto 150 acres as orchard and could also make gifts of a limited area to their heirs and relatives. In any case, a person could not retain more than 36,000 produce index units.
2. The land in excess to the prescribed limit would be resumed on the payment of 'fair' compensation in the form of interest-bearing bonds redeemable in 25 years.
3. The resumed land would be offered to the existing tenants for sale. The land not purchased by them would be sold to others. The existing tenants could make the payment of the price of the land in installments.
4. Occupancy tenants would become full owners.
5. All Jagirdaris were abolished without compensation.
6. A guarantee of security of tenure to the tenants.

The total area owned by those who possessed land more than the prescribed limit was 7¼ million acres. Of this nearly 2-2/5 million acres were resumed and distributed amongst the tenants.⁵⁶ The reforms were

⁵⁴ Khan, M. Ayub, op. cit., p. 87.

⁵⁵ Report of the Land Reform Commission for West Pakistan, (Lahore: Government of West Pakistan: 1959); Introductory Note.

⁵⁶ Twenty Years of Pakistan: (Karachi, 1967), p. 174.

Mushtaq Ahmad claims that 91, 59, 474 acres of land was owned by those whose holdings were larger than the prescribed limit. Of this 22, 25, 553 acres was resumed which was

accompanied by a drive to introduce modern methods of farming, the use of the better seed, better credit facilities, improved market conditions and the measures to check water logging and salinity. The Commission had emphasized the need of consolidation of fragmented holdings because unnecessarily splintered holdings proved uneconomical. The West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, was issued to effect compulsory consolidation of the fragmented pieces of land.

Pakistan made substantial progress in the field of development planning during the period of military rule. During 1947-58, political instability had hampered the systematic implementation of development plans and their efforts could not yield satisfactory results. In 1948, the government established a Development Board to co-ordinate development plans prepared by the provincial governments, recommended priorities, and oversaw the progress of various projects. The Development Board prepared a six-year Development Plan (1951-57) in 1950. While this Plan was being implemented, the government decided to formulate a co-ordinated and integrated development plan. In pursuance of this objective, a Planning Board was set up in July 1953. The Planning Board, after facing a number of difficulties, formulated the First Five-Year Plan (1955-60). It was finally ready after its first year had passed. For the reasons discussed in the earlier chapter and an over-optimistic approach of the planners, it failed to achieve most of its objectives.

The military leaders raised the Planning Board to the status of the Planning Commission and it was given the status of a Division in the President's Secretariat, with President as the Chairman. The Deputy Chairman was the operational head who was given the status of central minister. The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) prepared by this Planning Commission, aimed at the maximum mobilisation of resources for rapid economic growth, increase in national income and improvement of the conditions of the people. The target for the development outlay was Rs. 23 billions.⁵⁷ The major part of the Plan was implemented after the withdrawal of Martial Law. Unlike the First Five-Year Plan, it was a great success. All targets were achieved and, in certain cases these were exceeded.⁵⁸ The

distributed amongst 1½ lakh tenants.

See: Ahmad, M., op. cit. p. 186.

The Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1963, points out on page 33 that 2,547,000 acres were surrendered by 902 land-owners.

⁵⁷ When the plan period ended, it was found that total expenditure was Rs. 26.3 billion. The development outlay of the First Five Year Plan was Rs. 10.8 billion.

⁵⁸ As the Second Five Year Plan was completed in June 1965, we are not dealing with its achievements in details. Just to give a general idea, following may be mentioned:-

cardinal principle of economic planning was to provide "all possible incentives for the stimulation of private sector and to create those facilities which the private sector had neither the ability nor the willingness to develop."⁵⁹ The result was an enormous growth of the private sector in Pakistan.

The Agricultural Development Corporation was set up in 1961 in both the wings of Pakistan to help the farmers and provide them technical knowledge in the field of agriculture. In 1962, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was bifurcated into two corporations—one for each wing. In the same way the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was divided into two separate bodies, namely, the East Pakistan WAPDA and the West Pakistan WAPDA, and transferred to the provinces. Two separate Railway Boards were created—one for East Pakistan and the other for West Pakistan.

The economy of East Pakistan which was almost stagnant in the past, showed some signs of growth during the martial law period. The military government was conscious of the widespread complaint of East Pakistanis that they were neglected in the past by the central government and that their economic grievances were not accommodated. The military government therefore decided to allocate more resources to East Pakistan. The annual rate of allocation of foreign assistance for East Pakistan during 1958-61 increased at least three times over that of 1957-58.⁶⁰

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE:

The political and economic chaos which overtook Pakistan after the independence convinced the military leaders that the Westminster Model did not suit the conditions and circumstances of Pakistan. The military leaders declared: "The Revolution of October 7, 1958, was not aimed against the institution of democracy as such. No, it was only against the manner in which its institutions were being worked."⁶¹ The new leaders of

- a) The *per capita* income increased by 14.8 per cent, instead of the target of 12 per cent after taking into account population growth of about 2.6 per cent.
- b) The Gross national income increased by 30.4 per cent, instead of 24 per cent. planned.
- c) It planned to raise foodgrain production by 21 per cent. but the actual raise in production was 27 per cent.
- d) Industrial Production registered 61.4 per cent increase rather than 60 per cent. as planned.
- e) Foreign exchange earning rose at the rate of 7 per cent. The plan target was only 3 per cent.

⁵⁹ Khan, M. Ayub, Pakistan's Economic Progress; *International Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 1, January, 1967.

⁶⁰ *Years of Progress: 1958-62*; (Dacca, 1962), p. 3.

⁶¹ Khan, M. Ayub, Pakistan Perspective; *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4, July, 1960.

Pakistan were of the opinion that any return to parliamentary system of government would encourage political chaos and bring back 'the discredited' politicians. "Pakistan needs an executive, declared Ayub Khan, "which is popularly elected—and re-elected at fixed periods—but which cannot be overturned constantly by changing party combinations in the legislature."⁶² In his Pakistan Day message to the Pakistani Missions abroad, he said:—

.... The Constitution which came into force this day (March 23) in 1956 did not work at all. It was an amorphous document without a hard core and solid base. It was centrifugal in spirit and dispersed authority in total disregard of national unity, homogeneity and solidarity. It was a confused and unholy wedlock of the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the state in which the ultimate power for good government remained illusive, undefined and therefore, inoperative. The result was political, administrative and social chaos.

.... A situation like that was indeed inevitable when we tried to transplant other people's constitutional concepts and practices into the temperament, talent and environment of our own people. We are not going to make the mistake again. What we must have is a constitution which is sensible, workable and suits the genius of our people and the climate of our country.⁶³

Political stability and economic development are so much inter-linked that one cannot exist without the other. Stable political conditions encourage economic development and prosperity, without which liberal democratic institutions cannot work. It has been amply shown by research that democracy is closely related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do nations have greater chances of retaining democracy. A well known political sociologist observed, "a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favoured elite results either in Oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny."⁶⁴

⁶² Interview with Guy Wint: *Observer*, 19th April 1959. In his first public announcement about Basic Democracies, Field Marshal Ayub Khan declared: There were certain basic requirements of the western democratic structures which did not exist in our country. Western democracy presupposes a high degree of social and political awareness and mass literacy, so that the people know the value of their vote in terms of broad national policies and an advanced system of mass communication for speedy and accurate dissemination of information on a wide variety of themes of individual and general interest". For the full text, see: *Dawn*, 3rd December, 1959. Similar views were expressed on many other occasions: see:

Ibid., 11th October 1958; 3rd December 1958; 21st March 1960 and 27th October 1963. See also his address at the Lahore Basic Democracies Convention in June 1960. Full text may be found in Jafari R. A. (ed.), *Ayub Soldier and Statesman*: (Lahore, 1966), pp. 65-68.

⁶³ Jafari, R. A. (ed) *op. cit.*, 46.

⁶⁴ Lipset, S. M. *Political Man*, (London, 1969, H.E.B., Paperback), p. 50.

Thus the developing nations are embarked on an uphill task of maintaining democracy and ensuring economic development. Ayub Khan recognized this dilemma:

In these countries (developing countries) the battle for democracy has to face enormous problems. While there is need for giving a measure of political liberty, there is an overriding need to maintain stability and discipline in order to be able to enter the scientific and technological age as fast as possible.⁶⁵

Ayub Khan believed that the developing nations need economic development, political stability and unity more than any other thing. Unless a nation has attained sufficient level of economic development, liberal democratic institutions should not be introduced because these tend to divide people and encourage disintegrative forces. These tendencies undermine the 'output' of the government and slow down the pace of economic development. Therefore, he decided to put the economic house in order and introduced a sort of controlled democracy and claimed that his system was "of the type that people can understand and work."⁶⁶ This would, he thought, provide sufficient freedom of action to the executive to launch a strong offensive on the economic front. His views on this subject were formed as early as 1954. Ayub Khan, in his memorandum entitled 'A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan' declared that democracy in Pakistan should be "of a type that suits the genius of the people."⁶⁷

The experience during the Martial Law period convinced the military leaders that if the influence and power of the politicians was reduced to the minimum, stable government could be set up in the country which would facilitate economic development and industrialization. In order to achieve these objectives they adopted a two phased programme.

The first phase comprised the introduction of a new system of local government called the Basic Democracies (B.D. System) on the eve of the first anniversary of the military take-over. The B.D. system had four tiers.⁶⁸ It was said to have been designed keeping in view the peculiar conditions of

⁶⁵ Khan, M. Ayub, A New Experiment in Democracy in Pakistan; *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358, March, 1965.

⁶⁶ Address to the nation on 8th October 1958; See Appendix C. Addressing the Chairman and the members of the Union Councils of Haripur Tehsil, Ayub Khan declared that only strong Government backed by the people could set the country on road to progress and prosperity. *Dawn*, 21 March, 1960.

⁶⁷ For the text of the memorandum, see Appendix "A".

⁶⁸ Originally there was a fifth tier also, namely, the Provincial Advisory Council—one each for both the provinces. This was abolished after the elections of the Provincial Assemblies under the 1962 Constitution.

the country, to make the administrative process meaningful and to introduce democracy at the grass roots. The role of Basic Democracies, as envisaged by Ayub Khan, was very ambitious. First these were to reflect representation of the people at the lowest level. Second, these would develop into the nerve centre of their area. All local problems of development and civic responsibilities would be studied there. Third, these would, in due course of time, replace the purely official agencies as the traditional "Mai Bap" of the people. Fourth, this process would generate "fresh vigour and enthusiasm and liberate the moral and intellectual forces." This would throw up "a patriotic, honest, realistic and dynamic leadership" in Pakistan.⁶⁹

The country was divided into eighty thousand single member constituencies⁷⁰ (known as the B.D. Wards) with a population of 1,000 to 1,200 people. About ten constituencies were grouped together to form the lowest rung of the B.D. system.



The lowest level was known as Union Council in rural areas, Town Committee in small towns, and Union Committee in cities and Cantonments. Besides the elected members, there were nominated official and unofficial members.⁷¹ The next level of local government was Tehsil Council in West Pakistan and Thana Council in East Pakistan. It included the Chairmen of the Union Councils and Town Committees and official members. The official members included the representatives of nation-building departments at the sub-divisional level. The Council was headed by Tehsildar, Sub-Divisional Officers/Assistant Commissioner. The second level of local government for urban areas exceeding the population of 14,000, was the Municipal Committees instead of Tehsil Councils. The Municipal Committees were presided over by an official chairman. In Cantonments the second tier was known as the Cantonment Board. The third level in all cases was the District Council. It consisted of official members (representatives of nation-building departments at the district

⁶⁹ Field Marshal Ayub's address to the Nation: *Dawn* 3rd Sept. 1959.

⁷⁰ The total strength of the Basic Democrats was raised from 80,000 to 1,20,000 for the 1969 B.D. Elections. The Constitution was duly amended but before elections could be held, Field Marshal Ayub resigned and the country reverted to military rule. So no elections were held.

⁷¹ Later the system of nomination was abolished.

level) and the elected members. All the Chairmen of the Union Councils/Union Committees/Town Committees constituted electoral college to elect its members. The District Council was presided over by the Deputy Commissioner. The fourth tier of the B. D. System was the Divisional Council, which consisted of official and non-official members. The elected seats of the Divisional Councils were filled by the representatives of the Municipal Committees, Cantonment Boards and the District Council who were elected by the elected members of these bodies. Even those who were not Basic Democrats could also contest elections. The Commissioner presided over the meetings of the Divisional Council. The following table shows the number of various Councils under the B. D. System.

TABLE XI

Number of Councils and Committees under the B. D. System

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan Regular Areas	Special Areas	Total
Rural Areas:				
Divisional councils	4	12	-	16
District Councils (Agency Council)	17	46	-	63
Thana/Tehsil Councils	-	-	9	9
Town Committees	396	202	-	598
Union Councils	37	215	6	258
	4,032	3,302	112	7,446
Urban Areas:				
Municipal Committees (incl- uding Cantonment boards)	29	87	-	116
Union Committees	216	809	-	1,025
TOTAL	4,731	4,673	127	9,531

The Basic Democracies were entrusted with more powers and functions than the institutions of local self-government in the past and the government made liberal grants available to these institutions to enable them to perform their duties. The objective of the military authorities was that these institutions should bring forward a cadre of new leaders who should provide the basis for the new political system. These councils did a useful job in improving the conditions of villages, construction of roads, culverts and various other projects on the basis of the principle of self-help and produced impressive results with 'Grow More Food' campaign. But the

B. D. System could not produce a class of new leaders, independent in their outlook. No doubt, in certain areas the traditional occupants of power-positions were defeated in the elections by men of lower or lower-middle class origin but generally power remained concentrated in the hands of those who already enjoyed it. They were subservient to the Ayub Regime because the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, had given enough powers to the bureaucracy to control these institutions.⁷² Moreover, due to fear of victimization and the desire to win favour, the members did not take steps to displease the bureaucrats associated with these institutions. The lack of experience to run the affairs of their councils increased their dependence on the Chairman, 70 per cent. of the Union Councillors admitted that the Circle Officers had helped them in framing their budgets.⁷³ It was also noticed that 83 per cent. of the items on the agenda of the Union Councils of East Pakistan originated from the correspondence and visits of the government officials.⁷⁴ Similar trends could be seen in West Pakistan. It happened rarely that proposal brought forward by the government officials was turned down. The participation of the bureaucrats in these institutions was very significant because the Basic Democrats formed the electoral college for the election of the President, the members of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. It created an impression that the government wanted to keep these institutions under her wings so that the Ayub Regime could secure their votes in the elections. This identified the B. D. System with the Ayub Regime.

The second phase started on 17th February 1960, when Ayub Khan, after having a secured vote of confidence of the Basic Democrats, set up a Constitution Commission. It was headed by Justice Shahabud Din, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, and included representatives of Judiciary, commerce, industry, agriculture and the minorities. The principle of parity was maintained between the two wings of Pakistan by providing equal number of members from both the wings. The terms of reference were as follows:

To examine the progressive failure of parliamentary government in

⁷² The text of the order and the rules enforced on the basis of the Order are published in: Choudhry, G. W., (Ed.), *Documents and speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan* (Dacca, 1967), pp. 500-58.

To illustrate the point, it may be mentioned here that according to the said order the controlling officer had the power to quash the proceedings, suspend the execution of any resolution passed or an order made by the local council, prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done and require the local council to take such action as may be specified by him.

⁷³ 'An Analysis of the Working of Basic Democracies in East Pakistan', p. 52, quoted from: Sayeed, K. B., *op. cit.*, p. 253.

⁷⁴ Rehman, A. T. R., *Basic Democracies at Grass roots*, (Comila, 1962), p. 31.

Pakistan leading to the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 and to determine the causes and the nature of the failure. To consider how best the said or like causes may be identified and their recurrence prevented.

And, having further taken account of the genius of the people, the general standard of education and political judgement in the country, the present state of a sense of nationhood, the prime need for sustained development and the effect of the constitutional and administrative changes brought into being in recent months, to submit constitutional proposals in the form of a report advising how best the following ends may be secured:

A democracy adopted to changing circumstances and based on the Islamic principles of justice, equality and tolerance, the consolidation of national unity and a firm and stable system of Government.

After the inquiry had started, the Commission was given the following additional term of reference:

In the light of the social, economic, administrative and political reforms which are being carried out by the present regime, particularly the introduction of the Basic Democracies, what would be the most appropriate time-table for the implementation of the proposals to be made by the Constitution Commission.⁷⁵

The Constitution Commission held its meetings in several cities and also issued a questionnaire. In all 6,269 replies to the questionnaire were received and 565 persons were interviewed. This did not include several persons who had informal discussions with the Chairman of the Commission but hesitated to appear before the Commission.⁷⁶ The Commission's report, submitted to the President on 6th May 1961, recommended Presidential system, quasi-federal structure,⁷⁷ a Vice President, independent judiciary and direct elections on restricted franchise.

The president referred the report to five-men Cabinet sub-committee. The members of the sub-committee were:

1. Manzur Qadir, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations: (Chairman)

⁷⁵ Report of Constitution Commission, 1961; (Karachi, 1962), p. 1.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁷ One of the members (Sardar Habibullah), in his note of dissent, favoured Unitary form of government, see; *Ibid.*

Personally Ayub Khan was also in favour of Unitary system of government. See *Dawn*, 11th October 1958 and 16th December, 1959.

2. Mohammad Shoaib, Finance Minister.
3. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for National Reconstruction, Fuel, Power and Natural Resources.
4. Mohammad Ibrahim, Law Minister.
5. Abdul Qasim Khan, Industries Minister.

The sub-committee examined the report of the Constitution Commission and finalised the draft of the Constitution, which was announced by Ayub Khan on 1st March, 1962. It was enforced on 8th June 1962, when Martial Law was lifted. Before the final draft of the Constitution was announced, it had become quite clear what type of Constitution Pakistan was going to have because Ayub Khan made no secret of his views. The Constitution, as finally announced, had the stamp of his political views and the experience gained during the Martial Law period and it included most of the features of the memorandum presented by him in 1954. He said "My own analysis had led me to the conclusion that Pakistan needed a strong government capable of taking decisions which might not be popular but which were necessary for the safety, integrity and in particular development of the country. We could not afford the luxury of a system which would make the existence of the government subservient to the whims and operations of pressure groups. On this point, I was not prepared to make any compromise."⁷⁸ In his inaugural speech to the National Assembly on 8th June 1962, Ayub Khan said:

The Constitution that comes into force from today represents my political philosophy in its application to the existing conditions of Pakistan and it deserves a fair trial.⁷⁹

He further stated:

What I have procured in this Constitution has come from my heart and soul and it is my belief that the country can run sensibly and can prosper under this system. It is based on my long association with the administration at all levels, detailed knowledge of the country and the people, wide study, deep and prolonged thought and a burning desire to help the people in building the country into a powerful and progressive state.⁸⁰

The most outstanding feature of the Constitution was the position of the President. He enjoyed extensive legislative and executive powers and could influence the National Assembly. It provided for a federal structure of

⁷⁸ Khan, M. Ayub, *Friends Not Masters* (London: 1967), p. 213.

⁷⁹ For the full text of the address, see *Dawn*, 9th June, 1962.

⁸⁰ *Dawn*, 9th June, 1962.

government, but the position of the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Government was nothing more than an agent of the President. The National Assembly enjoyed restricted legislative and financial powers. The Constitution provided for indirect elections for the President, members of the National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies. We shall discuss the nature of the political system under the 1962 Constitution in the next chapter.

The Nature of the Reforms introduced by the Military Regime

The study of the period of the military rule in Pakistan shows that the military rulers avoided extreme methods and were generally lenient in their attitude towards the violators of Martial Law regulations. Ayub's words gave the impression that he was firm, strict and autocratic and would not compromise. But when came the time of action, he was considerate, sympathetic and avoided the use of repressive measures till he was convinced that there was no alternative. The last date for the declaration of the foreign exchange held abroad, filing of fresh income-tax returns, declaration of assets, etc., was extended more than once to enable more and more people to avail themselves of the opportunity. Martial Law regulations prescribed severe punishments including death sentence for various crimes. Nobody was actually executed except those involved in troubles in Baluchistan in support of the former Ruler of Kalat.⁸¹ The military courts awarded death sentences but the higher Martial Law authorities commuted these to life or 14 years' imprisonment. A good number of the people were sentenced for 14 years or more but none served the full period.

The reforms introduced by them clearly reflected that the military leaders adopted 'the middle of the road policy'. The land reforms were moderate in their effects. Two different views were represented before the Land Reforms Commission. One point of view urged the government not to break up the large holdings. Such views were expressed by the big landlords for obvious reasons. On the other hand, the intelligentsia, a section of the press and the peasants demanded radical reforms. The Commission recommended the middle way, which was readily accepted by the government. Most of the senior officers of the Pakistan Army came from the upper and upper-middle class and landlord families. Had the Army

⁸¹ In 1959, a group of the Khan of Kalat's supporters demanded the release of the Khan of Kalat. They collected a huge lashkar in the mountains of Jhalawan and started trouble in the area. The troops were despatched to control them. After a few encounters between the Baluch lashkar and the Army, in which some lives were lost, the ring-leaders were arrested by the Army. They were awarded death sentences by a Special Military Court.

authorities implemented radical reforms, they themselves would have been hit seriously. Ayub Khan did not want to antagonise them by adopting radical reforms. The maximum ceiling of 500 acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of un-irrigated land was quite high. The landlords could retain more than that by making gifts to their relatives and heirs. More radical measures were needed if the military leaders really wanted to bring down the influence of the landlords in the body-politic.

The treatment of the political leaders was another example of the way they wanted to solve the problems. The execution of political leaders by the military dictators is a common feature of *coup d'état*. In Pakistan the military leaders accused the political leaders of creating administrative, economic and political chaos but none was executed. However, they were debarred from taking part in active politics under the EBDO. When martial law was withdrawn in 1962, they engaged in politics from the background. A number of them helped to revive political parties and supported their favourite candidates in the national and provincial assemblies' elections (1964) and presidential elections (1965). After the expiry of the period of disqualification under the EBDO, one of the formerly disqualified politicians, Kazi Fazalullah (Sind) was appointed Home Minister in the West Pakistan Cabinet. Iskinder Mirza who was forced by the Generals to resign the office of President, received pension as the ex-head of the state till his death in 1970.

Conclusions:

The military take-over in Pakistan in 1958, often locally called 'the October Revolution', removed the political leaders and the so-called democratic institutions from the scene and gave a free hand to the civil service and the Army to run the country. The period of the military rule was not a military dictatorship of the type found in the Middle East and Latin America and, to some extent, in Africa. It was a benevolent authoritarian regime, determined to inculcate discipline which marked the organization of the Army. The case of Pakistan shows that a combination of civil and military leadership is capable of introducing certain reforms and accelerating the pace of economic development. But there is always a limit beyond which the military cannot change the existing social and economic order without damaging the interests of the regime itself. The military rulers of Pakistan did introduce certain measures to 'reform' the social and economic structure and accelerated the pace of economic development but they could not abolish the old system altogether and then introduce a new one.

The military regime is likely to build up public support if the demo-

cratic traditions are not strong, there is a lack of sympathy amongst the people for the previous regimes and there exists 'goodwill' between the Army and the people. Such a goodwill can vary from time to time. It is the product of several factors, i.e. the avoidance of repressive measures, adoption of some concrete measures to improve the social and economic conditions of the people, and the prevalence of a belief that the military regime is capable and willing to solve the problems of the society. In this respect, a statement on the part of the military rulers that they have no political ambition and that they will soon return power to the elected representatives can also be helpful, at least in the initial stages.

The military rulers have to think about the political system for the future. The sooner they solve this problem, the better. This creates dilemma in their mind especially when the Army has been brought up in the traditions of aloofness from politics and it is averse to the methods of the political leaders. The military leaders are torn apart by two opposing tendencies: They do not want to return to the previous system but they cannot permanently keep the country under military rule. Therefore, they endeavour to evolve a new political system or modify the existing one. Such a system reflects the peculiar conditions of the country as seen by the military leaders, their experience of running civil administration and their desire to see the country being run by an efficient and effective (not necessarily participatory) government.

6

The Military and Politics : The Second Phase

The end of direct military rule and the return of the armed forces to their barracks does not necessarily mean that the military will revert to the pre-coup position in relation to politics. Once the armed forces enter the political field, it becomes difficult for them to dissociate themselves from politics. Their assertions at the time of the military take-over that they will return the country to civilian rule 'as soon as possible' does not imply that they will abandon interest in politics. Firstly, once they taste the pleasures of exercising political power under the cover of martial law, they do not feel like surrendering all of it. Secondly, during the period of military rule, they introduce certain changes in the political, social and economic structure of the society. They are interested in the continuation of these policies after the end of military rule. Thirdly, the management of civilian affairs over some time creates a feeling in them that they are better qualified than the political leaders to rule the country. Therefore, they want to replace the direct military rule by a political system that will adequately protect their interests and ensure that the policies initiated by them are not abandoned.

The military leaders can play an important role in the political field after the restoration of constitutional life through numerous ways. First, they establish a puppet civilian government and control the levers of power from the background. Under this arrangement the ultimate power rests with the Generals and the political leaders act as puppets in their hands. Second, they let the political leaders run the civil government but watch politics carefully and keep the civil government informed of their reaction to the policies of the government. They may press the government to take or not to take any particular step. Third, the general, who leads the coup resigns military rank and runs the government as a civilian. This changes the nature of rule from the military to civil but the real decision making power still rests with the military commander turned civilian leader, the bureaucracy, and the serving generals. They have one interest in common—to run the administration 'efficiently' and protect their entrenched position.

The New Political System:

The 1962 Constitution made it clear that the military leaders, who led the 1958 coup, wanted to retain their privileged position. The military rule was brought to an end but the political power remained concentrated in the hands of Ayub Khan, who now rarely appeared in uniform. The Constitution introduced Presidential system of government which had more resemblance with the French Fifth Republic rather than the U.S. Presidential system. The roles of head of the state and head of the government were combined in the President, indirectly elected by an electoral college comprising the Basic Democrats. Central ministers and provincial governors and their ministers were responsible to the President. Consequently, the executive (central as well as provincial) was not directly dependant on legislative support and it was unaffected by the shifting currents of day to day politics. The President was entrusted with extensive executive, legislative and financial powers, including power to issue ordinance, declare the state of emergency, grant pardon and reprieves, and conduct foreign affairs. The National Assembly, a unicameral legislature with 156 members¹ divided equally between the two wings, was a weaker body as compared with the executive. The control of the National Assembly over the state purse was particularly restricted. It could discuss the 'recurring expenditure' but could not vote on it. It was only the 'new expenditure' which could be put to vote.² The method of amendment of the Constitution made it difficult for the National Assembly to amend the Constitution against the wishes of the President. The Constitution provided that if a bill for amendment was passed by at least a two-thirds majority of its total members, it could be submitted to the President for his signature. He could, within thirty days, assent to the bill, withhold his assent or return

¹ According to the 8th Amendment in the Constitution, the total strength of the National Assembly was raised to 218.

² Recurring Expenditure means the expenditure that ordinarily recurs from year to year but does not include expenditure for projects extending over several years. New Expenditure means:-

- (a) That expenditure on a project which exceeds by more than 10 per cent. of the expenditure already approved by the National Assembly for the project for the financial year in which it is to be spent.
- (b) Any other expenditure which is not recurring expenditure,
- (c) Any expenditure which is recurring and which is for a purpose in respect of which no provision was made by way of recurring expenditure in the Schedule of Authorised Expenditure for the previous year; and
- (d) So much of the recurring expenditure in the Schedule of the Authorised Expenditure that exceeds that expenditure as approved in the previous year by more than 10 per cent.

the bill to the National Assembly for reconsideration. If he refused to sign the bill, the National assembly could take it up again. If passed by three-fourths majority of the total members of the National Assembly, the bill was again presented to the President for his assent. In case the bill was returned for reconsideration, the National Assembly could reconsider the bill. If it was again passed with or without the amendments suggested by the President by at least two-thirds majority of its total membership, it was sent to the President for his signature. But if the National Assembly passed the bill with amendments other than those suggested by the President, at least three-fourths majority of the members must vote in its favour. Now the President could, within ten days, either sign it or put it to referendum. The decision of the referendum was final. Therefore, the Constitution could be easily amended only if the President agreed to the amendment bill.³ In case of a conflict between the President and the National Assembly, the former could refer the dispute to a referendum by the Basic Democrats.⁴

The Constitution introduced a quasi-federal structure with only one list of subjects—the Central list. All residual subjects were left to the provinces. The President had the overriding say in the affairs of the provinces. The governors were nominees of the President. They could not appoint ministers without the prior consent of the President. The provincial ministers were not responsible to the provincial assembly but to the provincial governor. The provincial assemblies had 155 members and were indirectly elected. These could legislate on all subjects not included in the Central list but their financial powers were restricted.

The provisions of the Constitution about the declaration of emergency equipped the President with enormous powers.⁵ The President could declare emergency in the country if he was convinced that there existed grave emergency in which the country as a whole or a part of it was threatened by external aggression or the security or economic life was threatened by internal disturbances beyond the control of a provincial government. The validity of the Proclamation could not be challenged in any court of law. No time limit was fixed for the operation of this proclamation. It must, however, be laid before the National Assembly as soon as possible. The Proclamation of Emergency enabled the President to run the country in a semi-dictatorial manner. The President could issue an

³ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Articles 208-209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 30.

The State of Emergency was declared in Pakistan in September 1965 on the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. See: *Gazette of Pakistan* (Rawalpindi), 1965, Extraordinary, p. 779.

ordinance irrespective of the fact whether or not the National Assembly was holding its session. The National Assembly had no power to disapprove any ordinance issued after the declaration of emergency. If the National Assembly approved it, the ordinance became an Act of the central legislature otherwise it remained effective as long as the Proclamation of Emergency was not withdrawn.

The President was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and was empowered, subject to law passed by the National Assembly, "to raise and maintain the Defence Service of Pakistan and the Reserves of those Services; to grant Commissions in those Services; to appoint chief commanders of those services and determine their salaries and allowances."⁶

Article 238 provided that for the first twenty years after the commencement of the Constitution, the Ministry of Defence should be entrusted to a person who had held a rank not lower than Lieutenant-General in the Army, or equivalent rank in the Navy or the Air Force. If the President fulfilled the qualification, he could take the charge of defence portfolio.

Thus, the Constitution introduced a system which provided a dominant position to the executive. The President enjoyed comparative freedom of action during the five-year term. This reflected Ayub's distrust of the political leaders. He drew his support mainly from three sources: the military, the bureaucracy and the Basic Democrats. The government enjoyed the backing of the armed forces. The two C-in-C of the Army, who succeeded Ayub were considered to be 'his' men.⁷ Both were Pathans but their tribes had no strong following. One of them, General A. M. Yahya Khan, was the youngest Army Chief and was given accelerated promotion. He was designated C-in-C of the Army on 29th March, 1966, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and appointed Deputy C-in-C with immediate effect. Later on 18th September, 1966, when he assumed the office of C-in-C, he was promoted to the rank of full General.

During this period, the senior military positions became a ladder for lucrative jobs in the public and private sectors. A good number of retired Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadiers, and their equivalent ranks in the other services, were provided with top positions in government and semi-government corporations, autonomous bodies and boards, where they could draw handsome salaries and other facilities admissible under the terms and conditions of service. Various private firms and limited

⁶ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 17.

⁷ General Mohammad Musa Khan (1958-66); General A. M. Yahya Khan (1966-71).

companies offered them directorships to avail of their influence and contacts in their dealings with the government. Some of the senior military officers resigned their posts to take up some of these positions. A large number of military officers were absorbed in various factories and mills run by the armed forces. In 1960, the central and provincial governments fixed a quota in various services for the retired military personnel and agreed to make some concessions in education, age and other qualifications for them. Some of the senior officers were appointed ambassadors in foreign countries. The possibility of getting a job with handsome salary and respectable status after retirement could keep the senior military officers loyal to the regime. This could also be a method to replace those officers who were 'unsafe' in the opinion of the government by more loyal officers. A diplomatic appointment might be used as a reward for services or to keep a person away from the country. The trend of the senior military officers occupying the highest positions of civil life can be illustrated with the help of the following table. It shows the posts held by the retired Commanders-in-Chief of the three services of the armed forces:

TABLE XII
Retired Commanders in Civil Offices

Name	Tenure as the C-in-C	Post Held
THE ARMY		
Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan	1951-58	Declared Martial Law in 1958. Retired from military service in 1960. President of Pakistan : 1958-60, 1960-65, 1965-69.
General Mohammad Yahya Khan.	1958-66	Governor, West Pakistan, 1966-69 (A few months before his retirement, it was announced that he would be appointed Pakistan's Ambassador in Iran. Later, a few days before his retirement the government changed its mind and appointed him Governor).

Name	Tenure as the C-in-C	Post Held
		Declared Martial Law and assumed the office of President of Pakistan in 1969. He also held the office of the C-in-C.
THE AIRFORCE		
Air Marshal Mohammad Asghar Khan.	1957-65	President, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation 1965-68. Entered Politics: November 1968.
Air Marshal Mohammad Nur Khan	1965-69	Governor, West Pakistan 1969-70. Entered Politics: 1970. President P.I.A.: 1974.
THE NAVY		
Rear Admiral M. S. Chaudhri	1953-59	Exact post is not known. He joined the Board of Directors of the Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. (A leading industrial firm of Pakistan).
Vice Admiral A. R. Khan	1959-66	Defence Minister of Pakistan 1966-69.
Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsen.	1966-69	Governor, East Pakistan 1969-71.

Note:- The Army before 1951, the Air Force before 1957, and the Navy before 1953 had British Commanders-in-Chief.

The marriage of convenience, which developed between the military and the bureaucracy during the period of military rule, continued after the restoration of constitutional life. The recruitment to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was made open to the officers of the military in 1960. This

practice was discontinued in 1963. The growing influence of the bureaucracy can be measured from the fact that it succeeded in convincing Ayub Khan not to introduce far-reaching changes in the structure as recommended by the Pay and Services Commission. The Commission had recommended the unification of the separate services into a seven-tiered structure. A Pakistan Administrative Service was to be created to replace the CSP with admission open to the technical services.⁸ These proposals threatened the privileged position of the CSP. They bitterly opposed the recommendations and ultimately the report was shelved. Another instance which indicated the growing influence of the bureaucracy took place during the session of the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. One CSP Officer went to the Assembly Chambers and slapped a member of the Assembly because the said member had criticised the CSP officer. The National Assembly and West Pakistan Provincial Assembly pressed for serious action against the civil servant. The government referred the matter to an inquiry committee but neither disciplinary action was taken against the officer nor was he asked to apologise. He was transferred to pacify public opinion. The growing influence was demonstrated when the question of acting Governor came up at the time of the Governor of East Pakistan's tour of China and the Governor of West Pakistan's tour of Turkey. On both the occasions, the senior-most Cabinet Minister was not appointed acting Governor. The Chief Secretaries acted as Governors and exercised powers as the head of the provincial administration. These acting Governors presided over the cabinet meetings. The concentration of powers in the hands of the President enabled the bureaucracy to exercise rare powers. Ayub Khan had introduced the system of Basic Democracies to encourage people's participation in the affairs of their area and to create a 'democratic' base. The bureaucracy dominated these institutions in such a way that their freedom of action was lost.

The system of Basic Democracies was the third important source of strength for the regime. Ayub Khan treated these institutions as an article of his faith. He entrusted sufficient powers and reasonable funds to these institutions. The basic objective of the system was to provide a basis for the new political system. The opponents of Ayub's political system talked of scrapping the Basic Democracies. Therefore, the Basic Democrats supported the Ayub regime for obvious reasons. The first presidential election under the 1962 Constitution was held in January 1965. These were

⁸ Gorvine, A., *The Civil Service under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan. The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIX, Summer 1964.
The Report of the Commission, submitted in 1962, was published in 1969. A summary of the recommendations of the Report may be found in *Urdu Digest*, Vol. 9, Nos. 8 & 9, June-July, 1969.

preceded by the elections of the Basic Democrats during October and November 1964. Ayub Khan defended his political system and cautioned the people that if the opposition parties candidates succeeded, the country would once again be plunged into political chaos similar to that of the pre-1958 period. The opposition parties formed a joint front, called the Combined Opposition party⁹ (the C.O.P.) and put forward Miss Fatima Jinnah as their Presidential candidate.¹⁰ The C.O.P. gave their Nine-point programme whose distinguishing features were the restoration of parliamentary system of government with direct election and universal adult franchise, and a promise to 'democratise' the 1962 Constitution. The election campaign clearly demonstrated that the personalities of the two candidates had greater appeal for the voters than the political parties supporting them. The Basic Democrats preferred to support Ayub Khan because they knew that in case the C. O. P. candidate won the election, the B. D. system would be scrapped. The results of the election showed that the Basic Democrats aligned with the Ayub regime and gave him a mandate for next 5 years.¹¹ Table XIII indicates the votes cast for the two major candidates.

TABLE XIII
Presidential Elections (1965) Result

Candidate	Votes Polled		Total	Percentage of Votes Polled
	E. Pakistan	W. Pakistan		
Ayub Khan	21,012	28,939	49,951	63.31
Miss Fatima Jinnah	18,434	10,257	28,691	36.36

⁹ The C.O.P. included: Awami League, National Awami Party, Jamat-i-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam Party and Council Muslim League. It was also being supported by the National Democratic Front.

¹⁰ There were two independent candidates. They were: K.M. Kamal and M. Bashir Ahmad. The real contest was between Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Miss Fatima Jinnah. K. M. Kamal and M. Bashir Ahmad secured only 183 and 65 votes respectively.

¹¹ There is a difference of opinion as to how far these elections were fair. The C.O.P. accused the Ayub regime of corruptly managing the elections. It was said that the government machinery was used to compel the voters to vote for Ayub Khan. Later in 1968, several leaders of opposition claimed that the elections were not as fair as most of the people thought. See: Feldman, H., *From Crisis to Crisis Pakistan, 1962-69* (Karachi, 1972), pp. 68-84.

For an informed analysis of the elections, see Mujahid, Sharif-al, *Pakistan's First Presidential Elections*, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 5, No. 6 June, 1965.

The election of the National Assembly also showed that the Basic Democrats strengthened the hands of the Ayub Regime. Field Marshal Ayub Khan's Convention Muslim League won an overwhelming majority in the elections. Table XIV shows the final party position in 1965 Elections:

TABLE XIV
Party Position in the National Assembly

Political Party	Seats Won		Total
	E. Pakistan	W. Pakistan	
Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)	55	69	124
The C.O.P.	14	1	15
Independent	9	8	17
Total:	78	78	156

The greatest advantage which Ayub Khan enjoyed over the opposition parties was the support of the military, the bureaucracy and the Basic Democrats as well as the lack of unity and understanding amongst the various opposition parties. Their leaders hardly trusted each other. Since the introduction of the 1962 Constitution and the revival of political parties, several attempts were made by the leaders to create a broad-based opposition alliance. The first major attempt was made in October 1962 by H. S. Suhrawardy. He formed the National Democratic Front (the N.D.F.) which enjoyed the support of 54 leaders from East and West Pakistan. The NDF demanded that "Pakistan should be governed by a democratic constitution."¹² Three major opposition parties—the National Awami Party, the Awami League and the Council Muslim League joined the N.D.F. in January, 1964, for the establishment of "full and complete democracy in the country."¹³ Another alliance was forged by the opposition parties in 1964 for the 1964-65 general elections. The political parties forming the C.O.P. had a common desire to defeat Ayub Khan in the

¹² *Dawn*, 5th October, 1962.

¹³ *New York Times*, 23rd January 1964.

Presidential election but they suffered from internal dissension. There was hardly any person among them who could claim to be the leader enjoying the full support of the political parties forming the C.O.P. The lack of unity was clearly manifested at the time of nomination of their Presidential candidate to oppose Ayub Khan. Miss Jinnah was persuaded to accept their nomination because they could not agree on any other candidate. There arose sharp differences amongst the political parties of the C.O.P. on the question whether they should or should not boycott the elections of the National and Provincial Assemblies. Once the elections were over, the C.O.P. gradually crumbled to pieces. Ayub Khan described the five opposition parties of the C.O.P., as "five cats tied by their tails".¹⁴ The C.O.P. was succeeded by another alliance of the opposition parties. On 1st May, 1967, the Awami League, the Council Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islam party formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (the P.D.M.). Its programme included the re-introduction of parliamentary system of government and direct elections, federal structure, the federal list to include only defence, foreign affairs, currency and inter-communication and trade, separate account of foreign exchange earned by provinces, the shift of Naval headquarters to East Pakistan, and regional parity in services to be achieved in ten years. The performance of this alliance was not much different from the previous alliance.

The opposition political parties accused Ayub Khan of suppression of dissent by putting undue restrictions on his political adversaries and by applying the Defence of Pakistan rules whereby the recourse to a regular court of law was restricted. The charges were not entirely baseless. Ayub generally regarded opposition to his rule, especially the Presidential system introduced under the 1962 Constitution, as subversion and anti-state activity. Therefore, he dealt sternly with his political adversaries when they attempted to challenge the foundations of his political system.

However, Ayub did compromise on a number of political issues. He was opposed to the revival of political parties. Soon after the introduction of the 1962 Constitution, he realized that political parties were inevitable. He agreed to their revival. Similarly fundamental rights were made justiciable and word ISLAMIC was inserted in the title of the Republic of Pakistan because of the widespread demand from several quarters.

Defence Policy

The military continued to occupy a pre-eminent position in the polity because, inter alia, the security environment did not improve. Relations

¹⁴ Cited from Myrdal, G., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 340 f.n.

with India were as strained as ever. The river water dispute had been settled with the help of the World Bank but other outstanding disputes, especially the Kashmir question, were poisoning the relations between the two states.

The most significant event of the sixties was the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a powerful state determined to play active role in the international system. This perturbed the Indian leaders who entertained regional ambitions. The hitherto dormant Sino-India border dispute became alive and resulted in an armed conflict in the Fall of 1962.

This conflict resulted from the failure of the Indian and the Chinese leaders to settle their differences amicably. The first indication of China's disagreement with India on the McMahon line came into the lime-light in 1953 when a few maps were found in the possession of a Chinese merchant visiting Calcutta, which showed parts of Assam and the whole of India's north-eastern frontier within China's boundaries.¹⁵ Some of the maps published in China showed about 36,000 square miles of territory on the north-eastern frontier and an area of 15,000 square miles in Ladakh within China, though India laid claim on them.¹⁶ Negotiations were resumed between the two governments to reconcile the discrepancies in the Indian and Chinese maps. No agreement could be reached. From 1954 the Chinese Army began to assert its control over the areas claimed by them. In the summer of 1956, a Chinese survey party came into the Spiti area and they entered Niljang-Jadhang and the Shipki pass. These developments resulted in border skirmishes between China and India which became more intense and frequent after 1959. These sporadic incidents culminated into a full-scale border war in 1962. The Indian Army could not face the superior Chinese troops and suffered on all fronts.

The Sino-Indian conflict had serious ramifications for South Asian regional politics, and especially the Indo-Pakistan relations. For the first time India was face to face with a bigger military power—a situation similar to that of Pakistan vis-a-vis India after the first Kashmir war in 1948-49. India which condemned Pakistan's acceptance of western military assistance, sought military aid from the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada and the Soviet Union. The aid programme had one short-term plan and one long-term aim. The short-term plan was for the immediate re-equipment of the armed forces. The U.S. and the U.K. earmarked \$100 million to provide India with military equipment.¹⁷ The long-term plan was

¹⁵ *South China Morning post*, 17th December 1953.

¹⁶ *India-China Border Problem*, (Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.), p. 4

¹⁷ This was agreed to by President Kennedy and Prime Minister McMillan at Nassau (Bahamas), see *The Hindu*, 23rd December 1962 and *The Guardian*, 5th March 1963.

prepared with the objective of expanding and modernizing the three services of India's military. The advice of military experts from the U.K., Australia, Canada and the U.S. was sought. The American Fact-finding Mission, headed by Averill Harriman, visited India in November 1962. The military section of the mission was headed by General Paul Adams, a senior Army officer. General Sir Richard Hull, Chief of the Imperial Staff of the U.K. also visited India during the same period. A team of Air Force experts of the U.S. and the Commonwealth came to India in January/February 1963 to survey various questions relating to air-support to ground forces, air cover to Indian cities and other requirements of the air force.

Special attention was given to the modernization of the existing airfields, the provision of strong radar system and the supply of necessary equipment for the construction of new airfields along the northern frontiers.¹⁸ The necessary training to handle the new equipment was also provided by American, British and Australian experts.¹⁹ India sent a number of missions abroad to purchase arms and military hardware. The Soviet Union was equally enthusiastic for providing military assistance to India. She committed more military aid to India than what the U.S. provided. The total value of Soviet military aid to India was about \$ 120 million. The Soviet military aid included ground to air missiles, AN-12 transport planes, Mi-4 helicopters and MIG-21 jet-fighters. It was also decided to manufacture MIG-21 in India.²⁰

The massive arms supply to India by Western powers was a matter of grave concern for Pakistan because this reinforced India's military superiority in South Asia. Pakistan's objections stemmed from the conviction that these arms would be used against Pakistan. Pakistani leaders argued that India had no intention of going to war with China. It was using the Chinese threat to obtain as much weapons as possible which would encourage India not to settle her outstanding disputes with Pakistan.²¹

¹⁸ For the full text of the agreement: *USIS, London, Press Release*, 23rd July 1963 see also, *Report, Ministry of Defence, 1964-65*, (Delhi: 1965), p. 41.

¹⁹ *New York Times*, 13th July 1963.

²⁰ For the details of Soviet military aid, see *Soviet News*, 25th February 1963; *The Hindu*, 17th March 1963, 12th September 1964, 24th February 1965, 7th September 1965.

The Times, 5th February 1963; *New York Times*, 13th May 1964. See also, Ian Graham, "The Indo-Soviet MIG deal and its repercussions," *Asian Survey*, vol. IV, No. 5, May 1964.

²¹ In an exclusive interview with Tom Stacy, Ayub Khan said: "if she (India) is not likely to use this (Western arms aid) against China, where is she going to use it? Obviously against Pakistan because they still say Pakistan is enemy number one". He explained that India did not have to assault Pakistan outright to humiliate her; it was simply enough to possess a greatly superior military force and threaten, bully and tease the two vulnerable halves of

Though these Western powers had defence treaty arrangements with Pakistan since 1954-55, they did not care for Pakistan's security sensitivities. This led Pakistan to review the pattern of her relationship with the West. Pakistan began to improve relations with the Socialist countries. A border agreement was signed with China in March 1963 which covered the frontier beginning at the tri-junction of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sinkiang province of China and running in South-Eastern direction up to the Karakoram pass. Pakistan surrendered no territory under her control. China ceded to Pakistan 750 square miles of territory.

India's growing military power underlined the need of paying greater attention to the modernization of the armed forces so that these were kept in a state of perpetual readiness. Speaking at the air display of the PAF, Ayub Khan said:

... More than ever before, our Armed Forces must enhance their effectiveness and remain at a high state of readiness to secure our rights, to deter and, if necessary, to defeat aggression. This must continue to be done till such time as we find ourselves in a friendly and healthier environment, where all disputes could be settled by peaceful means.²²

The government continued with the policy of allocation of substantial portion of national budget to the defence services and procured arms and equipment from abroad. Defence expenditure rose more rapidly during 1962-70 than during the period of direct military rule (1958 to 62). It touched the peak level in 1965-66²³ which represented about 199% rise over the defence expenditure of 1962-63. Though the defence expenditure of 1963-64 and 1964-65 was less than half of the total budget but the amount spent on defence was higher than in the previous years. After the peak of 1965-66, defence expenditure slid downwards but it was more

Pakistan and turn it into a satellite of India. He went on "In the military field, it is not the criminal intention that counts, it is the capability. But their intentions towards Pakistan were always malicious." *The Sunday Times*, 20th October, 1963.

In a press conference, Ayub Khan said: "Physically it is impossible for China to intimidate India to the extent of liquidation of that country. And for that matter India to intimidate China. India's Army is more than enough really to be able to cope with the threat developing from Tibet in the direction of India. So India's efforts, the U.S.'s efforts and anybody's efforts, for that matter, mean creating more problems. Any thought that by this India will be able to intimidate China, I think, is wishful thinking. She will use (her growing military power) against smaller countries, as she has been trying to do in the past. I mean, if she does not use it, she will try to intimidate people and so more and more problems will arise. *Dawn*, 23rd February, 1964.

²² *Dawn*, 29th October 1964.

²³ It needs to be noted here that, in addition to western arm aid to India, the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War was also responsible for the rapid rise in defence expenditure.

than double the expenditure of 1962-63. The salaries and other facilities of the personnel of the armed forces were raised, making them better off than their civilian counterparts. This gave rise to the charge that the officers were leading a luxurious life—a charge vehemently denied by the government.

The following tables show defence expenditure for the period of 1958-62 and 1962-70.

TABLE XV
Defence Expenditure 1958-62

Year	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of the Total Expenditure.
1958-59*	966.5	50.9
1959-60	1,043.5	56.51
1960-61	1,112.4	58.73
1961-62	1,108.6	55.80

* Covers the period of 15 months from 1st April, 1958 to 30th June, 1959.

TABLE XVI
Defence Expenditure 1962-70

Year	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of the Total Expenditure
1962-63	954.3	53.16
1963-64	1,156.5	49.49
1964-65	1,262.3	46.07
1965-66	2,855.0	53.67
1966-67	2,293.5	60.92
1967-68	2,186.5	53.63
1968-69	2,426.8	55.62
1969-70	2,749.1	53.35

The Indo-Pakistan War (1965):

After the cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949, there had been minor incidents on the Indo-Pakistan border and the cease-fire line in Kashmir, but the tension between the two countries did not burst out into a large scale war until April 1965. Fighting broke out between the armies of India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch (on the frontier between Indian State of Gujrat and the Sind area of West Pakistan). The Rann of Kutch is a desolate and barren territory which remains under water for half of the year. There is hardly any population and agriculture is wholly non-existent but there exist some grazing tracts in Chhad Bet. The trouble started on 4th April 1965, when the Indian Army occupied in Pakistan outpost at Ding on the pretext that it belonged to India and Pakistan had illegally occupied it. Pakistan moved her forces to an area lying between Chhad Bet and Beir Bet to prevent the Indian forces from advancing in the area which Pakistan considered to be hers. This was followed by a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan succeeded in pushing

back the Indian forces from the disputed area. A cease-fire agreement was signed through the mediation of the British Prime Minister which provided for the restoration of 1st January 1965 position in the Rann of Kutch and both the parties agreed to submit the dispute to adjudication either through talks or through a three-men arbitral tribunal. India and Pakistan were to nominate one member each. The third member who was to act as Chairman, was to be chosen jointly by India and Pakistan or by the Secretary-General of the U.N.²⁴

After the cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch, tempers remained high on both the sides and the violations of the cease-fire line in Kashmir increased. The political leaders of India and Pakistan accused each other of increasing tension in the Sub-continent. The tension took a new turn, when in August 1965, a large number of Kashmiris, who had been given para-military training in Pakistan, crossed the cease-fire line and entered the Indian part of Kashmir with the objective of carrying out sabotage. The police and the Indian Army attempted to round them up, but succeeded only to a limited extent. When their activities could not be brought under control, the Indian Army crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir and occupied three passes in Kargil, alleged to be the infiltration routes. In the third week of August, 1965, the Indian Army occupied Tithwal and Haji Pir, two strategic points in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. On 1st September 1965, the Pakistan Army also crossed the cease-fire line and advanced in the Chamb-Akhnur sector in the Indian part of Kashmir. As the Pakistan Army advanced in Kashmir the Indian Army crossed the international border on 6th September 1965, and launched a three pronged attack in the Punjab sector of the India-West Pakistan border to slow down Pakistan's advances in Kashmir. Thus, for the first time since independence, war spread all along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the India-West Pakistan border. The war lasted for 17 days in which the air forces of the two countries also participated. The navies of India and Pakistan had a short and limited encounter near Dawarka Naval base (India). There was no fighting on the East Pakistan-India border. India and Pakistan released contradictory information about their gains and losses in the war. The following table outlines their gains and losses as given by Indian and Pakistan sources:

²⁴ The Government of India nominated ambassador Ales Bebler, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, and the Government of Pakistan nominated Ambassador Entezam (Iran) a former President of the General Assembly of the U.N. The Chairman, Judge Gunner Legeren, President of the Court of Appeal for Sweden, was nominated by the Secretary General of the U.N. For the full text of the cease-fire agreement and the award of the tribunal, see: Razvi, Mujtaba, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1971), Appendices VII and VIII, p. 266-282.

TABLE XVII
Estimates of gains and losses during the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965.

	India		Pakistan	
	According to Indian Sources	According to Pakistani Sources	According to Indian Sources	According to Pakistani Sources
Territory Captured	740 Sq. miles	446 Sq. miles	210 Sq. miles	1,617 Sq. miles
Men killed	1,333	9,500	4,802	1,033
Tanks Lost	128	475	475	165
Air-Craft Destroyed	35	110	73	14

The war came to an end on 23rd September 1965, when India and Pakistan accepted the Security Council Resolution of 20th September 1965, calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire. In January, 1966, President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri went to Tashkent on the invitation of Prime Minister Kosygin. After a week's negotiations, in which Kosygin also took part, a declaration was signed by Ayub Khan and Shastri. Both the leaders affirmed "their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means." They decided to withdraw their troops to the position existing on 5th August 1965 (before the outbreak of hostilities) and agreed to base their relations on the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries was also restored.²⁵

During the short war of 17 days, the morale of the troops was high on both sides because both the parties were convinced that their cause was just. No spectacular success was achieved by either side. None was prepared to take the risk of waging war on a very large scale due to resource-

²⁵ For the details of the talks, see: *Keating's Contemporary Archives* (1965-66), p. 1187-89.

constraints. Moreover, since the commanders of both the sides were trained at British institutions, they were using the similar tactics of warfare, rather than taking courageous initiatives. But keeping in view the numerical strength and defence potential of the Indian Armed Forces *vis-a-vis* Pakistan, the Pakistan Armed Forces put up a more impressive show of their quality. Both the countries achieved some of their objectives. India succeeded in saving Kashmir from falling into the hands of Pakistan but could not make much gains on the international border which could have put her in a bargaining position on the Kashmir question. Pakistan failed to stir up rebellion in Kashmir by encouraging infiltrators and failed to impose a military solution of the Kashmir problem. Pakistan, however, succeeded in foiling the Indian attempt to capture a substantial part of the Pakistani territory. The war made it clear to India and Pakistan that the other country was not as weak as they might have thought. It widened the gulf between the two countries. The government and people in Pakistan realized that much would have to be done to safeguard its frontiers and create an effective deterrent capable of resisting 'aggression'. Addressing the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) Parliamentary Party, Ayub Khan declared that preservation of Pakistan's security was the nation's priority number one.²⁶ The military commanders viewed the 1965 war as the eventuality for which they had been given liberal allocation of funds and that they could fulfil their duty to defend the country from an external enemy.

One impact of the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, was that the acquisition of arms became an obsession. India, with the fear of a combined attack from Pakistan and China, increased her internal munitions programme. Tanks, aircrafts, missiles poured in from France, the Soviet Union and international arms brokers in Europe. Pakistan, fully convinced that India was arming herself for another attack, purchased arms and ammunition from France, Turkey, West Germany, Czechoslovakia and other countries.

The U.S. military aid to Pakistan and India was cut-off following the outbreak of the war in September 1965. Though this embargo applied to both countries but it caused greater problems for Pakistan whose Army was partially and the Air Force was almost entirely dependent on American equipment and aircraft. India was obtaining weaponry from several sources. Therefore, Pakistan was more critical of American arms embargo and pleaded for its withdrawal. In March 1966 the embargo was eased to permit the sale of "non-lethal" military equipment such as trucks, communication item, medical, engineering and quartermaster supplies. The policy of arms embargo by the U.S., was revised in early 1967. The State

²⁶ Dawn, 18th May, 1967.

Department further eased the embargo by agreeing to sell spare parts to India and Pakistan for military equipment previously supplied, but declined to sell combat equipment to either nation.²⁷ Both the governments expressed their indignation over the new U.S. policy. The Indian Government maintained that the sale of American spare parts to Pakistan would not only upset the balance of power but also add new impetus to the arms race.²⁸ The Pakistani circles claimed that the U.S. decision had hit Pakistan whose main source of supply of arms and ammunition was the U.S. and Pakistan needed new equipment to modernise its Armed Forces, particularly the Air Force.²⁹

With the traditional sources of supply cut off, Pakistan looked for new sources to secure equipment for the three services of the military. Besides purchasing arms from the European countries, Pakistan secured military equipment through Iran and Turkey. China was the most important source of supply of weapons to Pakistan. The New York Times reported that an 'air shuttle service' operated daily for some time after the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 between China and Pakistan, carrying arms and equipment. A large number of pilots were trained in China.³⁰ The first official admission of the Chinese military aid to Pakistan was made on 23rd March 1966, when Chinese MIG-19 led the fly-past in Rawalpindi and T-59 tanks took part in the military parade.³¹ A few days later, Z.A. Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister declared, "We had to go to China to find means of defence against aggression. We were victims of aggression and had to apply to any source."³² Pakistan pressed the Soviet Union either to supply arms to her or to cease supplying arms to India. The matter was taken up for the first time in June 1966 when a Pakistani military mission, headed by the C-in-C of the Air Force, visited Moscow. Two years later another military mission headed by the C-in-C of the Army visited Moscow. Soon afterward the Soviets agreed to supply light arms, military transport and helicopters to Pakistan on the terms they used to offer to India.³³

India's efforts for the acquisition of arms and equipment, which began

²⁷ U.S.I.S. (London), Press Release, 13th April, 1967.

²⁸ New York Times, 14th April, 1967.

²⁹ The Times, 15th April, 1967.

³⁰ 30th December, 1965.

³¹ The Times, 24th March, 1966.

³² Dawn, 31st March, 1966.

³³ New York Herald Tribune (European Edition) 25th, 26th June, 1966, Observer Foreign News Service, No. 25083, 15th July, 1968. Sieve, H., Moscow's shock for India, The Daily Telegraph, 9th August, 1968.

after the Sino-Indian Conflict 1962, touched a new level after the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965. She purchased tanks from Eastern European countries and supersonic fighters capable of carrying missiles, transport planes, surface to air missiles and a radar network during 1965-66 from a number of countries.³⁴ The main source of arms supply to India had been the Soviet Union. She provided her sub-marines and supersonic fighters.³⁵ It was also reported that India purchased Soviet made missiles, tanks and other items captured by Israel during the Israel-Arab War, 1967, through arms dealers in West Germany.³⁶ Particular attention was paid to the modernization of the Navy. It was re-organized on the basis of two fleets—one for the Bay of Bengal and the other for the Arabian Sea and it was decided to develop Goa as a major naval base with the assistance of Japan. Since the existing number of vessels did not justify a split into two fleets, more vessels of various kinds were acquired.³⁷ It was also decided to acquire sophisticated weapons such as guided missiles, radar training establishments, torpedoes and gun boats equipped with surface-to-air missiles.³⁸

The Armed Forces and Society:

The Rann of Kutch fighting and the September War between India and Pakistan brought the prestige of the armed forces to its peak. This was clearly reflected in the debates of the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies, statements of political leaders, various articles, poems and short stories. A glowing tribute was paid to the armed forces as sentinels constituting an effective deterrent to foreign enemy and for standing by the people and giving them their best during internal crisis. The armed forces featured prominently on the national days. Besides the Pakistan Day (23rd March) and Independence Day (14th August). The government decided to observe Revolution Day on 27th October and the Armed Forces Day on the second Sunday of January every year. After the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, 6th and 7th September were declared as the 'Defence of Pakistan Day' and the 'Air Force Day' respectively. Parades of the armed forces, air displays, display of various kinds of arms and ammunition, exhibitions, lectures and seminars about the role of the armed forces in nation building and defence of the country were regularly held on all these occasions. The armed forces

³⁴ Foreign Minister of Pakistan's statement: *New York Times*, 11th August, 1966.

³⁵ *The Guardian*, 9th August, 1967; *The Times* 29th May, 1967 and *Dawn*, 18th February, 1968.

³⁶ *Dawn*, 1st August, 1967 (Report of the London Correspondent).

³⁷ Vice Admiral A. K. Chatterjee, Chief of the Naval Staff's statement: *The Hindu*, 27th May, 1966. See also *Dawn*, 26th January 1969.

³⁸ Admiral Chatterjee's statement: *The Hindu*, 23rd March, 1969.

also featured on a number of stamps issued by the Pakistan Post Office.

The armed forces were also helped to maintain this image by their role in the extension of the authority of the government and assistance they extended in connection with natural calamities beyond the control of the civil administration. The Army was frequently used during floods and locust attacks in East and West Pakistan and cyclones in East Pakistan. The Army also undertook various nation-building and nation-unifying projects. The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) indicated that the military was expected to play an important role in the development of the society:

Important relationship between civilian and military uses of manpower should be carefully explored by the national manpower council in order to insure the best possible use of the manpower pool. When a given expenditure can serve the dual purposes of defence and development, substantial economies can be achieved. In an industrializing society with meagre resources, all such overlapping interests should be utilized. The armed forces utilize men during significant portions of their useful lives but the nation is concerned with their entire period of usefulness. New skills, habits of discipline and familiarity with group organizations are acquired during terms of military service. These attainments are national assets to be conserved after discharge and fully utilized in the civilian work of development.

The industrial installations and technical training facilities of the armed services can assist meeting the requirements for industrial training, these possibilities should be explored... The armed forces may also consider the establishment of a volunteer corps of reservists who would receive practical workshop training after which they would be placed in strategic civilian industry during the period of reserve status. It may also be considered whether a specific proportion of military manpower can be rotated on an actuarial basis through periods of service and into civilian life in order to upgrade the quality of the labour force and at the same time preserve a desirable age pattern within the military establishments.³⁹

The Indus Valley road from Gilgit to Peshawar and Rawalpindi, connecting Swat, Gilgit and Hunza with the rest of West Pakistan was constructed by the Army Engineers on the request of the civil government. This was the largest civilian construction project undertaken by the Army engineers. It improved means of communication in the North-West Frontier region. At Nukerji in Sind, the Army ran a Settlement Training Centre for providing training and necessary instructions to 40 persons every

³⁹ *The Second Five-Year Plan, 1960-65*; (Karachi Planning: Commission 1960); p. 375.

three months. They were trained in growing sugarcane, rice, wheat, poultry farming, marketing and the control of plant disease and pests. The trainees were provided with jobs or given lands to cultivate after the completion of their course. The results were encouraging. The programme of training was later, transferred to Agricultural University, Lyallpur. The Veterans Settlement Programme provided for allotment of land according to rank. Over 300,000 acres of land were earmarked in Sind, plus rice acreage along with West Pakistan-India border.⁴⁰ Land was distributed according to the fixed limit mentioned below :

Major-Generals and above.	240 acres.
Brigadiers and Colonels.	150 acres.
Lieutenant-Colonels.	124 acres.
Lieutenants to Majors.	100 acres.
Junior Commissioned Officers.	64 acres.
Non-Commissioned Officers and other Ranks.	32 acres.

Land could also be awarded for gallantry in action. The officers were allowed up to 50 acres, J. C. O.'s up to 25 acres and other Ranks up to 16 acres of their total area along the West Pakistan-India border.⁴¹ The specific object of granting land to military officers along the West Pakistan-India border was to create a defence reserve line of retired military officers. Later on, it was brought to the notice of the press that some of the officers exchanged their land in the border area with better land in the interior.⁴²

Another outstanding achievement of the Army Engineers was the construction of dams to overcome the shortage of water in the Quetta area. Three dams—the Wali Tangi Dam, the Sra Khula Dam and the Kach Dam, were constructed by them during 1960-64. Two more dams were constructed later on, and it was planned to generate hydro-electric power from these projects. The construction of these dams assured an adequate supply of water for the city of Quetta and the surrounding areas. The availability of water enabled farmers to grow more vegetables and fruit and it also increased the flow of springs in the area. According to one estimate the

⁴⁰ Moore, R. A., *The Army as a Vehicle for Social Change in Pakistan*; *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 2, NO. 1, October, 1967.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Under the land reforms introduced by Z. A. Bhutto's Government, all such exchanges were cancelled. See, Mr. Bhutto's address to the nation: *The Pakistan Times*, 2nd March, 1972.

cost of dam construction would have been five times more if the work had been done by the civilian engineers. Labour costs were naturally low; no profits were involved and the Army engineers had their own workshop.⁴³

Thus, all the old factors, inherited from the first phase, and the new factors outlined above, enhanced the prestige of the armed forces in the country. They were considered to be patriotic and firm. The military commanders and the government were aware of the fact that the armed forces enjoyed the respect of the people more than any other institution in the country. This reputation was used by the government to win support of the people. When General Mohammad Musa was appointed Governor of West Pakistan (replacing a civilian), the President had the background of General Musa in his mind.⁴⁴ General Musa was C-in-C of the Army at the time of the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965. The enthusiasm with which the people of West Pakistan welcomed the appointment, proved that the calculations of the President were not wrong. The reputation of the military men was also employed to build public opinion against the government. In November 1968, the decision of Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan to enter politics in opposition to Ayub Khan was a serious set-back to the regime. The opposition parties, who were anxious to bring down the Ayub regime, had succeeded in having a person in their fold, who could not be accused of corruption. A few other retired Generals followed his foot-steps and decided to enter politics; prominent among these being Lieutenant-General Azam Khan. These two retired military officers, namely, Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Lieutenant-General Azam Khan, strengthened the hands of the anti-Ayub forces due to their military service and non-political background.

Conclusions:

The political system introduced by the military leaders established an authoritarian system with guided democracy in Pakistan which ensured stability and continuity rather than people's participation in the affairs of the state. There was a concentration of powers in the hands of the President, indirectly elected for a period of five years. This was an admission on the part of the leaders of Pakistan that a political system could not be abstracted from its cultural context and then transferred in generalized form to a strange culture in the expectation that it would flourish on the strength of its own laws and inherent merits. This approach

⁴³ Moore, R. A., *Military and Nation-building in Pakistan and India*; *World Affairs*, Vol. 123, No. 3, December, 1969.

⁴⁴ General Mohammad Musa was appointed Governor of West Pakistan in September, 1966. He was due to retire on 27th October, 1966 as the C-in-C of the Army.

to the problems of democracy was not the invention of Ayub's mind. A number of other Asian leaders and scholars were convinced about the unsuitability of Western system of government for Asia. President Sukarno of Indonesia, King Mahendra of Nepal and Jayaprakash Narayan, an Indian scholar, neither wanted to introduce Western system of democracy nor they favoured the Soviet system of government. They emphasized the nature of Asian political culture and social conditions and proposed a kind of guided or restricted democracy. Such institutions were unacceptable to the West orientated and politically active people who favoured a participatory political system.

Ayub Khan enjoyed the support of the bureaucracy and the military. He introduced the system of Basic Democracies to encourage local development and create public support for his system. It was believed that these institutions would produce a cadre of new leaders who could serve as the base for the new political system and a link between the people and the government. Ayub Khan joined a political party to extend the political base of his rule. However, he achieved a limited success. The B.D. system and his political party were relying on the regime for their survival rather than serving as viable instruments of political mobilisation. The government's real strength was the bureaucracy and the military.

There was no improvement in Pakistan's security environment. The western arms supply to India in the backdrop of the Sino-Indian conflict (1962), the Indo-Pakistan War (1965), and the imposition of arms embargo by the U.S. in 1965 multiplied Pakistan's security sensitivities. The government seriously pursued the policy of strengthening the defence services, allocated more than half of the national budget, obtained weaponry from diverse sources abroad, and emphasized professional competence and training. A number of retired officers took up lucrative jobs in the private and public sectors. The government also appointed them to senior official and semi-official posts. Some of them entered active politics.

7

East Pakistan and the Armed Forces

The preponderant bulk of the Pakistan Armed Forces are drawn from West Pakistan. Even all the regions of West Pakistan do not provide equal number of recruits both for the officers cadre and the other ranks. The Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province, particularly their districts of Kohat, Peshawar, Campbellpur, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat have been the main recruiting areas for the army. Almost every second family in these districts has some links with the armed forces — some members of the family, relatives or close family friends are in the armed forces. The representation of East Pakistan was extremely poor in all the three services of the armed forces. The problem of regional imbalance in the armed forces was a legacy of British recruitment policy. At the time of independence, there was neither a single Bengali regiment nor a cantonment in the eastern half of Bengal because no troops were permanently stationed there by the British Government. In certain wings of army (i.e. Artillery) there was not a single Bengali. East Bengal had no military training or pre-cadet training institutions. Except during World War II, no permanent recruiting centres existed there.

British Recruitment Policy:

The cardinal feature of British recruitment policy was the concept of martial race. Their objective was not to maintain equilibrium between various races in the military but to raise a fine fighting force to pursue the aims of their colonial policy in South Asia. The political and military experience in India and keenness shown by the inhabitants of certain areas to join the military profession, convinced them that certain races furnished fine fighting men and certain races exhibited little or no aptitude for military service. They found it convenient to recruit the bulk of their army from the north and north-west India, particularly the Punjab, the N.W. Frontier Province and the Kingdom of Nepal. By the time they transferred power to the new Dominions of India and Pakistan, it was generally

believed in the military circles of British India that the South Indians (particularly Madras) and Bengalis were not as good soldiers as the Punjabis, the Pathans and the Gurkhas. The two world wars proved that the distinction between the martial and the non-martial races had greatly narrowed the base of recruitment but the assumption underlying the distinction did not fall to pieces. The traditional recruiting areas provided the largest number of recruits for the Indian Army.

The Army in India witnessed many changes in its organization after the 1857 upheaval. The proportion of the trained Indian troops to the British troops was fixed at one to three and Indian artillery was limited to mountain and light units. The 1857-1914 period saw the drift of recruitment to the North and North-West. Initially it was based on the distrust of the classes and the people who had been involved in the events of 1857 and confidence in those who stood aloof or supported the British. The inhabitants of North-West India came forward in large numbers to join the Army. The British had captured the Punjab in 1849 after a number of wars with the Sikhs. After the annexation of the Punjab, there was frequent trouble in the North-West-Frontier. Therefore, the quality of the Northern troops did not deteriorate. The South had a comparatively peaceful time. This dampened the efficiency of the Army in the South. General Sir O'Moore Creagh (C-in-C : 1909-1914) attributed the deterioration of the quality of Southern soldiers to several factors :-

In the hot, flat regions, of which by far the greater part of India consists ... are found races, timid both by religion and habit, servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors, and quite unwarlike. In other parts ... where the winter is cold, the warlike minority is to be found.¹

The British Government attached great importance to the North-Western Frontier because they feared Russian invasion through the frontier passes. They deployed the troops recruited from the region to defend and protect this area.

All this tended to the disbandment of units from Bengal and Madras. Further recruitment from these areas was discouraged. The Army became predominantly north Indian and Nepali. During World War I, the British Government was compelled by circumstances to encourage recruitment from the 'non-martial' regions. The response was not as encouraging as that of the 'martial' regions. The contribution of the 'non-martial' areas, which constituted about 70% of the total area, was less than the contribution of the North and North-West India. Bengal, with a population

¹ Creagh, Sir O'Moore, *Indian Studies*, (London : n.d.), p.233.

of 45 million, provided 7,117 combatant recruits. The Punjab, with a population of 20 million, provided 3,49,689 combatant recruits. The Punjab and the United Provinces provided three-fourths of the total number of combatant recruits.² In the Punjab, one out of 28 males, was mobilised, whereas, in the rest of India, the ratio was 1 to 150.³ During the late twenties, the Punjab, the N.W. Frontier Province and the Kingdom of Nepal provided about 84% of troops. The vast and populous regions of Bombay, Madras furnished only 13,000 men. On average, the central Province, Bihar and Orissa provided 500 persons, and Bengal and Assam, none at all.⁴ Similar trends in recruitment were observed during World War II. The Punjab and the N.W. Frontier Province provided 712952 recruits out of total of 2047430 recruits from all over India (excluding the princely states). Bengal provided 171252 recruits.⁵

Post Independence Period :

Partition of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent and the establishment of Pakistan further reduced the number of Bengalis in the Army. The non-Muslim Bengali Officers and men opted for India. Thus, East Pakistanis formed only 1% of the total strength of the armed forces in 1947.⁶ The government was anxious to do away with the British recruitment policy so that the people of all regions could have an equal opportunity to take part in the defence of the country. It could not however make bold departure from the British recruitment policy because the government was bogged down by the serious administrative, political and financial problems. Moreover, the security problems in wake of the strained relations with India and Afghanistan made it imperative to pay greater attention to the modernization and re-equipment of the armed forces. As a result, the government adopted the policy of gradual induction of Bengalis in the military.

A small garrison was stationed in East Pakistan with its newly established headquarters in Dacca to mark the beginning of the Army's presence there. A committee was appointed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali

² *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, (London, 193-), Vol. 1, Survey; p. 61

³ *Punjab Administration Report: 1921-22*, (Lahore, 1922), Vol. 1, p.28.

⁴ *India in 1929-30*, (Calcutta, 1930), p. 61.

⁵ Prasad, No., (ed.), *Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organization, 1939-45* (Calcutta, 1956), Appendix 16, p. 463.

⁶ Parliamentary Secretary, Defence, Qasim Malik's statement in the National Assembly, *Dawn*, 25th June, 1967.

Earlier in 1965, he disclosed that there were only 155 Bengalis in the Army at the time of independence, whereas now there were 13,000 Bengalis : *Dawn*, 20th July, 1965.

Khan to inquire into the causes of the paucity of recruits from East Pakistan and to suggest methods to attract recruits from there. The report of the committee was not released to the press but in pursuance of the recommendations, several steps were taken by the military authorities to overcome the problems of under-representation of East Pakistan.

The government decided to raise the first exclusively Bengal Infantry regiment. The nucleus was provided by the optees of the Bihar Regiment and the Bengal Pioneer Corps of the former Indian Army. Additional requirements of the J. C. Os. were fulfilled from the Punjab Regiment. When the required number of East Pakistani personnel were available, they replaced the Punjabis. By 1968 four such exclusive Bengali regiments had been raised. These regiments had the distinction of being purely Bengali. No other regiment could be called a hundred per cent. Punjabi, Sindhi or Pathan. Ten more exclusively Bengali battalions were raised in 1968-69. Recruitment to all branches of the military was also opened to East Pakistanis. In 1959, Ayub Khan decided to reduce physical standards in respect of recruitment of East Pakistanis to the Army but there was no change in the physical standards for West Pakistanis.

These measures increased the number of East Pakistanis in the three services of Armed Forces but their representation was never in proportion to their population. The following table shows East Pakistan's representation in the armed forces in 1963.

TABLE XVIII

East Pakistan's Representation in the Armed Forces

	Authorised Per cent	Actual Per cent
THE ARMY		
1. Officers	-	5
2. Junior Commissioned Ranks	7.8	7.4
3. Other Ranks	7.8	7.4
THE AIR FORCE		
1. Officers	-	16
2. Warrant Officers	-	17
3. Other Ranks	-	30
THE NAVY		
1. Officers	-	10

	Authorised Per cent	Actual Per cent
2. Branch Officers	-	5
3. Chief Petty Officers	-	10.4
4. Petty Officers	-	17.3
5. Leading seamen and below	-	28.8

Later the government was reluctant to disclose the number of East Pakistanis and West Pakistanis in the armed forces. It only declared that the East Pakistanis were being recruited at a faster pace than in the past. These figures did not indicate their proportion in relation to West Pakistanis. The number of East Pakistanis rose by about 100 per cent. In the Army during 1947-58 and went up by 500 per cent. by April, 1968.⁷ In 1967 they constituted 30 per cent. of the total strength of the Air Force and the Navy.⁸

The inadequate representation of East Pakistanis could be attributed to a number of inter-related factors. Recruitment to the Armed Forces was made open for the Pathan tribes, i.e. Yusufzais, Afridis, Khattaks and Bangash. These tribesmen and other West Pakistanis came forward in such a large number that the selectors had ample choice to select the best of them. The physically smaller East Pakistanis could not compete with them. Had there been serious shortages of recruits, the military authorities might have taken extensive steps to make up the deficiency from East Pakistan. The military profession did not attract the Bengali mind to such an extent as was the case in the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province. The profession of trade and money-lending carried status in Bengal. They were more active in political and agitational organizations rather than joining military service. A look at their folk tales and dances suggested that unlike N. W. frontier Province, their hero was a poor boatman (not a soldier) who went out fishing on the high sea or river and succeeded in returning home fighting against the unkind waves. He was often exploited by the government agent or the money-lender. The profession of soldiery enjoyed respect in N.W. Frontier Province and the Punjab. Their folk dances (i.e. Khattak, Bhargra) and folk tales emphasized courage, bravery and discipline. In the rural areas, a soldier returning home on leave was respected by the local people.

⁷ Vice Admiral A. R. Khan (Defence Minister)'s statement in the National Assembly: *Dawn*, 25th June, 1968.

⁸ Qasim Malik (Parliamentary Secretary Defence) statement in the National Assembly, *ibid.* 25th June, 1967.

In various cases a boy wanted to join his father's regiment in the Army. On the other hand, there was general lack of interest amongst the youths of East Pakistan to join the armed forces. It was observed that a large number of parents did not like their daughters to be married to boys serving in the armed forces.⁹ In the early years after independence, the selection board touring East Pakistan could find only a few boys for the Army. Most of them belonged to refugee families.¹⁰ With the passage of time, the situation improved, but material for officers remained far below the requirement because most of the candidates were not educationally up to the mark. When the first pre-cadet school was established in Dacca in 1952, with the capacity of 50, only 15 joined the school.¹¹ One year later, the school had to be closed due to the paucity of candidates.¹²

Table XIX shows the number of applications received for recruitment to the Army from both the wings of Pakistan.

TABLE XIX
Recruitment to the Army

Year	No. of applications from West Pakistan (Population according to 1951 Census 34.08 million)	No. of applications from East Pakistan (Population according to 1951 Census 42.15 million)	Total
1948	2708	87	2795
1951	1008	134	1142
1954	3204	165	3369
Total	6920	386	7306

Table XX shows the number of officers recruited in the Navy during 1956-57. It supported the contention that there were greater number of applications from West Pakistan.

⁹ Maj-General Istikhhar Ahmad, G.O.C., East Pakistan, while speaking in the Dacca University, said that he was disappointed by the response from the young men of East Pakistan to join the Armed Forces. He said that even recruitment to the University Officers Corps was far below the quota; *Dawn*, 15th November, 1955.

See also the Editorial in the *Pakistan Observer*, 15th May, 1967.

¹⁰ Khan, M. Ayub, *Friends Not Masters* (London, 1967), p. 26.

¹¹ *Dawn*, 2nd July, 1952.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1st October, 1953.

TABLE XX
Officer's Recruitment in the Navy

Year	West Pakistan Population Mid 1956 37.10 million.		East Pakistan Population Mid 1956 46.34 million	
	Applied	Recruited	Applied	Recruited
1956	110	11	22	3
1957	294	15	39	3
Total	404	26	61	6

After the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, publicity measures were increased to step up recruitment from East Pakistan. The government also agreed to fix a quota for East Pakistanis in all regiments but details of the quota were not disclosed. Later on, the recruitment quota of East Pakistan in the Army was doubled.¹³ The Defence Minister, however, disclosed some details about the quota of various regions in the Air Force and the Navy. There was no quota in the officer cadre of the Air Force but 50 per cent. of the vacancies for airmen were allowed to the selection centres in East Pakistan. So far as the Navy was concerned, 40 per cent. of vacancies of the Ratings were allocated to East Pakistan; 10 per cent. to Karachi and Sind; 40 per cent. to the rest of West Pakistan. The remaining 10 per cent. was transferable between East Pakistan on the one side and Karachi, Baluchistan and Sind on the other side on the alternate year.¹⁴

In spite of the lack of geographical contiguity, the defence planners of Pakistan did not favour a self-sustaining defence system for East Pakistan. The keynote to the defence strategy was what Ayub Khan pointed out in 1955: "The defence of East Pakistan does not lie in that part of the country". He maintained that East Pakistan was not defensible even if the entire military strength was thrown there, as long as the western base was not made strong.¹⁵ The military commanders were of the view that large

¹³ *Pakistan New*, London, 1st November, 1969.

¹⁴ *Dawn*, 25th June, 1968.

¹⁵ *Dawn*, 18th January, 1955.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan (C-in-C, Air Force: 1958-65) maintained that "the distance between the two wings of Pakistan is so great that rapid movement of forces from one theatre to the other is not practicable. The two Indian theatres of operation in the east and west are, therefore, likely to remain for all practical purposes, independent of each other and

scale war could not break out simultaneously on both the fronts. In case East Pakistan was invaded by India, they could adopt offensive strategy in the West to capture Indian territory or advance in Kashmir. This would check India's pressure in the East. The possibility of border skirmishes was not ruled out. A limited number of troops were stationed in East Pakistan. In order to supplement the efforts to strengthen defence and check smuggling, the border militia was expanded and better equipped. The East Pakistan Rifles were established. The Police were provided with more boats, modern arms and ammunition and additional communication equipment. The 'Ansars' and the 'Mujahid' forces were raised as paramilitary forces to serve as the second line of defence. They were given extensive military training.

The assumption underlying the defence strategy was partly based on British military training and partly on the experience during the post-independence period. The military commanders of India and Pakistan were orientated towards the use of armour. The East Pakistan terrain was not suitable for such operations. It was generally presumed that the Indian Armed Forces could advance comparatively easily in the western sector. Experience also showed that there were great chances of serious troubles on the West Pakistan-India border and Kashmir. In the north-west, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were strained and some of the Pathan tribes were a source of trouble. The troops remained concentrated in the N.W. Frontier Province, Kashmir and on the West-Pakistan-India border. After the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the situation was reviewed keeping in view the experience of the war. The strength of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in East Pakistan was raised and two new cantonments were established.

Pakistan had only one ordnance installation at Wah in West Pakistan, which, it was claimed, produced enough to meet the requirements of small arms and ammunition for the armed forces. The political leaders of East Pakistan demanded the setting up of similar installation in East Pakistan to bring it at par with West Pakistan. The controversy of an ordnance factory for East Pakistan was resolved after the Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, when the government decided to set up an ordnance factory near Dacca with the help of the People's Republic of China. It went into production in 1969. Work also started on the East Pakistan Machine Tool Factory with the estimated cost of Rs. 230.67 million.

not mutually supporting. The two wings of Pakistan, therefore, lend strength to each other's defence and together impose a strain on India's offensive capability which could prove decisive against the two halves of Pakistan separately. In military terms, therefore, Pakistan's division into two halves lends strength to her defence and enhances her security." Khan, M. Asghar, *Pakistan at the Cross-Roads* (Lahore, 1969), pp. 4-5.

The political leaders of East Pakistan criticised the government's recruitment policy and the measures adopted to strengthen the defence of East Pakistan. They characterized it as a deliberate attempt to keep the eastern wing dependant on West Pakistan in matters of defence, and exclude East Pakistanis from defence services. They also took exception to defence expenditure, a large part of which was spent on the salaries of the soldiers and officers (most of whom were West Pakistanis) and the defence of West Pakistan. The debates on defence expenditure, and general discussions on the budget in the National Assembly clearly reflected their dissatisfaction with the policy of gradual induction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces. They became more bitter in their criticism after Ayub's Martial Law because the military monopolised Power since 1958. As the higher echelons of the Army were exclusively West Pakistani, the educated classes and the politicians of East Pakistan felt completely excluded from the decision making process. The reservation of the defence ministry for a former senior military officer under the 1962 Constitution was interpreted in East Pakistan as an attempt to debar them from assuming the charge of the defence ministry in the near future. During the same period, the senior ranks of the armed forces became a ladder for lucrative civilian jobs after retirement. The inadequate representation of East Pakistanis in the higher ranks reduced their prospects of securing such jobs.

A large number of cut-motions on defence expenditure were moved by the members from East Pakistan in the National Assembly during 1962-68. The cut motions dealt with more or less the same subject—the failure of the central government to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in defence, and the recruitment policy. The repetition of arguments on the part of the sponsors and the opponents of the cut-motions over the years was very common. Even the wording of many cut-motions was more or less the same.¹⁶ They demanded the shifting of naval headquarters from Karachi to Chittagong and the setting up of military academies in East Pakistan on the lines of the Kakul and the Risalpur Academies. The shifting of naval headquarters to East Pakistan would have won a few supporters for the government and pacified opposition but it would have incurred a heavy expenditure without improving the fighting potential of the navy. Military strategy demanded greater co-ordination amongst the headquarters of these services. The shifting would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the navy to

¹⁶ The cut-motion of Syed Abdus Sultan in 1964 read, "the failure of the government to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in defence."

The cut-motion of A. H. M. Qamaruzzaman in 1968 read: "The failure of the government to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in defence requirements." See also the cut-motion of Maulvi Farid Ahmad in 1962 to raise discussion "on the recruitment of East Pakistanis in defence services."

maintain close contact with the headquarters of the army and the air force.

The demand for separate military training academies for East Pakistan was opposed by the government on the grounds that the cadet-intake from East Pakistan did not justify the duplication of these institutions. This would also have made it difficult to maintain uniform standards and develop comradeship and fraternity amongst the cadets. The government decided to set up four cadet colleges in East Pakistan to encourage the youths to adopt military career. Special facilities were provided to East Pakistanis to join the Military College, Jhelum (West Pakistan). The government agreed to give free airlift to East Pakistani students of the Military College, Jhelum, from Dacca to Lahore on admission and back during vacations.

The debates of the National Assembly were on party lines. The members from East Pakistan belonging to the government benches called for increasing the representation of East Pakistanis in the defence services but they supported the policy of gradual induction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces. The West Pakistani members belonging to the opposition benches criticised the government policy of recruitment but were not as outspoken in condemnation of this policy as were the members of opposition from East Pakistan. The East Pakistani members were more vocal in putting forward their demands than suggesting methods to solve them. Their speeches were marked by political over-tones and bitter remarks. Dr. Aleem-ul-Razee (Independent member from Mymensing) said that if they "could not succeed in getting association with the defence of the country through legal means they might resort to illegal methods as was happening in other South-East Asian countries."¹⁷ They wanted rapid and perhaps overnight parity irrespective of the consequences such a policy would have on the morale and efficiency of the armed forces. Some of the political leaders demanded that every region should be represented in the armed forces in proportion to its population. One East Pakistani member of the National Assembly remarked:

... Our defence forces must reflect the population of the country and be representative of different areas that constitute Pakistan. . . . The defence services must be manned in proportion to the population of different areas so that it may give a national character. . . .

From now stop recruitment from those areas which are over-represented and recruit from those areas which are under represented.¹⁸

The importance of fair representation of different regions in the armed

forces cannot be denied, especially in a country where the military exercises political power. This has to be harmonized with the imperatives of military's discipline, cohesion and efficiency. If the pure and simple principles of democracy are applied to the military, it would cease to be an effective fighting force.

The government policy increased the representation of East Pakistanis in the armed forces and strengthened the defence of East Pakistan but could not satisfy the vocal elements, who found that their representation was poor at every level and in all institutions of the state. The poor representation of East Pakistan in the military was added to the list of grievances against the central government. When the agitation for autonomy was launched by the Awami League, the issue of under representation featured prominently in their charge-sheet against West Pakistan. The military was viewed as a symbol of West Pakistani or Punjabi domination. This widened the gap between the military and East Pakistanis. When Yahya Khan refused to transfer power after the 1970 elections, Bengalis described the military as the main obstacle in the way of implementation of the electoral verdict. The military action in East Pakistan drew clear lines between the military and the Bengalis. This reinforced their conviction that the military rulers were treating them like a colonized people.

A large number of Bengali troops stationed in East Pakistan either deserted or were disarmed by Pakistani authorities after the outbreak of civil strife in March 1971. The deserted Bengalis served as the main core of the Mukhti Bahini which put up resistance against Pakistani troops. The lack of widespread civil support undermined Pakistani military operations against the insurgents. Once the war broke out with India in November, Pakistan military's performance and supply operations suffered heavily due to the absence of popular support and the activities of the Mukhti Bahini. The original plan for the defence of East Pakistan did not envisage the complete erosion of political support. The military in East Pakistan was confronted with two adversaries—Indian troops and the Bengalis who regarded the Indian troops as their "friends" and "liberators".

¹⁷ Dawn, 12th July, 1965.

¹⁸ National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I, No. 42, 29th June, 1968, pp. 3294-5/

The Change of the Horseman

By 1968 it seemed that Ayub Khan had succeeded in evolving a viable political system for Pakistan. A guided democracy and the alliance of the bureaucracy and the military would ensure the stability needed for economic development and industrialization. But the events from October 1968 to March 1969 clearly showed that the political stability given by his regime was personalized rather than institutionalized. What initially started as student demonstrations, culminated into a nation wide agitation against the political system introduced by Ayub Khan. Officials claimed that the discontent was generated by opposition leaders, especially the former Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, who were bent upon creating trouble in the country. In fairness, all the blame could not be laid at Bhutto's door. He criticised the Ayub regime just as other opposition parties had been doing ever since Ayub Khan came to power. The only difference was that he said things vehemently, fearlessly and, therefore, more effectively. The issues which led to political crisis in Pakistan in 1968-69 were many and complicated. They were constitutional, political, religious, parochial, regional and even emotional. Some of these were older than the Ayub regime.

Factors Responsible for the Political Crisis in 1968-69 :

Since the introduction of the 1962 Constitution, there was a section of public opinion (especially the former politicians) who resented the concentration of powers in the hands of the President, the system of indirect elections and the grant of limited financial powers to the National Assembly. The opposition leaders objected to Basic Democracies because they felt that an electoral college composed of 80,000 people could be relied on to vote Ayub Khan to power every time. They could be easily bribed and intimidated. The state of emergency declared in September, 1965, after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War, gave him semi-dictatorial powers. There was consensus in the opposition ranks on the

need of 'democratization' of the political system introduced by Ayub Khan. But some of them pleaded the re-introduction of parliamentary system of government while others pleaded only for the introduction of direct elections and grant of more powers to the National Assembly.

After the completion of the period of ban on the 'EBDOed' politicians on 31st December 1966, most of them entered politics and joined the anti-Ayub forces. Even before the completion of the period of the ban, they had been taking part in politics from the background. Now, they directly came into the field. With the passage of time, especially after the Tashkent Declaration, 1966, the opposition parties became increasingly hostile in their attacks on the government. In public meetings organized by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (the P.D.M.) in various cities of East Pakistan, its leaders advocated the restoration of democracy and the withdrawal of the state of emergency and laws made thereunder. They denounced the government for the growing inter-wing disparity and concentration of wealth in a few hands, thereby increasing impoverishment of the peasants in East Pakistan.¹ The P.D.M. leaders in West Pakistan were no less critical of the regime and demanded the restoration of parliamentary system of government.

The government reacted sharply to such demands of the opposition leaders. Ayub Khan warned the people about the opposition demand of direct election and parliamentary form of government, saying "God forbid if they succeed in their design, it would just lead the country to disaster."² In another speech, he declared that a strong and prosperous Pakistan could be achieved only when the disruptive elements "who are unaware of their misdeeds are completely eliminated from public life."³ On various occasions the government had to rely on her regulative and coercive capability to check hostile propaganda and political agitation against the regime. This increased bitterness between the government and the political leaders and developed political alienation amongst the people.

In the meanwhile, a number of incidents damaged the image of the Ayub Regime and helped the opposition leaders to muster support. The Tashkent Declaration was not welcomed in West Pakistan. It encouraged disenchantment with the Ayub regime in those parts of West Pakistan from which the bulk of the army was recruited. The Indo-Pakistan war had ended in a stalemate, with Pakistan failing to liberate Kashmir and India failing to subdue Pakistan. But the general belief in Pakistan was that they had won the war. It was in this background that the Tashkent Declaration

¹ *The Pakistan Observer*, 9th, 12th July, 1967.

² *Dawn*, 13th December, 1967.

³ *The Pakistan Times*, 21st December, 1967.

was interpreted as a near surrender. It provided for withdrawal of troops without outlining a solution to the Kashmir question.

There were strong anti-government demonstration in the major cities of West Pakistan. The government maintained that it had not changed her stand on Kashmir and the solution of the Kashmir dispute would soon emerge through the Tashkent Declaration. Ayub Khan declared, "the declaration has in no way detracted from or damaged our national viewpoint on Kashmir. The right to choose their future remains inviolate. I hope that this Declaration will open new avenues for the settlement of the Kashmir issue."⁴ Referring to the failure of the Tashkent Summit to arrive at a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the then Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto said that the failure had not weakened "our resolve to seek a just settlement under this very declaration or even outside its framework."⁵ No advance was made towards the solution of the Kashmir dispute during the post-Tashkent Declaration period. This was a major cause of disillusionment not only amongst the masses but also in the armed forces who had fought valiantly against the better equipped Indian troops.

The Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, added a new dimension to the East Pakistan-West relations. The political leaders of East Pakistan had always been bitter about what they considered the neglect of East Pakistan by the central government. The war provided another reason of bitterness. Though there was no war on the East Pakistan-India border, it was cut off from West Pakistan during that period. The East Pakistani leaders claimed that in view of its meagre defence potential, East Pakistan could have been over-run by India.⁶ This sense of insecurity was articulated by the political leaders to reinforce their grievances against the central government. This promoted political alienation and regionalism in East Pakistan. The debates of the National Assembly during 1966-68 clearly indicated the growing dissatisfaction in East Pakistan. Most of the questions put in the National Assembly by the opposition members from East Pakistan related to the disparity between the two wings to the disadvantage of East Pakistan. It was in such an atmosphere that the Awami League presented its Six Point Formula to secure the "legitimate" rights and "maximum autonomy" for East Pakistan. Ayub Khan endeavoured to accommodate some of their demands but his efforts hardly satisfied the vocal elements in East Pakistan. Their campaign for autonomy and the constant criticism of the government policies towards East Pakistan made the Ayub regime unpopular there.

⁴ Ayub Khan's address to Nation: *The Pakistan Times*, 15th January, 1966.

⁵ Z. A. Bhutto's statement issued from Larkana: *The Pakistan Times*, 17th January, 1966.

⁶ See also Chapter 7.

During the ten years of the Ayub regime, Pakistan experienced spectacular economic growth in quantitative terms. Pakistan's philosophy of economic development was based on the principle of maximum encouragement to private enterprise through state subsidies and other incentives without regard to the income distribution or other consideration of social justice. This accentuated economic inequality between the upper class on the one hand and a small middle class and the enormous lower class on the other hand. The upper stratum of the society rapidly moved into the higher income groups but the lower classes were denied the fruits of economic development. In 1968, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq, Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, disclosed that twenty families controlled 66 per cent. of the entire industrial capital, 80 per cent. of the banking and 97 per cent. of insurance capital. The statistics quoted by the Chief Economist might be symbolic and the number of such families could be twenty-two, twenty-five, or fifty but the statement rightly identified the growing concentration of wealth in fewer hands and the lack of sufficient attention to social justice. This widened economic disparities in Pakistan. The government propaganda machinery told the people how much better off they were now as compared with their conditions ten years ago. But the experience of the common man was contrary to that. Dissatisfaction was growing particularly in urban centres because very little was done for the embryonic urban proletariat. The number of the educated jobless was increasing and the prices of essential commodities were going up. In the summer of 1968, when the country was preparing to celebrate the Decade of Development to mark the 19th anniversary of 'the October Revolution', Karachi faced a serious shortage of drinking water and the country as a whole faced a big shortage of sugar. Sugar suddenly disappeared from the market and its price registered an exorbitant rise, beyond the means of a person earning less than a hundred rupees a month. The shortage became so acute that sugar had to be imported. In November, 1968 rationing system was introduced for sugar in all the major cities. All this made the common man sceptical of the economic development during the last ten years. The opposition leaders could point out that Ayub's economic planning had not improved the lot of the majority of the people, whose income had declined and the main burden of economic development was placed on those who could not afford it. The government recognized the inability of economic planning to produce an egalitarian society. The objectives of the Fourth Five-Year Plan announced in January 1969 emphasized the need "to synthesize the claims of economic growth and social justice through the pursuit of pragmatic policies" and "to direct the forces of socio-economic change in the interests of all the people."⁷ But it

⁷ *Objectives of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970-75* (Karachi, January, 1969).

was too late to realize this. The common man in Pakistan was not in a mood of waiting for another five or ten years to see the reorientation of the pattern of economic development.

Ayub's image was further damaged by the money-making activities of members of his family and by others who enjoyed his protection. Two of his sons secured their release from the army and decided to enter civil life. One of them, Gohar Ayub, and his father-in-law, General Habibullah entered business and industry. Gohar emerged as a powerful business magnet in a relatively short span of time. There was no evidence to suggest that Gohar Ayub secured all these positions and wealth with the express consent of Ayub Khan. But it could not be denied that the activities of Gohar Ayub were within the knowledge of Ayub Khan. He did allow, willingly or unwillingly, his son to use his name and make money. What added fuel to the fire were the efforts of Gohar Ayub to become the political over-lord of Karachi. His involvement in the disturbances in Karachi in January 1965, after the victory of Ayub Khan in the presidential elections, made him unpopular. He was appointed Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee for the Convention Muslim League in Karachi. A mistaken but widespread feeling grew that Ayub Khan was preparing Gohar for succession. The resentment against Gohar Ayub contributed to political discontentment in Pakistan.

While political discontent was simmering, Ayub Khan fell seriously ill in February, 1968. He was confined to bed for about a fortnight. For all political purposes, he did not function as the President of Pakistan during his illness.⁸ The Cabinet met him for the first time after his sickness on 28th February 1968. The meeting was short and he advised the ministers: "do not postpone decisions and execute essential policies and plans."⁹ The Cabinet again met him on 10th March 1968, when he was in a much better shape.¹⁰ Thus, in a period of 36 days, the ministers saw the President only once; even that too for a few minutes. His illness had two major impacts on the future course of politics in Pakistan: First, it brought the issue of successor to Ayub Khan into the lime-light. For the first time in ten years, people began asking themselves 'after Ayub, who?' after Ayub what? Second, Ayub's reliance on the bureaucracy increased after his sickness it appears that his health and medical advice did not permit him to devote as much time to administration as was the case in the past. This widened the already widening gap between Ayub Khan and the common man. The

⁸ Zafar, S. M., *Through the Crisis*; (Lahore, 1970), p. 128.

S. M. Zafar was Law Minister in Ayub's Cabinet in 1968.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

senior advisors kept him in dark and gave the impression that his name would go down in history as the second Ataturk. A massive programme of publicity was launched under the caption 'the Decade of Development' to mark the 10th Anniversary of Ayub's assumption of power. Ayub Khan became conscious of serious dissatisfaction against him only in October/November, 1968, when student riots became widespread. The other incident which confirmed the existence of dissatisfaction against his regime was an unsuccessful attempt on his life in Peshawar in November 1968.

The next General elections were due in Pakistan in autumn, 1969, and winter, 1970. According to the plans, the elections of Basic Democracies were to be held in autumn, 1969. This was to be followed by the elections of the President, the members of the National Assembly and the two Provincial Assemblies. Political parties stepped up their activities to prepare themselves for the next elections. They played up what they considered the failure of the government to mobilise people for their viewpoint.

Ayub Khan efforts to modernise society by adopting liberal and dynamic interpretation of the Islamic principles were not welcomed by the orthodox religious leaders. The Family Laws Ordinance invited the wrath of the orthodox section of population. His attempts to popularize the Family Planning Programme was declared un-Islamic by a large number of mullahs who quoted the verses of the Quran to show that the use of contraceptives was prohibited in Islam. There were numerous reports of Family Planning Officers beaten up by villagers and their offices attacked in rural areas. This section of population turned against Ayub Khan for what they considered 'anti-Islamic' policies of his regime.

There were serious allegations that corruption, nepotism and bribery had become rampant in Pakistan. It was claimed that all the evils which existed in Pakistan before Ayub Khan took over in 1958, had again grown out of proportion and it was difficult for an ordinary person to have his work done in government offices without promising bribes.

The Collapse of the Ayub Regime:

Political movement that forced Ayub Khan to resign and hand over power to General Yahya Khan was unique in the sense that it was spontaneous, unplanned and lacked unified direction. The scope and intensity of the movement was without a parallel in Pakistan and left few institutions and concepts untouched. When, in November, 1968, the movement started in the form of student agitation, no political commentator could visualize that Ayub Khan's regime would collapse and the country

plunge into a serious political crisis.

Political movement against Ayub Khan passed through four major phases. The four phases do not imply that the movement could be divided into four water-tight compartments. The events of these months were so interlinked that on occasions this classification appeared arbitrary. These phases reflected four major turning points in the movement which facilitated the analysis of the dynamics of this mass movement for the restoration of liberal democratic institutions in Pakistan.

The First Phase :

While the government was making necessary arrangements to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Ayub Khan's assumption of power, the opposition parties were planning their strategy for the new elections. In November, 1967, Z. A. Bhutto launched a new political Party—Pakistan People's Party. The first convention of the Party was held in December 1967. Z. A. Bhutto had been associated with Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1966. He was appointed Minister of Commerce in 1958. Changes in ministerial posts brought him to Foreign Ministry. It was in this ministry that he began to carve out his career which seemed to mark him as the apparent successor to Ayub Khan. His support for Ayub Khan's candidature in the 1965 elections was unqualified and so was his condemnation of the opposition. But in 1966, he had sharp differences with Ayub Khan on the Kashmir question and peace terms with India. This brought his break with Ayub Khan and the ruling Convention Muslim League where he held the key post of Secretary-General. After leaving Ayub Khan's Cabinet, his political future was uncertain for sometime. He was offered an ambassadorial assignment to France or any other place of his choice on "specially worked out terms."¹¹ He, however, decided to enter politics in opposition to Ayub Khan.

During the summer of 1968, Z. A. Bhutto embarked on an extensive tour of West Pakistan and addressed his party workers, supporters and public in Hyderabad, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Lahore, Karachi, and a number of other places. He received a rousing welcome everywhere due to his popularity as the foreign minister during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, his opposition to the Tashkent Declaration and the impression in the public that he was forced to resign on account of his pro-China orientations. Bhutto accused the government of not checking corruption, nepotism and

¹¹ Bhutto, Z. A., *Commitment to History*: Text of affidavit submitted to the High Court of West Pakistan, (Lahore, 1969), p. 18. The full text of the affidavit may also be seen in *Dawn*, 6th February, 1969.

mal-administration. He levelled hostile criticism against Ayub Khan, characterizing him as a dictator, whose regime was working against the interest of the common man.

When educational institutions re-opened after summer vacations in September, 1968, the political situation was tense. The government took note of Z. A. Bhutto's activities and the ministers issued rejoinders to his allegations. The Governor of West Pakistan (General Mohammad Musa) who until now avoided political controversies, publicly denounced those working against the government and accused the political leaders of "hatching conspiracies" to destroy Pakistan.¹² Such statements proved counter productive. Most other political leaders also became very active and reopened all the constitutional issues. But none made as significant impact as did Z. A. Bhutto. His dramatic popularity in West Pakistan was mainly due to two reasons: first, his great appeal to the people particularly the younger generation; second, the vacuum in the opposition ranks. H. S. Suhrawardy, I. I. Chundrigar, Maulvi Fazal Haq were dead. All other political leaders except Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, were men of provincial stature. Neither Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was active in politics nor his party (Nizam-i-Islam) was well organized.

The incident which sparked country-wide student demonstration, took place in Rawalpindi on 7th November, 1968. A party of Rawalpindi students was returning from Landi Kotal, where foreign goods were freely sold and smuggled into the interior of Pakistan. The students were intercepted by the Custom authorities; their goods withheld and a case was registered against them. They took out a procession in Rawalpindi to voice their protest against the custom authorities. A large group of them went to their protest against the custom authorities. The police Hotel Intercontinental to see Z. A. Bhutto, where he was to stay. The police advised them to disperse but the students wanted to wait till Z. A. Bhutto arrived there. There was an argument between the student leaders and the police authorities which worsened the situation. The students damaged the hotel property and the police used force to disperse them. This infuriated the students who burnt down buses and damaged public and private property. A large number of students gathered on Peshawar Road near the Coca Cola factory to welcome Z. A. Bhutto. The police resorted to force and opened fire. One student of the Polytechnic Institute received fatal injuries. The next day saw greater trouble. Troops were called out to restore law and order and curfew was imposed.

The majority of the political leaders must have welcomed the new challenge to the Ayub Regime, but Z. A. Bhutto was the only political leader who made no secret of his sympathy for the students. He attended

¹² General Mohammad Musa's broadcast: *Dawn* 18th October, 1968.

the funeral of the student killed in Rawalpindi. The funeral procession provided another opportunity for a demonstration against the regime and protest against the use of force by the police.

The Rawalpindi students remained in a state of ferment, and the students in other towns soon followed. Besides condemning the Ayub regime, they demanded the withdrawal of the University Ordinance which empowered the government to withdraw degrees under certain circumstances.¹³ From time to time certain minor demands were also put forward by them, i.e. reduction in bus fares, more seats in professional colleges and similar other demands. Education institutions remained closed for the major part of this period. Damage to public and private property, lathi charge, use of force by the police was quite widespread and frequent. The government unsuccessfully attempted to control the situation by imposing section 144, Cr. P. C., and curfew.

While the country was in the grip of student unrest, another incident took place which shook the government. On 10th November 1968, a young man fired two shots from a pistol in the meeting in which Ayub Khan was to address. Ayub Khan was sitting on the dais and the shots did not hit him. The young man was arrested and Ayub Khan later addressed the meeting. The incident came as a shock to Ayub who was given to understand by his advisers that the people, with the exception of a handful of political leaders, supported him.

The first phase of the movement reached its climax with the arrest of Z. A. Bhutto and Khan Abdul Wali Khan and eleven other political leaders. They were accused of "acting in a manner prejudicial to security, public safety and interest of Pakistan."¹⁴ The action against the political leaders was accompanied by a warning of serious action against those indulging in similar activities. The students were advised to be careful about these political leaders who intended to use them as their tool. They were also advised to limit their demands to their own problems which the government

¹³ It may be pointed out here that this clause of the Ordinance was never invoked but the students resented to the inclusion of such a clause in the Ordinance.

¹⁴ Government Press Note: Dated 14th November, 1968. Besides Z. A. Bhutto and Khan Abdul Wali Khan, following were arrested: Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Elar, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Rasul Bakht Talpur, Dr. Mubashir Hassan, Ajmal Khattak, Malik Aslam Hayat, Arbab Mohammad Hayat of Shergarh, Shaikat Lodhi, Amanullah Khan and Ahmad Raza Khan. On the next day, 10 more political leaders were arrested under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance: Mahmood-ul-Haq Usmani (Secretary-General of N.A.P.), Nawaz Butt, Altaf Azad, Amir Faisal Derani, Alla Bux Rind, Azizullah Hashmi, Zahid Ali, Azhar Abbas, Manazir Hakan and Zain-ul-Din Khan. These men belonged either to P. P. P. or the N. A. P.

promised to solve.¹⁵ These arrests were used to clamp the lid back on the simmering cauldron of politics. But the impact boomeranged since these arrests provided further provocation to the students.

The Second Phase :

The second phase witnessed the entry of a number of retired military officers and the men of good repute in the political field. The political parties became more assertive which transformed the student agitation into a full-fledged political movement.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd.) caused a sensation by announcing his decision to enter politics. He carried on the movement from where Bhutto had left and gained rapid popularity with his outspoken criticism of the regime, particularly the restrictions on political activity and the press. He accused that corruption and nepotism had reached their peak and were now up-rooting the basis of society. "Pakistan" he declared, "was ridden by repression, untruth, class distinction and serious disparity in the distribution of wealth."¹⁶ In another statement his attack on the Ayub regime was expressed in a stronger tone. He said :-

At present the whole structure stinks. It is not a healthy system. You have lot of people who are selected for no other quality except perhaps to agree with somebody's point of view. There is no criticism. The press is completely suppressed, there is no check on the Government. We are bordering on a police state.¹⁷

At the end of November 1968, S. M. Murshad, a former Chief Justice of East Pakistan High Court entered politics in opposition to Ayub Khan. Not long ago he had resigned as Chief Justice and was considered to be one of the possible Presidential candidates of the opposition parties. Lieutenant-General Azam Khan (Retd.) also decided to join the opposition ranks. These three personalities strengthened the hands of the opposition. Later on, a number of other senior retired military officers joined the opposition ranks.¹⁸

Air Marshal Asghar Khan and other opposition leaders talked of replacing the Ayub regime through peaceful and constitutional means but the movement was losing all restraints and getting out of control. The reason was that the political leaders were convinced that it would be

¹⁵ Dawn, 17th November, 1968.

¹⁶ Address to Rawalpindi Bar Association: *ibid.*, 23rd Nov., 1968.

¹⁷ The Times, 26th November, 1968.

¹⁸ These included Major-General Jilani, Major General Akbar Khan, Major General Sarfraz and a few others.

difficult to bring about a change of administration under the existing Constitution. So, the agitation turned out to be for the change of the political system rather than the change of the ruling elite. All the institutions associated with the system were made the target of hatred. The political leaders played upon regional differences and grievances which engulfed the whole of Pakistan in a severe political crisis. The One Unit Scheme of West Pakistan was called into question and there started a strong agitation in the smaller provinces against the Scheme.

Ayub Khan went to Dacca in the first week of December 1968 for a short visit. His stay in Dacca was marred by strong anti-government agitation. Two persons were killed and four others were injured as a result of firing by the police and the East Pakistan Rifles in Dacca and 128 persons were arrested on the first day of his visit.¹⁹ This added fuel to the fire and in a couple of days the whole of East Pakistan was in the grip of student agitation, who were joined by political leaders and other sections of population. The agitation in East Pakistan was very widespread and intense. The authority of the government receded very quickly. All those who had supported the Ayub regime in the past, found themselves in trouble.

Maulana Bhashani declared that his faction of the National Awami Party would boycott the forthcoming elections. He demanded the introduction of adult franchise, full autonomy for East Pakistan and the annulment of the One Unit Scheme in West Pakistan. He was of the opinion that only Defence, Currency, and Foreign Affairs should remain with the Centre.²⁰ A week later, the National Executive of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (The P.D.M.) announced its decision to participate in the elections only if five conditions were fulfilled. These conditions were:

1. Direct elections held under adult franchise.
2. Full powers to the directly elected parliament and provincial legislatures.
3. Immediate removal of the state of emergency and the repeal of all repressive laws.
4. Immediate restoration of full fundamental civic rights and freedoms and their complete justiciability.
5. Immediate release of all political prisoners and detenus and withdrawal of cases and actions against them.²¹

¹⁹ Dawn, 8th December, 1968.

²⁰ Dawn, 31st December, 1968.

²¹ Ibid., 7th January, 1969.

Eight opposition parties formed a united front, known as Democratic Action Committee (D.A.C.) with the object of establishing 'full and complete democracy' and 'restoring complete sovereignty to the people of Pakistan.' The political parties were: The Awami League (Six Points), the National Awami Party (requisitionists), Jamiatul Ulama-i-Islam, the National Democratic Front, the Awami League (Nawabzada Nasrullah group), the Council Muslim League and Jamat-i-Islami. The last five political parties were also the components of the Pakistan Democratic Movement. The D. A. C. decided not to participate in the elections and demanded :-

1. A federal parliamentary system of government.
2. Direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise.
3. Immediate withdrawal of the State of Emergency.
4. Full restoration of civil liberties and the repeal of all black laws, in particular the repeal of laws providing for detention without trial, and the University Ordinance.
5. Release of all political-detenus and prisoners, students, workers, journalists, including sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Khan Wali Khan and Z.A. Bhutto, and withdrawal of all political cases pending before courts and tribunals as the warrants of arrest issued against the political workers.
6. Withdrawal of all orders under Section 144, Cr. P.C.
7. Restoration of the right of labour to strike.
8. Withdrawal of all orders on the press including those on the grant of new declarations and the restoration of all presses, papers and periodicals which have been confiscated or where declarations have been cancelled including the 'Chattian' and the restoration of Progressive Papers Ltd., to their original owners.²²

It may be pointed out here that there was no mention of dismemberment of the One Unit Scheme in the demands of the D.A.C. The Pakistan People's Party and the National Awami Party (Bhashani Group) remained aloof from the D.A.C. In spite of their decision to oppose the Ayub regime from a common front, there were differences among these political parties due to their regional and provincial loyalties. As they had decided not to contest elections and had the common objective of overthrowing Ayub Khan, their differences did not appear on the surface.

²² Dawn, 9th January, 1969.

The Third Phase :

By the end of January 1969, Ayub Khan realized that the continued use of force would not solve the problem. There was hardly any person who believed that the opposition leaders were engaged in efforts to disintegrate Pakistan, as was claimed by the government spokesmen. People belonging to every walk of life, i.e. students, journalists, labourers, employees of semi-government bodies, lawyers and teachers were up against the regime. Ayub Khan decided to open a dialogue with the opposition leaders. The first indication of the change in the government policy was noticed in Governor of West Pakistan, General Mohammad Musa's speech on radio on January 27, 1969. He declared that the government was prepared to discuss any issue which was agitating the minds of the people.²³ On 5th February, 1969, Ayub Khan formally invited the leaders of the opposition parties for talks on 17th February. In the meantime, Z. A. Bhutto's case came up for hearing before the High Court. He submitted an affidavit to the Court which recounted his association with Ayub Khan and his sufferings in confinement. This was mainly addressed to the younger generation rather than the Judges of the High Court and was a catalogue of charges against Ayub Khan.²⁴ Bhutto alleged that the government warned him not to enter politics after he had resigned the post of Foreign Minister in 1966.²⁵ These charges were denied by Ayub Khan.²⁶ In order to build more pressure against Ayub Khan, Z. A. Bhutto threatened to starve himself to death unless the State of Emergency was lifted.²⁷

The opposition leaders expressed their willingness to participate in the talks provided certain conditions were fulfilled. These were :-

- The State of Emergency should be lifted and the Defence of Pakistan Rules should also be repealed.
- All arrested students and political workers should be released.
- Section 144 should be lifted.
- Government proceedings under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance and the Press Ordinance should be withdrawn.
- The 'Lathi' charging of students by the Police must be stopped.

²³ Dawg, 28th January, 1969.

Khan Abdul Sabur Khan, Central Minister, winding up debate on political situation in the National Assembly, declared that President Ayub Khan was prepared for talks "if a reasonable proposal for meaningful talks came from the opposition." *Ibid.*, 1st February, 1969.

²⁴ Bhutto, Z. A., *op. cit.* pp. 20-21.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Dawn, 6th and 7th February, 1969.

²⁷ The Times, 7th February 1969.

The government accepted most of these demands. The State of Emergency was withdrawn on 14th February, 1969. Z. A. Bhutto, Khan Wali Khan and a number of other political leaders were released and it was decided to commence talks on 19th February, instead of 17th. Immediately after the withdrawal of the State of Emergency, a new crisis threatened the proposed talks. Z. A. Bhutto and Maulana Bhashani decided to boycott the talks. The Awami League insisted that the Agartala Conspiracy Case should be withdrawn and if Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and 34 others detained in connection with this case were not released, it would not participate in the talks. The government was willing to release Mujibur Rehman on parole to enable him to participate in the talks, but the Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman did not agree to it and insisted on his unconditional release.

In order to facilitate the talks Ayub Khan declared in February that he would not seek re-election and that he was prepared to discuss amendments in the constitution to accommodate their demands. On 22nd February, the government also decided to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and 34 other accused were set free. It removed the last impediment in the way of holding of talks between the government and the opposition leaders. The talks, known as the Round Table Conference, started on 26th February 1969.²⁸ After a brief session, it was decided to summon it on 10th March 1969.

The second session of the talks began on 10th March in Rawalpindi. There were sharp differences on various political and constitutional issues amongst the political leaders participating in the talks. Only two demands were jointly presented by the components of the D. A. C.

- Restoration of federal parliamentary system with regional autonomy.
- Elections on direct adult franchise.

²⁸ Following political leaders took part in the R. T. C. on behalf of the Opposition :-

The D. A. C. : Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan.
Awami League (Pro. PDM Group) : Abdus Salam Khan.
Awami League (Six Points) : Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Syed Nazrul Islam.
The N. D. F. : Nural Amin and Hamidul Haq Choudhry.
Council Muslim League : Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Khawaja Khair-ud-Din.
Nizam-i-Islam : Choudhri Mohammad Ali and Maulvi Farid Ahmad.
Jamiat-i-Islami : Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and Prof. Ghulam Azam.
Jamiatul Ulama Islam : Mufti Mahmood and Pir Mohsinud Din.
The N. A. P. (Requisitionists) : Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Prof. Muzaffar Ahmad.
Independent : Air Marshal Asghar Khan ; Justice S. M. Murshad and Lieut-General Azam Khan.

Different political leaders raised various issues individually. Khan Wali Khan insisted on the immediate dismemberment of One Unit. Mufti Mahmood objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and emphasized that the 22 points agreed to by Ulema in 1951 should be implemented so that Pakistan could become a true Islamic State. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's tone was very bitter and he emphasized his six points. He argued for the dismemberment of One Unit, full regional autonomy for the provinces, representation on the basis of population, two currencies, two federal banks and no taxation powers with the centre. Various political leaders demanded the withdrawal of warrants of arrest against all political workers and the repeal of the 'black' laws. A few of them were disturbed by the growing lawlessness in the country and asked the government to do something about it.

Ayub Khan was aware of the fact that the basis of unity amongst the opposition parties was fragile. He accepted their demand to re-introduce parliamentary system of government and direct elections for the members of National and Provincial Assemblies without disturbing the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan and the One Unit Scheme. The future of One Unit and the principle of parity, Ayub Khan maintained, must be decided by the new parliament "elected on the basis of direct adult franchise."²⁹ The acceptance of the two main demands of the D.A.C. removed the only basis of agreement amongst the component parties of the D.A.C. and their differences became very sharp. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman dissociated himself from the D.A.C. The political leaders, who for the first time in ten years, had succeeded in building anti-Ayub agitation in the country, did not want to miss this opportunity to bring down his regime. They now fanned regional and parochial feelings. Politics of Pakistan, once again became the manifestation of personal and regional grievances and desire on the part of the political leaders to win support by all possible means.

The Fourth Phase :

The movement entered the fourth phase before the beginning of the talks between the opposition leaders and Ayub Khan. There was an incident which gave a fillip to agitation in East Pakistan. One of the accused of the Agartala Conspiracy Case (Flight Sergeant Zahurul Huq) was shot dead while allegedly trying to escape from the military custody. Nobody in East Pakistan believed this story. A huge crowd, protesting against the incident, attacked the houses of two central ministers, destroyed

²⁹ *The Guardian*, 14th March, 1969.

fire-fighting machines and overturned police jeeps. Later, they burnt down the State Guest House and the offices of the Convention Muslim League. Troops were called out and a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed in Dacca.³⁰

With the passage of time, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman fanned anti-West Pakistan feelings and held West Pakistan responsible for all the problems of East Pakistan. He clearly hinted Pakistan might break away. He said, "I will not go back on my word to the people. These are the people's demands. We have waited for 20 years. We want justice now."³¹ Maulana Bhashani openly preached violence.³² Speaking in Karachi, he advised the people to take up arms against the capitalists and imperialists. They could get arms, "if they raided the dens of these rich people."³³ In West Pakistan the movement to dismember the integrated province of West Pakistan and create four provinces became strong.

East Pakistan was in the grip of appalling lawlessness. The rival student factions were more powerful than the police. Conditions were precarious in rural areas where an unchecked reign of terror was spreading. Many villages were razed and thousands of East Pakistanis were left homeless. Police stations were attacked, officials were clubbed to death. They also turned on rent collectors and the Basic Democrats who formed the lowest tier of Ayub Khan's political system. A large number of Basic Democrats were forced to resign and some of them were burnt alive. There were reports of setting up of 'people's courts' which lashed some people, crucified others and blinded a few. In the absence of executive authority and a police force, village turned against the village, old rivalries were settled with axe and one section of the people clashed with another section. As the anarchy spread, food trains and river ferries were looted and the vital movement of food supplies came to standstill.³⁴ The urban centres of both the wings witnessed a series of seizures of factories and partial or total strikes. lockins of managers-owners by their workers) and partial or total strikes. The regime found itself powerless to cope with such a situation. In certain areas the machinery of government had come to standstill while in other areas it hardly existed.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 17th February, 1969.

³¹ *The Times*, 12th March, 1969.

³² He said in Dacca: "The Time has come to achieve democracy through violence. The days of constitutional struggle are over." : *The Times*, 12th March, 1969.

³³ *Dawn*, 19th March, 1969.

³⁴ The conditions in East Pakistan have been described on the basis of the reports of the following newspapers :

The Times, 16th, 20th, 23rd March, 1969.

The Observer, 23rd, 25th March, 1969.

Transfer of Power to General Yahya Khan :

On the evening of 25h March 1969, Ayub Khan addressed the nation over the radio for the last time as President of Pakistan. He announced his decision to step down and hand over power to General Yahya Khan, C-in-C of the Army. Explaining the reasons of his resignation, he said :-

The situation in the country is fast deteriorating. The Administrative institutions are being paralysed. Self-aggrandisement is the order of the day. The mobs are resorting to gheraos at will, and get their demands accepted under duress. And no one has the courage to proclaim the truth. Every principle, restraint and way of civilised existence has been abandoned. Every problem of the country is being decided in the streets. Except the Armed Forces, there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation.³⁵

A day earlier, he wrote a letter to General Yahya Khan, informing him of his intentions to hand over power to him. He wrote :-

It is with profound regret that I have come to the conclusion that all civil administration and constitutional authority in the country has become ineffective. If the situation continues to deteriorate at the present alarming rate, all economic life, indeed, civilized existence will become impossible I am left with no option but to step aside and leave it to the Defence Forces of Pakistan which today represent the only effective and legal instrument, to take over full control of the affairs of this country They alone can restore sanity and put the country back on the road to progress in a civil and constitutional manner.³⁶

General Yahya Khan abrogated the 1962 Constitution, banned all political activity (not political parties) dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial cabinets and declared Martial Law throughout the country. He assumed the Supreme Command of the armed forces and on 31st March 1969 proclaimed himself President of Pakistan. His address to the nation on 26th March 1969 reminded one of Ayub Khan's address to the nation on 8th October 1958. The objectives of the new regime, as declared by General Yahya Khan, were not different from the objectives outlined by Ayub Khan after the assumption of power in 1958, except that Yahya Khan declared that the new constitution would be framed by the representatives of the people. He claimed that the sole aim of his regime was to protect the life, liberty and property of the people, to pull the country back to sanity, and to put the administration back on the

³⁵ For the full text of the address, see Appendix E.

³⁶ For the full text of the letter, see Appendix D.

rails. He said :-

The Armed Forces could not remain idle spectators to this state of near anarchy (administrative laxity, strikes and violence). They have to do their duty and save the country from disaster It is my firm belief that sound, clean and honest administration is a pre-requisite for sane and constructive political life and for a smooth transfer of power to representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise.³⁷

The transfer of power from Ayub Khan to Yahya Khan, which took place in one day, was quite mundane. It brought back Pakistan, once again, on the starting point. The succession was simple and swift and less complicated than constitutional transfer of power. All available evidence suggested that Ayub Khan was not forced to resign by his Generals at gun point. He resigned before such an eventuality arose. The political conditions were getting from bad to worse and the transfer of power through any other method would have only delayed military take-over for a few days or weeks. Had he stayed on, the possibility of his Generals forcing him to resign could not have been ruled out.

When, by the middle of March, the Civil Government found itself incapable of restoring law and order, Ayub Khan had three choices open to him :-

- Resign and allow transfer of power in accordance with the 1962 Constitution.
- Declare Martial Law in the country or those parts where situation was totally out of control of the civil administration but continue as President. After fresh elections on the basis of adult franchise, transfer of power to the elected representatives.
- Resign and hand over power to the Army.

The constitutional provision was that after the resignation of the President, the Speaker of the National Assembly should act as President³⁸ and the election to the office of the President should be held within the period of ninety days.³⁹ In theoretical terms transfer of power was possible through this procedure but in practice such a transfer was impossible due to the serious political crisis and law and order situation in the country. The

³⁷ For the full text of the address, see Appendix F.

³⁸ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 16 (1).

³⁹ Ibid., Article 165 (4).

Constitution provided for the election of the President through an electoral college comprising the Basic Democrats. By March the Basic Democracies had been discredited and nobody would have accepted the principle of indirect elections. Thus the Constitution had to be amended to waive the condition of 90 days and to hold direct elections. But it was hardly possible, first, to hold the National Assembly session due to the conditions discussed in the earlier section; second, to have a dispassionate study of the whole problem (provided sessions could be convened), and, third, to have direct elections of the President (Provided the National Assembly succeeded in amending the said provision). The transfer of power to the Speaker would have encouraged great violence and disturbances in the country mainly for two reasons. First, the powers of the Acting President were restricted as compared with an elected President. The situation was already out of control and the Acting President would have found it difficult to control it. The movement was not against Ayub Khan alone, it was against the total system introduced by him. Second, the Speaker of the National Assembly had close association with the Ayub regime and was a nominee of the Convention Muslim League. He would not have been accepted by the political leaders of East Pakistan.

The second choice, i.e. declaration of Martial Law to maintain law and order but continuing as the President would not have solved the problem facing the nation. The Ayub regime was already being accused of using repressive measures to curb a popular movement. The experience of the last few months had clearly demonstrated that the use of force would not bring the situation back to normal. A month earlier he had withdrawn the State of Emergency in view of the demand of the opposition political leaders. Reintroduction of the State of Emergency or declaration of Martial Law would have convinced everybody that Ayub Khan wanted to maintain power at all cost. The military commanders were not willing to declare martial law under Ayub Khan. This would have identified the military with the discredited regime of Ayub Khan and tarnished their image in the minds of the people.

By the spring of 1969, Ayub Khan had lost the support of the military commanders. The resentment against him in the military started with the Tashkent Declaration and it continued to grow. When the regime faced the serious political crisis of 1968-69, the military dissociated itself from Ayub Khan. The main indicator of the military's unhappiness with Ayub Khan was the emergence of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and a few other retired Generals as active and vocal opponents of the Ayub Regime. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, being the first Pakistani C-in-C of the Pakistan Air Force, was still respected in the military circles. It was quite unlikely that he would have entered politics in opposition to Ayub Khan. The military was also not

happy with him due to his decision to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The accused were in the custody of the military and most of the evidence of the case was collected by the military intelligence. Its withdrawal put the military in an embarrassing position. The announcement of Ayub Khan's decision not to seek re-election contributed to his loss of sympathy of the military and the bureaucracy. Now the military commanders were not willing to go out of the way to support him. Yahya Khan realized that the time was fast approaching when he could exercise supreme political power. By rendering unqualified support to Ayub Khan, he would have missed this opportunity.

General Yahya Khan informed Altaf Gauhar, Central Information Secretary, in early March 1969 that in his estimation the situation was entirely out of control of civil administration and Ayub Khan should leave it for him to put everything in order. Ayub Khan sent him a message that the situation was likely to improve and there would be no need of intervention by the Army. On this Yahya remarked: "If that was what the President wished, he himself should pack up and go to Peshawar leaving the country and the President to manage as best they can."⁴⁰ This clearly indicated that Ayub Khan had lost the support of the military and Yahya Khan had become ambitious for political power.

Ayub Khan could no longer depend on the unified and solid support of the military. The civil administration was already ineffective and after Ayub Khan's decision not to seek re-election, it also did not render as much support to him as was done in the past. Ayub Khan had not ruled out the possibility of such a situation when he could not depend upon the military and the bureaucracy. He established the system of Basic Democracies to provide him a political base independent of the military and the bureaucracy. But his efforts did not yield satisfactory results. The erosion of these sources of power was the major cause of his decision to step down from Presidency.

He made a final attempt to save the situation on 19th March, 1969 by approving Yusuf Haroon and Dr. N. M. Huda as Governors of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, with the hope that the new Governors might succeed in seeking the co-operation of different political parties to run the administration till the elections were held. Yusuf Haroon hurriedly met various political, labour and student leaders and appealed for calm. There was hardly anybody willing to pay heed to his advice. The government servants and the police threatened to go on strike. In East Pakistan, Dr. N. M. Huda found the whole administrative machinery totally paralysed.

⁴⁰ Altaf Gauhar's statement before a Division Bench of Sind Baluchistan High Court, *The Sun*, 29th September, 1972.

beyond the hope of recovery in the near future. After receiving communications from the two governors, Ayub made up his mind to hand over power to the Army Chief.

Conclusions :

The country-wide political agitation against the Ayub regime was a revolt against the injustices suffered by the people and the growing economy disparity, which encouraged frustration and political alienation. The Ayub decade showed that only economic growth could not sail an authoritarian regime to success. Economic growth must also be accompanied by economic justice and social change.

The opposition political leaders succeeded in forcing Ayub Khan out of office but failed to produce an alternate leadership. The failure of the Round Table talks clearly demonstrated that the political leaders had not learnt any lesson from the events of 1947-58. They were not only fighting against the Ayub regime but they were also trying to outwit each other. Once again, conditions were created where, except the armed forces, the society was fragmented and all the political issues since 1947 were reopened. The armed forces demonstrated their ability to maintain a cohesive organization which facilitated the military take-over in 1969.

When General Yahya Khan realized that the Ayub regime was totally discredited and it relied on the military for its survival, and the political leaders were unable to put forward an alternate leadership, he considered himself as the 'natural heir' to Ayub Khan.

9

Second Military Regime : 1969-71

General Yahya Khan assumed the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan¹ without facing any opposition. Life returned to normal as the new administration took over. Most industrial units resumed their normal work. The stock market which plunged to rock bottom in the third week of March, took a tentative upward swing. The students went back to their classes and the politicians retreated to their drawing rooms. There prevailed an imposed truce in Pakistan.

Nature of the Military Regime :

In the first few weeks, General Yahya Khan followed Ayub Khan's course very closely. He drew heavily on the previous Martial Law Administration. The Martial Law regulations were reintroduced with slight modifications. A Provisional Constitution Order was issued which provided that until a constitution was enforced, Pakistan would be governed as nearly as possible by the 1962 Constitution. The Fundamental Rights, as enumerated in the 1962 Constitution, were suspended and no court was authorised to pass any order, issue any decree or writ against the orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any other Martial Law Authority. No judgement of a special military court or summary military court could be challenged in any ordinary court of law. The Order further provided that the President could make "such provision, including constitutional provisions, as he may deem fit, for the administration of the affairs of the state."²

¹ He assumed the office of President on 31st March 1969 - 6 days after taking over power from Ayub Khan.

² For the full text of the Provisional Constitution Order, see: *Pakistan News* London, 15th April 1969.

The transfer of power from Ayub Khan to General Yahya Khan did not shift political power from the hands of the military and the bureaucracy. In fact it provided another opportunity to these elements to exercise political power without any popular and constitutional restraint.

Yahya Khan had limited, if any, experience of politics. He had been C-in-C since 1966 and was overshadowed by Ayub Khan. He could not seriously think of assuming the office of the head of state until early March 1969, though this idea must have tingled his mind earlier. Therefore, when he took over as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, his views about the future of Pakistan were not as clear as that of Ayub Khan in 1958. A source close to the military circles reported that after his first broadcast to the nation, Yahya Khan "sat down holding his head in dismay and woefully remarked: What should we do now."³ He waited for a fortnight before calling a press conference. The ambiguity of his mind in the first few days was clearly reflected by an announcement of the appointment of three prominent members of Ayub's government as his advisers: Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister, as adviser on Foreign Affairs; Vice Admiral A. R. Khan, former Defence Minister, as Adviser on Defence, and Fida Hussain, a senior civil servant, as adviser on administration and co-ordination. An hour later the military authorities withdrew this order without assigning any reason.

Lieutenant General S. G. M. Peerzada was appointed Principal Staff Officer to the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators were also appointed. They were: Lieutenant-General (Later General) Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff, Army; Air Marshal Nur Khan, C-in-C, Air Force and Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, C-in-C, Navy. These four senior officers were the decision-makers at the back of Yahya Khan. He relied heavily on these officers during the first few months of Martial Law. They controlled the whole administration, central and provincial, through the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. There was, however, a difference of temperament and approach towards the various problems facing the nation between Air Marshal Nur Khan, Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsan and General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lieutenant General Peerzada. The latter were closer to Yahya Khan (as both were from the Army) and were relatively more ambitious. They removed Air Marshal Nur Khan and Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsan from their way by having them appointed Governors of West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively in August 1969.

³ Khan, Fazal Muqem, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*, (Islamabad: 1973), p. 16.

This left General Abdul Hamid Khan⁴ and Lieutenant-General Peerzada as the closest associates of Yahya Khan. Later two more Generals joined this ruling clique: They were: Major General Umer, Chairman of the National Security Council, and Major-General Akbar, Chief of Inter-services Intelligence. In August 1969, a Cabinet was appointed by the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, which continued to function till the last week of February 1971. This innovation did not change the character of the regime. These Generals continued to enjoy privileged position and were the key decision-makers.

An analysis of the careers of the members of the Cabinets also showed that the powerful combination of the civil and military elite, which was the main cause of Ayub Khan's failure, still shared power with Yahya Khan. Four of the eight ministers were former senior bureaucrats (Two of these four had been Police Chiefs of their Provinces). Two of the other four were former politicians who held cabinet posts before Ayub Khan took over in 1958. The seventh was a retired Major-General and a graduate of the R. M. A. Sandhurst. The eighth minister was a former Chief Justice of Pakistan. Except the two former politicians, the rest of them held important official posts in the past.

In spite of many parallels with 1958, one could not help pointing out that certain things distinguished the circumstances of Yahya's Martial Law. The situation inherited by him was much worse than that of October 1958. The mood in the country was not that of 1958, when, sick of the political leaders, people welcomed Martial Law. Now the political leaders had re-emerged on the political scene and succeeded in building public support for themselves. The five months of rebellion against the Ayub regime had undermined every political institution and produced total chaos. The atmosphere was charged with left-right confrontation, regional emotionalism and other political issues. There was a strong movement for maximum autonomy in East Pakistan which was showing the signs of transforming itself into a secessionist movement. The Dacca students had already demonstrated their power during the last few weeks of the Ayub regime. A few weeks after the declaration of Martial Law, there were reports of defiance of the martial law regulations in East Pakistan. The regime showed signs of weakness in dealing with such cases. Yahya Khan wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the articulate groups of East Pakistan. In September 1969, the Dacca students held public meetings in

⁴ It is interesting to note that during Yahya's Government, the Pakistan Army, for the first time, had two full Generals in active service. Yahya Khan who was the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, continued to hold the office of the C-in-C, Army with the rank of full General. Later, Lieut-General Abdul Hamid Khan was also promoted to the rank of General but he continued to hold the post which he occupied before the promotion.

total disregard of the martial law regulations. The military authorities issued their arrest orders. The student leaders went underground and challenged Yahya Khan with a direct confrontation, if the arrest orders were carried out. Yahya Khan 'pardoned' all the student leaders. Another important incident during these days was Maulana Bhashani's peasant rally organized in total disregard of the martial law regulations.⁵ The main reason for this lenient attitude was Yahya's desire not to spark an explosion by an open confrontation which could upset the forced and uneasy peace in East Pakistan.

Yahya Khan declared in unequivocal terms at the time of the take over that he had no 'political ambitions' and that his assumption of power was to "bring back sanity and ensure that the administration resumed its normal functions to the satisfactions of the people." This, in his opinion, was a prerequisite for "sane and constructive political life and for smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people. . . . It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a workable constitution and find solution of all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people."⁶ He reiterated that he would arrange elections to the constituent assembly on the basis of direct adult franchise. The representative would frame "a workable constitution which would ensure the integrity of the country."⁷ But the lack of political skills, his inability to keep a balance between the diverse political/economic/social and regional forces operating in the political system, and the use of "gun" to settle political problems plunged the country into a civil war. Instead of restoring democratic institutions, Yahya Khan presided over the disintegration of Pakistan.

Martial Law Administration in Action

Immediately after assuming power, the new administration paid attention to the problems of labour. In the past, the right of strike had been taken away from labour and the growth of trade unions was discouraged. During the last few months of the Ayub regime, labour expressed its fury over the policies of the government and demanded far-reaching changes in

⁵ *The Daily Telegraph*, 14th October 1969.

There were widespread disturbances in Dacca in November 1969, when the Urdu speaking people came out in streets demonstrating against the Chief Election Commissioner's decision to publish electoral forms only in Bengali. Seven people were killed. Later the Chief Election Commissioner decided to publish the forms in both Urdu and Bengali.

⁶ For the full text see: Appendix 'F'.

⁷ General Yahya Khan's first news conference: *The Guardian*, 11th April, 1969.

labour laws. Air Marshal Nur Khan announced a new labour policy which restored the right of collective bargaining, the right to strike and lock-out after the failure of bilateral negotiations and conciliation efforts. The number of essential and public utility services where, strike could be prohibited, was reduced. The labour policy further simplified the method of recognition of trade unions, provided regulations for their functioning on proper lines, reduced the administrator's powers of prosecuting a union in a court of law in cases of default and extended legal protection to the office-bearers of a union. A minimum wage for unskilled workers applicable to all commercial and industrial firms employing more than 50 persons was increased from Rs.115 to Rs.140 per month. The government also proposed to set up a welfare fund with Rs. 100 million as contribution from the government. The main objective of all these measures was to "create an environment in which both industrialists and the workers could work together to achieve higher productivity and equitable distribution of wealth."

The Yahya regime was conscious of the severe criticism of Ayub's economic planning and development policies. It adopted several measures to promote social justice and egalitarianism. In order to discourage the concentration of wealth in few hands, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, was enforced. A new financial institution called Equity Participation Fund with its headquarters at Dacca, was established. It was assigned the responsibilities of, inter alia, supplementing the capital resources of small and medium sized enterprises in the private sector in East Pakistan and the less developed areas of West Pakistan. The head office of the Industrial Development Bank was shifted to Dacca.

The Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75), launched on July 1, 1970, reflected the desire of the government to bring about a wider distribution of resources and fruits of economic development. Rs. 4,900 million were allocated to the public sector and Rs. 2,600 million were given to the private sector in the Plan. For the first time, East Pakistan was provided with more than half of the total allocation of fund and resources=52.5% as against 36% in the Third Five Year Plan. However, the Fourth Five Year Plan became a victim of the political conflict that engulfed Pakistan in 1970-71. Even before the commencement of the Plan, several political quarters demanded its postponement due to what was described as the shortfalls in all sectors of East Pakistan in the Third Five Year Plan. It was demanded that these shortfalls should be rectified prior to the introduction of the new Plan. Some argued that any new plan should be introduced by the elected government to be installed after the 1970 polls. Another demand related to the bifurcation of the national planning machinery into

two units—one for East Pakistan and the other for West Pakistan. The existing planning machinery at the provincial level should be up-graded and empowered to prepare and implement plans for their respective provinces. The Planning commission at the national level should only be a coordinating body to make necessary adjustments and reconciliations where necessary between the plans chalked out by the planning experts of each wing of Pakistan.⁸ The military leaders did not accept these demands and introduced the Plan. But it was disrupted due to the outbreak of insurgency and the military action in East Pakistan in 1971. The new government of Pakistan headed by Z. A. Bhutto discarded the Plan and introduced the annual development plan.

In order to cleanse the administration and rehabilitate its "neutrality" a series of martial law regulations were issued to check growing nepotism, favouritism and corruption in civil administration. The senior officials of the Central and Provincial government were required by an ordinance to declare their movable and immovable assets. The regulations encouraged members of public to make complaints and enjoined the police to record and report to the military authorities cases of bribery, corruption or any complaint of smuggling, black-marketing, hoarding or having property and foreign exchange outside Pakistan. Any involvement in such practices could entail severe punishment ranging from fines to 14 rigorous imprisonment.

The most serious jolt to the higher civil services was administered under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 in December 1969. 303 class I civil officers⁹ were suspended under this regulation on the charges of misuse of office during the last eleven years. They were given an opportunity to defend their position before three tribunals set up at Karachi, Dacca and Rawalpindi. Most of them submitted their explanations but, with a few exceptions, they were either dismissed or compulsorily retired from service. Some of the dismissed officers had been decorated during the Ayub era for meritorious service. The mass dismissal of senior civil servants was generally welcomed but there were few who believed that their dismissal would end corruption in the civil services or that the rest of the officers had never indulged in 'unfair and corrupt' practices.

A Services Reorganization Commission was appointed by Yahya's predecessor under the chairmanship of Chief Justice A. R. Cornelius. The report, submitted in 1962, suggested far-reaching changes in the structure of the services and proposed the doing away with the privileged position of

⁸ *The Pakistan Observer*, 4th February 1970.

⁹ Later their number rose to 311. But the expression of 303 continued to be used.

the CSP in the bureaucracy. However, the higher bureaucracy under Ayub Khan succeeded in shelving the report. It was in 1969 that the report was made public. Yahya Khan expressed his desire to implement the recommendation of the report but he found it difficult to achieve any breakthrough in this direction because the well-entrenched bureaucracy was opposed to such a move.

Yahya Khan decided to merge the states of Chitral, Swat and Dir with West Pakistan. Hitherto these states were being ruled by their princes despite their accession to Pakistan.¹⁰ Another important administrative reorganization related to the abolition of the integrated province of West Pakistan, i.e. the One-unit Scheme¹¹ This was done in view of the persistent demand of most political leaders during the anti-Ayub movement. The integrated province of West Pakistan was reconstituted into four provinces of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan on July 1, 1970. Four Lieutenant-Generals assumed the office of Governor of these provinces. This decision was accompanied by the abolition of the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan. The government decided that representation in the National Assembly would be provided on the basis of population.

The assumption of power by Yahya Khan was accompanied by a definite promise to hold 'fair and free' elections and transfer of power to the elected representatives. He repeated this promise time and again in his speeches and statements. In order to fulfil this promise Justice Abdus Sattar, Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan, was appointed Chief Election Commissioner on 28th July 1969 to prepare electoral rolls and delimit constituencies. Full political activity was permitted from 1st January 1970,¹² through martial though martial law remained enforced.

The Legal Framework Order (LFO), issued on 30th March 1970, provided the guidelines for the general elections and outlined the principles which the military leaders thought the National Assembly must keep in mind while framing the constitution. Table No. XXI shows the seats allocated to each province in The National Assembly.

¹⁰ *The Guardian*, 29th July 1969.

¹¹ The One Unit Scheme was introduced in 1955, when the separate provinces were abolished in West Pakistan and an integrated Province of West Pakistan was created. See, Inamur Rehman, *Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan*, (Karachi: 1982), pp. 64-88.

¹² *The Guardian*, 29th November, 1969.

TABLE XXI

Allocation of Seat to Provinces in the National Assembly

Province	General Seats	Women Seats	Total
East Pakistan	162	7	169
The Punjab	82	3	85
Sind	27	1	28
N.W.F.P.	18	1	19
Tribal Areas	7		7
Baluchistan	4	1	5
Total	300	13	313

Every province had a separate provincial legislature. Table XXII shows the composition of Provincial Assemblies:

TABLE XXII

Composition of Provincial Assemblies

Province	General Seats	Women Seats	Total
East Pakistan	300	10	310
The Punjab	180	6	186
Sind	60	2	62
N.W.F.P.	40	2	42
Baluchistan	20	1	21

The National Assembly was required to frame the constitution within 120 days of its first meeting. After the expiry of the period the National Assembly would automatically dissolve. The President reserved the right to authenticate the constitution. The LFO did not lay down the voting procedure in the National Assembly. It left this to be decided by the National Assembly. It outlined five broad principles for the future Constitution to Pakistan:-

First: The Constitution must ensure the independence, territorial integrity and national solidarity of Pakistan. The territories which now and may hereinafter be included must be united into a federation.

Second: It must preserve the Islamic Ideology which was the basis of the

creation of Pakistan. The head of the state will be a Muslim.

Third: It must be democratic constitution in which such basic ingredients of democracy as free and periodical elections on the basis of population and direct adult franchise are included and fundamental rights are guaranteed. Moreover, independence of judiciary must be protected.

Fourth: The division of powers between the centre and provinces shall be effected in such a way that provinces enjoy maximum autonomy, that is to say, "maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers", but the federal government shall also have adequate powers including legislative, administrative and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country.

Fifth: It must ensure the fullest participation of the people of all areas in national activities, and it must contain a statutory provision to remove all disparities, in particular economic disparities among various provinces of Pakistan within a fixed period of time.¹³

The political leaders raised three objections on the LFO. First, they claimed that the provision that in case the President did not authenticate the constitution, the National Assembly would be dissolved, was the negation of the sovereignty of the National Assembly. Second, another clause provided that the President alone would decide any question or doubt as to the interpretation of the LFO which could not be challenged in any court of law. This was considered to be contrary to the norms of democracy because it concentrated all the power in the hands of the military. Third, the political leaders also objected to the time limit of 120 days, which they considered as insufficient for such a delicate task of framing a constitution for Pakistan.

In spite of these objections the political leaders welcomed the decision of the military government to hold general elections. All the political parties issued election manifestos and their leaders toured both the wings extensively to win the people over to their side. The issues which got prominence during the election campaign were not identical all over Pakistan. The central theme of the election campaign in East Pakistan was the question of provincial autonomy. The main target of the criticism was

¹³ The Legal Framework Order, 1970. Article 20 (1) to (5).

For the full text of the L.F.O. see: *White Paper on the crisis in East Pakistan*, Islamabad, 5th August, 1971). Appendix B, pp. 18-35.

See also: General Yahya Khan's Address to the nation, *Dawn*, 29th March, 1970, and *The Financial Times*, 31st March, 1970.

the West Pakistani political elite and the central government, who were accused of having unsympathetic and callous attitude towards East Pakistan. The Awami League put forward a Six-point Formula which aimed at converting Pakistan into a very loose federation. It was said time and again that if the people did not vote for the Awami League, the political, administrative and economic "exploitation" of East Pakistan by West Pakistan would never end and that East Pakistan would continue to be a "colony" of West Pakistan. The election campaign in West Pakistan was overshadowed by the sharp polarisation of the left and the right. Z. A. Bhutto, who was the most vocal spokesman of socialist economy, gave the four-fold slogan:

Islam is our Faith.

Democracy is our Polity.

Socialism is our Economy.

All power to the people.

His economic programme and a promise of 1000 year war with India captured the mind of the people of West Pakistan. The rightist political parties which were divided amongst themselves, also put forward their manifestos which aimed at improving the lot of the common man and campaigned, in most of the cases, on the slogan 'Islam in danger'.

The election was originally scheduled in October 1970 but the devastating cyclone in East Pakistan upsetted the plans. After a review of the situation the election was put off till December 1970. According to the new schedule, the elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies were held on 7th and 17th December 1970 respectively. Following table shows the number of General Seats in the National Assembly won by different political parties:

TABLE XXIII

General Seats won by different Political Parties in the National Assembly

Political Party	East Pak.	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Awami League	160	0	0	0	0	160
The P.P.P.	0	62	18	1	0	81
Qayum Muslim League	0	1	1	7	0	9
Council Muslim League	0	7	0	0	0	7
J.U.I. (Hazarvi)	0	0	0	6	1	7
J.U.P.	0	4	3	0	0	7
N.A.P. (Wali)	0	0	0	3	3	6
Jamat-i-Islami	0	1	2	1	0	4

Political Party	East Pak.	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Convention						
Muslim League	0	2	0	0	0	2
P.D.P.	1	0	0	0	0	1
Independent	1	5	3	7*	0	16
Total	162	82	27	25	4	300

*All from the tribal areas.

Note: Several other political parties also put up their candidates. As these did not capture any seat, their names have not been included in the Table.

TABLE XXIV

Percentage of Valid Votes polled by the Political Parties

Political Party	East Pak.	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Awami League	75.11	0.07	0.25	0.22	1.06	39.20
The P.P.P.	-	41.66	44.95	14.28	2.38	18.63
Qayum Muslim League	1.07	5.42	10.70	22.64	10.94	4.46
Council Muslim League	1.60	12.66	6.84	4.06	10.99	5.96
J.U.I. (Hazarvi)	0.92	5.19	4.85	25.45	20.00	3.98
J.U.P.	-	9.96	6.91	0.02	-	3.94
N.A.P. (Wali)	2.06	-	0.37	18.50	45.23	2.43
Jamat-i-Islami	6.07	4.74	10.1	7.22	1.16	6.03
Convention					-	3.34
Muslim League	2.81	5.11	1.79	0.57	0.37	2.24
P.D.P.	2.81	2.26	0.08	0.32	6.81	7.04
Independent	3.47	11.65	11.11	6.01		

Note: Same as under Table No. XXIII.

These tables show that two political parties swept the polls. The Awami League won 160 seats and the Pakistan People's Party won 81 seats. However, both were regional in their character. The Awami League secured 75.11% of total votes cast in East Pakistan but it did not secure a single seat in any of the four provinces of West Pakistan. It merely got 0.07%, 0.25%, 0.22% and 1.06% of the votes cast in Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan respectively. The Pakistan People's Party did

not contest elections in East Pakistan. It polled 41.66%, 44.95%, 14.28% and 2.38% of the votes cast in the Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan respectively.¹⁴ The success of the Pakistan People's Party was impressive but the landslide victory of the Awami League was unprecedented. This was a big set back to the older political parties i.e. the three factions of the Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islami and the N.A.P. (Wali). The political parties which were contesting the elections on purely religious grounds were routed. The Jamat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulma Islam (Hazarvi) and the Jamiat-i-Ulma Pakistan captured only 4, 7, and 7 seats respectively. The Nizami-i-Islam Party, Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadees and the Khaksars failed to win a seat.

The results of the elections made it clear that the future of Pakistan would depend on whether Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Z.A. Bhutto could reach an agreement on the shape of the constitution which would also be acceptable to General Yahya Khan.

Towards The Civil War

Some of the observers considered the elections "a significant and successful first step" towards the restoration of civilian government.¹⁵ They did not realise the political malaise in Pakistan was too deep-rooted to be removed by a general election. The major stumbling block in the way of evolving an agreed constitution was not that the National assembly had never been directly elected but the feeling of political alienation and frustration which had developed in many parts of Pakistan particularly, in East Pakistan. The election results added a new dimension to the problem of East and West Pakistan relations. An analysis of the election campaign shows that far more than the restoration of representative institutions was involved. The whole edifice of the Awami League election campaign rested on anti-West Pakistan slogans and what they described as the exploitation of East Pakistan during the last twenty-three years.

This was true that the pace of development in West Pakistan had been higher than that of East Pakistan. There were certain factors responsible for that. The main factor being that both the wings of Pakistan did not start with equal resources. At the time of independence West Pakistan was far more developed than East Pakistan. East Pakistan remained neglected

¹⁴ The 1970 Election statistics have been quoted from :-
Report on General Elections Pakistan 1970-71, Vol. I (Election Commission of Pakistan), Karachi : 1972.

¹⁵ Baxter, C., Pakistan Votes - 1970. *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3, March, 1971.

during the British period. For all practical purposes, it lacked industry and means of communications, particularly, metalled roads and railways.

The geographic and climatic conditions of East Pakistan were not as favourable for industry as were those of West Pakistan. A high proportion of land was under rivers and streams. During the rainy season, rivers burst out of their banks and disrupted the poor system of communication. Floods and cyclones were the regular features of life in East Pakistan and caused great damage to life, property and crops. In a country like Pakistan, which had limited resources and had to depend to a great extent on foreign aid, the economic planners preferred to implement such projects whose return would be greater and quicker. This led to the tendency of more investment in West Pakistan.

Immediately after independence the greater attention towards setting up industry and business was paid by those who migrated from India. They preferred to settle down in West Pakistan and set up their enterprises there. East Pakistan lacked such a class. Some of these people went to East Pakistan to setup industry but when the political leaders of East Pakistan adopted an anti-West Pakistan posture in the mid-fifties the West Pakistani industrialists felt insecure and reduced or stopped further investment. When Ayub Khan came to power, private entrepreneurs again started increasing investment in East Pakistan, but they were again discouraged by the Six-point Formula of the Awami League.

Most East Pakistani political leaders and economists did not give much credence to the historical, climatic and economic factors to explain East Pakistan's under-development. They alleged that East Pakistan was a victim of deliberate neglect on the part of the central government. This feeling of economic injustice coupled with their exclusion from the decision-making process at the national level and the long-drawn movement for recognition of Bengali as one of the official languages of Pakistan (1947-54), developed frustration and political alienation in East Pakistan.

The East Pakistani political leaders had formulated a long list of grievances against the central government and the West Pakistani politicians. Though exaggerated, these were not without foundations. They complained about their under-representation in the higher echelons of the military and the bureaucracy, and the neglect of East Pakistan in the allocation of foreign aid, development funds and other resources. The question of foreign trade was another point of disagreement between the two wings. Trade between India and Pakistan had been suspended since the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965. There was desire among the leaders of Awami League to re-establish trade links and normal relations with India. Talking to a British journalist, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman said that he would like to

see India and East Bengal able to live side by side, like U.S. and Canada.¹⁶ It was also claimed that despite the formal commitment of the government to reduce disparity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, disparity in per capita income had widened and due to the lack of requisite government attention to the needs and requirements of East Pakistan, its economic development had been retarded.¹⁷

It was in this atmosphere that the Awami League presented the Six-point Formula in 1966 to, what was described, protect the genuine rights of East Pakistan.¹⁸ As Mujibur Rahman launched a movement for his political demands as laid down in the Six-point Formula, he was arrested for anti-state activities.

A number of persons were arrested in December 1967 for allegedly plotting the secession of East Pakistan. By May 1968, a few more arrests were made, raising the number of the accused to 35. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, already in detention, was also charged with involvement in this 'plot' whose details were said to be worked out in Agartala, an Indian border town, in collaboration with Indian officials. A tribunal comprising a former Chief Justice of Pakistan and two judges of East Pakistan High Court was constituted to try the accused. While the case was under trial, a mass movement started against the Ayub regime. Ayub Khan yielded to the near unanimous demand of the political leaders to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy case and release Mujibur Rahman and his 'co-conspirators'.

The Awami League contested the 1970 polls on the basis of the Six-point Formula under the leadership of Mujibur Rahman. The Six-point Formula provided:-

1. The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which the election to the federal legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal franchise. The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.
2. The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign affairs, and subject to the conditions provided in (3) below, currency.
3. There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alternative a

¹⁶ *The Financial Times*, 7th December 1970.

¹⁷ *Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75*, Vol. I (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970), pp. 28-30.

¹⁸ Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, *Six-Point Formula Our Right to Live*, Dacca: East Pakistan Awami League, 1966.

single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional federal reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another.

4. Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided on the basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that the federal government revenue requirements are met consistently with the objectives of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the government of the federating units.
5. constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of the federating units. The foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the governments of the federating units on the basis of ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the constitution. The regional governments shall have power under the constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility of the federal government.
6. The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.

The Awami League leaders created emotional hysteria on the crest of which they sailed to success in the elections. The cyclone which hit East Pakistan in November 1970, provided an excellent opportunity to build up hatred against West Pakistan. The central government was accused of the "deliberate, cold-blooded murder" of a million people in the cyclone-devastated areas of East Pakistan because of what was described as the failure of the central government to provide relief in the cyclone-affected areas.¹⁹

The Following are excerpts from the speeches of the leaders of the Awami League during and after the elections, which reflected the outlook and main theme of their election campaign.

¹⁹ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Statement: *The Times*, 27th November 1970.

The flesh and blood of the Bengalis had been swallowed up by the exploiters and dacoits (from West Pakistan) all these years. They must be wiped out from the body politic of the country through the ensuing polls.²⁰

A class of exploiters belonging to Western region had sucked East Bengal for the last 23 years. History of Pakistan is a history of conspiracy, and a history of continuous oppression.²¹

A million people had died in the cyclone, and another million would lay down their lives willingly to thwart a conspiracy against Bengalis by bureaucrats, vested interests, the ruling clique and coterie of old politicians.²²

The people have had enough of the crimes committed in the name of national integration and the urge of the people of Bangladesh for autonomy cannot be denied.²³

A little over two months after the elections, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed a public meeting in Dacca. His speech was, perhaps the best example of the Awami League outlook in 1970-71. He summarized his charges against West Pakistan in these words:-

... Thus, over 80% of all foreign aid obtained has been utilised for the benefit of the vested interests of West Pakistan. Over two-thirds of all imports made over the last 23 years has been into West Pakistan. Foreign exchange earnings of Bangladesh to the extent of over Rs. 500 crores has been utilised in West Pakistan. Bangladesh has been used as a protected market of 70 million for the benefit of a handful of the industrialists of West Pakistan, who had been enabled to make gigantic profits. As a result of such a ruthless exploitation, the economy of Bangladesh is in a state of imminent collapse. Haunted by the spectre of famine and denied of the bare means of subsistence, the people of Bangladesh have been reduced to a state of total starvation. We can, on no account, allow this state of affairs to continue.²⁴

The hardening of the attitude of the Awami League leadership after such an election campaign and the landslide victory was not surprising. This was designed to serve two purposes; first, to maintain the tempo of the

²⁰ Mr. Tajuddin Ahmad, General Secretary, East Pakistan Awami League's statement cited in: *White Paper on the East Pakistan Crisis*, (Islamabad, 5th August, 1971), p. 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *The Guardian*, 27th November, 1970 (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Statement).

²³ *The Times*, 27th November, 1970 (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Statement).

²⁴ *The Pakistan Observer*, 25th February, 1971.

movement built over the last one year. Second, to force the military commanders and the West Pakistan political leaders to accept the constitution the Awami League wanted to rush through the Constituent Assembly. This, they thought, would also deter Yahya Khan from using military against the Awami League.

Immediately after the election the Awami League leadership made it clear that they were not willing to accept any amendment in the six-point formula. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared that since the approval of the six-point formula by the people in the elections, this was "no more his or his party's property." Claiming that the Awami League could not amend this formula, he announced that "none would be able to stop us from framing a constitution on the basis of the six-point programme."²⁵ Professor Muzaffar Ahmad, a prominent Awami Leaguer said that the election results "showed that Bangladesh refused to be colony and would never bow to any people or nation."²⁶

The Awami League's policy pronouncements after the elections caused great anguish amongst the ruling generals. They had never accepted the Six-point Formula but they allowed the Awami League to contest elections on that basis in the hope that the Awami League would not secure an absolute majority and it would then be willing to make a compromise. Now, these calculations were upset. Yahya Khan visited Dacca from 11th to 15th January 1971, to obtain a first hand assessment of the political situation in East Pakistan. His negotiations with Mujibur Rahman proved fruitless because Mujib categorically refused to accommodate the concerns of the military leadership and the West Pakistani leadership. On his return from Dacca, Yahya Khan visited Z. A. Bhutto at Larkana and informed him of his talks with Mujib and the overall assessment of the political situation in East Pakistan.

Z. Bhutto who had emerged as the strongest political leader of West Pakistan, avoided an open condemnation of the Six-Point Formula during the election campaign but he did not endorse it either. He expected that Mujibur Rahman would soften his stance once the elections were over. Bhutto flew to Dacca on 27th January 1971 for negotiations with Mujibur Rahman to find out a solution of the constitutional dilemma which would be acceptable to both the political parties. The visit to Dacca proved a futile attempt as the Awami League leadership was not prepared to accept any amendment in the Six-point Formula and the Pakistan People's Party leadership was not ready to concede all the six points.²⁷ After the failure to

²⁵ *The Pakistan Observer*, 4th January 1971; See also, *Ibid.*, 25th February 1971.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 5th January, 1971.

²⁷ For Bhutto's version of the negotiation :-

arrive at an agreement with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bhutto adopted a new strategy to bring about a political settlement. He decided to adopt a hard line towards the Six-point formula with a hope that such a policy would compel Mujibur Rahman to come to a compromise with the P.P.P. He launched the new strategy in a press conference at Peshawar on 15th February 1971, by declaring that his party would not attend the National Assembly session beginning on 3rd March, 1971, unless he received a clear assurance from the Awami League leadership that the P.P.P.'s reasonable suggestions and demands would be given due consideration.²⁸ Addressing a mammoth public meeting in Lahore, he demanded the postponement of the National Assembly session or the waiving of the 120 days' limit imposed for constitution-making so that there could be fuller discussions between the political leaders of the two wings. He threatened to launch a "great movement" if the session of National Assembly was held in the absence of P.P.P. members.²⁹ Criticising those political leaders of West Pakistan who had decided to participate in the National Assembly session, he said :-

The P.P.P. expected the people to take revenge from the people, who had chosen to attend the assembly session, If the people failed to take the revenge the P.P.P. itself would take action against them . . . If any member of his party attended the session, the party workers would liquidate him.³⁰

Yahya Khan and his advisers were, by now, convinced that Mujib would not agree to anything less than a constitution based purely on the Six-point Formula. They made up their mind to apply pressure on Mujib to bring him down for a compromise. At this stage, Bhutto's stance on the Six-point formula came to them as a big relief. Yahya Khan decided to postpone the session of the National Assembly on 1st March 1971, on the pretext that the largest political party from West Pakistan was not participating in the session. The postponement, he claimed, would enable the political leaders to arrive at some settlement.³¹ Five days later, he announced 25th March 1971 as the new date for the session of the National

Bhutto, Z. A. *The Great Tragedy* (A People's Party Publication), Karachi: 1971, pp. 21-26.
See also: Kardar, A. H. *People's Commitment: Politics in Pakistan, 1970-71*, Lahore: 1971, pp. 76-77.

²⁸ Bhutto, Z. A. *op. cit.*, p. 28.

²⁹ *Dawn*, 1st March, 1971.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, Chairman of the P.P.P., Punjab warned that if the new government at the centre was formed without the P.P.P. they would "never forgive". *Ibid.*, 25th March, 1971.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2nd March, 1971.

Assembly.³² Yahya Khan's action of postponement of the National Assembly session was motivated by the desire to press Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to come to an understanding with the majority party of West Pakistan.

The postponement, however, provoked a serious political storm in East Pakistan. A province-wide call to strike by Mujibur Rahman as a part of his civil disobedience movement brought about the complete closure of the government, semi-government offices, all business concerns, the high Court and Banks; Transport came to a grinding halt. East Pakistan was, for all practical purposes, cut off from the rest of the world. Inter-wing communications were also suspended. The Pakistan flag and the portraits of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah were burnt in public and slogans for an independent Bangladesh were raised. Maulana Bhashani, who had boycotted the elections and remained quiet during the last three months, appeared on the scene and extended support to Mujibur Rahman. He declared that "complete independence for East Bengal from Pakistan had now become inevitable".³³ This was a very crucial turning point in the political crisis. It had two consequences of far-reaching importance. First, it created an impression in the minds of the Awami League leadership that Bhutto and the ruling military Generals would not let the democratically elected National Assembly frame a Constitution based on the Six points. Second, the political movement in East Pakistan slipped into the hands of the hard core of the Awami League.

Even before the general elections of 1970, a section of the Awami Leaguers and militant students were talking in terms of an independent and sovereign Bangladesh.³⁴ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not yield to their demand. In the post-election period there was pressure to turn the election into a vote of independence. He, however, favoured a Constitution on the basis of six point rather than outright independence. The postponement of the National Assembly session forced East Pakistan to a point of no-return. The hard core of the Awami League set East Pakistan on the road to outright independence. Had Mujibur Rahman asked them to delay the implementation of the plan of "independent Bangladesh", he would have been swept aside by the growing political storm.

³² *Ibid.*, 7th March, 1971.

³³ *The Times*, 10th March 1971.

³⁴ In a public meeting in Dacca in February, 1970, student leaders put forward the demand for an independent sovereign Bengal.

The Observer, 1st March, 1970.

The slogan "long live independent East Pakistan" was raised in a meeting addressed by Maulana Bhashani. *The Guardian*, 24th November, 1970.

Thus, on 2nd March, 1971, the image of a united country faded into an illusion. The Central Government's writ did not run in East Pakistan and in fact, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the *de facto* ruler of East Pakistan.

On March 7, 1971, speaking at a public meeting in Dacca, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman put forward a 7 point demand list to be accepted before the Awami League could consider the question of attending the National Assembly session. The demands were :-

1. Immediate withdrawal of Martial Law.
2. Transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.
3. Immediate withdrawal of all military personnel to barracks.
4. Immediate cessation of the transfer of troops from West Pakistan to East Bengal.
5. Immediate cessation of firing on civilians.
6. Non-interference by the military authorities in different branches of the government in Bangladesh.
7. Maintenance of law and order to be left exclusively to the police and the Bengali East Pakistan Rifles, assisted, whenever necessary, by Awami League volunteers.³⁵

The Awami League workers were on a rampage. There was widespread arson and looting in East Pakistan from the first week of March, 1971. The Awami League workers attacked and killed non-conformists and members of the Urdu-speaking community and all those who had moved to East Pakistan from West Pakistan for business, trade or any other purpose. They were forced to surrender their cars, bicycles and huge sums of money to the Awami League workers. Those who refused were murdered in cold blood and their houses were burnt. In Dacca and other cities, weapons and ammunition were collected forcibly from licence-holders. The Armed Forces, stationed in East Pakistan, were subjected to all kinds of insults and the supply of commodities of day to day needs was suspended to cantonments.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman set up a parallel government and issued a number of directives to government officials/non-governmental organizations and the public.³⁶ The public was advised not to pay taxes and all educational institutions, government offices, High Court and other

³⁵ Dawn, 8th March, 1971.

³⁶ For the details of the directives, see : Dawn, 16th March, 1971 and *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan*, (Islamabad, 5th August, 1971), Appendix D, pp. 37-46.

courts were closed. Radio, television and newspapers were ordered to follow the instructions of the Awami League high command. The Pakistan flag was replaced by a new Bangladesh flag which appeared on all government and semi-government buildings and private houses.

Yahya Khan rushed to Dacca to resume negotiations with Mujibur Rahman. They were later joined by other West Pakistani leaders including Bhutto. But the sands of time had run out. The Awami League jubilant over its successful establishment of a defacto control of Dacca, with the exception of the cantonment and the Governor House, shifted its stance. It not only demanded the immediate withdrawal of martial law and transfer of power to the elected representatives, but also proposed that the members of the National Assembly from East Pakistan and West Pakistan should meet separately and frame constitution for their part of the country. The National Assembly would later hold a joint session to tie up the two constitutions into the Confederation of Pakistan.

The new proposal was not acceptable to the ruling generals and West Pakistan political leaders because confederation negated the concept of united Pakistan. While the negotiations were not formally broken-off, it had become quite clear that the Awami League would not agree to a settlement other than the one on its terms. Yahya Khan decided to use the coercive power of the state to assert the power of the central government. On the night between March 25-26, 1971, he ordered the military to move out of cantonments and put down what was described as an armed rebellion but what the Bengalis described as their legitimate attempt to assert their rights won in the 1970 elections. The Awami League was outlawed and a number of the Awami League leaders including Mujibur Rahman were arrested.³⁷ Others crossed the border into India.

Civil War and Dismemberment

The military action in East Pakistan marked the beginning of an all-out civil war between the Pakistan military supported by the pro-Pakistan minority in East Pakistan and the Awami League and others who supported the Bangladesh movement. This turned out to be a long drawn and bloody

³⁷ General Yahya Khan told the nation : "I have ordered them (the Armed Forces) to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government," Address to the Nation on 26th March, 1971. Earlier warning by General Yahya Khan was sounded on 6th March, 1971. "... let me make it absolutely clear that no matter what happens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistan Armed Forces and Head of the State, I will ensure complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan I will not allow a handful of people to destroy the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis." Address to the Nation on 6th March, 1971.

conflict for both sides.³⁸ A large number of personnel of the East Pakistan Rifles, East Bengal Regiment and the Bengali Police deserted and joined the ranks of the Awami League. Some of them managed to escape with their equipment. These professionally trained men formed the main core of the Mukhti Bahini which operated as a guerilla force. They were joined by the Bengali personnel of the 'Ansars', the 'Mujahid' force (Home Guards organized by the East Pakistan Government) and a large number of militant Awami League workers and young Bengali volunteers. In the initial stages of the civil strife they fought open battles with the Pakistan Army. This worked to their disadvantage because the Pakistan Army was better organized and had superior fire power. By the last week of April, the Pakistan Army had established a firm control over the major cities and towns. The Mukhti Bahini guerillas either retreated to rural areas or returned to their bases across the border in India.

Two factors militated against the consolidation of the initial success by the Pakistan Army. First, the Pakistan Army lacked public support in East Pakistan. With the exception of the non-Bengali minority, others were either indifferent towards the Pakistan Army or saw it as an 'occupation force'. This adversely affected their morale. It also caused serious problems of supply and the back-up operations which undermined the follow-up measures undertaken by the Pakistani authorities.

Second, the India factor played a key role in changing the character and direction of the civil strife in East Pakistan. India jumped on the political crisis in East Pakistan as the 'chance of the century' to humble her traditional adversary. Two personnel of Indian intelligence services hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore on 30th January 1971 in the garb of Kashmiri freedom fighters. The plane was destroyed by the hijackers after releasing the passengers. The Government of Pakistan arranged the prompt return of the passengers to India and appointed a

³⁸ Various reports appearing in the Western press emphasized the severity of "repression" and loss of innumerable life in East Pakistan. See, for example: *The Sunday Times*, 13th June, 1971 (Genocide: Report by Anthony Mascarenhas); *The Sunday Times*, 5th December, 1971 (I Back India and Freedom by John Grigg); *The Daily Telegraph*, 6th December, 1971 (Editorial).

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman claimed that 3 million Bengalis were killed during the military operations in East Pakistan: Mujib's interview on the B. B. C. cited in *Outlook*, Vol. I, No. 3, 22nd April, 1972.

The official circles of Pakistan denied the charges of genocide of any kind in East Pakistan and accused the western press of exaggeration.

See Yahya Khan's T.V. interview: *The Pakistan Times*, 5th August, 1971.

General Tikka Khan, Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, claimed that only 30 thousand Bengalis were killed between March and December, 1971. *Dawn*, 10th March, 1972.

commission of inquiry, headed by a Judge of the High court, to investigate the incident. The inquiry commission confirmed that "the hijacking of the aircraft was arranged by Indian intelligence agencies as the culmination of a series of actions taken by the Indian Government to bring about a situation of confrontation between Pakistan and India".³⁹ As a protest against the burning down of the aircraft by the hijackers on the Pakistan soil, the Indian Government banned the flights of Pakistani aircraft over the Indian territory. India maintained that "Pakistan's failure to deal with the two hijackers" would provide "an open encouragement to the repetition of such criminal acts in future."⁴⁰ The ban on overflights disrupted communications between the two wings of Pakistan at a time when crucial negotiations were going-on between the leaders of East and West Pakistan.

Once the civil strife broke out the Indian Government made no secret of her deep sympathies and support for the Bangladesh/insurgent movement. India's Parliament passed a resolution moved by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31st March 1971 calling upon the Pakistan government to stop "the massacre of defenceless people" in East Pakistan, the resolution expressed solidarity of the Indian people with the people of East Pakistan "in their struggle for a democratic way of life."⁴¹ Four days later a similar resolution was adopted by the All India congress Committee.

India extended a wide ranging assistance to the Bangladesh movement. This included the assistance to the Bangladesh nationalists to set-up a government-in-exile which had its headquarters at Calcutta; financial and material assistance through voluntary organizations and massive propaganda campaign in support of the insurgent groups. The most valuable assistance included the permission to the Mukti Bahini to establish its base-camps in India; recruitment, organization and training of the Mukti Bahini by the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Army, and provision of equipment and weapons.⁴² India also launched a diplomatic offensive at the international level to mobilize international public opinion in support of its policies on the crisis and the Bangladesh movement. What helped India to mobilize support at the international level was the massive influx of Bengali refugees into India in the wake of the civil strife. This put the Pakistani

³⁹ For the text of the findings of the commission, see: Williams; L. F. Rushbrook, *The East Pakistan Tragedy*, London: Tom Stacey, 1972, Appendix 4, pp. 121-26.

See also, *Pakistan Year Book*, 1971, p. 127.

⁴⁰ Government of India's note to the Government of Pakistan, dated 3rd March 1971: *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXIV No. 2, second quarter 1971, pp. 118-19.

⁴¹ *The Guardian*, 1st April 1971.

⁴² For a detailed analysis of India's assistance to the Bangladesh movement, see: Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, *Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's role in the Civil War in East Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1981, pp. 162-213.

military authorities in an embarrassing position and provided an opportunity to India to internationalize the crisis. Mrs. Indra Gandhi maintained that the influx of millions of refugees from East Pakistan threatened to undermine India's political and economic stability and, therefore, it constituted an indirect "aggression" on India. She demanded the return of the refugees to their homes. But, she emphasized that they would go back only if East Pakistan had a government they could trust. This in her opinion, could come about only if the Pakistan military was withdrawn from East Pakistan and power was transferred to the Awami League leadership then based in India.

India extended all possible assistance to the Mukti Bahini in the hope that its volunteers would dislodge the Pakistan Army. The Mukti Bahini engaged in quite widespread guerilla activity but it was unable to force the Pakistan Army into submission. This compelled the Indian authorities to revise their strategy. The Indian Army was allowed to directly manage the training of the Mukti Bahini personnel. It also planned and coordinated the Mukti Bahini operations and inducted the BSF men into this force. At times, the Indian soldiers provided fire cover to the Mukti Bahini in the border areas. The situation in East Pakistan took a sharp turn in the middle of November 1971, when the Indian troops started crossing the India-East Pakistan border and began to undertake military operations in support of the Mukti Bahini. These pin-prick attacks culminated into a full-fledged attack on East Pakistan by the Indian military on 21st November 1971.

This change in Indian's strategy—from political and indirect military intervention to an all-out invasion of East Pakistan—was the result of a number of changes at the regional and international level. India succeeded in obtaining Soviet blessing for its policies in East Pakistan. This was manifested by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union on 9th August, 1971. This Treaty was not a defence pact in the strict sense of the word but it had defence ramifications. An article of the Treaty provided that "in the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for the countries."⁴³ This was followed by the arrival of the Soviet military mission headed by Marshal Kutakov to assess the requirements of military hardware and equipment by India. Subsequently, the Soviets rushed weapons and equipment to India. All this put the Soviet seal of approval on the policies of India's government.

⁴³ Article 9. See *Ibid.*, pp. 230-31.

Two other developments contributed to India's resort to direct attack on East Pakistan. First, the establishment of direct relations between the U.S. and China, following a secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Beijing while he was on an official visit to Pakistan caused serious anguish in India. It was interpreted as the emergence of a U.S.-Pakistan-China axis against India and the Soviet Union. Second, a high-powered Pakistani delegation visited China in the first week of November. The delegation was headed by Bhutto and included, among others, the Chief of the Air Staff and two very senior officers of the Army and the Navy. They brought back a vague promise of Chinese support for Pakistan. Yahya Khan seemed so satisfied by the delegation's visit that he declared, "If India attacked Pakistan, China will of course intervene."⁴⁴ The later events proved that Yahya Khan's remarks were misleading and the Chinese had made no such categorical commitment. However, as no contradiction was issued by the Chinese Government, the Government of India was greatly perturbed. It invoked the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and co-operation to counter this Chinese posture. There were hectic consultations and diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets rushed military hardware and equipment to India.

The longer the climax was delayed the greater might have been chances of international pressure on India and Pakistan to resolve the Bangladesh crisis through peaceful means. Some diplomatic activity was going on to bring about an understanding between India and Pakistan. Yahya Khan also made some conciliatory gestures towards East Pakistan. In order to make the government broad-based, the military governor of East Pakistan was replaced by Bengali civilian governor and the government created Peace Committees in several cities and towns. In early November, Yahya Khan accepted the U.S. suggestion to open negotiations with the Awami League leaders and promised to return East Pakistan to civilian rule by the end of the year. This information was communicated to the Indian Government through its ambassador in Washington by the U.S. Government.⁴⁵ India was no longer prepared to wait because by that time India was deeply committed to the Bangladesh movement and her army had completed necessary preparations for an all-out offensive to "settle" the Bangladesh crisis. Above all, the Soviets had endorsed India's new strategy and by the third week of November, the passes on the Sino-Indian borders

⁴⁴ *The Pakistan Times*, 9th November, 1971.

⁴⁵ *The Pakistan Times*, 10th February, 1972. Wilcox, Wayne, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, (Washington: 1973), p. 51.
See, President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report : Section on South Asia, USIS, Lahore, Important Text, 10th February, 1972.

were snow-bounded, thereby minimizing the chances of Chinese intervention.

It was on 21st November 1971, that the Indian troops launched a full-fledged attack on East Pakistan. The Pakistani troops put up good resistance in the beginning. But, very soon their position began to weaken. As they did not enjoy public support in East Pakistan, the maintenance of supply line turned out to be a serious problem. Guerrilla activity in the interior, particularly around Dacca, was quite intense. A close air and sea blockade was established by India and she succeeded in isolating Pakistani troops fighting in East Pakistan.⁴⁶ On December 3, Pakistan launched a counter offensive on the West Pakistan-India border to release pressure on East Pakistan. This strategy did not work. By 15th December, Indian troops were knocking at the doors of Dacca. On the next day, Pakistani troops in East Pakistan formally surrendered to India. Earlier on December 6, India had extended formal recognition to the Bangladesh Government-in-exile.⁴⁷ Pakistan reacted sharply by severing her diplomatic relations with India. India's recognition to Bangladesh was interpreted by Pakistan as "the culmination of her (India) actively pursued policy motivated by deep hatred of Pakistan."⁴⁸ Ten days later Bangladesh came into existence.

It is difficult to say whether the proposed talks between Yahya Khan and the Awami League leadership would have succeeded in resolving the political conflict. The fact remains that the dim chances of rapprochement were frustrated by India's invasion of East Pakistan. Any dialogue between the Awami League leadership and the Government of Pakistan would have been detrimental to the establishment of Bangladesh of the type India wanted—a Bangladesh subservient to India.

Conclusions:

The Yahya Khan era was the most turbulent period in the history of Pakistan. He assumed powers as a caretaker but lacked ideas and his handling of the political situation was inept. Instead of restoring democratic process he presided over the dismemberment of Pakistan.

The military rule in Pakistan (1969-71) showed that it might not be difficult for a disciplined army to take over the levers of political power in a

⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that three weeks before the war broke out on the East Pakistan-India border, Admiral Nanda, Chief of the Indian Naval Staff said, "The Indian Navy would completely cut all links between West Pakistan and East Pakistan by sea and Pakistan forces in that part will remain bottlenecked." *The Pakistan Times*, 29th October, 1971.

⁴⁷ Justifying India's decision, Mrs. Gandhi said that General Yahya Khan was now "totally incapable of regaining control of the territory". She added that the Government of Bangladesh "reflects the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, which no other governments can claim to represent." *The Times*, 7th December, 1971.

⁴⁸ *The Pakistan Times*, 7th December, 1971.

country like Pakistan which lacked stable political institutions. The military leadership, however, finds it difficult to solve the basic social, political and economic problems ailing a polity.

The Yahya regime must however be given credit for holding fair and free elections at the national and provincial levels. The acceptance of the demand of representation on the basis of population and the reconstitution of the old provinces in West Pakistan facilitated the holding of national elections. There were no serious complaints of official interference in the polls, though some reports from East Pakistan indicated that the Awami League workers intimidated the rival candidates and their supporters. It was only after the elections that the military regime could not deal with the situation. The Awami League's assertion that the new constitution must be based on the Six-point Formula was not acceptable to the ruling generals as well as to a large number of West Pakistani political leaders. The inability to bring about an amicable resolution of this political dispute set in motion a process which led Pakistan into the most devastating crisis of history.

What happened in East Pakistan was tragic but not surprising. It was the outcome of the failure of the ruling generals and the political leaders to arrive at a political settlement; the Soviet support to India; and India's invasion of East Pakistan. Basically, it represented the failure of Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman. While negotiating with the Awami League leadership, Yahya Khan always had the military option at the back of his mind. He thought that since he had the 'gun' in his hand he could impose a solution of the East Pakistan crisis. Bhutto, having realized that Mujib was not prepared to make any change in his six-points, adopted a hard line to cow him down. This was a miscalculation. A cursory look at Mujib's career could make it clear that he had been a stubborn political leader and, given the electoral victory and the political tempo in East Pakistan, his retreat from the original stance was not expected, especially when he distrusted the ruling generals and most West Pakistani politicians. Bhutto's refusal to attend the National Assembly session created the impression that he was in league with the ruling generals. The outbreak of the civil strife in East Pakistan also reflected Mujibur Rahman's failure. He was not in favour of the declaration of independence at that stage. He wanted to delay it for some time. But Yahya Khan's decision to postpone the National Assembly session proved the last straw on camel's back. The militant elements got control of the movement. Mujibur Rahman read the writing on the wall and went along with them.

The military action in East Pakistan no doubt pushed the political crisis to the point of no return, the dismemberment of Pakistan could not be attributed to the military action alone. It was the outcome of confluence of several domestic and external factors.

The Turn of the Tide

The emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as Pakistan's President on 20th December 1971, in place of General Yahya Khan, was a logical outcome of the defeat in the war with India and the loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Bhutto's People's Party swept the 1970 polls in the western wing and he emerged as the leading politician of West Pakistan. A few weeks after the military action in the eastern wing, the PPP leadership demanded that power should be transferred to the elected representatives in the western wing before the eastern wing was ready for it. Throughout April-December 1971, this theme was played up time and again. The military leaders did not accept the proposal of transferring power in West Pakistan only. Once East Pakistan was lost, they had no choice but to hand over the reins of government to Z. A. Bhutto, leader of the majority Party in West Pakistan.

The Military Under Fire

Bhutto assumed Presidency¹ at the time of the gravest crises in the history of Pakistan. The nation had sunk in the darkest depth of despair. The loss of East Pakistan had deeply hurt emotions and caused unprecedented anguish. The people were bewildered and confused by what had happened. Fears were expressed at home and abroad about the fragmentation of what was then left of Pakistan.

Bhutto enjoyed three major political advantages. First, he was the elected leader and his party was now the majority party in the National Assembly. The ordinary folks had high hopes in him because of his

¹ Bhutto assumed the offices of President and Chief Martial Law Administrator on 20th December 1971. He continued with martial law, generally described as civilian martial law, until 21st April 1972, when an Interim constitution (1972) was enforced. In other words, the second martial law lasted from 25th March 1969 to 21st April 1972. Bhutto moved over to Prime Ministership on 14th August 1973 when parliamentary system was introduced under the 1973 Constitution. Fazal Illahi Chaudhury was elected President.

election rhetoric of "Rotti" (bread) "Kapra" (clothes), and "Makan" (shelter). They were convinced that his advent to power would solve their basic problems and that his election promises would be fulfilled in no time. Second, the Supreme Court of Pakistan unanimously held in April 1972 that General Yahya Khan's assumption of power on 25th March 1969 was an act of "usurpation" and it was therefore "illegal and unconstitutional."² This was the reversal of the Court's earlier judgement of 1958 which legitimized Ayub Khan's seizure of power by upholding victorious revolution or a successful coup d'état as a recognized method of changing a constitution.³ Though the latest judgement came four months after General Yahya Khan had handed over power to Bhutto, it strengthened the hands of the civilian government vis-a-vis the military. Third, the military debacle lowered the status of the military as a nation-building force. The military's reputation was at the lowest ebb. The immediate reaction to the fall of East Pakistan was a wave of street demonstrations in the major cities against General Yahya Khan and his senior military advisers. The demonstrators demanded an open trial of Yahya Khan and his advisers and called for a transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Two days before Yahya Khan resigned and handed over power to Bhutto, a caption of an Urdu language daily read:

"Pakistan ki Shikast Ka zimmadar Yahya Khan hain."⁴

(Yahya Khan is responsible for Pakistan's defeat.)

The same newspaper put the following headline on the front page

"Aik awaz, aik aalan: Qaum ka katil Yahya Khan."⁵

(One voice, one declaration: Yahya Khan is the murderer of the nation.)

General Yahya Khan and his advisers might have liked to stay in power but the country-wide demonstrations left no choice for them. They realized that the continuation of Yahya Khan or any other General as head of the state would lead to further deterioration of political situation in Pakistan.

The strong political base was the major source of strength of the new government. It gave the PPP an edge over the military which for the first time found itself down graded in Pakistan. The political atmosphere was

² *Aasma Jilani vs. The Government of the Punjab and others*: PLD, 1972, supreme Court, pp. 139-270; See also Appendix J.

³ See chapter 5 and Appendix J.

⁴ *Daily Javaban* (Lahore), 18 December 1971.

⁵ *Ibid.* 19 December 1971. See also editorials in *ibid.* 19 and 20 December 1971; *Nawa-i-Waqf* (Lahore), 19 December 1971.

conducive to asserting civilian supremacy over the military. In order to consolidate its position, the PPP leadership ridiculed and condemned the Generals time and again. The public was told many stories about the private lives of Yahya Khan and his senior military advisers. The stories talked of Yahya Khan's involvement with a number of women and heavy drinking. It was alleged that these activities finished up so much of his time that he could not perform his duties as the head of the state. A few news captions are given below:

12 corrupt women were ruling Pakistan under the cover of Yahya Khan.⁶

Not one "Rani" (queen), twelve "ranis": A few disclosures about Yahya Khan's life.⁷

Yahya Khan had lost senses during the last few days of war due to heavy drinking.⁸

The political elite accused the Generals of sabotaging the democratic process in Pakistan. Their naïve explanations which focused on one aspect of the political malaise, had an appeal for the ordinary people. They asserted that a coterie of Generals in collaboration with the bureaucracy became politically ambitious. These Generals entered politics to serve their own interests and undermined the prospects of democratic institutions and values in the society. J. A. Rahim, then a minister for Presidential Affairs, said:

What had happened was that a small and selfish junta of individuals, having ... placed themselves in charge, had then unilaterally assumed the direction of the nation's destiny. They started by promising the people of Pakistan the benefits of true democracy but, in fact, [they] denied the possibility of people's power to the authentic leaders of the people. The ruses they employed were Machiavellian, and when the results of their endeavours became manifest, it was too late.⁹

The role of the Generals in the politics of Pakistan came under heavy fire in Bhutto's address to the nation on 4th March 1972. He declared his intention to wipe-out "bonapartism" from the military:

.... What has happened in Pakistan since 1954, and more openly since 1958 is that some professional Generals turned to politics not as a profession but as a plunder and as a result the influences that had crept into socio-political life destroyed its fabric as the influence

⁶ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 3 January 1972.

⁷ *Daily Javdan*, 10 January 1972.

⁸ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 30 January 1972.

⁹ *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 27 December 1971.

bonapartism had affected Europe in the 18th and 19th cent. But come what may, these bonapartic influences must be rooted out in the interest of the country in the interest of Pakistan of tomorrow in the interest of the Armed Forces and the People of Pakistan.¹⁰

In another statement, Bhutto put forward the idea of 'People's Army' instead of a conventional army, a theme which did not appear in his later speeches:

We must take a leaf or two out of North Vietnam's military textbook. A People's Army rather than a conventional army, that is the philosophy that will guide us in our new defence policy.¹¹

On his return from a foreign trip, Bhutto took a salute and inspected the guard of honour presented by a contingent of the People's Guards (Paramilitary force of the PPP) rather than from the contingent of the armed forces which was the practice in the past.

The target of the new civilian leadership was a section of the Generals whose deep involvement in politics plunged the country in a crisis. They expressed the desire to make the armed forces a fine fighting force to safeguard national interests. But the ordinary folks, encouraged by the statements of the political elite, hardly made a distinction between the Generals and the armed forces. On occasions the armed forces were severely criticised. A section of public opinion was very hostile towards the military. They (the military) were described as an anti-people force which supported the 'status quo' forces in the society.

This was a disturbing development for the military and it did not contribute to their morale-building. Their sense of pride was already injured by the military debacle and the loss of East Pakistan. The general mood at home was more disheartening and demoralising for them. The solid contribution made by the military towards national reconstruction was pushed to the background and everyone was finding holes in them. When ever a calamity of colossal magnitude was faced by the nation in the past, the military came forward to help the civil government. Their splendid services during the early days of Pakistan and their efforts to mitigate human sufferings during the natural calamities were testimony of their dedication to duty and to their motherland. The responsibility of the sad events of 1971 could not be attributed to the armed forces. Their performance suffered because the top military leadership had been corrupted by its deep involvement in politics.

It was in this atmosphere that the civilian government appointed a

¹⁰ For the text of the statement, see Appendix G.
The Pakistan Times, 29 March 1972.

military debacle in East Pakistan and the cease-fire in West Pakistan. The Commission was headed by Hamudur Rehman, Chief Justice of Pakistan. Other members of the commission were: Anwarul Haq, Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court; and Tufail Ali Abdur Rehman, Chief Justice of Sindh-Baluchistan High Court. The commission examined 213 witnesses, including Bhutto, Yahya Khan and the Services Chiefs and some political leaders. The first report was submitted to the government in July 1972. After the return of the POWs from India, the commission re-opened its inquiry in May 1974 to collect more information from the senior military officers and the bureaucrats who were in East Pakistan at the time of the fall of Dacca. It recorded the evidence of 73 persons and submitted a supplementary report to the government in November 1974. Despite the public demand the Hamooder Rehman Commission report was not published. The official circles maintained that the report dealt with the top security matters and the government would release it only after its contents had been scrutinized. However, neither the report nor a summary of its findings were published by Bhutto and his successor, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq.

Bhutto came hard on the top brass of the military who were associated with the Yahya regime and the conduct of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. A number of senior officers were removed as a part of the cleaning campaign. These retirements were welcomed because the people were demanding severe punishment for those responsible for the 1971 military debacle. Table XXV shows the number of senior military officers relieved from service in the first four months (December 1971 - April 1972) of Bhutto's assumption of power.

TABLE XXV

Senior Military Officer Relieved from Service	
THE ARMY	
General	2
Lieut-General	11
Major-General	10
Brigadier	6
THE NAVY	
Vice Admiral	1
Rear Admiral	4
Commodore	2

Senior Military Officers Relieved from Service

THE AIRFORCE

Air Marshal	1
Air Vice Marshal	2
Air Commodore	3
Group Captain	1

TOTAL	43
-------	----

The most dramatic assertion of civilian supremacy over the military was the removal of Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, Chief of Army Staff, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, Chief of Air Staff, in March 1972. They were said to be interfering in the affairs of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission inquiry into the 1971 military debacle.¹² The catalyst to their removal was their unwillingness to make the Army and the Air Force available to the civil government during the Police strike.¹³ Both were given diplomatic assignments outside Pakistan. Two years later, Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry who had succeeded Air Marshal Rahim Khan, was also retired. His differences with the civil government arose when the Prime Minister reversed his decision of pre-mature retirement of seven Air force officers who had been acquitted by the court martial from charges of involvement in the 1973 conspiracy.¹⁴

Five major changes were introduced in the administrative set-up of the military high-command:

1. The designations of the heads of the three Services were changed from the C-in-C of the Army, the C-in-C of the Navy, and the C-in-C of the Air Force to the Chief of Army Staff, The Chief of Navy Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff respectively. The three Chiefs were put under the command of the Joint chiefs of Staff Committee, with the President of Pakistan as the Commander-in-Chief. This system encouraged close cooperation between the three Services and emphasized joint responsibility for planning, direction and the conduct of war. The former system was inherited by Pakistan from the British. The political elite were too engrossed in their own affairs to assert their control over the military. The C-in-C got a relatively free hand in running their affairs. Now, after 24 years, the colonial structure of the armed

¹² *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 4 March 1972; *Dawn* (Karachi), 4 March 1972.

¹³ See, Air Marshal Rahim Khan's interview: *Daily Jang* (Lahore), 20 March 1984.

¹⁴ *The Pakistan Times*, 16 April 1974; *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 17 April 1974.

affairs. Now, after 24 years, the colonial structure of the armed forces command was done away with.

2. The tenure of the Chiefs of Staff was initially fixed at four years. Later in 1975, it was reduced to three years. This new rule did not apply to General Tikka Khan, Chief of Army Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff, who were appointed under the old rules for a period of four years. The government also decided not to grant extension to the Services Chiefs so that a particular commander did not hold post for a very long period of time.¹⁵ This was to have two advantages; First, no commander would be able to consolidate his hold over his 'force' which a long stay could facilitate and he would not also manoeuvre for an extension. Second, a very lengthy tenure of the senior commanders blocks the promotion of junior officers and often causes grumbling in the Services.
3. In order to promote an integrated defence system, the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was created on a permanent basis. General Mohammad Shariff was appointed first Chairman on 1st March 1976. The JCSC was designated as the highest military body "for considering all problems bearing on the military aspects of national defence and rendering professional military advice thereon."¹⁶
4. A White Paper on Higher Defence Organization, issued by the Government of Pakistan in May, 1976, outlined the government's defence and strategic policy and institutional arrangements for dealing with defence affairs. It advocated the integrated defence approach with the ultimate responsibility of national defence resting with the Prime Minister. He was assisted by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Other important bodies involved in the decision-making process included the Defence Council, the Ministry of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs of Staff and the Services headquarters.¹⁷ (For the details of their role and functions, see Appendix I.)
5. At the time of independence, the Naval headquarters were set up at Karachi; whereas the Army and the Air Force headquarters were situated at Rawalpindi and Peshawar respectively. In 1974, the

¹⁵ After the imposition of martial law in 1977, this principle was not applied. Several senior officers, including the Services Chiefs were given extensions.

¹⁶ *White Paper on Higher Defence Organization*, Government of Pakistan, 1976. For the full text see Appendix I.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Naval headquarters were shifted to Islamabad to facilitate greater co-operation between the three Services and the civil administration. In 1983, the Air Force headquarters were also shifted to Rawalpindi.

The 1973 Constitution (enforced on 14th August 1973) reflected the desire of the political elite to push the military back to its traditional field. The functions of the military were clearly laid down in the Constitution. The military, under the direction of the federal government was required to "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."¹⁸ No previous constitution had ever defined the functions of the military. Their inclusion in the 1973 constitution was indicative of the determination of the framers of the constitution to "put an end" to the military's involvement in the active politics.

The constitution defined high treason as any attempt to or any kind of direct or indirect assistance to an attempt to abrogate or conspire to abrogate and subvert the Constitution "by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means."¹⁹ The Parliament was authorized to make laws for those found guilty of high treason.²⁰ In September 1973, the Parliament passed a law providing death sentence or life imprisonment for the subversion of the constitution.²¹ The Constitution also laid down the oath for the personnel of the armed forces which specifically forbade them to take part in political activities of any kind. It read:

I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under law.²²

The political elite hoped that these clauses of the 1973 constitution coupled with the judgement of the Supreme Court in the Asma Jilani vs the Government of the Punjab case (1972) would deter any future military intervention in politics.

The People's Party Government assigned special importance to strengthening the civilian regulatory apparatus so as to reduce its reliance on the military in situations of law and order. As early as 1950, the military

¹⁸ *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 1973, Article 245.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 6 (1) and (2).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 6 (3).

²¹ *Nawa-i Waqt*, 15 September 1973.

²² *The Constitution*, 1973, Third Schedule.

civilian force to control law and order situations. Bhutto's government decided to strengthen the civilian security forces. This was done by providing better equipment and communication system to the police. The Federal Investigation Agency was created and the existing intelligence agencies were streamlined.

A new task force—Federal Security Force (FSF)—which soon became controversial, was created in October 1972 with the declared objective of providing assistance to the civil administration and the police for the maintenance of law and order. This force was placed under the direct control of the Federal Government. Its strength was 13,875 men and officers in 1974²³ which rose to 18,563 by the end of 1976.²⁴ Its equipment included semi-automatic 7.62 rifles, SMGs and LMGs, 60 mm mortars, hand grenades, modern communication equipment and transport vehicles. There were plans to acquire re-conditioned tanks from the Army.²⁵ It was decided in February 1976 to extend the scope of activities of the FSF by associating it in nation-building and developmental work i.e. construction of houses in urban areas, the Integrated Rural Development Programme, flood control and adult education.

Nobody can dispute the need of a special task force to assist the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order and for extension of development and nation-building work. But, the FSF soon turned out to be a kind of private force at the disposal of the ruling party which was used against the political opponents and the dissidents within the ruling party. By the time the Bhutto era came to an end (1977) the FSF had become quite a notorious organization.

Rehabilitation of the Military.

The major target of Bhutto's policy towards the military during 1972-73 was the neutralization of the military's political power. When the senior commanders associated with the Yahya regime and the conduct of the 1971 war had been removed, and Bhutto felt that he had established hold over the military, he began to make overtures towards the military and cultivated the military high-command. Two considerations shaped this perspective. First, despite the separation of East Pakistan, the defence considerations of the post-1971 Pakistan, Bhutto was bound to maintain a strong and efficient military. Second, the government realized that the establishment of the FSF

²³ Statement by Federal Home Minister in the Senate: *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 5 December 1974.

²⁴ *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. III, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979, p. 26.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

did not mean that it would not need the military's assistance for internal security operations and relief work. The relevance of the military for the Bhutto government's goals was underlined when Bhutto dismissed Ataulah Mangel's government in Baluchistan in 1973 and then relied on the troops to suppress insurgency there.

Pakistan inherited a complex security situation in 1972. Over ninety thousand Pakistani civilians and military-men were POWs and some parts of (West) Pakistani territory were under India's occupation. In order to settle these and related problems Bhutto and Indira Gandhi signed a peace agreement at Simla, popularly known as the Simla Accord, in July 1972. This set in motion a process which paved the way for the withdrawal of troops, return of the POWs and normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. The implementation of the Simla Accord faced a number of problems caused by differences on the delineation of the line of control in Kashmir, the painfully slow pace of return of the POWs, and the Indo-Bangladesh threat to hold war trials of 195 POWs.²⁶ The protracted negotiations for the settlement of these problems left bitter memories which overshadowed Indo-Pakistan relations in the subsequent years.

Pakistan's military debacle in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh with India's active assistance and intervention confirmed India's political and military preponderance in South Asia. India wanted to give permanence to this power structure.²⁷ India's defence expenditure registered a steady rise during 1972-77. The manpower of the Indian Army was not raised but special measures were adopted to increase the mobility and strike capability of the infantry, artillery and armoured units. Defence production was stepped up. India also continued to obtain sophisticated

²⁶ In August 1973, an agreement was reached between India and Pakistan which provided that India would repatriate to Pakistan all, except 195 POWs, and all civilian internees. The future of 195 POWs was to be decided at a meeting between the representatives of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. All the Bengalis living in Pakistan were to be repatriated to Bangladesh and a substantial number of non-Bengalis living in Bangladesh were to be repatriated to Pakistan.

The first batch of the Pakistani POWs came home on 19th September 1973. The last batch arrived in Pakistan on 30th April 1974.

Pakistan recognized Bangladesh on the eve of 2nd Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore in February 1974. Consequently a conference of the representatives of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan was held in Delhi. It was agreed at this conference to unconditionally release the 195 POWs.

1,08,750 non-Bengalis were moved from Pakistan to Bangladesh. 1,21,700 Bengalis who escaped to Nepal after repatriated from Bangladesh to Pakistan. 10,350 non-Bengalis who escaped to Nepal after the fall of Dacca, were flown to Karachi. These repatriation operations were conducted under the supervision of the UNHCR.

²⁷ For detailed study of Pakistan's defence problems after 1971, see: Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defence Policy," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXVI No. 1, First Quarter 1983, pp. 32-56.

weapons and military hardware from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union. Above all, India exploded a nuclear device in May 1974 in Rajasthan. Describing this as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE), its leaders maintained that the explosion was an extension of research work in the field of nuclear technology and it was meant to keep India abreast of developments in science and technology. Independent observers found it difficult to swallow this explanation because of the distrust of the "peacefulness" of a nuclear explosion, India's policy of keeping all nuclear options open, and its refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty.

These developments were bound to cause deep concern in Pakistan whose leaders strongly believed that India would use its growing military power to restrict Pakistan's policy options and impose India's political preferences on Pakistan. There were additional problems for Pakistan. The new Afghan government, headed by Sardar Mohammad Daud which came to power in July 1973, revived the hitherto dormant Pukhtunistan question and launched a massive anti-Pakistan propaganda. During 1973-74, the Pakistani law-enforcing agencies seized large quantities of arms, ammunition, communication equipment and anti-Pakistan literature in NWFP and Baluchistan. The most sensational recovery of arms was made from the embassy of Iraq at Islamabad. All weapons and equipment recovered from the Iraqi embassy were Soviet-made and were brought into Pakistan under diplomatic cover.²⁸

In view of these defence considerations and internal security problems, the Bhutto government could not permanently antagonise the military. Bhutto began to mend fences with the military after the reassertion of civilian supremacy and took steps to remove the impression that his government was anti-military. He stopped making the stinging criticism of the military. He also visited various military establishments of the three Services and addressed the officers on international, regional and domestic political situation and explained his strategies to deal with external and domestic problems.

The budgetary allocations for defence services continued to rise during 1971-77. Bhutto's government allocated more resources to the military than any previous government, though the world-wide inflation and devaluation of Pakistani rupee offsetted the benefits of the steady rise in defence expenditure. The following table shows defence expenditure during 1970-77.

²⁸ These items were recovered from the Iraqi embassy: Submachine guns 300; magazines 921; 7.62 mm ammunition 10,000 rounds; incendiary hand grenades 40; 7.62mm loaded field magazines 20,000 to 30,000 rounds of ammunition; guerrilla warfare equipment and radio communication sets.

TABLE XXVI
Defence Expenditure 1970-77

Year	Defence Expenditure (In million Rs.)	Defence Expenditure as percentage of total expenditure
1970-71	3,201.5	55.66
1971-72	3,725.5	59.09
1972-73	4,439.6	59.34
1973-74	4,948.6	42.02
1974-75	6,914.2	42.83
1975-76	8,103.4	46.00
1976-77	8,120.6	44.71

Note: Defence expenditure of 1970-71 has been included in the table to indicate the steady rise in defence allocations. Defence expenditure rose by approximately 218 per cent during 1971-72 and 1976-77.

These resources were spent on the expansion and modernization of the three Services as well as for removing hardship of the officers and Other Ranks. Pay, allowances and other concessions for the non-commissioned ranks were revised in April 1972. Higher salaries for the Commissioned ranks were provided in August 1973. In June 1975, the rates of disturbance allowance and kit allowance admissible to the Commissioned ranks were reviewed. The benefits of disturbance allowance were also extended to Lieutenants and equivalents, the J.C.Os, and the N.C.Os. The flying pays for the officers of the Air Force and the Army were increased. A compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 and Rs. 50,000 was made payable to the family if a Commissioned officer and Other Rank respectively met with a fatal accident while flying or sailing in a sub-marine during peace time. In January 1977, pensions and other benefits for the military personnel were increased.

The Navy established its air-wing in 1972 so that it could operate in air, in addition to its assigned job on the surface and subsurface. Special attention was given to indigenous production of arms and military equipment. A Defence Production Division was set up in the Ministry of Defence in 1973 to encourage and streamline defence production. Three existing ordnance complex at Wah was expanded and modernized. Three new ordnance factories were set up at Gadwar, Sanjwal, and Havailian.

Plans were prepared to establish overhaul and production facility for aircraft, tank, and armoured personnel carriers. The Machine Tool Factory at Landi and the Heavy Mechanical Complex at Texila started supplying military orders. The work on setting up the first steel mill was resumed with soviet cooperation in December 1973. It was formally inaugurated in January 1985 and had an annual capacity of 1.1 million tons.²⁹

The Bhutto government obtained military hardware and weapons from external sources. This was facilitated by the U.S. decision to lift embargo on sale of lethal arms to India and Pakistan in February 1975. The U.S. Government decided to "consider requests for arms exports for cash on case by case basis."³⁰ The embargo on military sales was first imposed during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Later, the U.S. agreed to supply non-lethal items. Subsequently the U.S. agreed to sell spares for the military equipment supplied in the past. The supplies of non-lethal equipment and spare parts were suspended during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.³¹ This embargo was discriminatory to Pakistan for two major reasons. First, Pakistan's defence system was America-oriented. Therefore, Pakistan was hit harder by the U.S. refusal to supply weapons. Second, Pakistan's indigenous defence production was far below its requirements. The lifting of embargo in 1975 provided Pakistan an opportunity to obtain new weapons to replace the out-dated equipment. However, the American condition that all purchases should be paid in cash was a serious constraint on Pakistan's ability to purchase new equipment. Nevertheless, the lifting of embargo was a positive development which was welcomed by the civilian leaders as well as the military high command.

The Military's Response

The commanders who took control of the military after the 1971 debacle accepted the principle of civilian supremacy and emphasized the military's aloofness from active politics. General Tikka Khan, Chief of Army Staff (1972-76) stressed professionalism and loyalty to the constitution and the civilian authority established thereunder. He reminded the officers and men of the Army that they were sworn to protect the permanent constitution. The role of the Army was not only to defend the country against external aggression but also to put down internal uprising

²⁹ For a comprehensive study of defence production in Pakistan and progress report on various defence-related projects, see Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan," in James E. Katz (ed.), *Armaments Production in Developing Countries*, Lexington Books, Lexington: D. C. Heath & Co., 1984, pp. 265-278.

³⁰ For the full text of the statement: *The Pakistan Times*, 26 February 1975.

³¹ Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1976, pp. 49-69.

when called upon to do so.³² This was the reiteration of the role of the military as laid down in 1973 constitution.

The Right-wing opposition parties which were greatly perturbed by Bhutto's personalized style of rule, appealed a couple of times to the Chief of Army Staff to remove the Bhutto government.³³ Addressing a public meeting at Lahore in 1973, Mian Tufail Mohammad, leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, declared that the government should hand over power to the military which would then hold national elections.³⁴ The military ignored such appeals and maintained a constitutional and professional posture. General Zia-ul-Haq who succeeded Tikka Khan in 1976, advised the troops to adhere to their professional role and paid tribute to the civilian government for maintaining deep interest in the modernization of the military.³⁵

There was, however, some resentment over the government policies in a small group of the Army and the Air Force officers. This came to light when 14 officers of the Air force including two Group Captains, and 21 officers of the Army including 2 Brigadiers (one retired) were arrested on charges of conspiring to seize power by arresting the top government executives and the top brass of the Army.³⁶ This plan was discovered before it was launched. Two separate court-martials were held for the Air Force and the army officers. The Air Force court-martial dropped case against one officer. Nine out of the remaining thirteen officers were not found guilty. Four were sentenced to various terms of rigorous imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years.³⁷ The Army court-martial acquitted one out of twenty-one officers. Two were sentenced to life imprisonment and thirteen were sentenced to various terms of rigorous imprisonment ranging from 2 to 10 years. Two were dismissed from service and the promotion of three officers was stopped.³⁸ The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary, ordered the premature retirement of all the fourteen Air force officers. Their cases were reviewed by the government. The pre-mature retirement of 7 officers by the Air Headquarters was cancelled and they were reinstated. The pre-mature retirement of the other seven officers was confirmed but the embargo on their re-employment was lifted. The revision of the Air Headquarters decision was resented to by the Chief of Air Staff. The civilian leadership asked him to resign which he did.³⁹

³² *Dawn*, 13 October 1973; see also *The Pakistan Times*, November 5, 1973, 11 July 1974.

³³ See, *Weekly Meyaar* (Karachi), 21-28 February 1976, pp. 5-7.

³⁴ *Dawn*, 19 February 1973. For the full text of his speech, see *Lail-o-Neher* (Lahore), 25 February 1973.

³⁵ *The Pakistan Times*, 10 February 1976, 29 March 1976; *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 8 June 1976.

³⁶ *The Pakistan Times*, 1 and 3 April 1973; *Dawn*, 13 May 1973.

³⁷ *The Pakistan Times*, 2 February 1974.

³⁸ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 3 March 1974.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 17 April 1974; *The Pakistan Times*, 16 April 1974.

This episode had important implications for the civil-military relations. The deviant behaviour of the officers involved in the conspiracy was not typical of the mood of the military. The military as an institution stood by the civil government. No sympathy was expressed for the convicted officers by the in-service personnel as well as by the press. It was for the first time that the decision of the military high-command was reversed by the civil government and the Air Force Chief was asked to resign for differences with civil government. It was a clear assertion of civilian supremacy over the military.

Throughout this period, the military extended invaluable service to the civil government. The military's assistance to the civil government included the maintenance of law and order, nation-building activities and the rescue operations during natural calamities. These were not new assignments. The military had been conducting similar operations in aid of the civil authorities in the past.

The Army was called out by the civil government for the maintenance of law and order on seven occasions during 1972-77.

TABLE XXVII

Law and Order Operations of the Army : 1972-77

Dates	Description
July 1972	Language riots in Sind.
October-November, 1972	Labour trouble in Landi and Korangi area, (Karachi).
December 1972-February, 1973	Trouble in Pat-Feeder area and Lasbela (Baluchistan).
February 1973-July 1977	Periodic counter-insurgency measures in parts of Baluchistan, accompanied by pacification measures.
June 1974	Anti-Ahmedia riots. The troops patrolled the main streets of the major cities but they did not have to use force.
October 1976	Conflict between the civil administration and the tribesmen in Dir (NWFP).
April - July 1977	Anti-Bhutto movement. Periodic use of troops for the maintenance of law and order; martial law in Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad (April - June).

The nation-building activities of the Army included its contribution towards economic uplift and development of Baluchistan. While the troops were busy in operations against the dissident tribesmen, the Army engineers undertook a number of nation-building projects. They constructed about 350 miles of roads. Most of these roads were constructed in the Marri and Bugti areas and marked the beginning of a new phase of development of these neglected regions of Baluchistan. The construction work also provided employment to the tribesmen who were living in conditions of abject poverty. The Army engineers also widened and improved about 200 miles of the old roads. Other projects undertaken by the military included the making of permanent arrangements for the supply of water for drinking and agricultural use, the opening of dispensaries in the remote areas, the running of schools and supply of rations in the food scarcity areas. The Kahan Dam was constructed to irrigate about 500 acres of land. In Dera Bugti, a 'spring-fed' water-supply project was completed. Fifteen 'check-dams' were constructed on "nallahs" to control the flow of rain water and use it later on. Eighty-six wells were dug up and persian wheels were provided to lift water. By the middle of 1975, the Army engineers had also installed eighteen tubewells in the Kohlu, Mawand, Kahan, and Dera Bugti areas to overcome the serious shortage of water.

In May 1976, the Public Works Department (PWD) was abolished in the northern areas in NWFP and all its development work was transferred to the Army.

The Army's assistance was sought in 1974 to reinforce the efforts of the civil armed forces (paramilitary forces, Rangers) to check the smuggling of foodgrain to India and Afghanistan. The troops were deployed on the border which brought the smuggling of foodgrain under control, at least temporarily. The most solid and impressive contribution of the three Services was their assistance to the local administration in the wake of natural calamities. Pakistan faced two major types of natural calamities : floods (August 1973, August-September 1975 and July-August (1976) and an earthquake in the Swat and Hazara district of NWFP in December 1974.

Flood water swept across the parts of the Punjab and Sind. Thousands of houses and bridges were destroyed and large stocks of foodgrain were swept away. The Army was assigned the duty of undertaking rescue and relief operations and restoring means of communications. The military personnel rescued thousands of people; ferried food, clothings and medicine; and repaired roads and embankments.⁴⁰ In December 1974, an

⁴⁰ Commenting on the Army's relief operation during the 1973 floods, Bhutto said, "The whole nation has reason to be proud of their services, their tasks and their prompt response to the governments call for assistance". *The Pakistan Times*, 4 September 1973.

earthquake in Swat and Hazara district caused havoc. Out of population of 97,000 affected by the earthquake, 5,300 were killed and 17,000 were wounded. Some of the villages were completely razed to ground. The Army took command of the relief operations. It rescued the trapped persons, built shelters, provided medical assistance, food and clothings, and buried the dead bodies. The Army engineers repaired roads and bridges and restored communication system. The Air Force helicopters conducted aerial survey and flew supplies from Islamabad to the affected region.

These tasks in the "non-professional" field helped to restore the military's image in the polity.

Civilian Institution Building :

The containment of military's political role and the rehabilitation of civilian supremacy over the military makes it imperative to, inter alia, establish viable civilian political institutions and processes. These institutions must enjoy a widespread legitimacy and should be instrumental to resolving political, economic and social problems affecting the polity.

While asserting civilian supremacy over the military and providing for the military's demands of modernization, the Bhutto government adopted policies to extend the popular support it enjoyed at the time of assumption of power and endeavoured to lay down infra-structure for political institutions. These policy measures included the introduction of socio-economic reforms, formulation of the constitution, and the use of the ruling People's Party as the major instrument of political mobilisation. However, these policies faltered. The socio-economic reforms could not usher in the promised era of change. These caused disillusionment amongst the supporters and evoked opposition from the well-entrenched politico-economic interests. The Constitution's participatory and democratic character was softened through amendments and by the heavy reliance on the regulative apparatus of the state. The People's Party suffered from internal conflicts, ideological and personality feuds and personalization of power by its chairman.

A series of economic reforms were introduced with the objective of promoting egalitarianism in the society. The emerald mines in Swat and ten categories of industries were placed under state control. These included iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, motor vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, cement, gas and oil refineries. All managing and sub-agencies were abolished. This order hit 78 managing agencies and 106 companies.

Land reforms introduced in March 1972, fixed the ceiling on individual

land holding on 150 acres for irrigated and 300 acres unirrigated land. In terms of Produce Index Units (PIU), the ceiling was 12,000,⁴¹ with a permission to retain additional 2,000 PIU for owning a tractor and tubewell. Total area resumed by the government under these reforms was 8,92,000 acres. Out of this only 4,32,000 acres were distributed by 1975.⁴² In January 1977, new land reforms were introduced and the individual ceiling was reduced to 100 and 200 acres for irrigated and unirrigated land respectively. These reforms could not be implemented because of the national elections and the mass movement that engulfed the country during March-July 1977. In November 1975, the land holders owning land up to 12 acres of irrigated or 25 acres of unirrigated land were exempted from payment of land revenue. The impact of these land reforms was limited for several reasons—landholding ceiling fixed on individual basis, exemption for owning tractor and tubewell, etc, the loopholes in implementation, and the policy of landlords to surrender uncultivable land which could not be purposefully redistributed.

Life insurance business was nationalised on March 19, 1972, and the government established the State Life Insurance Corporation to undertake life insurance business. All Pakistani banks were nationalized on January 1, 1974. Private schools and colleges were also nationalized and the teaching and non-teaching staff was offered salary and other facilities equivalent to those serving in the government owned educational institutions. New universities and secondary and intermediate education boards were set up. A University Grants commission was established. The courses and syllabi for various classes were thoroughly revised.

The labour received special attention of the government. The labour reforms aimed at providing a more "meaningful" participation to workers in industrial management as well as more "equitable" share of profits. The industrialists were made responsible for the education of one child of every worker employed in their concern. New rules were announced regarding bonus, gratuity, leave, compensation and retirement. These rules also provided for a "quick and fair" settlement of collective disputes, protection of workers against "victimization" and promotion of trade unionism. A minimum wage limit was also fixed.

The new health policy was as ambitious as were the other policies of the government. It professed the high sounding goal of bringing medical treatment within the easy reach of the common man. The import, manufacture, sale and prescription of medicines was switched over to

⁴¹ Originally the ceiling was fixed at 15,000 PIU. A few weeks later it was reduced by 3000 PIU.

⁴² Pakistan Economic Survey, 1974-75, Islamabad : Government of Pakistan, 1975, p. 168.

generic names with effect from April, 1973.

Though these reforms reflected the desire of the government to pull the nation out of the crisis, these could not bring about the promised revolution. Their impact was generally moderate. As a result the government performance remained far below its promises. This brought a wrath of criticism of the government policies from the extreme Right and the extreme Left. The latter evaluated the policies on the basis of the orthodox marxist doctrine. The former were disturbed by the rhetoric of Islamic Socialism. The gap between the promises and the performance of the government can be attributed to a number of factors.

First, the 1970 elections were held in an entirely different circumstances. The military debacle and the fall of East Pakistan created a situation which nobody envisaged at the time of the polls. The promises were so wild that they could not be fulfilled under normal condition; whereas Pakistan's conditions were more than abnormal. Bhutto leaned on martial law regulations during the first four months of his government. When the Interim Constitution was enforced on April 21, 1972, Fundamental Rights guaranteed therein were suspended under the proclamation of emergency.

Second, these reforms were announced in a great hurry. Their implications were not fully taken into account before the details were made public. This created partial confusion and these could not be fully implemented. The most outstanding example of the hurriedly announced policy running into difficulties was the generic names policy. It was heralded with considerable fanfare and described as a revolutionary measure. Initially the government refused to make any change in the policy and declared that if the western countries did not supply raw material for indigenous manufacture of medicines, they would secure necessary cooperation from the socialist countries.⁴³ Soon after wards, the deadline for the shift to generic names was extended and many categories of medicines were exempted from the use of generic names.

Third, the unsatisfactory internal conditions undermined the output of the government. Bhutto was asking for some time to translate his promises into reality but the people wanted quick results and over-night changes. The responsible members of his government continued to make wild statements and painted a very rosy picture of the future. Some of the PPP

⁴³ The Federal Health Minister, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, informed the National Assembly that "Pakistan could procure from the socialist countries sufficient raw material for indigenous production of medicines and at much cheaper rates if there were to be any non-cooperation from the capitalist countries in view of the switchover to generic names of medicines." *The Pakistan Times*, 22 August 1972.

workers, especially at the lower level, and the People's Guards, misused the party's name and interfered with local administration. There were cases of the PPP workers forcing officers to appoint or dismiss people under the threat of demonstrations or complaints to the higher authorities. Personal and group rivalries were given political colour and the party's power was used to deal with the rivals. Such developments were bound to breed discontent amongst the officials and ordinary citizens who suffered at the hands of the party workers.

Within four months of assumption of power by Bhutto, an interim constitution (1972) was enforced and martial law was withdrawn. The National Assembly appointed a committee to prepare the new (Permanent) constitution. This goes to the credit of the ruling PPP and the opposition parties that they displayed political accommodation towards each other which facilitated the formulation of the constitution within one year. The constitution, known as the 1973 Constitution, provided parliamentary system with a very weak President, bicameral legislature with sufficient law making and financial powers, federalism with provincial autonomy, independent judiciary and a guarantee of fundamental rights.

However, the consensus which facilitated the making of the 1973 Constitution was allowed to fade away by the ruling party's impatience towards political dissent. The spirit of the constitution was compromised by suspending fundamental rights and the centre's interference in the provincial domain. Several amendments were introduced in the constitution in 1975 and 1976 which adversely affected the independence of judiciary and restricted the right of the people to seek judicial remedies against the excesses of the administration.

The dismissal of the Mengal cabinet in Baluchistan in February 1973 by the federal government and the resignation of Mufti Mahmud's cabinet in NWFP as a mark of protest caused an irreparable damage to institution in Baluchistan. This exposed the inability of the federal government to settle political problems through political means and led it into a serious political mess because a large number of Baluch activists took to hills and launched guerrilla action. The anti-insurgency operations under taken by the Army under the instructions from the civilian federal government kept the regular troops tied down in Baluchistan until the coup of 1977 when the military government abandoned military operations in Baluchistan. These military operations hardened the attitude of those Baluch leaders who suffered during these years. It also marked the beginning of Bhutto's reliance on the military for achieving political goals.

The prospects of viable political institutions were also undermined by

the refusal of the PPP government to accept opposition to its policies as a legitimate political activity. The opposition political parties were often described as anti-national and conglomerate of "adventurists" and "selfish" politicians. Whenever the opposition parties engaged in organized political activity to mobilise people in their support, the government dealt with them in a ruthless manner. The most vocal opposition, the National Awami Party (NAP) was banned in February 1975 for what was described as antistate activities and its alleged involvement in the PPP leader Sherpao's assassination.⁴⁴ Subsequently, the NAP leader Wali Khan and 43 others who were under detention since the banning of the NAP, were put on trial for anti-state activities before a special tribunal. The tribunal consisted of Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain of Lahore High Court, Justice Abdul Hakim of Peshawar High Court, and Justice Mushtaq Ali Kazi of Sind-Baluchistan High Court. The tribunal proceedings were held in camera in Hyderabad jail. (This was often described as the Hyderabad conspiracy case). This case was under trial when Bhutto was overthrown in July 1977. The military government of General Zia-ul-Haq withdrew the case and released the NAP leaders. These strategies enabled Bhutto to establish his personal ascendancy but such a style of rule promoted greater distrust between the government and the opposition, sharpened political cleavages, and undermined the prospects of development of self-sustaining political institutions needed for limiting military's political role.

The ruling PPP which championed the cause of the down-trodden masses, failed to emerge as a vibrant political machine capable of sustaining popular support. It was an umbrella party which included people with conflicting ideologies and goals. The intellectual and political discord was intensified after the party assumed power because everybody tried to get on the bandwagon. As the office-bearers were nominated by the party high-command, different factions at the local, provincial and national levels established personal connections with the prominent leaders at the national level and exploited mutual jealousies amongst the national leaders so as to secure party nomination and obtain a share of state patronage. Any change at the party's national level had ramifications for the future of the party men at the lower levels. The downfall of a leader meant that his protégé would also find themselves in disfavour unless they shifted their loyalties.

The ruling party was kept intact by the use of state patronage and the personalization of power by Bhutto. He ran the party like his fiefdom and often described other party leaders as his "creatures". A number of party

⁴⁴ In accordance with law, the government referred the ban on the NAP to the Supreme Court for confirmation. The government presented massive evidence in support of its contention that the NAP was an "anti-national" party. The Supreme Court confirmed the ban. As the proceedings were open, the press reported them in detail during March-September 1975.

stalwarts and enthusiastic workers who took exception to Bhutto's management of the party and the state affairs soon realized that their dissent would not be tolerated, let alone accommodated. A number of them dropped out. These included, among others, Mukhtar Rana, Meraj Mohammad Khan, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, J. A. Rahim, Khursheed Hassan Meer, Dr. Mubashar Hassan, Haneef Ramay, Mian Iftikhar Tarri. Some of them were harassed, arrested and/or criminal cases were registered against them.

The personalization of power, the lack of viable organizational network, and factionalism greatly weakened the PPP and it lost the momentum which characterized its organization before the assumption of power.⁴⁵ It lost "its effectiveness as an instrument of political participation and recruitment" and it was unable to serve "as an effective channel of communication between the elite and the mass populace."⁴⁶

Conclusions:

The Bhutto era (20th December 1971 to 4th July 1977) can be described as an interlude of civilian rule in Pakistan. The military debacle in 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the dismemberment of Pakistan brought the military's image to the lowest ebb. This facilitated the transfer of power from the military commanders to Bhutto who enjoyed popular support and commanded a clear majority in the National Assembly of the residuary Pakistan.

Bhutto used this twin leverage—the scaled down image of the military and his mass appeal bordering on charisma—to reassert civilian supremacy over the military and limit its political role. A number of steps were taken to achieve this goal. These included the criticism of the military's involvement in politics, removal of several senior officers, appointment of an inquiry commission to look into the military debacle of 12971, the restructuring of the military high-command, the reduction of the tenure of the Chiefs of Staff, and a decision not to grant extensions to the Services chiefs. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the military-men to eschew active politics and clearly defined their role as the defence of the country against external aggression and, subject to law, assistance to the

⁴⁵ See, Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan People's Party : The First Phase 1967 - 1971* Progressive Series No. 9, Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1973; Anwar Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party : Phases One and Two," in Ziring, Braibanti and Wriggins (eds.), *Pakistan The Long View*, Durham : Duke University Centre for Commonwealth and comparative Studies, 1977, pp. 70-116.

⁴⁶ Maliha Lodhi, "Pakistan in Crisis," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XVI No. 1, March 1978, pp. 60-78.

civil government for the maintenance of law and order, whenever called upon to do so.

The top brass who assumed the command of the armed forces after Bhutto's ascendancy to power appeared to have accepted the changed situation. With the exception of minor disaffections, they began to adjust to the diminished role of the military in the political system. However, Bhutto's efforts to give permanence to the rehabilitated principle of civilian supremacy over the military did not succeed. This was partly due to the fact that the military recovered from the set-back of 1971 by 1976 and regained its confidence, and partly because of Bhutto's failure to create viable political institutions.

Several developments contributed to the regaining of confidence by the military. The unnecessary delay in the return of the POWs from India (the last batch reached Pakistan on 30th April 1974) evoked sympathy for the military. The general feeling was that the POWs had to pay a high price for the mismanagement of the war by the Generals who were deeply involved in politics. The fault was with the senior commanders who had been removed by the civilian government.

The defence concerns of Pakistan did not change after the establishment of Bangladesh. The mutual distrust between India and Pakistan, India's desire to assert its dominant position in the South Asian regional system, India's nuclear explosion, and the revival of Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory by Sardar Daud's government (1973-78) underscored the continued relevance of a well-equipped and efficient military for the security of Pakistan. The military continued to obtain the largest share of the national budget. This facilitated the expansion and modernization of the military. Moreover, the U.S. decision to lift arms embargo in 1975 was also a welcome development for the military. All these factors contributed to the regaining of confidence on the part of the military.

The civil government's calls to the military for the maintenance of law and order despite the establishment of the FSF, demonstrated to the government that it would occasionally need military to assert its authority. The use of the military in Baluchistan resumed the erosion of Bhutto's power vis-a-vis the military. The assistance extended by the military to cope with heavy rains, floods and earthquake helped to restore the image of the military.

Bhutto's strongest asset was the popular support which he enjoyed at the beginning of his rule. Instead of using his mass appeal to institutionalize participatory framework and establish self sustaining political institutions, he opted for personalization of power and created a

patrimonial system wherein loyalty to the chief rather than to the system was assigned a high premium. The whole edifice of the political system was built around his personality.

The PPP which could have been another source of sustained political strength for the new system, was not allowed to develop into an autonomous and self-sustaining political machine. It suffered from ideological disharmony and weak organization. A large number of those who joined the party after it assumed power were more interested in making quick fortune. The most valuable asset of the party was the personality of Bhutto who ran the party like his estate.

The fate of such a personalized, authoritarian and patrimonial political system will always be closely linked with the fate of its leader. As long as the leader is strong enough to assert himself, everything appears to be under control. When the leader loses credibility for one reason or another, the political system either cannot sustain itself or it faces a serious crisis of legitimacy and stability. If the polity has a tradition of military intervention in politics, such a situation provides an opportunity to the military to retrieve political initiative. This was what happened with the Bhutto system in 1977.

The Return of the Military

The coup d'état of July 5, 1977, led by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq which displaced Bhutto's civilian government, was the reassertion of the military's dominant role in the polity after an interval of 5½ years. The military was able to wrest political initiative from civilian/political leaders not because the top brass conspired to overthrow the civilian government. Rather, the inability of the political elite to manage the wake of the political crisis of 1977 and the gradual erosion of civilian institutions in the wake of the mass movement encouraged the military commanders once again to overthrow the regime which stood discredited by street agitation.

General Elections

The political developments that ultimately led to the military take-over began to unfold with the Bhutto government's decision in January 1977 to hold general elections on March 7 and 10. The ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was preparing for general elections for the past several months and most political analysts thought that given the divided opposition, the PPP would sweep the polls. Much to their surprise, the opposition, parties forged an electoral alliance, called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Formally launched on January 11, 1977, it consisted of nine political parties: (i) Tehrik-i-Istaqlal (TI), (ii) Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), (iii) Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), (iv) Jamiatul Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), (v) Pakistan Muslim League Pagaro Group (PML-Pagaro), (vi) National Democratic Party (NDP), (vii) Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), (viii) Khaksar Tehrik (KT), (ix) Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC). The PNA was predominantly rightist-fundamentalist in orientation. The JI, JUP, JUI and KT were Islam-oriented fundamentalist parties; the PML, PDP and AKMC were rightist. The TI could be described as slightly left of the centre and the NDP was leftist and a successor to the defunct NAP. Three of these

political parties, i.e. PDP, KT and AKMC had very little political clout, although the leader of the PDP (Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan) enjoyed respect as an elder statesman and an ardent champion of democracy.

The PPP sought a fresh mandate on the basis of its track record: socio-economic policies, services to Islam and achievements in foreign policy. The PNA highlighted the inadequacies in the government's domestic and foreign policies and especially the curbs on civil and political liberties. They promised the enforcement of Islamic system (Nizam-i-Mustafa) in Pakistan at the earliest. The lifting of restrictions on public meetings for election campaigning enabled the PNA to articulate public grievances against the government and mobilise support for their programme. The PNA felt confident to capture a reasonable number of seats in the National Assembly and thus emerge as a formidable opposition. However, when the results of the National Assembly polls were declared, the PPP routed the PNA. The following table shows the election results.¹

TABLE XXVIII
National Assembly Elections, 1977

Party	No. of candidates	No. of seats Won	Percentage of the votes cast
PPP	191	155	58.1
PNA	168	36	35.4
PML-Qayyum	37	1	
Independent	324	8	
Other Minor Parties	21	0	
Total	741	200	

The PPP success in the elections proved short lived because the PNA alleged massive rigging of the polls by the ruling party. As a mark of protest the PNA boycotted the provincial elections which were held on March 10 and successfully staged a countrywide strike on March 11.

For a detailed analysis of the 1977 polls, see: Marvin Weinbaum, "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVII No. 7, July 1977, pp. 599-618; Sharif al Mujahid, "The 1977 Pakistani Elections: An Analysis", in Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society*, Durham, N.C. Carolina Academic Press, 1980, pp. 63-91.

Encouraged by the popular response, the PNA decided to launch a mass protest movement in support of their major demands which included the scrapping of election results, the holding of fresh polls, the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner, and the resignation of Prime Minister Bhutto. Later, the PNA agreed to withdraw its demand for the Prime Minister's resignation provided sufficient guarantees were provided for a free and fair elections.

Mass Movement

The mass movement was triggered by the PNA claim of widespread irregularities in the General Elections and Bhutto's inability to recognize that the charges of election-malpractices were not a cry of the defeated opposition parties. Some of Bhutto's enthusiastic supporters and cabinet members did engage in activities which created doubts about the credibility of the electoral exercise.

What started as a protest against malpractices in the elections transformed into a country wide agitation against the Bhutto government. The political movement was able to draw support from all those political quarters who had developed grievances against the PPP government over the last 5½ years. They employed the catch-all slogan of *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (the Islamic system of government) which meant different things to different people: to orthodox and fundamentalists it meant a polity which accommodated their religio-political views and guaranteed an effective role for them in the political system; for lawyers, journalists and several other groups this was a charter for the restoration of civil and political rights; and labour viewed this as a framework for better deal. The business and trading interests which were the mainstay of the movement considered this as an opportunity to put an end to the socialistic policies of the government. Several other groups interpreted this as a guarantee against the highhanded methods adopted by a large number of PPP workers.

The 1977 mass movement was more widespread than the 1968-69 popular upheaval. In addition to the major urban centres, the mass movement engulfed small towns. The market towns witnessed reasonably intense political activity. The business and trading community which had been alienated by the PPP government's policy of nationalisation and greater state intervention in economic life extended financial support. The frequent suspension of commercial activities (closure of shops and business centres) proved an effective weapon against the government. The religious political parties provided the hard-core workers and, in view of restriction on public meetings, mosques and religious schools served as the nerve centres for the PNA movement. A large number of anti-government

processions were taken out from these religious institutions, invariably led by religious leaders. Women, students and children protest marches were also staged in support of the demand of introduction of *Nizam-i-Mustafa*.² The casualties during the first 2 months of the agitation (up to the end of May) raged from 250 to 296. Thousands of people were wounded or arrested.³

Bhutto reacted to the mass agitation in his characteristic style-making a personal appeal directly to the people, arresting the leading PNA leaders and describing them as anti-national. The Police and the FSF (Federal Security Force) were extensively used to contain the agitation. The army was called out to bolster the civil government. Bhutto did adopt a number of political strategies to salvage his position. He endeavoured to appease the fundamentalists by imposing a complete ban on drinking, gambling and night clubs, and invited the PNA *ulema* to join the Council of Islamic Ideology for the implementation of sharia (Islamic Legal code).⁴ When there was no respite in agitation, the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan offered his good offices to facilitate a political dialogue between the PNA and the government. He was joined by the ambassador of the UAE and Foreign Minister of Libya which helped the resumption of negotiations between the PNA leaders, most of whom were in detention, and Bhutto.

The political dialogue between the government and the opposition leaders which began in the last week of April proceeded at a painfully slow pace. It was greatly undermined by the mutual distrust of the negotiating parties; they wanted to outmanoeuvre each other rather than resolve the crisis through accommodation. This was the first time that the PNA immobilised the government by its country-wide agitation. They did not want to lose this opportunity to humble their main political foe—Bhutto. The PPP leadership wanted either to outwit the PNA or extract an agreement which would defuse the situation but keep the political initiative in their hands. While the negotiations were going on Bhutto brought about a constitutional amendment to hold a referendum whether he should stay in office or not. Although no referendum was held but the fact that such a decision was made unilaterally, the PNA felt deceived which reinforced their distrust of Bhutto. Later, when the government and the PNA agreed in principle to repolling but the details of the agreement had not been

² See, Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger, 1980, pp. 157-164; Mohammad Waseem, "Mass Movements in Pakistan: An appraisal," *The Muslim* (Islamabad), 16 September 1983, Analyst, "The Mechanics of a Mass movement," *Ibid*, 25 May 1984.

³ According to the official count the figure was 250. The PNA sources claimed that 296 persons were killed. See, Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-82*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1983, pp. 122-23.

⁴ *New York Times*, 18 April 1977.

finalised, Bhutto left for a visit to a number of Islamic countries without giving any reason for undertaking a quickly arranged foreign trip. His absence from the country delayed the finalisation of the agreement and raised doubts as to his seriousness about the impending agreement. This, inter alia, contributed to the last minute differences between the PNA and the government.

Resurgence of the Military

Bhutto was able to assert civilian supremacy over the military in the early seventies mainly because of the debacle suffered by the military in 1971 and the popular support enjoyed by Bhutto. As long as Bhutto's civilian government neither faced crisis of legitimacy nor it relied on military's support for its survival, it was able to assert its leadership over the military. However, the persistence and intensity of the mass movement and the inability of the political elite to manage the political crisis altered this pattern of civil-military relation.

Bhutto often described himself as a man of the people "their brother, friend and comrade."⁵ He used to bypass his cabinet colleagues and party leaders and made direct appeals to the people for securing their support for his policies. This strategy was also employed in the early stages of the mass movement. Much to Bhutto's surprise the charm of his personality had faded in the wake of mass mobilisation by the PNA leaders. The PPP could also be a source of strength for the government during these months but the PPP lacked viable organizational network. As the ruling party was too much dependent on the leader, it could not sustain itself after the erosion of charisma of its leader. Bhutto was left with no choice but to depend on the repressive laws, the police and the FSF. When this did not produce the desired results, the army was called out to maintain law and order. This temporarily salvaged Bhutto's position but in the long run it contributed to shifting political initiative from the civilian leaders to the Army high command.

The Army was called out within a week of the outbreak of civil strife but its role was limited to assisting the civil authorities. The turning point came on April 21, when Bhutto imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore. The Army authorities were given wide powers (generally exercised by the civil authorities) to restore law and order, including powers to hold summary trials. The government admitted that all efforts to find a political settlement were "frustrated" which made it imperative to

⁵ Anwar H. Syed, "Z.A. Bhutto's Self characterization and Pakistani Political culture," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVIII No. 12, December 1978, pp. 1250-1266.

hand over these cities to the Army.⁶

Bhutto's strategy was to retrieve political initiative vis-a-vis the PNA by falling back on the military and by demonstrating that the military high command fully supported his policies. On April 28, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff committee and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services pledged their support to the "legally constituted" government of Bhutto. Their statement emphasized:

.... We wish to make it absolutely clear that Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force are totally united to discharge their constitutional obligation in support of the present legally constituted Government and to fulfill the pledge their officers and men have taken to defend the country's independence even to the peril of their lives.⁷

During the course of negotiations between the PNA and the government, senior Army officers were sent to the PNA leaders to brief them on external threat to Pakistan and the situation in Baluchistan. Bhutto was present in one such briefing. The Army Chief was invited to cabinet meetings and the top brass of the military were regularly briefed by the government on the course of negotiations between the government and the PNA. This was done to demonstrate to the opposition parties that the besieged government enjoyed military's support.

The PNA strategy was to keep the pressure on the government and break the link between the military and the Bhutto government because the PNA leaders had realized that as long as the military stood by the government, Bhutto could not be removed simply by street agitation. The PNA therefore endeavoured to convince the military commanders that they were extending support to a government that had, as they put it, lost legitimacy and was thoroughly discredited. This was done through direct appeals to the military commanders and by applying public pressure on the troops performing police duties.

Soon after the imposition of martial law in three major cities, the PNA leadership demanded the withdrawal of martial law and appealed to the Services Chiefs not to lend any support to Bhutto's government. One of the PNA leaders, Air Marshal (Retd.) Mohammad Asghar Khan addressed a lengthy letter to the Chiefs of Staff and officers of three Services. The Air Marshal argued that the officers and men were not duty bound to obey the orders of the Bhutto government as it was no longer a lawful government. He wrote:

... Bhutto has vitiated the constitution and he is guilty of a grave crime

⁶ See the official statement; *The Times*, 22 April 1977.

⁷ For the full text of the statement: *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, 1 May 1977.

against the people. It is not your duty to support his illegal regime nor can you be called upon to kill your own people so that he can continue a little longer in office. Let it not be said that the Pakistan Armed Forces are degenerated police force, fit only for killing unarmed civilians. . .

The letter concluded:

... As men of honour it is your responsibility to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not the blind obedience of unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan. God be with you.⁸

Strong public pressure was also applied on the troops undertaking police duties in urban centres. The troops either had to open fire on the defiant agitators or face taunts of the demonstrators about the Army's performance in East Pakistan in 1971. The PNA women made telephone calls to the senior officers' wives requesting them to restrain their husbands from undertaking action against the demonstrators. The PNA supporters began to imprint anti-Army slogans on currency notes to express displeasure over the use of troops for containing anti-Bhutto agitation. As bulk of the troops came from the Punjab and NWFP, such a propaganda and negative environment was bound to perturb the troops performing law and order duties in these provinces. The top echelon of the military were not unaware of the intense political pressures on the officers and men during the period of the mass movement.

These developments had three major consequences. First, the military high-command became fully aware of the fact that the Bhutto government's popular base had eroded and it was now dependent on the Army's support for its survival. Second, the continued use of the military against the civil population tarnished the image of the military as an independent force. Third, the PNA which demonstrated its strength in the streets was making overtures towards the military to dissuade the commanders from supporting the Bhutto government. It became clear to the military commanders that if they displaced Bhutto, the PNA would not question such an action.

For the military which played political role and tasted power in the past, the deepening political crisis and prospects of support for the military's extended role in the polity, were bound to rekindle desire to snatch political initiative. The political crisis was reviewed by the top commanders and Bhutto was communicated their concern about the

⁸ For the full text of the letter, see: Mohammad Asghar Khan, *op.cit.* pp. 116-18.

deteriorating political situation. They advised him to work out a political settlement at the earliest.⁹

This signal which gave a clear indication of the military commanders' changing perspective on the political situation did not have any meaningful impact on the government policy towards the PNA agitation as well as on the course of political negotiations. Despite the agreement on holding fresh elections, the PNA and the government were deadlocked on its modalities and arrangements for the interim period. This dashed all hopes of an early resolution of the conflict.

The military commanders who had already indicated their impatience over the protracted negotiations decided to withdraw their support to the Bhutto regime and assumed power on July 5, 1977. The coup, later described as the Operation Fairplay, did not surprise any one. Bhutto himself had not ruled out the possibility of a coup d'état. He was so deeply trapped in the political crisis that he had no option but to capitulate. The PNA welcomed the coup and celebrated the removal of Bhutto by the military.

THIRD MILITARY REGIME

The July 1977 coup was as peaceful as were the coups in 1958 and 1969. General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff who declared martial law throughout the country, took over as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). The 1973 Constitution was suspended (not abrogated). Federal and provincial cabinets, national and provincial assemblies were dissolved. The Prime Minister, cabinet members and the leading opposition leaders were arrested and placed under "protective custody." The President of Pakistan was allowed to continue as the titular head of state and the Chief Justice of provincial High Courts were appointed acting governors of their respective provinces.

A Military Council was set up as the highest decision making body. It consisted of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Services' Chiefs.¹⁰ A few other senior generals were also associated with

⁹ See, General Zia-ul-Haq's interview: *New York Times*, 9 July 1977; General Zia-ul-Haq's address to the seminar on National Integration at Lahore: *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, 15 April 1984. See also General Faiz Ali Chisti's interview: *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 15 September 1983; *Daily Jang* (Lahore), 24 September 1984.

¹⁰ They were: General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee: General Mohammad Shariff (up to October 1978), General Mohammad Iqbal (March 1980 to March 1984), General Mohammad Rahimuddin (March 1984-), Chief of Naval Staff: Admiral Mohammad Sharif (up to March 1979), Admiral Karamat Rehman Niazi (March 1979 - March 1983), Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan (March 1983-)

policy making who were assisted by senior civilian bureaucrats. Civilian ministers were also associated with martial law regime from 1978 when the first cabinet was appointed, but the CMLA, the Military council, and the military-bureaucracy elements dominated decision making. Pakistan was divided into five martial law zones. Each zone was headed by a Martial Law Administrator. The zones were: Zone A: Punjab; Zone B: NWFP; Zone C: Sind; Zone D: Baluchistan; Zone E: Northern Areas. Each zone was further subdivided into sub-zones. Like the previous martial laws, stringent martial law regulations were issued. Special military courts and summary military courts were set up to punish people for violation of martial law regulations. No appeal could be made against the judgements of these courts in any regular civilian court.

General Zia-ul-Haq projected himself as a reluctant ruler. He argued that the armed forces stepped into the political field when it became quite clear to them that the politicians were unable to resolve the political crisis. He emphasized, like most other military rulers, that neither he nor his fellow officers had any political ambition and that he would return the country to democratic rule within 90 days. General Zia-ul-Haq declared:

My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which would be held in October this year [1977]. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule. During the next three months my total attention will be concentrated on the holding of elections and I would not like to dissipate my powers and energies as Chief Martial Law Administrator on anything else.¹¹

In another statement General Zia-ul-Haq said: "I will not accept a political office because I do not think I am fit for that".¹²

During the eight years (1977-1985) the military rulers expanded the goals of the coup and made several shifts in their political priorities ranging from emphasis on "Islamization", "decency in politics" and the decision of General Zia-ul-Haq to stay on in power as an elected president after the withdrawal of martial law. Table XXIX outlines the changing pattern of the military regime's political priorities and expansion of goals:

Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Zulifqar Ali Khan (up to July 1978), Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamim (July 1978 - March 1985), Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Jamal Khan (March 1985-).
For the full text, see Appendix "H".
¹² *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 8 August 1977.

TABLE XXIX

Changes In The Military Regime's Political Priorities And Goals

Approximate Date	Major Priorities
July 1977	Elections within 90 days and transfer of power to the elected representatives. (Election date: October 18, 1977)
October 1977	(Election postponed) Accountability of the Bhutto regime Islamization.
February-March 1979	Islamization. Elections (Date fixed: November 17, 1979)
September-October 1979	(Election postponed) Local bodies polls on nonparty basis. Islamization and restructuring of the politico-economic system. Induction of decency in politics.
January-February 1980	Islamization and restructuring of the politico-economic system. Moral renewal and decency in politics.
March 1981	Defence of the territorial and ideological boundaries in the backdrop of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981.
August 1983	Local bodies polls on nonparty basis: August-September.

Approximate Date	Major Priorities
	A phased programme announced to hold national and provincial elections by March 1985, followed by transfer of power to the elected representatives. Prior to the transfer of power the 1973 Constitution will be amended to increase the powers of the President.
August 1984	General Zia-ul-Haq declared that he might like to continue as President after the withdrawal of martial law in order to complete the process of Islamization.
	Taking a cue from General Zia-ul-Haq's statement, several local councils passed resolutions urging him to stay on as President.
November 1984	General Zia-ul-Haq declared that he was prepared to share rather than transfer power to the civilian political elite.
December 1984	Presidential referendum by virtue of which General Zia-ul-Haq claimed to have secured mandate to continue as the elected President for five years from the day the elected parliament held its first session.
February 1985	General Elections on nonparty basis.
March 1985	Several amendments in the 1973 Constitution which greatly strengthened the position of the President.
	The amended 1973 Constitution was enforced minus articles on fundamental rights and the powers of judiciary. Members of the Senate elected.

Approximate Date	Major Priorities
	First session of the Parliament.
	General Zia-ul-Haq sworn in as the elected President.
	Prime Minister appointed.
	A promise to withdraw martial law but no definite date was given for its withdrawal.
April 1985	Provincial (civilian) chief Ministers installed.
August 1985	Prime Minister Junejo declared that martial law would be withdrawn by the end of 1985.

Elections and Accountability

The political agitation against the Bhutto government convinced the military commanders that the People's Party had lost popular support and that Bhutto would be politically dead once he was ousted. This appraisal was reinforced by the quick capitulation of the ruling People's Party to the coup. The military leaders did not visualize any problem in holding national elections in 90 days and transferring power to the PNA which was, in their opinion, sure to win the forthcoming polls. These calculations were greatly upset by the massive turn-out of people on the eve of Bhutto's first visit to Lahore, Multan and Karachi after being released from the "protective custody" of the military regime. This demonstrated that despite the over lose his popular base. This encouraged Bhutto to contest aggressively the October 1977 polls because he did not want his support to fizzle out by adopting a low profile. He began to defy martial law authorities and threatened them with retribution if he was elected.

This placed the ruling generals on the horns of a dilemma. If they ignored Bhutto's clear violations of martial law regulations, the credibility of the regime would be compromised and Bhutto would be able to sway more votes to his side. On the other hand if they reacted sharply, there was bound to be a direct confrontation between the military and the People's Party. The military commanders decided to adopt the latter course. The need for such policy was also underlined by the strong "fears" on the part of the ruling generals and the PNA that the People's Party would perform

better than its right-wing political adversaries in the October polls.¹³ Interestingly enough it was during these days that the military leaders became aware of Bhutto's "misdeeds" and his "machievellian" style of rule. They, therefore, decided to postpone national elections and instituted inquiries into the cases of irregularities by his government. They also reopened a murder case involving Bhutto as a co-conspirator. Later the process of accountability was extended to cover other senior officials of the Bhutto government and the members of his ruling party.

All the former members of national and provincial assemblies since 1970 were ordered to submit a list of their property as of December 1970 and July 1977, indicating any change in their assets in the period between these dates. Several tribunals (known as Disqualification tribunals) were set up to inquire into the charges of misconduct, corruption, and misuse of office against the members of national and provincial assemblies, especially the cabinet members or those holding other public/representatives office during the Bhutto era. A Disqualification Tribunal comprised a judge of High Court and a military officer not below the rank of Brigadier or equivalent. Later the Disqualification Tribunals were reconstituted. These now consisted of a Brigadier and a Sessions Judge or a magistrate (Class I). These tribunals reviewed the cases of a large number of politicians and approximately 180 persons were disqualified to hold any public office for seven years. The PNA supported the process of accountability and argued that this would facilitate free and fair elections. The martial law authorities also set up boards to review the petitions filed by the civil servants compulsorily retired by the Bhutto government. Some of the petitions were accepted.

The martial law authorities issued several White Papers spread over 2,771 pages describing how Bhutto rigged the March 1977 elections, how he and his family undermined the governmental institutions and procedures and obtained or extended to others illegal favours.¹⁴ General Zia-ul-Haq characterized Bhutto as the "worst cheat and cold-blooded murderer" who "had been running a Gestapo style police state in which kidnapping and

¹³ See, William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 51 No. 3, Fall 1978, pp. 406-426. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1980, pp. 174-75.

¹⁴ The following White Papers were issued by the military government in 1978-79 before the execution of Bhutto: (1) *White Paper on the conduct of General Elections in March 1977*, July 1978, 1449pp; (2) *Summary of White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections in March 1977*, July 1978, 118pp; (3) *White Paper on Misuse of Media*, August 1978, 363pp; (4) *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Four volumes: Vol. I: *Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, His family and Associates*, January 1979, 179pp; Vol. II: *Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions*, January 1979, 353pp; Vol. III: *Misuse of the Instrument of state power*, January 1979, 228pp; Vol. IV: *The Economy*, January 1979, 81pp.

political murders had become a routine affair." He very confidently said that Bhutto and his colleagues would not be able to escape punishment and that the martial law powers would be used against such "criminals".¹⁵

Bhutto's trial on murder charges which lasted from October 1977 to March 1979 turned out to be a long-drawn legal battle. The Lahore High Court awarded him death sentence in March 1978. An appeal was filed against this judgement before the Supreme Court which gave a split verdict (4 to 3 judges) upholding the High Court Judgement.¹⁶ A review petition was made to the Supreme Court which was turned down. Bhutto's execution in pursuance of the Supreme Court judgement removed him physically from the political scene but his name, despite his reputation for corruption and despotism, would be a formidable political force and an asset for the PPP.

It was shortly before the Supreme Court finally condemned Bhutto to death that a new date (November 17, 1979) for national elections was announced. As the political parties were getting ready for these elections, the military government started changing the ground rules for the polls which caused confusion. The major electoral changes included: (i) the system of separate electorate for the Muslims and non-Muslims; (ii) Proportional representation instead of the simple majority-single member constituency system; (iii) an amendment in the Political Parties Act, 1962, which called for (a) registration of political parties with the Election Commission as a pre-requisite for taking part in national elections, (b) submission of accounts of the party to the Election Commission for scrutiny, (c) publication of a formal manifesto, (d) holding of annual elections for the office bearers of the party, (e) submission of a list of office bearers and ordinary members to the Election Commission. The Election Commission could refuse registration to any political party unable to fulfil any of these conditions. The political parties not registered with, or refused registration by, the Election Commission could not take part in the national elections.

These changes were opposed by most political parties. Some of them including the PPP, the NDP and the PDP, refused to file registration papers. Amidst these controversies the military government decided to hold local bodies elections on nonparty basis prior to national elections. Most political parties opposed this move on the grounds that these were being held on nonparty basis and that the military rulers had suddenly decided to hold these elections ahead of the already announced national elections. Despite the negative response of the political parties the military authorities

¹⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq's interview: *Urdu Digest* (Lahore) September 1977, p.28.

¹⁶ The judgement was written by Chief Justice Anwarul Haq with three judges concurring. They were: Mohammad Akram, Karam Elahi Chauhan, Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah. The dissenting judges were: Daroo Patel, Ghulam Safdar Shah and Mohammad Haleem.

went ahead with the local bodies polls. Much to their dismay a large number of people having ties with the political parties, especially with the PPP, got elected. The success of the pro-People's Party candidates alarmed the military government which saw this as an indication of how the party might perform in the upcoming national elections. The government therefore postponed the elections for the second time declaring that the time was not ripe for any kind of national elections.

During the period from November 1979 to August 1983 the promise to hold elections was often repeated. The military advanced several reasons to delay elections and transfer of power. At times the military rulers called upon the people to work for the 'welfare and good' of everybody rather than asking for national elections.¹⁷ Sometimes the need for establishment of an 'Islamic system of democracy' was cited as a higher priority.¹⁸ At other times they emphasized that elections could not be held without a guarantee of 'positive' results¹⁹ an indirect way of suggesting that no elections could take place unless they were sure about the success of the political groups sharing their political perspective on national and international affairs. At still other times regional strategic environment was referred to as the major reason for not holding early elections.²⁰ Pakistan's Interior Minister, Mahmood A. Haroon, was quite forthright when he declared that there could be no national elections as long as the Soviet troops stayed in Afghanistan.²¹ On top of all this, General Zia-ul-Haq claimed that if the majority made a wrong decision it could be turned down because, in his opinion, Islam did not believe in the rule of majority. Only a "correct" decision needed to be honoured even if it was supported by a minority.²²

It was on August 12, 1983, that General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq announced a phased programme of holding elections to the national and provincial assemblies and transferring power to the elected representatives by March 23, 1985. A large number of political leaders favoured early elections and, given the track record of the military regime, were skeptical of the new promise to hold elections. This time the promise was fulfilled and general elections were held in the last week of February 1985. For details see the section on civilianization of the military regime.

¹⁷ *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, 12 April 1980.

¹⁸ *Dawn*, 14 April 1982.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13 May 1982; *Viewpoint* (Lahore), 21 October 1982.

²⁰ General Zia-ul-Haq's interview: *The Washington Post*, 9 December 1982.

²¹ *Daily Jang* (Lahore), 25 February 1982. See another statement by the Interior Minister: *The Muslim*, 11 April 1982.

²² *Viewpoint*, 30 September 1979 and 23 September 1982.

Islamization

The Islamization of the polity emerged as the cardinal concern of the martial law regime. Some attribute this to the disposition of General Zia-ul-Haq who had the reputation of being a religious person even before coming to power. The desire to restructure the polity on Islamic lines did not appear prominently in the early days of the martial law regime. In his first speech after coming to power General Zia-ul-Haq took note of the resurgence of Islamic sentiments in the anti-Bhutto movement and declared that he considered the introduction of Islamic system "as an essential prerequisite" for Pakistan. However, the theme of Islamization was not pursued seriously by the military regime. While presenting the government point-of-view before the Supreme Court in the well-known Begum Bhutto case, the defence counsel did not highlight Islamization as the main objective of the martial law regime. The Supreme Court, while legitimizing the imposition of martial law under the "doctrine of necessity", conditioned it with "the earliest possible holding of free and fair elections for the purpose of the restoration of democratic institutions under the [1973] Constitution"²³ rather than Islamization.

As the commitment of the martial law regime to hold early election wavered and as confrontation started developing between the martial law authorities and the People's Party, the need for the Islamization of politics and society began to figure prominently in their speeches and statements. Once the elections were pushed to the background and the accountability of the ousted regime was initiated, Islamization was employed as *raison d'être* of the continuation of martial law. The Islamization process had three aspects: First, efforts to mobilize and forge a cooperative relationship with those who shared the regime's perspective on Islamization. Second, reliance on the conservative Islamic tenets to introduce (or make proposals for) changes in the politico-legal system and especially the 1973 Constitution. Third, introduction of several measures, including new laws, administrative actions and guidelines for imbuing Islamic spirit in the society.

The following major steps were undertaken to restructure the polity on Islamic lines.

- The Council of Islamic Ideology was reconstituted and expanded so as to accommodate more religious scholars.

- Shariat benches were created in all the high courts in 1979. One year later a Federal Shariat Court was set up in place of Shariat benches in

²³ Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs. the Chief Army Staff, etc. *PLD*, 1977, Supreme court, pp. 657-763 (p.723); See also Aitzaz Ahsan, "July five 1982 The Five years of Martial Law," *The Muslim*, 5 July 1982.

each high court. The Shariat court has the power to strike down any law or administrative action as un-Islamic if it violated the fundamental laws of Islam. An appeal against the judgement of this court can be made to the Shariat bench of the Supreme Court. The Federal Shariat Court has ulema and non-ulema jurists as judges.

- Islamic punishments (i.e. amputation of hands, stoning to death and lashing) were prescribed for theft, adultery and drinking. It may be noted that no punishment of amputation of hands and stoning to death has so far been carried out in Pakistan.

- An interest free banking system described as Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) System was initiated in January 1981. By mid - 1985 all Pakistani banks switched over to this system.

- A compulsory tax—Zakat—(2.5 per cent annual deduction from saving accounts and other investments) was imposed. The military government used these funds for helping the poor.

- Another annual tax—Ushar—(One tenth of farm produce) was introduced in 1983.

- The revised education policy (1979) laid special emphasis on the projection of Islamic teaching and ideology of Pakistan in the syllabi of various classes. Liberal funds were made available for religious education.

- The appointment of "Nazimeen-i-Salaat" (Organizers of prayers) in August 1984 to encourage the people to offer prayers regularly. They were required to submit reports to the government on the religious conduct of people in their areas.

- The government offices were ordered to make specific provision for prayers in their schedule.

- The mass media was directed to reflect orthodox Islamic values; film censorship was stricter than ever; various cultural activities considered not in conformity with the fundamentals of Islam were discouraged.

- A more systematic segregation of the Ahmadis who had been pronounced non-Muslims by an amendment in the Constitution during the Bhutto era.

- A promise to set up *Qazi* courts (religious courts) in every locality.

The Islamization process had its problems. A number of Muslim sects who did not share the establishment's perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their religious sensitivities. The most forceful expression of resentment was made by the Shia sect. Under the leadership of their religious leaders they staged a massive protest in Islamabad in the Summer of 1980 against the compulsory deduction of 'Zakat' by the

government. The government, fearing this protest might trigger agitation in other cities, with political parties jumping on the bandwagon, gave in and made 'Zakat' voluntary for the Shia sect. Tension between the Shias and one of the most conservative Sunni sect — the Wahabis — has surfaced quite often. Similarly the Wahabi-Brelvi differences have become more pronounced.

Several religious and non-religious groups argue that the major focus of Islamization has been regulative, punitive and extractive. Very little effort has been made to implement other aspects of Islam - i.e. social and economic egalitarianism and accountability of those exercising political authority. These groups believe that the current strategy of Islamization is not likely to solve major social and political problems and thus will prove counter productive to the goal of Islamization of Pakistani society. The left of centre groups are the strongest critics of the military government's policy of Islamization because this has been used to contain and undermine their political activities.

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

The ruling generals associated with the third martial law regime since 1977 openly declared that they were conservative in their orientations and forged political ties with several groups of the Right. General Zia-ul-Haq's early socialization in a deeply religious home-environment and his preference for the orthodox-fundamentalist interpretation of Islam created a natural sympathy in his heart for the political groups of the Right, especially those religion - oriented parties that shared his perspective on Islam.

The catalyst to the Right-military rulers cooperation was the military regime's decision to initiate the process of accountability against the ousted regime — a deeply cherished goal of the PNA. The military government thought that an understanding with these political groups would extend their political base, facilitate the introduction of fundamentalist Islamic reforms, and encourage these groups to bring forward an alternate viable leadership. The military leaders' alignment with the Right can be divided into two phases:

The First Phase 1978-79:

A number of political parties constituting the PNA responded favourably to General Zia-ul-Haq's overtures towards them and decided to join his cabinet in August 1978, ostensibly to facilitate Islamization of the polity and lead the nation towards general elections. This cooperation which lasted until two weeks after Bhutto's execution in April 1979, proved useful

for the military in dealing with political dissidents and partly civilianized and humanized the military rule, at least to the political Right. But it could not produce an alternative leadership the military could trust and ultimately transfer power. It also failed to eliminate the support-base of the dissident Left, and those political parties on the Right that were not willing to join hands with the military rulers. Several reasons account for this.

First, not all the constituent parties of the PNA were enthusiastic towards active cooperation with the military regime. Tehrik-i-Istiqal, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), and the National Democratic Party (NDP) did not favour close identification with the martial law regime. These political parties withdrew from the PNA which weakened the Alliance. Second, there was a lack of agreement on goals between the military regime and the PNA. The military leaders hoped that the inclusion of representatives of some political parties would expand their political base and facilitate the desired politico-economic changes in the polity. The PNA expected to "share the credit" for the Islamization of the polity and make use of state patronage to strengthen their political influence. But the PNA ministers soon found that the ruling Generals and senior civilian bureaucrats often by-passed them on important policy matters. This impaired the civilian ministers' ability to distribute patronage among their workers. The military rulers were also somewhat disappointed by the intra-PNA squabbles and the ministers' desire to work like a political government. Third, there were personality, policy and factional conflicts within the PNA, as well as periodic grumbling about what some of the PNA parties considered the greater tilt of the military towards the Jamaat-i-Islami, and vice versa.

It was after the introduction of the first set of Islamic laws in February 1979, the rescheduling of the election date (to November 1979) in March 1979, and the execution of Bhutto in April 1979, that the PNA decided to loosen its ties with the military. It withdrew its ministers from the cabinet but assured the military commanders of its continued cooperation, albeit outside of the government.²⁴ The military commanders did not ask the PNA ministers to stay on.

The Second Phase 1979 onwards

The second phase of "alignment between the Right and the military crystallized the "like-mindedness" between the military and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Another constituent element of the PNA — the Muslim League (Pagaro Group) — also maintained a favourable disposition towards the military but more significant than this was the burgeoning understanding between the military and the Jamaat-i-Islami. The roots of this cooperative

²⁴ *Daily Jang* (Karachi), 16 April 1979.

relationship can be traced to the first phase when the Jamaat-i-Islami, like the Muslim League (Pagaro Group) was more keen to join the martial law government than other parties in the PNA and made it clear that it would join the government even if the PNA did not.²⁵

After the decision of the military rulers to postpone the national elections scheduled for November 1979, for the second time, some of the Rightist political groups, especially the JUI which had served as the king-pin in the PNA, were alienated from the military. The growing cleavage between a number of the Rightist political parties and the ruling generals made it imperative for the military to cultivate those groups in the Right which were still sympathetic towards them. These included the Jamaat-i-Islami and the highly orthodox *ulema* and their followers.

No doubt, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the ruling Generals did not completely share each other's goals but they realized that a cooperative relationship would be mutually rewarding. The Jamaat-i-Islami derived benefits by enjoying a relative freedom to engage in a low keyed political activity and also extending its influence in the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media and educational institutions. For the military government the threat of political agitation by a political party with a highly disciplined cadre was temporarily eliminated. The Jamaat also helped the military to undercut the efforts by other political groups to launch a political agitation against the military government. The Jamaat's support to the military was quite crucial in the period immediately after Bhutto's execution in April 1979. A few hours before Bhutto's execution the chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Tufail Muhammad, met with General Zia-ul-Haq. It was not known what transpired between them but what the Jamaat chief said to the newspaper correspondents after the meeting was quite revealing. He said that Bhutto's execution would not lead to the deterioration of political situation. If at all that happened, his party would take care of that.²⁶ After Bhutto's execution the Jamaat supporters were clearly visible in several urban centres, though they did not have to go into 'action' because the pro-Bhutto demonstration were sporadic.

The other major group cultivated by the military consisted of the extremely orthodox religious leaders and their followers who supported the government decision to assign the highest priority to Islamization. They favoured the use of the resources of the state including the coercive power, to effect the "total and immediate" Islamization of the society. These religious leaders opposed modern democratic institutions and processes, especially legislature elected on the basis of direct adult franchise. They

²⁵ *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 13 July 1978.

²⁶ *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 4 April 1979.

advocated the establishment of a religious state bordering on theocracy rather than a modern democratic Islamic state. Such a point of view was helpful to the military government to side-track the demand of early elections during 1979-85.

POLITICAL STRATEGY

The military commanders did not abrogate the 1973 Constitution at the time of assumption of power in 1977, although most of its articles were suspended. The President of Pakistan (Fazal Illahi Chaudhury) was allowed to continue as the titular head of state. The military's decision to assume political power was provided with legal legitimacy by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs Chief of Army Staff, etc. case. While extending recognition to martial law under the "doctrine of necessity", the Supreme court conditioned it with the holding of free and fair elections under the 1973 Constitution, though no time limit was fixed for holding elections. The judgement also granted power to the CMLA to amend the Constitution to facilitate the performance of his duties for the achievement of the defined goal, i.e. the holding of free and fair elections.²⁷ President Fazal Illahi Chaudhury resigned his office in September 1978 and General Zia-ul-Haq who was the CMLA, assumed Presidency as well.

When the military rulers decided to expand their goals, several changes were made in the 1973 Constitution to strengthen the position of the martial law authorities. The major target of these changes was the higher judiciary which was slowly stripped of its power of judicial review and writ jurisdiction. In March 1981, a Provisional Constitutional Order replaced what was left of the 1973 constitution and completely subordinated the judiciary to the martial law authorities. Fifteen judges of the higher courts (four judges of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice; seven Judges from the Punjab High Court; two from the Sind High Court; and two including the Chief Justice from the Baluchistan High Court) either

²⁷ Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs Chief of Army Staff, etc. PLD, 1977 Supreme Court, pp. 657-763. (See Appendix J).

There is a difference of opinion amongst the jurists as to the power of amendments in the constitution derived from this judgement by the CMLA. General Zia-ul-Haq and the pro-government circles maintain that the CMLA has unconditional powers to make amendments in the 1973 Constitution. A large number of legal experts do not accept this interpretation. See Pervez Hassan, "Legitimising Martial Law: Some Legal Perspectives," *The Muslim*, 25 September 1983; Warris Meer, "Pakistan Kay Aaeen Masael per Aik Nazar", (Urdu) (A Look at Pakistan's Constitutional Problems), *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, 19 January 1985; Irfan Sibghatullah, "Jurists in the Dock," *The Herald* (Karachi), February 1985, pp. 71-73. *The Muslim*, 9 January 1985

voluntarily refused or were disallowed by the martial law authorities to take oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order. Consequently they lost their jobs.²⁸

The Zia regime imposed restrictions on political activities and talked of "depoliticizing" the society. But the policies it adopted contributed to greater political controversies and polarization. The major step that eluded their goal of depoliticization was their decision to identify the regime with the political Right and tamper with the fundamental features of the 1973 Constitution. This compromised the political autonomy of the ruling Generals and made their credentials as "impartial brokers" unacceptable to those who suffered because of their orientations and policies.

The military regime faced political difficulties periodically, although none could be described as a formidable challenge. The most vocal critics have been lawyers, journalists and the political parties constituting the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The lawyers have been intermittently holding conventions, organizing protest marches, boycotting courts and offering themselves for arrest since the summer of 1980 in order to press for their demands for the withdrawal of martial law, restoration of civil and political rights and restoration of independence of the judiciary.

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a left oriented political alliance dominated by the PPP, was set up in February 1981. It included the following political parties; (i) the PPP (ii) the NDP (National Democratic Party) (iii) the PDP (Pakistan Democratic Party) (iv) Tehrik-i-Istiqal, (v) Pakistan Muslim League (Khariuddin-Qasim Group), (vi) The QMA (Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi), (vii) the PMKP (Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party), (viii) The JUI; subsequently the JUI split on the question of participation in the MRD, (ix) The PNP (Pakistan National Party), (x) The Awami Tehrik (Formerly Sind Awami Tehrik), (xi) The NAP (Pakhtoonkhwah). The first joint statement of the MRD issued in February 1981 demanded the withdrawal of martial law and that "free, fair and impartial elections" to the National and Provincial Assemblies should be held under the 1973 Constitution with the objective of transferring power to the elected representatives.

²⁸ They were: Supreme Court: Anwarul Haq (C.J.), Durab Patel, Fakhuruddin G. Ibrahim, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain. Punjab High Court: Zaki-ud-Din Pal, K.M. Samdani, Aftab Farukh, Ameer Raza Khan, Khwaja Habibullah, Khalilur Rehman, Khurshid; Sind High Court: G. M. Shah, Abdul Hafeez Mamin; Baluchistan High Court: Khuda Buksh Marri (C.J.), M.A. Rasheed.

In September 1977, Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Yaqub Ali Khan) was removed from office. In March 1985, the Acting Chief Justice of Baluchistan High Court (Abdul Qadeer Chaudhury) was demoted and transferred to Sind High Court. The Chief Justice of Federal Shariat Court (Aftab Hussain) was removed from office in October 1984.

The MRD launched two major political movements. The first countrywide agitation was launched in February 1981. For a while the Zia regime was in difficulties but the hijacking of Pakistan International Airlines aircraft to Kabul in March 1981 by an underground group called Al-Zulfikar undermined the movement. Although the MRD as well as the PPP leadership condemned hijacking, the fact that the eldest son of the former Premier Bhutto led the hijacking operation, partially tainted the MRD, and especially the PPP, with the blame of the hijacking.

It was not until August 1983 that the MRD launched another movement. The public response to the MRD call for civil disobedience was low keyed in the Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan. However, in the interior of Sind it sparked a militant movement that brought to surface the simmering discontent and alienation that permeated the Sindhi-speaking populace of Sind. It produced intense violence and manifested strong ethnic and regional sentiments.

The military regime did not pursue the strategy of total suppression of dissent. It showed tolerance towards low-keyed or sporadic criticism. However, when a person or a group engaged in open and active politics against the regime, it adopted several strategies to contain such activities. These strategies included: First, the discouragement of, and restrictions on, the press (including censorship) to publish the views of the dissenting politicians. The private printers ran the risk of heavy financial and legal penalties for printing their views in the form of booklets or pamphlets. Second, the imposition of restrictions on their inter-provincial or inter-city travel so that they are not able to establish a rapport with each other. Third, the issuance of warnings to politicians to desist from making statements. The political activists were denied permission to hold closed-door meetings, not to speak of public meetings or mass-contact tours. Fourth, periodic house arrest of prominent leaders and detention of political activists at the middle and the lowest levels under martial law regulations whereby no writ could be filed in the regular courts for their release.

Two other factors compromised the ability of the politicians to launch a political movement against the military government. First, a fairly reasonable pace of economic development was maintained. More important than this has been the inflow of funds in the form of remittances by Pakistanis working abroad, mainly in the Gulf and the Middle Eastern states. The Gulf bonanza dampened the agitational zeal of the poor and provided a useful but temporary safety valve for the military regime. To most, an opportunity of job in the Gulf states holds better prospects for the future than a change of government in Pakistan. As long as this remains a viable option and the consequent prosperity and consumerism stays afloat, the politicians will face an uphill task to launch a sustained political agitation.

Second, the direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, and the influx of Afghan refugees has enabled the military government to deflect political pressures in the domestic political system. Any attempt to launch political agitation was discouraged on the ground that it could undermine the nation's ability to deal effectively with the political and strategic fall-out of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, U.S. economic assistance and military sales, and the widespread support to Pakistan by the Third World, especially the Muslim states, in the context of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan contributed to boosting the martial law regime's position in the domestic political system.

The military government was also successful in mobilizing a number of orthodox *ulema* and their followers as a counterweight to the Left of the centre groups endeavouring to launch a political movement. A number of Right-wing political parties which suffered under the PPP rule (1972-77) and were afraid of the PPPs performance in an electoral contest, obliged the military regime by opposing the MRD protest movement.

The key to the invulnerability of General Zia-ul-Haq during the eight years of martial law was the support he enjoyed from the senior commanders. General Zia-ul-Haq's inoffensive disposition with streaks of humility gave other senior commanders no reason for complaints. In order to remove bottlenecks in career advancement of the officers, a number of senior commanders were retired in 1980 and 1984 after the completion of their normal or extended tenures. All the senior Generals commanding troops in April 1985 were appointed to the present rank after the imposition of martial law in 1977; General Zia-ul-Haq being the only exception who had been holding the present rank and post since 1976.

There were no visible signs of disaffection in the Army. An isolated attempt to subvert the discipline of a section of the Army-men was uncovered in March 1980 before it could be launched. A retired Major General and his "co-conspirators" were arrested. They were subsequently tried and convicted. The Army officers and men in general were unaffected by this episode.

A number of people were arrested in January 1984, on the charges of smuggling a large quantity of arms, ammunition and other lethal equipment from a "neighbouring" country as a part of a plot to overthrow the military government. One year later, 19 persons were put on trial before two military courts which held their sessions in camera at the Attock Fort. The accused included one lawyer from Lahore, two Police Officers, two squadron leaders of the PAF, and fourteen Army Officers (i.e. Colonel: 1, Major: 12, Captain: 1). In July 1985, four military officers were awarded life sentence and three were given ten years imprisonment each. The rest were acquitted. Given the fact that the relatively junior officers were

involved, one could not be sure about the seriousness of the plot.

NEW HORIZONS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE POLITY

Traditionally the role of the military has been confined to defence against external aggression and assistance to civil administration in the performance of its duties. However, the three military take-over (1958, 1969, 1977) and especially the experience of eight years of martial law since 1977 — the longest military rule in Pakistan — have led the military commanders as well as a number of civilian intellectuals to review the classical distinction between the civil and military domains. They are of the view that the military's role in domestic politics which it has been intermittently performing since the late fifties needs to be acknowledged and accommodated in the politico-legal arrangements.

The senior commanders argue for the expansion of the role of the military by suggesting that the military must safeguard the nation's ideological frontiers. General Zia-ul-Haq said that "Pakistan's armed forces were responsible for not only safeguarding the country's territorial integrity but also its ideological basis."²⁹ Elaborating his statement he remarked that the "preservation of that Ideology (Pakistan Ideology) and the Islamic character of the country was ... as important as the security of the country's geographical boundaries."³⁰ Similar views were expressed by General Rahimuddin, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General K.M. Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, and several other senior officers. This means that the Military commanders wish to reserve the right to step into domestic politics on the pretext of protecting Islam and Ideology of Pakistan.

Not long after assuming power, General Zia-ul-Haq put forward a proposal for a constitutional guarantee that would enable the military to share decision making power with the political elite at the national level. Such a provision, General Zia-ul-Haq argued "was essential in an ideological state like Pakistan."³¹ He also talked about a constitutional provision allowing the military commanders to take over the reins of government at the time of national emergency.³² These proposals met with more opposition than other political and constitutional proposals put forward by the ruling Generals. With the exception of the government

²⁹ *The Muslim*, 14 March 1984. See also *Ibid.*, 21 May 1984, 16 September 1983, 27 May 1982.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ See, excerpts from General Zia-ul-Haq's statements on the role of the military in the future political system: *Defence Journal*, (Karachi), Vol. VIII No. 12, December 1982, pp 35-38; See also *Dawn*, 7 May 1982, *Daily Jang* (Lahore), 23 April 1982; *The Pakistan Times*, 15 September 1977.

³² *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 22 June 1979, *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, 9 Dec. 1982.

circles and official newspapers, these proposals were either not welcomed or were totally opposed by the political circles.

Despite strong opposition, General Zia-ul-Haq decided to set up a National Security Council (NSC) with powers to "make recommendations relating to the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 232 of the Constitution, security of Pakistan and any other matter of national importance that may be referred to it by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister."³³ The NSC consists of eleven members. They are: the President, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Senate, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, the Navy and Air Force, and the provincial Chief Ministers (four in number). The grant of open-ended powers to the NSC provides a direct role to the military's top brass in the constitutional and political set-up. Given the tradition of weak political institutions and military intervention in politics, such a body which is answerable to none overshadows the elected and the participatory political forces. This further reinforces the powers of the all-powerful President. With the exception of the Chairman of the Senate, all civilian members of the NSC are the appointees of the President and they can be removed by him in his discretion. The civilian representation is therefore weak, and the President (in the present case General Zia-ul-Haq) and the top brass of the military will dominate the NSC. They can virtually veto any decision of the political leaders, if they so desire. They can also emerge as the key decision-makers in the polity by imposing a state of emergency. (The NSC was abolished later on see the next section)

The martial law administration appointed military (mostly Army) officers to top civil jobs. They were assigned to the civil administration and to semi-government and autonomous corporations. Many senior officers (mostly retired) held top or near top assignment in the federal or provincial government or autonomous corporations. They were also nominated to the elite groups of the Central Superior Services. The most common groups selected for their induction included the District Management Group (formerly the CSP), the Foreign Service of Pakistan. And the Police Service of Pakistan e.g., in mid-1982, 18 out of 42 Pakistani ambassadors posted abroad came from the military (fifteen of them belonged to the Army). During 1980-85, 96 Army officers were inducted into the selected cadres of Central Superior Services on permanent basis, while 115 were re-employed on contracts. This caused bitterness among their civilian counterparts who joined these services after a tough competitive examination. According to the information supplied to the Punjab Assembly by the provincial Minister for Revenue (Chaudhuri Mohammad

³³ *Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order 1985* (President's order 14 of 1985), Article 152-A (1) and (2).

Iqbal), 6,150 military officers and men were allotted 4,48,024 acres of agricultural land in the Punjab during 1950-85. Agricultural land was also allotted to military officers and other ranks in other provinces.

Special attention is being given to the improvement of the conditions of the ex-servicemen. A ten percent quota of civil jobs was reserved for them. Three welfare cum industrial organizations for the welfare of the ex-servicemen—the Fauji Foundation (Army), the Baharia Foundation (Navy) and the Shaheen Foundation (Air Force)—expanded their operations during the period of the Zia regime, strengthened the present programmes, launched several new ones and created new job opportunities for ex-servicemen. A number of other material benefits were provided to the serving and retired military men i.e. assignments in the Gulf states, and the provision of pieces of land for construction of houses or shops. A number of officers who had been given residential plots at cheap rates sold them to civilians at exorbitant prices.

The budgetary allocation for the military maintained a steady rise. The rate of increase during the Zia years was higher than that of the Bhutto period. The following table gives defence expenditure for 1977-88:

TABLE XXX
Defence Expenditure 1977-1988

Year	Defence Expenditure (in Million Rs.)	Total Expenditure	D.E. as a percentage of federal expenditure
1977-78	9,675	25,452	38.00
1978-79	10,168	29,861	34.00
1979-80	12,665	37,948	33.34
1980-81	15,300	46,349	33.00
1981-82	18,630	51,166	36.41
1982-83	24,566	59,183	41.5
1983-84	26,798	68,949	38.86
1984-85	31,866	90,074	35.37
1985-86	35,606	100,043	35.59
1986-87	41,335	111,856	36.95
1987-88	47,015	136,151	34.53

CIVILIANIZATION OF MILITARY RULE

One major dilemma faced by the military regime stemmed from the fact that General Zia-ul-Haq, like a large number of military rulers of Asia and Africa, expanded the goals of the coup. He took over as a caretaker ruler but subsequently decided to introduce wide-ranging changes in the politics and society of Pakistan. He also decided to change from *khaki* to *mufti*. This underlined the need of civilianization of military rule.

General Zia-ul-Haq's views on the future shape of Pakistani polity were influenced by his fundamentalist-Islamic disposition, military background which valued discipline and efficient managerial ability, and the experience of military rule since 1977 which kept the politicians in check. He often indicated his preference for the total exclusion of political parties from the political process—a view opposed by the political leaders for obvious reasons. He also favoured presidential system, a relatively weak legislature, and a carefully tailored electoral process.

In order to bring about changes in the 1973 Constitution to make it reflective of his political ideology, General Zia-ul-Haq sought opinion from three committees, in addition to the advice from the bureaucracy and his own private consultations.

The Council of Islamic Ideology submitted its first report in April 1982 which recommended a federal system, universal adult franchise and separate electorate. It did not favour elections on nonparty basis.³⁴ Since the report had not endorsed the official standpoint on party system and the electoral process, it was returned by the President for reconsideration. The revised report was presented to the President in June 1983 which accommodated some of the official views i.e. restrictions on political parties.³⁵

The Special Committee of the Federal Council recommended that the 1973 Constitution "should be adopted with the minimum essential changes in its provision." It also supported the right of people to form political parties.³⁶ As these views ran counter to the views of the ruling Generals and the members of the Sub-committee refused to reconsider their recommendations, the report was not given serious consideration by the government.

General Zia-ul-Haq appointed a commission headed by Maulana Zafar

³⁴ The summary of the first report was leaked to a section of press: *The Muslim*, 27 July 1982.
³⁵ Council of Islamic Ideology, *Constitutional Recommendations for the Islamic System of Government*, Islamabad, 1983.
³⁶ Report of the Special Committee of the Federal Council on the Form and System of Government in Pakistan from Islamic Point of View, Islamabad; Federal Council Secretariat, 1983.

Ahmad Ansari to recommend an appropriate form of government. The report (known as the Ansari Report), submitted in August 1983, put forward very conservative views on the future shape of the polity.³⁷ These views were close to the official standpoint on political parties, electorate, powers and position of the head of state and legislature. General Zia-ul-Haq publicly applauded the report, although its recommendations were not fully accommodated in the electoral laws and constitutional amendments.

The process of civilianization of military rule began with the announcement of August 12, 1983 plan by General Zia-ul-Haq which envisaged the holding of elections and transfer of power to the elected representatives by March 23, 1985. He however declined to make any commitment about the schedule and mode of elections as well as the amendments he wanted to introduce in the suspended 1973 Constitution. These ambiguities were purposely maintained because the General who disclaimed any political ambition when he assumed power in 1977, had started toying with the idea of staying in power after the establishment of representative institutions. Some of his cabinet colleagues, the right-wing supporters and especially the conservative religious groups argued that Zia-ul-Haq should continue in office to complete what they described as the mission of Islamization of Pakistani polity.

General Zia-ul-Haq unfolded his plans in phases. In August 1984, he declared that he might like to stay on as President. Taking cue from his statement, several local bodies (elected in 1983 in non-party polls) passed resolutions urging him to continue as president after the restoration of constitutional system. This encouraged General Zia-ul-Haq to adopt a more definite posture and he declared in October 1984 that power would be transferred to the elected representatives only if they gave him an undertaking that the "present process of Islamization would continue."³⁸ Less than one week later he removed all doubts about his political plans by declaring that he would "share" power rather than "transfer" it to the representatives elected in the upcoming elections.³⁹

General Zia-ul-Haq's decision to continue as president after the restoration of participatory process underlined the need of seeking a popular mandate to "legitimize" his transition from military ruler to civilian ruler. A referendum was hurriedly organized in December 1984 which did not directly seek a vote of confidence for the General. Rather, it sought popular approval for the process of Islamization of the polity and the

³⁷ Ansari Commission Report on Form of Government. Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1983.

³⁸ Dawn, October 26, 1984.

³⁹ The Muslim, November 1, 1984.

introduction of representative institutions in Pakistan. A positive vote on this question was deemed to have mandated General Zia-ul-Haq to stay as president for the next five years: 1985-90. The referendum-proposition read:

Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, to bring in laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of Ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.

The official results showed a high turn-out (62.15 per cent) in the referendum with 97.71 per cent. votes in favour of the proposition. The independent sources disputed these figures and described the referendum exercise as dubious.

Once General Zia-ul-Haq secured his political future, the schedule for national elections was announced. February 25 and 28, 1985 were fixed for the polls to the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies respectively. This was for the first time that direct national elections were held on non-party basis. The principle of separate electorate was also applied whereby the Muslims and non-Muslims voted separately for the candidates of their religious faith.

There was a proliferation of candidates in the general election (1985) because the political parties were excluded from the electoral process. A large number of candidates were political non-entities who wanted to try out their luck in a partyless elections. About one quarter belonged to the "nouveau riche" category who made fortune during the last five to ten years. These included the persons engaged in manpower export to the Gulf states, the leading feudal transporters, contractors and the middle ranking traders. The leading feudal families, tribal chiefs and religious leaders (i.e. pirs and sajjadanasheds) who could not afford to stay out of power game due to their stakes in local politics fielded candidates. The Jamaat-i-Islami nominated candidates who contested polls in their individual capacity. The Pagara Muslim League supported a number of candidates by declaring them "like-minded" persons. The MRD, the JUP and the number other political parties boycotted the polls but several of their members defied the party directive and participated in the elections in their individual capacity.

The election campaign was closely regulated by the military government. The candidates were not allowed to use loudspeakers, hold public meetings or take out processions. The candidates generally shied away from talking about domestic political problems or foreign policy.

They focused on local problems and issues. Parochial and ethnic considerations, local alliances and local feuds figured prominently in election-campaigning.

Table XXXI shows the number of candidate for National and Provincial Assemblies:

TABLE XXXI

The 1985 General Elections : Candidates

	General Seats		Candidates	
	Muslims	Non-Muslims	Muslims	Non-Muslims
National Assembly	207	10	1,103	61
Provincial Assemblies				
Punjab	240	8	1,745	78
Sind	100	9	881	85
NWFP	80	3	590	5
Baluchistan	40	3	341	28

Note: The seats reserved for women have not been included in the table.

The MRD had appealed for the boycott of the polls but the following table shows that their appeal did not keep the voters away from polling stations.⁴⁰

TABLE XXXII

The 1985 General Elections : Voters' Turn-out

	Percentage of Votes polled
National Assembly	52.93
Provincial Assemblies	
Punjab	61.80
Sind	49.82
NWFP	47.61
Baluchistan	46.62

This was followed by the elections to the upper house of the

⁴⁰ See, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "The 1985 General Elections." *The Muslim*, January 7 and 8, 1986.

parliament, i.e. the Senate, whose members were elected by the provincial assemblies and the National Assembly. The exclusion of political parties and restrictions on political mobilisation enabled the feudal and tribal elite to emerge triumphant in the polls. The well-known landed families of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and the tribal chiefs of Baluchistan tightened their hold over the elected bodies. The commercial elite and the affluent candidates also performed well in the polls.

On 2 March 1985, Zia-ul-Haq issued the *Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO)* which amended or substituted 57 articles, added 6 articles and deleted 2 articles of the original 1973 Constitution. Chapter 3-A of part VII about the Federal Shariat Court was first inserted in the Constitution in 1979. It was amended in 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1984. This was retained in the RCO. Two schedules (2nd and 7th) were added and two (3rd and 5th) were amended. The parliamentary system of government was retained. However, the President was assigned so many over-riding powers that the original character of the 1973 Constitution was diluted. The all-powerful President was given wide discretionary powers which made it impossible for the Prime Minister to emerge as an autonomous power centre. The President appointed and removed the Prime Minister (The provision regarding the appointment of the Prime Minister was later amended, see below). The Services Chiefs, provincial Governors, Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme court, High Courts, Federal Shariat Court and a number of other top officials were also appointed by him. The President was to act on the advice of the cabinet on matters not falling under his discretionary powers. Even in these matters, he could ask the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, to reconsider the advice. He could dismiss the federal government and dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion (article 58-2-b) if he was of the firm view that the government could not be run in accordance with the constitution and an appeal to the electorate was necessary. The RCO inserted article 270-A in the Constitution for validation of all martial law regulations, laws and orders and all other actions including the judgements of the military courts. The Presidential referendum (1994) was provided constitutional cover and Zia-ul-Haq was allowed to retain the post of the Chief of Army Staff after the withdrawal of martial law.

The joint session of the Parliament was held on 23 March 1985 and Zia-ul-Haq took the oath as the elected President for a term of five years (1985-90). He appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo, a feudal from Sind who had been relatively inactive in politics since the late sixties, as Prime Minister, who later obtained a unanimous vote of confidence from the National Assembly. The provincial Chief Ministers (civilian) and their cabinets were appointed by the respective military governors in

consultation with the President on early April. However, martial law was not lifted.

Though Zia-ul-Haq civilianized his rule in a careful manner and coopted a docile political leadership, the differences in the temperament and style of governance of Zia-ul-Haq and Junejo built strains in their interaction. Zia-ul-Haq wanted to demonstrate that he had rehabilitated an elected and civilian order but he was so used to exercising power without any constitutional or judicial restraints that he often felt uncomfortable when he had to yield some powers to the coopted civilians leaders. What haunted him was the fear that the "protégé" Prime Minister might not behave that way all the time. Junejo also faced a dilemma: the overall cover of martial law was a source of strength because a number of political parties, especially the PPP, questioned the legitimacy of the civilianized political order. However, if the civilian leaders used the protective cover of martial law for too long, their credibility was bound to suffer.

The first strain between Zia-ul-Haq and his civilian government emerged when the Prime Minister, the two houses of the parliament and the provincial assemblies of the Punjab, Sind, and NWFP demanded the withdrawal of martial law. Zia-ul-Haq reluctantly conceded the demand but sought the approval of two major enactments as a pre-condition. The first enactment was the 8th amendment to the constitution which endorsed the RCO with some modifications. Though the primacy of the President and the constitutional indemnity to the martial law regime was retained, some provisions of the RCO were amended. The National Security Council (see p. 243) was done away with and the National Assembly was allowed to elect the Prime Minister from March 1990 onwards (as against nomination by the President stipulated in the RCO). Similar powers were given to the provincial assemblies for electing chief Ministers from March 1988 onwards and that the President would appoint provincial Governors in consultation with the Prime Minister.

The second legislative measure was the Political Parties (Amendment) Act which revised and expanded the Political Parties Act, 1962, in order to regulate the formation, registration and working of political parties. The detailed rules under this enactment were announced in January 1986. The procedures laid down by the martial law government in 1979 for the registration of political parties (see p. 231) were already validated through the 8th amendment.

The federal government announced plans in August 1985 to set up a Federal Reserve Force with the initial strength of 10,000 personnel for effectively coping with the law and order situation in the post-martial law period. The plan was to equip the new force with non-lethal weapons, i.e.,

water cannons, rubber bullets, and special training for riot control. The proposal evoked opposition from the political circles who viewed this as the resurrection of the FSF of the Bhutto era. The provincial governments expressed strong reservations on placing a new security force at the disposal of the federal government. Later, the proposal was dropped and the provincial governments were given funds with a choice either to set up such a force or to strengthen the existing police force by new recruitment, better training, and modern equipment.

These measures—8th Amendment and a blanket indemnity, permission to Zia-ul-Haq to hold on to the position of Army Chief, sufficient regulatory powers over political parties, and the strengthening of the regulatory apparatus of the state—gave Zia-ul-Haq enough confidence to withdraw martial law on 30 December 1985 and the amended 1973 Constitution was fully restored.

Zia-ul-Haq and Junejo diverged on political management more frequently in the post-martial law period. However, as they needed each other to ward off challenges from their political adversaries, they underplayed or denied the differences. Zia-ul-Haq did rescue the Junejo government from difficult situations. In early 1986, the Junejo government encouraged some members of the National Assembly to join the official Muslim League before it was formally registered as laid down in the amended Political Parties Act. This made these members liable to disqualification, and when the Speaker of the National Assembly referred their cases to the Chief Election Commission for adjudication, Zia-ul-Haq amended the law to save these members (supporters of Junejo) from being disqualified. The government reciprocated by passing a vote of no-confidence against the Speaker, Syed Fakhr Imam, who had admitted a privilege motion against Zia-ul-Haq for assailing the National Assembly in a statement. Junejo was again in a vulnerable situation as Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in April 1986 and, in August-September, the MRD launched a movement for holding new party-based election. It was Zia-ul-Haq's support and the use of the regular troops in Sind to contain the agitation that salvaged the situation for Junejo. Zia-ul-Haq periodically mounted pressure on the government either by publicly criticizing its performance or by encouraging the orthodox Islamic groups to dispute the legitimacy of the democratic and electoral processes.

Junejo began to distance himself from Zia-ul-Haq in 1987 and, by early 1988, they were diverging on important policy issues: the signing of a peace treaty for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Junejo's decision to hold consultations with the political leaders, including Zia-ul-Haq's adversaries on Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, and the planned reduction in the defence expenditure. The growing criticism of the military,

especially the defence expenditure and the perks of the senior officers, inside and outside the parliament in 1986-87 perturbed the military circles who felt that the civilian government was deliberately encouraging anti-military sentiments. On top of all this, was the blowing-up of the Ojhri ammunition dump in Rawalpindi in April 1988 which caused much havoc in the area. Whereas Zia-ul-Haq and the Army wanted to hush up the matter, the political circles demanded punitive action against those Army personnel whose negligence had caused the incident. Zia-ul-Haq felt that if the civilian government took action against some officers his role as the guardian of the interests of the military would be compromised. Furthermore, after removing some senior officers, the government could feel confident to ask him to quit as the Army Chief.

As the personal and institutional insecurity mounted and Junejo asserted his autonomy in decision-making, Zia-ul-Haq decided to make use of his position as the Army Chief to take command of the government. On 29 May 1988, he removed the civilian government in a coup-like manner by invoking Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution and directly assumed all executive authority. He began to work towards coopting another set of leaders on his terms but his death in an air crash in August 1988 cut short his plans.

After Zia-ul-Haq's death, General Mirza Aslam Beg and other senior commanders decided to let the constitutional procedures to take effect and installed Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of the Senate, as acting President, as provided in the constitution. It was this decision of the top brass that facilitated the holding of party-based elections in November and the assumption of power by Benazir Bhutto as the head of coalition government in December.

The military's decision to stay on the sidelines and support the democratic process was a departure from the policies of Zia-ul-Haq who had strongly favoured the institutionalization of an expanded role of the military. This was a tactical withdrawal based on a realistic assessment of the political situation⁴ and did not represent their exit from the political domain or their inability to play a salient role. Before assuming power, Benazir Bhutto had to assure the Army Chief that her government would respect the military's interests and concerns and ensure effective political and economic management.

⁴ For an analysis of the factors that shaped the decision of the senior commanders not to assume power after the death of Zia-ul-Haq, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan,' *Survival* (Vol. 31 No. 3, May-June 1989), pp. 255-268.

12

Civil Military Relations: Past Influences and Future Developments

The heritage and training orientations do shape the disposition of the military but these are not the only factors that determine the role of the military in a polity. These may emphasize a distinction between the military and the civilian domains with an over all primacy of the civil, and underscore aloofness of the military from active politics. If socio-political environment is not supportive of such a pattern of civil-military relations, and especially if the civilian leadership is unable to cope with the problems of governance, the military is not likely to limit its role to the professional realm of defence and security. Initially, the traditions and professionalism restrain the military from playing a salient role in politics and society. As socio-economic crises deepen and political institutions degenerate, the professional attributes facilitate the expansion of the role of the military and make it convenient for the senior commanders to step into the political domain.

The Pakistan military began its independent career on 15 August 1947, when the British withdrew from South Asia and divided the British Indian armed forces between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan, although the process was not completed until March-April 1948. The Government of Pakistan reorganized the three services of the armed forces on the organizational pattern and traditions of the British Indian military. This was understandable because their officers were trained in the British military institutions or the institutions set up by the British in India. A good number of British officers were also retained. The British traditions, adopted in Pakistan as the cardinal principle of military organization, emphasized the aloofness of military personnel from active politics and stressed the primacy of the civil over the military, although the latter's relevance to the security and survival of the state was fully recognized.

These traditions began to erode by the mid-1950s. The military expanded its role and the senior commanders, especially those of the Army, emerged as important actors in the decision-making process along with the

bureaucracy. They played important role in Pakistan's alignment with the United States in 1953-55 and supported the Governor-Generals in their efforts to pursue a domineering and manipulative role in the domestic context. A major shift in the role of the military occurred in October 1958, when General Ayub Khan established military rule by dislodging the tottering civilian government. His rule under the cover of martial law lasted until June 1962, when he civilianized his regime by coopting a set of political elite and gave a new constitution which legitimized his authoritarian rule. The second coup was staged by General Yahya Khan in March 1969 in a rather peculiar way; Ayub Khan invited Yahya Khan to assume power who scrapped the 1962 Constitution and declared martial law in the country. Second martial law (March 1969-April 1972) was the most turbulent period in Pakistan's history. Though Yahya Khan could be credited for holding the first fair and free direct general elections in December 1970, he was unable to cope with the delicate political situation in the post-election period. The country was plunged into a bloody civil war in the then East Pakistan and war with India. The consequences were catastrophic for Pakistan: defeat in the war and the break-up of Pakistan as East Pakistan became an independent state as Bangladesh. The Yahya regime terminated abruptly on 20 December 1971 (four days after the surrender by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan) because there was a widespread demand in Pakistan for his resignation and the senior commanders viewed him as a liability. As the military's reputation had suffered due to the events of 1971, no other general was in a position to succeed him. The senior commanders handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the PPP which had won the majority seats in the National Assembly in the 1970 general elections in West Pakistan (post-1971 Pakistan). Bhutto who assumed Presidency also served a Chief Martial Law Administrator because there was no constitution available to replace martial law. It was in April 1972 that an interim presidential constitution was approved by the National Assembly and martial law was withdrawn.

General Zia-ul-Haq was the third "man on horseback" who imposed martial law in July 1977 and brought an end to the brief period of directly elected civilian rule. Initially, he projected himself as a reluctant ruler but as he succeeded in consolidating his position, he expanded the goals and preside over the longest martial law in Pakistan's history (July 1977-December 1985). He did not give a new constitution but he made so many changes in the 1973 Constitution that its original character was diluted. He also coopted a set of political leaders as "adjuncts to military supremacy," which enabled him to rule till his death in an air crash in August 1988. In

Omar Noman, *Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947* (London: Kegan Paul, 1990), p.118.

other words, with the exception of a period of civilian rule spread over little over five years and six months (20 December 1971 to 5 July 1977), the military had, during 1958-88, either directly exercised power under the cover of martial law (1958-62, 1969-71, 1977-85) or ruled indirectly through a civilianized government of a former or serving Army Chief (1962-69, 1985-88).

Major Causes of the Erosion of Civilian Supremacy

Three clusters of factors explain the decline of civilian influence over the military and the establishment the military's dominance in Pakistan. These are the nature of its political leadership and the problems of the civil society; the specific organizational characteristics of the military and its position in the society; and the interactions across the functional boundaries between the civil and the military domains.

Pakistan faced a serious crisis of political leadership within a couple of years of attaining independence. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who led the independence movement died in September 1948, thirteen months after independence. Liaquat Ali Khan, his lieutenant and first Prime Minister, partially filled the gap but he was assassinated in October 1951. They got insufficient time to establish and legitimize the participatory institutions and processes. Their successors who did not possess national stature, lacked imagination and were unable to inspire people, let alone deal with difficult political and economic problems. A large number of them had feudal and semi-feudal background and were primarily motivated by their personal ambitions and parochial considerations. The Muslim League which served as the vanguard party during the freedom struggle, failed to transform itself into a national party. Given the weak and divided leadership, the Muslim League could not be instrumental to state-building and nation-building. It was not merely the Muslim League which suffered from discord, indiscipline and weak organization, other political parties that vowed to displace the Muslim League, suffered from similar weaknesses and problems. Consequently, the political leaders were unable to develop a consensus on the operational norms of the polity. By the time the first constitution was introduced in March 1956, a strong pattern of violation of the parliamentary and democratic norms had been established. The political leaders showed little, if any, regard for the democratic norms, and often engaged in free-for-all struggle for power. This state of affairs adversely affected the economy, agricultural and industrial development; trade and commercial activities suffered heavily. Black-marketing, hoarding of food grain and medicines, nepotism and corruption at the government level intensified socio-economic strains in the polity. There was much frustration

and alienation at the common man level who felt that the political institutions and processes were not responsive to their needs and aspirations. The general disposition of the populace towards the political institutions and leaders ranged from indifference and negative evaluation to hostility.

The military in Pakistan stands out as the most cohesive, disciplined, and task-oriented institution. It is the largest pool of trained manpower and possesses technology and skills which are also relevant to socio-economic modernization of the civil society. Above all, the military possesses sophisticated instruments of violence which are the ultimate source of its power. The military has benefitted from Pakistan's acute security problems caused by Pakistan's adversary relationship with India, a stronger military power, and Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. All Pakistani governments—civilian and military—were convinced that Pakistan needed strong and well-equipped military to cope with the external threats. Strong religious fervour also created support for building a strong military. As a result, all governments allocated the largest share of the national budget to defence and security. The defence allocations constituted the single largest item in the national budget from the beginning to the early nineties when debt servicing pushed it to the second place.

The military also benefitted from Pakistan's decision to join U.S.-sponsored pacts in the 1950s. The new weapons, military hardware, and training that the three services obtained under these arrangements gave them greater confidence and improved their efficiency and the strike capability. This reinforced institutional imbalance between the disciplined, confident military and the weak and incoherent political institutions and processes. Similarly, the reinvigoration of Pakistan-U.S. security relations during the 1980s against the backdrop of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan proved a boon for the military. The economic and military assistance and diplomatic support which became available during this period strengthened the position of the military in the polity and contributed to the survival of the military government of Zia-ul-Haq.

Traditionally, the image of the military in Pakistan has been good. It has enjoyed respect partly due to the martial traditions of Punjab and NWFP and partly because of the Islamic concepts of "jihad" (holy war), "ghazi" (victorious), and "shaheed" (martyr). The military's strength is also a consequence of its strong ethnic and regional cohesion. Majority of Army officers and other ranks hail from the Punjab, followed by the NWFP and the tribal areas. These two groups (Punjabis and Pakhtuns) have not only developed strong mutual ties, but have also established links with the civilian bureaucratic elite, most of whom have a similar ethnic background.

The traditional Punjabi-Pakhtun composition of the Army has been a source of strength that, *inter alia*, contributes to enhancing the military's efficacy in politics. However, this is one of the major grievances of Sindhis and Balochs, who are under-represented in the Army and are virtually non-existent in the higher echelons.

The interaction across the functional boundaries between the civil and the military is inherent in any political system because the two domains are inter-connected. What really matters is the nature and direction of such interactions and their impact both on the two domains and the political system. If the military performs numerous functions in the civilian domain over an extended period, its position is likely to be strengthened in the polity at the expense of the civilian leaders and institutions. In Pakistan, the military was closely associated with the state formation process from the beginning and it helped the civilian government in performance of the administrative tasks. The government sought the assistance of the Army for evacuation and protection of refugees at the time of independence. Its personnel were also involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the incoming refugees. The civilian governments continued to rely on the military in the subsequent period for the maintenance of law and order and for coping with natural calamities, i.e. floods, cyclones, earthquake, etc., as well as for a number of other administrative problems, i.e., food shortages, smuggling, dacoity, narcotics trafficking, etc. The military also made a significant contribution to developmental work in the form of anti-salinity drive, road construction and improvement of water resources in Balochistan, the northern areas, and improvement of water resources in Balochistan. These activities in the civilian domain helped to build the image of the military and adversely affected the reputation of the civilian government. The military began to be viewed at the common man level as a resourceful organization capable of salvaging the situation when the civilian leaders were unable to manage it.

The growing stature of the military was in sharp contrast to the degeneration of the political machinery. The political leaders were so divided and fully preoccupied with petty power struggles that they could hardly assert their leadership on the military. In fact, they tried to cultivate the senior commanders to strengthen their position in the domestic political fray. The senior commanders joined hands with the senior bureaucrats to assume a commanding role in decision-making but avoided direct involvement in political management. The senior commanders also enjoyed freedom and autonomy in dealing with their professional and service affairs which helped them to consolidate their position. The military had become "too powerful" for the political leaders to tamper with and [it] virtually ran

itself without outside interference."²

The Military in Power

The coups in Pakistan dislodged the discredited governments which suffered from a crisis of legitimacy and their political survival was in serious doubt. In 1958, the opposition political parties had built strong pressures on the civil government which was relying on the Army's support for its survival. In 1969, the nation-wide mass agitation had paralyzed the Ayub regime. In 1977, the violent street agitation immobilized the elder Bhutto government. Initially, the military extended support to the besieged civil government. However, the inability of the civilian government to overcome the crisis of legitimacy led the senior commanders to conclude that they were protecting a discredited regime which would not survive if they withdrew their support. This tempted them to assume power directly. There was no resistance to the coups in 1958, 1969 and 1977; the governments capitulated the most opposition leaders who wanted to get rid of the government at any cost, welcomed the military's decision.

The experience of Pakistan suggests that it might be easy for a disciplined army to take over the reins of government in a polity where a broad-based consensus has not been developed on the operational norms of the polity, the political institutions and processes suffer from the crisis of legitimacy, and the populace is alienated from the political system. However, a successful coup and its initial accomplishments are no guarantee that it will be equally successful in solving the basic social, economic and political problems that are the root-causes of the fragility and mal-functioning of the civilian institutions. The three military regimes in Pakistan registered initial gains, i.e., restoration of law and order, resumption of normal economic activity, some measures of efficiency in administration, and some economic relief to the people. However, when it came to the formulation of a viable participatory framework for political action and the creation of an infra-structure for ensuring socio-economic justice, the performance of the military regimes was not better than their civilian predecessors.

The Ayub regime, often described as the "showcase" of economic development and political stability, was unable to cope with the participatory and distributive pressures on the political system. It came to an end under worse conditions than those which brought Ayub Khan to power. General Yahya Khan lacked political prudence and skills to steer

² Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan", in Ali Bannuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds), *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), p.315.

Pakistan out of the East-West Pakistan conflict. His failure to maintain a balance between the diverse political, economic and regional pressures plunged Pakistan into an unfortunate and bloody civil war, leading to Pakistan's defeat in the war with India. The limits of the military rulers to create viable political institutions facilitating political participation and socio-economic justice resurfaced during the period of General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law.

Zia-ul-Haq pursued the Islamization agenda to ensure his political survival and cultivated orthodox and conservative Islamic groups as a counterweight to his political adversaries who questioned the legitimacy of his extended rule. His selective Islamization strengthened the punitive, regulative, and extractive functions of the state but paid very little attention to the Islamic principles emphasizing socio-economic egalitarianism and accountability of the rulers. This was coupled with a shrewd manipulation of the political forces so that no serious challenge developed at the national level. He succeeded in his venture but in his desire to perpetuate his rule he accentuated the existing ethnic, linguistic, religious-sectarian cleavages which further divided and fragmented the political forces. These divisions and cleavages made Pakistan's transition to democracy in the post-1988 period extremely difficult and uncertain.

Withdrawal from Power

The military's withdrawal from power is a complex affair. Despite the promise of an early return to the barracks, most military rulers find it difficult to surrender power, not to speak of adopting an apolitical posture. Their self-styled missionary zeal, the post-coup political problems and their political goals and ambition, impel them to expand their goals and hang on to power. However, the military rulers are not able to overcome the crisis of legitimacy and they cannot continue ruling for an indefinite period under martial law and emergency. Sooner or later, they have to think about some political framework to replace direct military rule, although they ensure that such a transition does not adversely affect the professional and corporate interests of the military and their entrenched position is adequately protected.

There are different courses of action available to them to achieve this goal. First, the ruling generals can resign their military rank and continue exercising power as civilians. This is done when legal and constitutional arrangements have been made to ensure such a transition and a section of the political elite has been coopted. The military regimes adopt a graduated scheme, mostly starting at the lowest level, i.e. the setting up of local councils, in order to build a new popular base for themselves. At times, the

top ruling general may like to keep his rank after changing to constitutional rule. The bottom line is that the generals who civilianize their rule wish to maintain a close relationship with their service, whether they retain the rank or discard their uniform. Second, the military commanders transfer power to a carefully selected "loyal" civilian leaders who act more or less as a show-piece, a facade, to give a civilian complexion to military rule. Third, they withdraw to the barracks but keep the successor civilian regime under close observation. They are not interested in the day-to-day affairs of the government but make sure that the civilian government does not neglect their professional and corporate interests. Fourth, the military may favour a permanent constitutional arrangement for their input to policy-making or demand some kind of supervisory role. If the military commanders cannot evolve a political framework reflecting any of these options or a combination thereof, they are reluctant to transfer power to their civilian counterparts unless certain unforeseen developments cause a breakdown of the regime - i.e., a serious economic crisis, widespread and sustained street agitation, defeat in a war, dissension among the senior commanders.

The dilemma the military regimes face is that the professional and organizational attributes which facilitate the assumption of power become obstacles to evolving viable solutions to the major political and economic problems. As a hierarchical and authoritarian institution, the military emphasizes internal cohesion, discipline, obedience and bureaucratic rigidity. It puts "premium on authoritarian rather than democratic attitude."³ This mental framework evaluates policy-options by invoking what it considers "the criteria of rationality, efficiency and sound administration,"⁴ and stresses that "orders are to be obeyed, not discussed and debated."⁵ This has two major consequences for the military regime. First, the political institutions they create reflect these ethos and provide little room for dialogue, bargaining, accommodation and participation. Second, they demonstrate a strong distaste for competitive and participatory political activity and adopt an impatient attitude towards dissent. At times, they attempt to achieve what has been described as "cohesion without consensus"⁶ by relying on the control apparatus of the state. Such political arrangements do not guarantee enduring solutions to the political problems and are unable to cope with the participatory pressures.

³ Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and political Power* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1972), p. 79.

⁴ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 119.

⁵ Joseph P. Smaldone, "The Paradox of Military Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Charles L. Cochran (ed), *Civil-Military Relations* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 219.

⁶ Edward Feit, *The Armed Bureaucrats* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 3, 18.

Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq engaged in constitutional and political engineering, coopted a section of the political elite and excluded their political adversaries from the political process in order to civilianize their military regimes. They were successful in ensuring the continuity of the key personnel and policies in the post-martial law period and protected their personal, professional and corporate interests. But, their regimes could not overcome the crisis of legitimacy and never shaped up as viable entities. They had to rely heavily on the coercive apparatus of the state and the support of the Army. Ayub Khan had to quit when he faced massive street agitation and lost the support of the Army. Zia-ul-Haq flirtation with the civilian dispensation ran into serious problems. Neither the general was satisfied with the performance of the coopted civilian leadership nor the latter succeeded in building an autonomous support base at the popular level.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the only civilian leader who temporarily rehabilitated the primacy of the civil over the military. This was partly due to the popular support he enjoyed in the early stage of his rule and partly because the military's reputation was at the lowest ebb due to the debacle in the 1971 war with India. He removed a number of senior officers of the three services, especially those belonging to the Army, restructured the military high command and reduced the tenure of the services chiefs. He was unable to sustain the commanding role of the civilian leadership because Pakistan's security environment did not improve in the seventies. The security pressures kept the military directly relevant to the future of the state. Bhutto's vision of Pakistan's active role at the international level also impelled him to continue paying attention to the expansion and modernization of the military. As in the past, the military obtained the lion's share in the national budget. What really tilted the balance against Bhutto was his failure to empower the political institutions and processes which could give permanence to the primacy of the civilian leaders. He gradually diluted the democratic character of the constitution and resorted to authoritarian governance. His reliance on the military for the suppression of the Baloch insurgency, alienation of the politically active groups as he suppressed dissent, and his inability to establish the PPP as a viable political machine weakened the civilian government. As the Bhutto government was confronted with a massive street agitation in 1977, and as the opposition indicated that they were not averse to Bhutto's removal by the military, the Army Chief seized the opportunity to overthrow Bhutto and reasserted the dominance of the military.

The decision of the top brass under General Mirza Aslam Beg (Army Chief, August 1988-August 1991) to let the constitutional procedures to take effect after the demise of Zia-ul-Haq created the conditions for holding

party-based elections, followed by the transfer of power to the elected civilian leaders. General Aslam Beg and his successors (Asif Nawaz Janjua: August 1991-January 1993, Abdul Waheed Kaker: January 1993-January 1996, and Jehangir Karamat: January 1996) supported constitutional and participatory governance and avoided direct management of political affairs.

Post-Withdrawal Civil-Military Relations

The military's decision to return to the barracks reflects a realistic assessment of the domestic situation and the international environment. The top brass recognize the right of the civilian leaders to govern and run the affairs of the state but this does not mean that the senior commanders have abandoned interest in power management at the highest level. The primary consideration is not the exercise of supreme political power but the protection and advancement of professional corporate interests. If this can be done from the outside, why step-in?

The civilian leaders hold the levers of power within a democratic framework with sufficient scope for acting autonomously. The military engages in what can be described as *Non-take-over intervention* whereby the military commanders make input to policy making, make specific demands or question the policy measures of the civilian government with reference to their interests in respect to their internal service autonomy, the defence expenditure, service perks and benefits, and foreign policy issues of direct concern to them. They also expect that the civilian government would provide a relatively effective and transparent administration capable of maintaining some semblance of political order and economic stability in the polity.

The long years of military rule have enabled the military to penetrate the major sectors of the state and the society, i.e., government and semi-government institutions, the private sector, industry, business, agriculture, education, communications and transportation. Different industrial, business and commercial projects undertaken by the Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, the Shaheen Foundation, and the Bharia Foundation as well as the setting up of an engineering and technical university, a medical college, a transport company, and the projects of Frontier Work Organization have contributed to expanding the influence of the military in the society and the economy. The military governments also appointed serving and retired military officers, mainly that of the Army, to lucrative civilian jobs in the government and semi governments and organizations. The private sector also accommodated them to avail of their contacts with the government and the military, a practice that was not discontinued by the

civilian governments as these did not want to alienate the military. The military has thus spread out so widely in the government and the semi-government institutions, the society and the economy that it can exercise sufficient clout even when it is not in power.

The experience of the two governments of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990 and October 1993-November 1996) and the first term of Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993) showed that the civilian governments could not disregard the sensitivities of the military. Their poor political and economic management, serious complaints about financial improprieties and attempts to tamper with the military's autonomy and professional interests caused strains in their interaction with the senior commanders. As the economy faltered and the military was convinced that these governments were unable or unwilling to improve their performance, they supported the President in removing these governments in August 1990, April 1993, and November 1996. When, the confrontation between Nawaz Sharif (Prime Minister) and Ghulam Ishaq Khan (President) threatened the functioning of the government, the Army Chief brokered a deal between the two in July 1993 for their simultaneous resignations and the holding of new elections. The military's decisive role in changing the political balance in the polity was once again demonstrated during Nawaz Sharif's second term. The government's strategy to use its parliamentary majority to strengthen the position of the Prime Minister caused the executive-judiciary conflict which plunged the polity in a serious crisis in October-November 1997. What salvaged the position of Nawaz Sharif was the decision of the Army Chief to let his government stay-on because the senior commanders felt that the removal of the Prime Minister within one year of the elections would be very awkward, especially because his support in the parliament and the outside had not eroded. The Army's decision titled the balance in favour of the Prime Minister, making it possible for him to carry out his threat to impeach President Farooq Leghari if the latter did not remove the Chief Justice as desired by the government. The President preferred to resign on 2 December. Once Leghari was out, the government had no problem in removing the Chief Justice, thereby overcoming the crisis that could have led to the removal of Nawaz Sharif.

The revived participatory political institutions and processes have not stabilized to the extent that Pakistan's transition to democracy could be described as non-reversible. Civilian consolidation is threatened by ethnic and religious-sectarian conflict, stepped up violence and a lack of minimum socio-economic security for the people. The government finds it difficult to command voluntary loyalty of the populace. The democratic process is under severe pressure due to the intolerant and non-accommodative disposition of the competing political interests who often engage in a free-

for-all struggle for power. Above all, the unsatisfactory regional security environment underlines the relevance of the military to state survival. The government is thus obliged to assign a high priority to defence. A civilian government, faced with such internal problems and external security pressures, cannot take the command of the situation without the support and cooperation of the military. It must therefore cultivate good relations with the military and make necessary funds available for the modernization of the military. There is a lack of consensus among the political leaders on the role of the military in the polity. The PPP and the Muslim League (Nawaz), while in opposition, and a couple of other political parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, often call upon the Army to force the government out of office. Such calls add to the problems of the government and bolster the position and role of the military in the political process.

There is a cost for the military for its repeated assumption of power. The military is viewed as an autonomous political actor with its own agenda rather than a non-partisan institution. Many ills that characterize the civil society like corruption, strong material considerations and nepotism appear to have afflicted the military during the years of power. This has caused much concern at the highest level in the military because the high command views these ills as threats to professionalism. The desire to retrieve the reputation is one of the major considerations that has contributed to the decision of the top commanders to stay away from governance and political management.

What appears quite striking is that despite the political role of the senior commanders, the military as an institution "remains hostage to its origins."⁷ The British military traditions with an emphasis on professionalism, discipline, and aloofness from active politics continue to be the hallmarks of military training and organization. The role as a "ruler-praetorian" military is not fully accepted within the military and a large number of officers feel that governance is not their primary responsibility. Zia-ul-Haq talked of the military's role as the guardian of the "ideological frontiers" of Pakistan in order to justify his extended rule but this idea could not catch on. Another problem is caused by sharp ethnic imbalances in the Army which builds resentment against military rule in Sindh and Balochistan as the Sindhis and Baloch are under-represented. The Urdu-speaking populace—Mohajirs—in urban Sindh, also developed complaints against the Army due to its security operation in urban Sindh (1992-94). Their resentment does not appear to be so pronounced as the Mohajirs have fair representation in the three services, especially in the Air Force and the

⁷ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.117.

Navy. However, the growing ethnic consciousness will increasingly complicate the issue of legitimacy of direct military rule. These trends are reinforced by the tenacity of ideological commitment to democratic and participatory ethos that pervade the civil society. This commitment has survived despite intermittent constitutional breakdowns, political discontinuities, absence of elections after regular intervals, and the ascendancy of the military-bureaucratic elite. The fair and free electoral process is viewed as the legitimate mechanism for assumption and exercise of political power.

These trends are expected discourage the senior commanders from directly ruling the country with broader political goals. However, the military can continue to influence the political process while staying on the sidelines. The post-1988 pattern of civil-military relations enables the military to influence the nature and direction of political change as an autonomous actor by virtue of its organizational strengths and its significant presence in all sectors of the government and the society. The best safeguard against the military's expanded role is the removal of the causes that produce intervention. As these causes persist in Pakistan and the participatory political institutions and processes have not been firmly established, the military will continue to overshadow the political process.

Appendices

APPENDIX A

A MEMORANDUM WRITTEN BY GENERAL AYUB KHAN, C-in-C OF THE ARMY: OCTOBER 4, 1954

A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan¹

The Aim.

1. The ultimate aim of Pakistan must be to become a sound, a solid and cohesive nation to be able to play its destined role in world history. This can be achieved only if as a start a constitution is evolved that will suit the genius of the people and be based on the circumstances confronting them, so that they are set on the path of unity, team work and creative progress.

2. Before such a constitution can be devised, it is obvious that certain preliminary steps will have to be taken that will provide the setting for the unhindered evolution of such a constitution. Taking of such preliminary steps, therefore, becomes the immediate aim of Pakistan.

FACTORS

General.

3. (a) The people of Pakistan consist of a variety of races, each with its own historical background and culture. East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population probably belong to the very original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation of Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghals, Pathans or the British. In addition, they have been and still are under considerable cultural and linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible psychologically to adjust to the requirements of their new born freedom. Their peculiar complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensive aggressiveness probably emerge from this historical background. Prudence, therefore, demands that these factors should be recognised and catered for and they be helped so as to feel equal partners and prove an asset. That can be done only if they are given a

¹The text was kept as classified information until 1960.

considerable measure of partnership.

- (b) The population in West Pakistan, on the other hand, is probably the greatest mixture of races found anywhere in the world. Lying on the gateways to the Indian Sub-continent it was inevitable that each successive conquering race should have left its traces here. Consequently, this forced mixture of races has fusion of ideas, outlook and culture, despite linguistic variety obtained. Strategically and economically too, this area is destined to stand or fall as a whole. Lying as it does in the basin of the Indus river and its tributaries, its future economic development must be considered as a whole to achieve maximum results. All this indicates, therefore, that West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from the north or south, must be welded into one unit and all artificial provincial boundaries removed, regardless of any prejudices to the contrary which are mostly the creation of politicians rather than real. When doing this, however, regard must be had for the prejudices and fears of people and their future balanced development. This unit should therefore, be so subdivided that each sub-unit embraces a racial group or groups with a common economy, communications and potentiality for development, and administration decentralized in them to the maximum possible.
- (c) The creation of one unit in West Pakistan, however, is possible only if the biggest constituent is prepared to show large-heartedness and make a sacrifice for the common good. Punjab is the biggest and most important province in West Pakistan with more than half its population. If she insists on proportionate representation, the others will, at once, shy off. Besides, no coalition can work with one dominant partner. Therefore, for its preservation and the glory of Pakistan, Punjab should be asked to accept forty per cent representation in the legislature of this unit, others having representation in proportion to their population. But before such a unit can be brought into being, the existing provincial and state's legislatures and cabinets will have to be done away with so as not to interfere and impede reorganization.

Deductions from the above:

- (1) Call East Bengal one unit and give it as much partnership as possible.

(2) Reorganize West Pakistan into one unit and give it similar partnership as above.

(3) Abolish present provincial ministries and legislatures to speed up reorganization.

(4) Sub-divide each unit into convenient sub-units, each embracing a racial group or groups with common economy, communications and prospective development. Administration to be decentralized in these sub-units as much as possible.

(5) In order to remove any fear of domination, Punjab to be asked to accept forty per cent representation in West Pakistan unit legislature.

(6) Both East and West units to have their own legislatures.

4. Given the above, the fear of one unit dividing or dominating others would disappear; harmonious and unfettered development in each unit will be possible, fear of provincialism will be reduced to the minimum and the danger of politicians interfering with the local administrators curtailed. In other words, very valuable gains would have been made by such a reorganization.

5. Having created two provincial units in Pakistan, the next question is to determine the structure of administration in each unit. Before answering such a question, it would be appropriate to reiterate the fact that our eventual aim must be to develop democracy in Pakistan, but of a type that suits the genius of the people. Our people are mostly un-educated and our politicians not so scrupulous. The people are capable of doing great things, but they can also be easily misled. Unfettered democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous, especially now-a-days when Communism from within and without is so quick to make use of its weakness. We, therefore, have to have a controlled form of democracy with checks and counter-checks. This indicates that legislature finds the cabinet, whose actions are controllable by a Governor, who in turn is controlled by the Head of the State (President); in certain circumstances, the Governor having the power to remove ministers or the ministry. He could also be in a position to protect the rights of the services and have them carry out their obligations.

6. Connected with the election of legislatures is the question of franchise. It is too late now to resile from universal suffrage, however, great though its shortcomings may be. The answer would be to provide checks here too, so as to prevent its becoming irresponsible. We must not forget that democracy is a means to an end and not an end by itself and that there is no set pattern of democracy that can be applied to every country without modifications. It would be advisable, therefore, to enable people to elect a college of people in each sub-unit, who in turn elect members for the provincial and central legislatures. Such an electoral system would be more

easily manageable and would make for a good deal of responsibility.

7. As to the size and type of provincial and central legislatures, opinions may differ, but the need for strict economy in men and money would indicate that one legislature for each Province, of about 150 members each, would do. Similarly the central legislature, of which mention will be made later, should not be of a strength more than that.

8. Whilst talking about administration there is the problem of our legal system, which is most expensive, ineffective, dilatory, tyrannical and totally unsuited to our genius. This will need complete overhaul and to be made humane, quick and cheap. The answer would seem to lie in having a Jirga-cum-Judicial system and revision of evidence and procedural laws with only one right of appeal. The highest judicial court for dealing with cases other than constitutional will have to be created in each sub-unit. The federal or the Provincial High Courts should deal only with cases of constitutional nature.

Deductions from the above:

(1) In each province there should be one legislature of about 150 members each, headed by a cabinet. There should be a Governor in each province appointed by the President with powers of control over the Cabinet and the Services.

(2) The electoral system should consist of election of electoral colleges in each sub-unit by Universal suffrage, these colleges to elect members for the provincial legislature, the central legislature and also to elect the President, of which mention will be made later.

(3) The legal system should be simplified and decentralized to sub-units; introduction of Jirga-cum-judicial system to be examined.

(4) Government servants Conduct Rules should be revised so as to make summary dealings in cases of rewards and punishment possible.

The Structure of the Centre:

9. Having created two units of the country, their federation on an equal basis without fear of domination of one over the other becomes a practical proposition. This federation should consist of one legislative house of about 150 strong, equally divided amongst the two units, headed by a cabinet. This cabinet should have executive powers as voted by the legislature, subject to some effective control by the President, who should be elected. The President should be made the final custodian of power on the country's behalf and should be able to put things right in both the provinces and the centre should they go wrong. Laws should be operative only if certified by the President except in cases where these are passed by three fourths majority. No change in the constitution should be made unless

agreed to by the President. In case of serious disagreement between the President and the legislatures, provision should be made for fresh elections of either one or both. Acceptance of the Mohammad Ali Formula for the election of the President and passing of laws would perhaps be necessary.

10. For reasons given before, the province should have as much partnership as possible and that means that in addition to the subjects already in their hands, communications, except inter-provincial, Industries, Commerce, Health etc., should be handed over to the Provinces, leaving Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency in the hands of the Centre.

11. The quick development of our resources and raising the standard of living of our people is one of the main problems which Pakistan has to solve. This can be done effectively only if we overhaul our educational system to prepare our manpower for the task and to have well-controlled and well-financed organisations to undertake major development projects. That indicates organization of Development Boards rather on the P. I. D. C. fashion for education, cottage industries, land and power and hosts of other things in each province. This arrangement will help relieve local administrations of a lot of head-aches and will ensure quick development.

12. But nothing much will be gained unless we carry out land reforms in a scientific fashion. Possession of vast areas of land by a few is no longer defensible nor is acquisition of land without compensation. The Egyptian example is a very good one; they allowed the owner a certain limit of holding; buying the rest for distribution amongst peasants, who will pay the cost in seventy yearly instalments.

13. It was mentioned earlier that the President should be made the repository of power. He can discharge this duty only if the services are made directly responsible to him. To do that, a system of Joint Staff headed by a Supreme Commander should be appointed by the President. In addition to other duties, he should be made the Defence Member and *ex officio* member of the Cabinet. This will not only knit the services together and lead to economy in pooling things common to all the services, but would put a stop to any attempt by politicians to interfere in the internal affairs of the services to promote their personal interests.

14. The experience of the last seven years has shown how dangerous the use of ambiguous clichés can be. Everybody said we should have an Islamic Democracy without ever defining what it was and how it differed from the normally understood democracy. Perhaps it is not possible to define it. Would it, therefore, not correct to say that any variety of democracy when worked in the spirit of the Quran can be called an Islamic Democracy. We shall perhaps do better and avoid many pitfalls if we accept this concept.

Outline Plan:

15. As a preliminary step, abolish Provincial ministries and legislatures in West Pakistan and create one Province of it under a Governor with the requisite staff.

16. Create sub-units in East Bengal and West Pakistan equivalent to a commissioner's division, each division containing racial group or groups with common language, common economy and communications and common development potential. Decentralize administration so that the head of the division becomes the king-pin of administration.

17. Overhaul the legal system so as to make it cheaper and quicker, placing the highest, appellate court in a division, except for cases involving points of constitutional law, for which a Federal Court or a High Court in each province should suffice. A Jirga-cum-judicial system should be evolved and procedural law simplified.

18. Create Development Boards in each province covering Education, Water and Power, Land Reforms and Development, Cottage Industries, etc.

19. Create a Joint Staff for the three Services headed by a Supreme Commander who in addition to other duties should be the Defence Member and be the *ex officio* member of the Central Cabinet coming finally under the President.

20. The Central Government to consist of one legislature consisting of about 150 members equally divided between the two province, a Cabinet and the President. The President to have overriding powers to assume control should things go wrong in the provinces or the centre. To avoid undue domination of the one province over the other; apply the Mohammad Ali Formula to the election of President and passage of bills.

21. The Provincial Government in East Bengal to consist of a legislature of about 150 members headed by a Cabinet with a Governor appointed by the President; the Governor to have some measure of control over the Cabinet and the Services.

22. Province to have maximum partnership possible, the Centre holding only with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency and such Communications as are inter-provincial.

23. The Government Servants Conduct Rules should be revised so as to make summary awards or punishments possible.

24. The suffrage should be adult franchise, who should be called upon to elect an electoral college in each division, who will then elect the President and members of the Central and Provincial Legislatures.

25. Finally, hope and pray that this Constitution is worked in the spirit of the Quran. If so, our solidarity, strength and future is assured.

**PROCLAMATION MADE BY ISKANDER MIRZA,
PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, ON 7TH OCTOBER 1958**

For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends. There have been a few honourable exceptions. But being in a minority they have not been able to assert their influence in the affairs of the country.

These despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of the lowest order. Adventurers and exploiters have flourished to the detriment of the masses and are getting richer by their nefarious practices.

Despite my repeated endeavours, no serious attempt has been made to tackle the food crises. Food has been a problem of life and death for us in a country which should be really surplus. Agriculture and land administration have been made a handmaiden of politics so that in our present system of government, no political party will be able to take any positive action to increase production. In East Pakistan, on the other hand, there is a well organized smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities of life. The masses there suffer due to the shortages so caused in, and the consequent high prices of, these commodities. Import of food has been a constant and serious drain on our foreign exchange earnings in the last few years, with the result that the Government is constrained to curtail the much-needed internal development projects.

Some of our politicians have lately been talking of bloody revolution. Another type of adventurers among them think it fit to go to foreign countries and attempt direct alignment with them which can only be described as high treason.

The disgraceful scene enacted recently in the East Pakistan Assembly is known to all. I am told that such episodes were common occurrences in pre-partition Bengal. Whether they were or not, it is certainly not a civilized mode of procedure. You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, killing the Deputy Speaker and desecrating the National Flag.

The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot get man from the Moon. The same group of people who have

brought Pakistan on the verge of ruination will rig the elections for their own ends. They will come back more revengeful because I am sure the elections will be contested mainly, on personal, regional and sectarian basis. When they return, they will use the same methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy and are the main cause of the present widespread frustration in the country. However much the administration may try, I am convinced, judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and unscrupulous scramble for office, that elections will be neither free nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties. On the contrary, they are likely to create greater unhappiness and disappointment leading ultimately to a really bloody revolution. Recently, we had elections for the Karachi Municipal Corporation. Twenty per cent. of the electorate exercised their votes, and out of these, about fifty per cent. were bogus votes.

We hear threats and cries of civil disobedience in order to retain private volunteer organizations and to break up the One Unit. These disruptive tendencies are a good indication of their patriotism and the length to which politicians and adventurers are prepared to go to achieve their parochial aims.

Our foreign policy is subjected to unintelligent and irresponsible criticism, not for patriotic motives, but from selfish view-points, often by the very people who were responsible for it. We desire to have friendly relations with all nations, but political adventures try their best to create bad blood and misunderstandings between us and countries like the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R. and the People's Republic of China. Against India, of course, they scream for war, knowing full well that they will be nowhere near the firing line. In no country in the world, do political parties treat foreign policy in the manner it has been done in Pakistan. To dispel the confusion so caused, categorically reiterate that we shall continue to follow a policy which our interest and geography demand and that we shall honour all our international commitments which, as is well known, we have undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan and, as a peace-loving nation, to play our part in averting the danger of war from this troubled world.

For the last three years, I have been doing my utmost to work the Constitution in a democratic way. I have laboured to bring about coalition after coalition, hoping that it would stabilize the administration and that the affairs of the country would be run in the interests of the masses. My detractors, in their dishonest ways have on every opportunity, called these attempts palace intrigues. It has become fashionable to put all the blame on the President. A wit said the other day, "If it rains too much it is the fault of the President. A wit said the other day, "If it rains too much it is the fault of the President. If only I the President and if it does not rain it is the fault of the President". If only I alone were concerned, I would go on taking these fulminations with the contempt it deserve. But the intention of these traitors and unpatriotic

elements is to destroy the prestige of Pakistan and the Government by attacking the Head of the State. They have succeeded to a great extent, and, if this state of affairs is allowed to go on, they will achieve their ultimate purpose.

My appraisal of the internal situation had led me to believe that a vast majority of the people no longer have any confidence in the present system of government and are getting more and more disillusioned and disappointed and are becoming dangerously resentful of the manner in which they have been exploited. Their resentment and bitterness are justifiable. The leaders have not been able to render them the service they deserve and have failed to prove themselves worthy of the confidence the masses had reposed in them.

The Constitution which was brought into being on 23rd March 1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is full of dangerous compromises so that Pakistan will disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed. To rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution. Then, it is my intention to collect a number of patriotic persons to examine our problems in the political field and devise a Constitution more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people. When it is ready, and at the appropriate time, it will be submitted to the referendum of the people.

It is said that the Constitution is sacred. But more sacred than the Constitution or anything else is the country and the welfare and happiness of its people. As Head of the State, my foremost duty before my God and the people is the integrity of Pakistan. It is seriously threatened by the ruthlessness of traitors and political adventurers whose selfishness, thirst for power and unpatriotic conduct cannot be restrained by a Government set up under the present system. Nor can I any longer remain a spectator of activities designed to destroy the country. After deep and anxious thought, I have come to the regrettable conclusion that I would be failing in my duty if I did not take steps, which in my opinion, are inescapable in present conditions to save Pakistan from complete disruption. I have, therefore, decided that

- a) The Constitution of the 23rd March, 1956, will be abrogated.
- b) The Central and Provincial Governments will be dismissed with immediate effect.
- c) The National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies will be dissolved.
- d) All political parties will be abolished.
- e) Until alternative arrangements are made, Pakistan will come under

Martial Law. I hereby appoint General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, as Chief Martial Law Administrator and place all the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command.

To the valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan, I have to say that having been closely associated with them since the very inception of Pakistan, I have learned to admire their patriotism and loyalty. I am putting a great strain on them. I fully realize this, but I ask you, officers and men of the Armed Forces, on your service depends the further existence of Pakistan as an independent nation and a bastion in these parts of the Free World. Do your job without fear or favour and may God help you.

To the people of Pakistan I talk as a brother and a fellow compatriot. Present action has been taken with the utmost regret but I have had to do it in the interests of the country and the masses, finer men than whom it is difficult to imagine. To the patriots and the law-abiding, I promise you will be happier and freer. The political adventurers, the smugglers, the black-marketeers, the hoarders, will be unhappy and their activities will be severely restricted. As for the traitors, they had better flee from the country if they can and while the going is good.

APPENDIX C

GENERAL (LATER FIELD MARSHAL) AYUB KHAN'S FIRST BROADCAST TO THE NATION: 8TH OCTOBER 1958

I am going to address you on matters which are both solemn and serious. It is vital that you should listen to them carefully, understand them correctly, so as to be able to act constructively—as in correct action lies the salvation of us all and our future generations.

You should have heard by now the declaration by the President abrogating the Constitution and imposing Martial law throughout Pakistan. He has appointed me as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and all the Armed Forces of Pakistan, including the civil armed forces, have been put under my command. This is a drastic and extreme step taken with great reluctance, but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country. History would never have forgiven us if the present chaotic conditions were allowed to go on any further.

These chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers who, in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal gains. Some have done it as a matter of right because they professed to have created Pakistan, and others who were against the very idea of Pakistan openly worked for its dissolution or in any case did all they could to aggravate its problems. Their aim is nothing but self-aggrandizement or thirst for power. Meanwhile, weak and irresolute governments looked on with masterly inactivity and cowardice and allowed things to drift and deteriorate, and discipline to go to pieces.

Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, politicians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged ceaseless and bitter war against each other, regardless of the ill-effect on the country, just to wet their appetites and satisfy their base motive. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. They could see no good in anybody else. In this mad rush for power and acquisition all that mattered was self-interest. The country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned. There were a few honourable exceptions but their conscience was dead and they were rendered ineffective by hordes of their supporters in the Assemblies changing party affiliations from day to day.

Appendix C

293

There are two things a man—a man of any conscience finds it very difficult to do : change his religion, change party affiliations. But our so-called representatives in the Assemblies shifted from one party to the other without turning a hair or feeling any pangs of conscience. This is the basis on which democracy has been run in Pakistan and in the sacred name of Islam. In the process, all ideals and the high sense of values inherent in our religion and culture have been destroyed. The result is total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos in the country, which cannot be tolerated in these dangerous time. Pakistan certainly cannot afford this luxury. It has far too many internal problems to solve and external dangers to guard against—to solution of which the prerequisite is a secure and stable base within the country.

Our people are by nature patriotic and good people. They are tolerant, patient and can rise to great heights when well led. They are also intelligent and could see all this happening in front of their eyes. But they found themselves helpless as they did not wish to aggravate the problems facing the country or perhaps did not wish to hurt the feelings of the Army which in the final analysis, is responsible for law and order and which had served them so well with loyalty and devotion. But lately I could see that they were beginning to lose faith even in us for not saving them from the tyranny and mental and spiritual torture. I am sure they are sick and tired of the unscrupulous type of politicians who were busy tearing their dear country into pieces. The Army too felt the same and much more, but held their patience for reasons which I will just now explain.

This is the occasion on which I feel I should take my countrymen and women into confidence as to the Army's attitude and behaviour. Ever since the inception of Pakistan we in the Armed Forces saw very clearly the internal problems facing the country and the external dangers to which it was exposed. We were also conscious of our limited means. We solemnly decided to build a true national army free from politics, a model of devotion to duty and integrity imbued with the spirit of service to the people and capable of effectively defending the country. Further, I always told to my people that our major task is to give cover to the country behind which it could build a sound democratic system and lay the foundation of a stable future. We kept severely aloof from politics.

You may not know, but I refused on several occasions the late Mr. Ghulam Mohammad's offer to take over the country. I did so in the belief that I could serve the cause of Pakistan better from the place where I was, and also had a faint hope that some politicians would rise to the occasion and lead the country to a better future. Events have falsified those hopes and we have come to the present pass. A perfectly sound country has been turned into a laughing stock. This is sad, but the situation has to be faced

and remedies found, as God willing they are going to be.

Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand and work. When the time comes your opinion will be freely asked. But when that will, events alone can tell. Meanwhile, we have to put this mess right and put the country on an even keel.

There are certain problems which need immediate solution, yet there are others which are of a long-term nature. We shall do our utmost to solve them and eradicate evils. But in all this, I must demand your wholehearted understanding, co-operation and patience. I must also ask you to work hard and put in your best effort. This is the period when our State has to be built and this can only happen if people work. Slogan-mongering can never take the place of hard sweat. Remember that there are certain things which it should be in our power to put right. We shall see that is done. But there are others, solutions to which are beyond, leaving result to God. So, when judging our performance, do keep these hard realities of life in mind.

As to the operation of Martial Law, I propose to use the civilian agencies to the maximum. The Armed Forces will be utilised as little as possible. In the main, they will continue to attend to their prime role of external defence. Martial Law Regulations will be produced which will tighten up the existing laws on matters like malingering or inefficiency amongst officials, any form of bribery or corruption, hoarding, smuggling or black-marketing, or any other type of anti-social or anti-State activity. Such matters will be dealt with ruthlessly and expeditiously. In other words the nefarious activities of the bad characters of all description shall be firmly curbed in order that Pakistan is made safe for the law-abiding citizens.

Since Martial Law will, in the main, be operated by the civilian agencies I must ask them to discharge this onerous and perhaps unpleasant duty honestly, justly and faithfully. Here is an opportunity for you to show your mettle. Go to it and show us what sort of stuff you are made of! Your Services have tremendous traditions. Do not miss this opportunity to revive them and in doing so you can be assured of the Armed Forces' faithful support. At this critical juncture it is more than ever necessary for the Armed Forces to be prepared at all times to face external aggression. But they are fully aware that internal stability is absolutely essential if they are to successfully repel aggression from outside.

Some of them may have to be called upon to perform duties in connection with Martial Law. Whatever these duties may be, I expect them to do them loyally, efficiently, and unhesitatingly. Their behaviour at all times must be correct, disciplined and impartial. I have every confidence in

their ability to face any challenge, however difficult it may be.

A word for the disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black-marketeers and other such social vermin, sharks and leeches. The soldiers and the people are sick of the sight of you. So it will be good for your health to turn a new leaf and begin to behave, otherwise retribution will be swift and sure. At any rate, they have no cause to feel neglected. We shall be making desperate efforts to catch up with them as soon as possible.

I have spoken to you, my fellow citizens, at some length to put you in the picture and remove doubts and misgivings and to convince you that this extreme step has been taken in your interest and in the interest of the stability of Pakistan. Now let us all bow before Almighty God in all humility to guide us to a better future, so that we may emerge from this hour of trial as a sound, solid and strong nation! Amen! Pakistan Paindabad!

APPENDIX D

TEXT OF THE LETTER SENT ON 24TH MARCH 1969 BY FIELD MARSHAL AYUB KHAN TO THE C-in-C PAKISTAN ARMY, GENERAL YAHYA KHAN

It is with profound regret that I have come to the conclusion that all civil administration and constitutional authority in the country has become ineffective. If the situation continues to deteriorate at the present alarming rate, all economic life, indeed, civilised existence will become impossible.

I am left with no option but to step aside and leave it to the Defence Forces of Pakistan, which today represent the only effective and legal instrument, to take over full control of the affairs of the country. They are, by the grace of God, in a position to retrieve the situation and to save the country from utter chaos and total destruction. They alone can restore sanity and put the country back on the road to progress in a civil and constitutional manner.

Restoration and maintenance of full democracy, according to the fundamental principles of our faith and the needs of our people, must remain our ultimate goal. In that lies the salvation of our people who are blessed with the highest qualities of dedication and vision and who are destined to play a glorious role in the world.

It is most tragic that while we were well on our way to a happy and prosperous future, we were plunged into an abyss of senseless agitation. Whatever name may have been used to glorify it, the time will show that this turmoil was deliberately created by well-tutored and well-backed elements. They made it impossible for the Government to maintain any semblance of law and order or to protect the civil liberties, life and property of the people. Every single instrument of administration and every medium of expression of saner public opinion was subjected to inhuman pressure. Dedicated but defenceless Government functionaries were subjected to ruthless public criticism or blackmail. The result is that all social and ethical norms have been destroyed and the instruments of Government have become inoperative and ineffective.

The economic life of the country has all but collapsed. Workers and labourers are being incited and urged to commit acts of lawlessness and brutality. While demands for higher wages, salaries and amenities are being extracted under threat of violence, production is going down. There has been a serious fall in exports and I am afraid the country may soon find itself in the grip of serious inflation.

All this is the result of the reckless conduct of those who acting under

Appendix D

297

the cover of a mass movement, struck blow after blow at the very roots of the country during the last few months. The pity is that a large number of innocent but gullible people became victims of their evil designs.

I have served my people to the best of my ability under all circumstances. Mistakes there must have been but what has been achieved and accomplished is not negligible. There are some who would like to undo all that I have done and even that which was done by the Governments before me. But the most tragic and heart-rending thought is that there are elements at work which would like to undo even what the Quaid-i-Azam had done, namely the creation of Pakistan.

I have exhausted all possible civil and constitutional means to resolve the present crisis. I offered to meet all those regarded as the leaders of the people. Many of them came to a conference recently but only after I had fulfilled all their pre-conditions. Some declined to come for reasons best known to them. I asked these people to evolve an agreed formula.

They failed to do so in spite of days of deliberations. They finally agreed on two points and I accepted both of them. I then offered that the unagreed issues should all be referred to the representatives of the people after they had been elected on the basis of direct adult franchise. My argument was that the delegates in the conference who had not been elected by the people could not arrogate to themselves the authority to decide all civil and constitutional issues, including those on which even they are not agreed among themselves. I thought I would call the National Assembly to consider the two agreed points but it soon became obvious that this would be an exercise in futility. The members of the Assembly are no longer free agents and there is no likelihood of the agreed two points being faithfully adopted. Indeed, members are being threatened and compelled either to boycott the session or to move such amendments as would liquidate the Central Government, make the maintenance of the Armed Forces impossible, divide the economy or the country and break up Pakistan into little bits and pieces.

Calling the Assembly in such chaotic conditions can only aggravate the situation. How can any one deliberate coolly and dispassionately on fundamental problems under threat of instant violence?

It is beyond the capacity of the civil government to deal with the present complex situation, and the Defence Forces must step in.

It is your legal and constitutional responsibility to defend the country not only against external aggression but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos. The nation expects you to discharge this responsibility to preserve the security and integrity of the country and to restore normal social, economic and administrative life. Let peace and happiness be

brought back to this anguished land of 1 million people.

I believe you have the capacity, patriotism, dedication and imagination to deal with formidable problems facing the country. You are the leader of a force which enjoys the respect and admiration of the whole world. Your colleagues in the Pakistan Air Force and in the Pakistan Navy are men of honour and I know that you will always have their full support. Together the Armed Forces of Pakistan must save Pakistan from disintegration.

I should be grateful if you would convey to every soldier, sailor and airman that I shall always be proud of having been associated with them as their Supreme Commander.

They must know that in this grave hour they have to act as the custodians of Pakistan. Their conduct and actions must be inspired by the principles of Islam and by the conviction that they are serving the interests of their people.

It has been a great honour to have served the valiant and inspired people of Pakistan for so long a period. May God guide them to move toward greater prosperity and glory.

I must also record my great appreciation of your unswerving loyalty. I know that patriotism has been a constant source of inspiration for you all your life. I pray for your success and for the welfare and happiness of my people.

APPENDIX E

FIELD MARSHAL AYUB KHAN'S LAST ADDRESS TO THE NATION: 25TH MARCH 1969

This is the last time that I am addressing you as President of Pakistan. The situation in the country is fast deteriorating. The administrative institutions are being paralysed. Self-aggrandisement is the order of the day. The mobs are resorting to Gheraos at will, and get their demands accepted under duress. And no one has the courage to proclaim the truth.

The persons who had come forward to serve the country have been intimidated into following the mobs. There is none among them who can challenge this frenzy. The economy of the country has been crippled; factories are closing down and production is dwindling every day.

You can well appreciate the feelings which overwhelm me at this moment. The country, which we nourished with our sweat and blood, has been brought to a sad pass within a few months.

I had once suggested to you that the national problems should be settled in the light of reason and not in the heat of emotions. You have seen that the fire of emotions once kindled has rendered every man helpless.

I have endeavoured to serve you to the best of my ability. I firmly believe that the people of Pakistan are endowed with the blessings of an eternal faith and they have the capacity to overcome every difficulty. All that our people need is patience, discipline and unity.

On February 21, I had announced that I would not contest the next elections. I had hoped that after this announcement, people would restore peaceful atmosphere and would try to find a suitable solution to the country's political problems in a dispassionate mood. I thought that personal hatred would vanish and once again we would devote ourselves to the progress of the country.

Unfortunately, the conditions continued to deteriorate from bad to worse. You are aware of the results of the round table conference. After weeks of deliberation the representatives of various parties could agree only on two demands. And I accepted both of them I had suggested that the issues over which there was no unanimity should be referred for a decision to the directly elected representatives of the people.

But this proposal was not acceptable to the political leaders. Every one of them was insisting for the immediate acceptance of their demands without even waiting for the election of the people's representatives.

Some people suggested to me that if all these demands were accepted, peace would be restored to the country. I asked them in which country? For the acceptance of these demands would have spelled the liquidation of Pakistan.

I have always told you that Pakistan's salvation lay in a strong centre. I accepted the parliamentary system because in this way also there was a possibility of preserving a strong Centre. But now it is being said that the country be divided into two parts. The Centre should be rendered ineffective and a powerless institution. The defence services should be crippled and the political entity of West Pakistan be done away with.

It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of our country.

It grieves me to see that a great desire of my life could not be realised. It was my desire to establish the tradition that political power should continue to be transferred in a constitutional manner.

In the conditions prevailing in the country, it is not possible to convene the National Assembly. Some members may not even dare to attend the Assembly session. And those who would come, not be able to express their real opinion because of fear. There is also the danger of the National Assembly becoming the scene of bloody conflicts.

The integrity of the country takes precedence over every thing else. The fundamental and basic constitutional issues can only be settled in a peaceful atmosphere when people's representatives can deliberate over these calmly.

Today such an atmosphere does not exist. As soon as conditions improve some one stokes up the fires of mischief. It is also painful that people are bent upon destroying all that has been achieved in the last ten years, or even during the previous regimes. There are those who would like to destroy the country established by the Quaid-i-Azam.

It hurts me deeply to say that the situation now is no longer under the control of the Government. All Government institutions have become victim of coercion, fear and intimidation.

Every principle, restraint and way of civilised existence has been abandoned. Every problem of the country is being decided in the streets. Except for the Armed Forces there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation.

The whole nation demands that General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfil his constitutional responsibilities. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force are with him and the entire nation has faith in their valour and patriotism. They should always

keep in view the welfare of the people and their every action should be in conformity with the principles of Islam.

The security of the country demands that no impediments be placed in the way the Defence Forces and they should be enabled to carry out freely their legal duties. In view of this, I have decided to relinquish today the office of the President.

I am conscious of your sentiments. Have faith in the Almighty and do not abandon hope. I am very grateful to you all that you not only conferred on me the honour of being the President of Pakistan for ten years but also participated in the work of national reconstruction with courage and perseverance. Your achievements will be written in history in letters of gold. I also thank the Government servants who, at difficult moments displayed courage and selflessly served the nation in every way.

Some of my close associates have been subjected to bitter and uncalled for criticism. But unmindful of all this they worked day and night for the betterment of the country with humility and dedication. The Almighty will reward them.

My dear countrymen, my parting request to you is to appreciate the delicate situation and assist your brethren in the defence forces in every conceivable manner to maintain law and order.

Every soldier is your own brother. He is animated by love for the country and his heart and head are illumined by the light of Islam. I pray to God for the speedy and complete establishment of harmony and peace so that we continue to march towards progress and prosperity along the path of democracy.

APPENDIX F

GENERAL A. M. YAHYA KHAN'S FIRST BROADCAST TO THE NATION: 26TH MARCH 1969

You have already heard Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan's speech, which was broadcast on Tuesday and by now, you must also have read his letter of 24th March which is addressed to me and has been published in the press. As is evident from this letter, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan took all possible steps, in the past few weeks to come to some arrangement whereby a peaceful and constitutional transfer of power could take place. As we all know, his efforts did not meet with success. He, therefore, called upon me to carry out my prime duty of protecting this country from utter destruction.

As proclaimed earlier I have imposed Martial Law throughout Pakistan. We in the Armed Forces had hoped that sanity would prevail and the extreme step would not be necessary, but the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally ineffective and have almost completely broken down. Serious damage of life and property has occurred and a state of panic has paralysed life in the nation. Production has gone down to a dangerously low level, and economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set back. Strikes and violence have become a daily routine and the country has been driven to the edge of an abyss. The nation has to be pulled back to safety and normal conditions have to be restored without delay. The Armed Forces could not remain idle spectators of this state of near anarchy. They have to do their duty and save the country from utter disaster. I have, therefore, taken this step.

My sole aim in imposing Martial Law is to protect life, liberty and property of the people and put the administration back on the rails. My first and foremost task as the Chief Martial Law administrator, therefore, is to bring back sanity and ensure that the administration resumes its normal functions to the satisfaction of the people. We have had enough of administrative laxity and chaos and I shall see to it that this is not repeated in any form or manner. Let every member of the administration take a serious note of this warning.

Fellow countrymen, I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government. It is my firm belief that, a sound, clean and honest administration is a prerequisite for sane and constructive political life and for smooth transfer of power to the representatives to give the country a workable Constitution and find a

Appendix F

303

solution of all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people. I am, however, conscious of the genuine difficulties and pressing needs of various sections of our society including the student community, the labour and our peasants. Let me assure you that my administration will make every endeavour to resolve these difficulties.

A word about your brethren in the Armed Forces : You are well aware that they have always stood by the nation selflessly and gallantly; they have always responded to the call of duty with promptness and devotion. They have never regarded any sacrifice as too great to ensure and enhance the security and the glory of Pakistan. The Armed Forces belong to the people. they have no political ambitions and will not prop up any individual or party. At the same time I wish to make it equally clear that we have every intention of completing the mission that we have embarked upon, to the nation's satisfaction.

We are passing through the most fateful period of our history. The recent events have dealt a serious blow to our national prestige and progress. The Martial Law administration cannot and will not tolerate agitational and destructive activities of any kind. I urge everyone of you to cooperate with my administrations in bringing the country back to sanity. Let everyone, whatever his calling may be, return to his post and do his bit to repair the damage caused to the economy and well being of Pakistan.

EXCERPTS FROM Z.A. BHUTTO'S
ADDRESS TO THE NATION:
4th March 1972

As I have repeatedly said, the strength of Pakistan lies in the strength of its people. We are determined, come what may, to make our people strong, to make our people happy, to make our people content and to make our people feel that it is their Pakistan, the Pakistan of their dreams, to make them feel that their children will have a secure and happy future and that they have really been in the promised land.

My dear friends, citizens, the interests of the country are supreme and it is in the interest of the country and in the interest of the Armed Forces of Pakistan that today we have taken the decision to replace the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force. Both of them have been replaced by officers who are familiar with the Armed Forces and who have kept working with them with devotion and with splendid records. Replacements have been made on merits and in the highest consideration of the country and the Armed Forces.

By now you must have heard Lt-General Gul Hasan Khan who has resigned this afternoon has been replaced by Lt.-General Tikka Khan and that Air Marshal Rahim Khan has been replaced by Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry. From today we will no longer have anachronistic and obsolete posts of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Every wing of the Armed Forces, that is, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force will be headed by a Chief of Staff. This is the practice in many countries and this practice has worked successfully in those countries.

So we have changed the colonial structure of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and injected a truly independent pattern into this vital service.

We are determined to have a new vigorous institution of the Armed Forces. We are absolutely determined to have an invincible armed force. I know that Pakistan possesses the material to have a strong and valiant army. We have had in the past a strong and valiant army and we are determined to restore that force. It must again become the finest fighting machine in Asia. This we must do. This is a sacred task. It is a sacred undertaking and you will see that with the passage of time this will be done. And so in this spirit of supreme national interest these changes were necessary. The structure has been changed and the heads of these Services are dedicated individuals who will now direct all their energies to the promotion of their services and bringing them to the highest contemporary standards. This task shall become their ceaseless endeavours and night and day they will have to

direct all their talents and energy to build this great machine. And you must remember, my friends and compatriots, that the people of Pakistan and the Armed Forces themselves are equally determined to wipe out the Bonapartism influence from the Armed Forces. It is essential so that these tendencies never again pollute the political life of this country. Bonapartism is an expression which means that professional soldiers turn into professional politicians. I use the word Bonapartism because what has happened in Pakistan since 1954 and more openly since 1958 is that some professional Generals turned to politics not as a profession but as a plunder and as a result the influences that had crept into Pakistan's socio-political life destroyed its fabric as the influence of Bonapartism had affected Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. But come what may, these Bonapartism influences must be rooted out in the interest of the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan. So, that is why these decisions had to be taken and I am certain the whole nation will rally round it and everyone in the Armed Forces from ordinary jawan to senior officer right down to the ranks will understand it in the spirit in which these decisions have been taken.

I recently had a long session with General Tikka Khan and I had given him my ideas and my thoughts on improving the morale and standard of the Pakistan Army. A similar meeting, this evening, I am going to have with the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Air Marshal Zafar Choudhry, and I hope that we can have equally constructive meeting. I had a similar meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Navy.

You must also know that along with structural change we have decided that the tenure of the Chiefs of Staff will be fixed, and under no circumstances will there be an extension of that tenure. It will remain a fixed tenure and at the conclusion of it there will have to be new person replacing the present incumbent. Only in this way can fresh ideas begin to flow because it is necessary for new ideas to take charge over a period of time. This is both in the interest of the Armed Forces and the nation.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, we have to have a few more changes because on taking over on the 20th December I announced the changes in the Army. A number of Army Generals were retired and some others were retired in the Navy also. It is necessary to do the same in the Air Force.

So not only the commander-in-Chief of the Air Force has been relieved of his duties but in addition to that we are retiring today Air Vice-Marshal Steven Yusuf, Air Vice-Marshal Khaiber Khan, Air Commodore Abdul Qadir, Air Commodore Salahuddin, Air Commodore T.S. Jan and Group Capt. Syed Mansur Ahmad Shah. These officers are also retired from the Air Force.....

APPENDIX H

GENERAL MOHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ'S FIRST ADDRESS TO THE NATION:

5th July 1977

I deem it a singular honour to address the great nation of this great country. I am grateful to God Almighty for this. You must have learnt by now that the Government of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has ceased to exist and an interim Government has been established in its place. This change-over which began at about midnight last night, was completed by this morning. I am grateful to God Almighty that the process of change-over has been accomplished smoothly and peacefully. This action was carried out on my orders. During this period the former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and some of his colleagues have been taken into protective custody. Likewise, all the prominent leaders of the Pakistan National Alliance except Begum Nasim Wali Khan have also been taken into custody.

The reactions to this takeover have so far been very encouraging. A stream of congratulatory messages has been pouring in from different quarters. I am grateful for this to my nation as well as to the buoyant and "Momin" Armed Forces of Pakistan.

It is necessary to add here that some people have expressed misgiving that the Army takeover may have been at the behest of someone. Could it be that General Zia had secretly concerted with the former Prime Minister? On this, I can only say that truth can never remain unexposed. In fact, such an air of distrust has been created during the past few months that even well-meaning people also get bogged down in doubts and apprehensions.

You must have heard from the morning news bulletin that the Armed Forces of Pakistan have taken over the administration of the country. The Army takeover is never a pleasant act, because the Armed Forces of Pakistan genuinely want that the administration of the country should remain in the hands of the representatives of the people who are its real masters. The people exercise this right through their elected representatives, who are chosen in every democratic country through periodic elections.

The elections were held in our beloved homeland on March 7 last. The election results, however, were rejected by one of the contending parties (the Pakistan National Alliance). They alleged that the elections had been rigged on a large scale and demanded fresh elections. To press their demand for re-elections, they launched a movement which assumed such dimensions that people even started saying that democracy was not workable in Pakistan. But I genuinely feel that the survival of this country

lies in democracy and democracy alone.

It is mainly due to this belief that the Armed Forces resisted the temptation to take over during the recent provocative circumstances in spite of diverse massive political pressures. The Armed Forces have always desired and tried for the political solution to political problems. That is why the Armed Forces stressed on the then Government that they should reach a compromise with their political rivals without any loss of time. The Government needed time to hold these talks. The Armed Forces bought them this valuable period of time by maintaining law and order in the country. The Armed Forces were subjected to criticism from certain quarters for their role in aid of the civil administration, but we tolerated this criticism in the hope that it was a passing phase. We hoped that when this climate of agitational frenzy came to an end, the nation would be able to appreciate the correct and constitutional role of the Armed Forces and all fears would be allayed.

I have just given you a very broad outline picture of the situation obtaining in the country. It must be quite clear to you now that when the political leaders failed to steer the country out of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators. It is primarily, for this reason, that the Army perforce, had to intervene, to save the country.

I would like to point out here that I saw no prospects of a compromise between the People's Party and the PNA, because of their mutual distrust and lack of faith. It was feared that the failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos and the country would thus be plunged into a more serious crisis. This risk could not be taken in view of the larger interest of the country. The Army had, therefore, to act as a result of which the Government of Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist: Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country: the National and Provincial Assemblies have been dissolved and the provincial Governors and Ministers have been removed.

But the Constitution has not been abrogated. Only the operation of certain parts of the Constitution has been held in abeyance. Mr. Fazal Elahi Chaudhry has very kindly consented to continue to discharge his duties as President of Pakistan as heretofore under the same Constitution. I am grateful to him for this. To assist him in the discharge of his national duties, a four-member Military Council has been formed. The Council consists of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

I will discharge the duties of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Martial Law orders and instructions, as and when required, will be issued

under my orders.

I met Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali, Chief Justice of Pakistan, this morning. I am grateful to him for the advice and guidance on legal matters. I want to make it absolutely clear that neither I have any political ambitions nor does the Army want to be detracted from its profession of soldiering. I was obliged to step in to fill in the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have accepted this challenge as a true soldier of Islam. My sole aim is to organise free and fair elections which would be held in October this year.

Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule. During the next three months, my total attention will be concentrated on the holding of elections and I would not like to dissipate my powers and energies as Chief Martial Law Administrator on anything else.

It will not be out of place to mention here that I hold the Judiciary of the country in high esteem. I will do my best to refrain from doing anything which is likely to restrict the power of the Judiciary. However, under unavoidable circumstances, if and when Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations are issued they would not be challenged in any court of law.

I will soon announce the modalities and detailed timetable for the holding of elections. I hope and expect that all political parties will co-operate with me in this behalf. A good measure of tension had been created in the country during the recent political confrontation. It had, therefore, become imperative to allow time to cool off human emotions. I have, therefore, banned all political activities from today till further orders. Political activities, however, will be allowed before the polls.

My dear countrymen, I have expressed my real feelings and intentions, without the slightest ambiguity. I have also taken you into confidence about my future plans. I seek guidance from God Almighty and help and co-operation from my countrymen to achieve this noble mission. I also hope that the Judiciary, the administration and the common man will extend wholehearted co-operation to me.

It would be my utmost endeavour to ensure that the Martial Law Administration not only treats the people in a spirit of justice and equality but also make them feel so. The civil administration, too, had to play an important role in this behalf. I am, therefore, pleased to announce that the Chief Justices of the Provincial High Courts have, on my request, consented to become the Acting Governors of their respective provinces. The officers in the civil administration, who have any apprehensions about their future,

are hereby assured that no victimisation will take place.

However, if any public servant fails in the discharge of his duties, shows partial role or betrays the confidence of the nation, he will be given exemplary punishment. Similarly, if any citizen disturbs law and order in the country, he will also be severely dealt with.

So far as foreign relations are concerned, I want to make it absolutely clear that I will honour all the agreements, commitments and contracts signed by the outgoing Government.

In the end, I would appeal to all the officers and men of the Armed Forces to discharge their duties justly and impartially. I hope they will deal with every situation without showing any undue lenience. I will also expect them to forgive those who have ridiculed or harassed them. This will be in the true Islamic tradition. I call upon them to preserve their own honour and that of their profession in the discharge of their duties. I am sure they will acquit themselves of their new responsibility honourably. This will certainly enhance their prestige and position in the society.

I will now like to enumerate the following few points:-

1. The civil courts will continue to discharge their duties as before.
2. The Federal Security Force will soon be reorganised.
3. Large-scale transfers of civil servants, which have been ordered recently, will be reviewed.
4. The organisation of the Interim Government is as follows:
 - a) President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry will be the Head of the State,
 - b) The important administrative matters will be dealt with by the Military Council mentioned earlier.
 - c) The Chief Martial Law Administrator will be the Chief Executive.
 - d) Secretary-General Defence, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, will co-ordinate the functioning of all Federal Ministries and Departments.
 - e) The Federal Secretaries will continue to head their respective departments.
 - f) The Chief Justices of the provincial High Courts will be the Acting Governors of their respective provinces.
 - g) The Provincial Administration will be headed by the Provincial Martial Law Administrators, and the Provincial Secretaries will continue to hold charge of their respective

departments.

5. I sincerely desire:-
 - (a) The Civil administration to discharge its duties without any fear or apprehension.
 - (b) The Press to live up to its claims as the advocate of "freedom of the Press" without violating the "code of conduct."
 - (c) The nation to develop a sense of sanity and reasonableness.
 - (d) The life, honour and property of every citizen to be safe,
 - (e) Peace and tranquillity to prevail and 'Goondaism' to come to an end, and,
 - (f) Educational institutions not to become political arenas.
6. I want to assure you that the frontiers of Pakistan are fully guarded and the Armed Forces are there to discharge their duties. Authorised traffic across the borders is continuing.
7. To conclude, I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why, I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country.

Pakistan Paindabad.

APPENDIX I

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

Text of the White Paper issued by the Bhutto Government in May 1976:

The over-riding concern of Pakistan's national life is the country's defence. Pakistan actively seeks a peaceful international order. It harbours no design on the territory of any other state. It adheres to the principle that any territorial acquisition by force is totally inadmissible. It has always sought and upheld the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Despite this policy of peace inherent in the State's ideology and orientation, the fact remains that three times in the first quarter century of its existence Pakistan has been the victim of aggression, with war imposed on it. This happened in 1948, when the nascent state had not had the time to assemble even the rudiments of a modern defence establishment, in 1965, and again in 1971 when the country was forcibly dismembered.

These events are now a part of the nation's history. There are, however, important lessons of profound validity for the preservation of the country's independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity to be learnt from the manner in which Pakistan was dragged into these wars and the type of political leadership and higher strategic direction that was provided for their actual conduct:

(i) A nation's dedication to peace and adherence to the principle of pacific settlement of international disputes do not, by themselves, constitute sufficient guarantees that it will be left unmolested in its peaceful existence. For as long as there are conflicts and disputes in the region of geographical, political or economic interest to a nation, latent threats to its sovereignty and independence will continue to exist and a nation can ignore the existence of such threats only at its peril.

(ii) In the present day world order national security is essentially the responsibility of the whole nation. In this setting it is not the justice of a country's cause or the righteousness of the principles it upholds but the strength, composition and preparedness of its defence organization and the quality of its political and military leadership and institutions that would deter those with aggressive designs from encroaching on its security.

(iii) It is only a representative Government and the exertion by the Government that ends the separation of the Armed Forces from the people and eliminates the element of caprice from decisions of war or peace. An

unrepresentative regime, lacking a perception of the national interest as distinguished from the interest of a class or group, draws guidance from subjective appreciation of the national situation which is often determined by the personal predilections, fears, anxieties or ambitions of an individual or group and may have no correspondence to realities.

(iv) As a corollary, national defence policy is no longer a military affair alone. Physical defence in the form of defence against attack by another country still constitutes an important element of the defence policy but military strategy, if it is to succeed, needs to be integrated with political, diplomatic and economic strategies, reflecting the essential unity of defence policy.

(v) The evolution of national defence policy and its administration require (a) effective political control at the top, both to secure the proper integration of the various relevant elements and to provide competent political guidance to the nation's defence effort and (b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based, and to translate the overall policy when formulated into specific, mutually consistent, plans for implementation by the Armed Services and other agencies concerned.

At the time present Government came into power, the country did neither have an integrated defence policy backed by well-coordinated joint plans nor the organization and institutions for the formulation and execution of such policy and plans. The defence policy had virtually become the responsibility of one man and his coterie.

A Defence Committee of the Cabinet with charter to secure and supervise the integration of the various elements of national defence policy did exist but it seldom met and remained an agency largely on paper. There was a Joint Chiefs Committee as well, served by a Joint Chiefs Secretariat but it concerned itself only with minor Inter-Services, mostly administrative matters. The system of control and direction of the Armed Forces was a hodgepodge of colonial and totalitarian feature.

In critical times, the Chief Executive of the country did not even have a Cabinet body to handle issues of national defence and to provide political leadership and strategic guidance to the defence efforts of the nation and the actual conduct of war. The Defence Ministry itself was no more than a routine coordinating agency. The result was that there was little comprehension of the problems of one Service by another and no secure system of consultation between them, far less an integration of their plans.

The fact is startling but authentic that the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Navy was informed of the out-break of hostilities in 1971 only by a radio

news bulletin to which he happened to listen. This was not an accident but a natural result of the defence system established in the country. The country's Physical defence depended almost entirely on individual Service's war Plans evolved largely in isolation from the requirements and capabilities of the other services and seriously lacking in many of the essentials that go into the making of a viable national defence policy.

The logical outcome of this state of affairs was the whimsical, unplanned, Partial and ill-fitting measures that were resorted to in the 1971 war and which resulted in the loss of half of the country. There were no joint Army-Air or Navy-Air plans.

REORGANIZATION

No responsible Government could countenance such a situation, and one of the first tasks, therefore, to which the present Government, soon after it came into power, addressed itself, was to rationalize the country's Defence Organization. The reorganization of the Ministry of Defence, involving the creation of a separate Division, with its field organization, for defence production, the appointment recently of a Secretary-General, the transfer of the Naval Headquarters to Islamabad in 1974, the arrangements presently underway to move the Air Headquarters also to the national capital, the measure to give the three Services, irrespective of their size, an equal say in the country's defence, the promotion of the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff to the same military rank as the Chief of Army Staff, and the reorganization of the Military Wing in the Cabinet Division, which serves as the Secretariat of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

Beyond these administrative measures, the Government also gave serious and prolonged consideration to instituting in the country an efficient machinery for the formulation and pursuit of a coherent and viable defence policy in keeping with the historical setting and experience of the country and the temperament, urges and aspirations of its people. In evolving this machinery, attention was focussed upon the following main principles:

(a) The full combat power of available forces can be developed in peace, and decisively applied in war, only through a unity of effort which results from a unity of aim and a clearly conceived overall strategy. Instead of a mere coordination of single-Service plans which entails an uneasy compromise, there must be a jointly conceived and developed national defence plan.

(b) This requires a permanent and cohesive Higher Organization of Defence. It is an established fact of experience that the coordination or

unification which is brought about under the stress of an emergency evaporates in easier times of peace. Moreover, the attempts at coordination in actual war operations can be precarious unless the necessary infrastructure for coordination is established before hand and essential procedures for joint action are laid in advance.

(c) The Higher Defence Organization must not be a set of ad hoc committees, nor must the national defence policy be based on occasional ad hoc studies. The ever-changing international situation, changes in socio-economic conditions within the country and rapid developments in the technology of weapons and electronic communication make it necessary to conceive of defence in a dynamic frame and to organize defence planning as a continuous process which can be effectively carried out by a permanent Inter-Service set-up only.

(d) While the three Services should be but the instruments of an integrated defence strategy, the understandable fact remains that matters arise which may be of conflicting concern to them, as might be the case, for example, in the selection and induction of new weapons system. In the absence of a Higher Organization of Defence, the selection of weapons largely reflects the demands of one service which may not be harmonious with the weapons and equipment system of other Services and which may draw off excessive funds from the Defence budget, creating areas of deficiency elsewhere in the total defence system.

The Higher Organization of Defence should be so constituted as to give correct military advice to the Government on all such matters by transcending the interest of one Service against another. It must not work through Service-oriented negotiations which yield a compromise that reflects only the lowest common denominator between the different ideas. Rather, it must determine priorities from the point of view of overall national security. At the same time, it must not impair the efficiency or weaken the management of the three fighting Services.

(e) For a country, like Pakistan, defence is primarily a matter of the most judicious and cost-efficient use of resources. It cannot afford waste or duplication. This can be ensured only by an unbiased planning and controlling authority which will also translate into military terms the defence policy and other directions handed down by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

On the basis of these principles and taking into account the major studies carried out, including a careful examination of Higher Defence Organization of a number of countries, and the proposals put forward, the Government have decided to establish a Higher Organization for Defence.

The following are the salient points of the Organization:

The Prime Minister

Under the Constitution, control and command of the Armed Forces vests in the Federal Government. As the Chief Executive of the Federation, the Prime Minister is responsible to the nation for safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan and preserving protecting its Constitution. It follows that the Prime Minister determines the national aims in the field of defence and directs the national effort towards their achievement. It is his duty to ensure that the nation is prepared at all times to defend the country. Specifically, this means that the Prime Minister is responsible for:

- (A) Allocation of the necessary resources to defence within the State's capacity and in fulfilment of its short term and long term interests;
- (B) Establishing expanding and/or reorganizing institutions to ensure the coordinated application of such resources;
- (C) Ensuring the raising and development of the Armed Forces commensurate with the national requirements, resources and priorities; and
- (D) Coordinating defence policy with domestic and external policies.

As Minister for Defence, the Prime Minister is assisted in the discharge of his duties by the Minister of State for Defence. The latter performs such functions and exercises such powers as may be transferred or delegated to him by the Defence Minister.

The Chief Executive of the Federation is empowered by the Constitution to act either directly or through the Federal Ministers. Though in actual practice he acts on all important matters with the concurrence of the Cabinet, those relating to defence are considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. This Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes as its permanent members the Ministers of Defence, Interior, States and Frontier Regions, Kashmir Affairs, Information and Broadcasting, Communications, Commerce, Industries and Production. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), the three Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries General of Defence and Finance and the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance are in attendance and only other Minister/Secretary whose subject is under consideration is called upon to be present.

The charter of the D.C.C. is as follows:-

- (A) To define from time to time the task of the Armed Forces of Pakistan in accordance with the national strategy and overall policy of the Cabinet and to secure the necessary assessments and plans for the fulfilment

of defence policy from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee;

(B) To consider these assessments and plans and to keep under constant review the organization for the country's defence and its preparedness for war;

(C) To take appropriate action through the various Ministries, on matters of foreign, political, economic and administrative policies which have a bearing on the country's defence potential and to coordinate the plans and actions of the ministries in, this behalf, and

(D) To supervise the conduct of war during hostilities.

The terms of the charter imply that the Committee will be responsible, inter-alia, to evaluate the total threat and to lay down the minimum force requirements to meet it, to define the task of the Armed Forces in accordance with the national strategy and the overall policy of the Government, to determine the future force goals and to review from time to time the preparedness of each Service to execute the approved plans.

Defence Council

While the Defence Committee of the Cabinet determines and approves defence policy, the Defence Council is responsible for its translation into military policy. Chaired by the Prime Minister as Defence Minister, its members include the Minister of Finance, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, Secretaries General of Defence and Finance and Secretaries of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance. When required, any other official may be in attendance.

According to its charter, the Defence Council is required, among others:

(A) To examine, review and recommend for approval to the D.C.C. the role, size, shape and development of each of the three Services and other Defence Establishments as well as the budget allocations for each;

(B) To review all assessments and plans concerning defence put up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee or other departments for submission to the D. C. C. and

(C) To formulate policies for indigenous production, research and development and for induction and procurement of defence materials and equipment.

The Minister of State for Defence

As has been said above, the Prime Minister as Defence Minister is assisted in his duties by the Minister of State for Defence. In addition to the preparedness of the Armed Forces and periodical revision of the defence plans and their adjustment to prevailing conditions, the Minister of State is responsible to the Prime Minister.

(i) To ensure effective civilian participation in the war effort and smooth functions of all the Services during war;

(ii) To ensure through the appropriate Ministry Division and/or other institutions and organizations that training is provided to the people in Civil Defence, fire-fighting, first-aid, defence against aircraft attacks, etc; and

(iii) To coordinate through the Secretary-General (Defence) the working of Defence Division, Defence Production Division, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Services Headquarters.

Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Defence is the Secretariat of the Defence Minister (Prime Minister) which is headed by Secretary-General (Defence) and comprises the Defence Division, Defence Production Division, Aviation Division, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) is the highest military body for considering all problems bearing on the military aspects of national defence and rendering professional military advice thereon. It consists of a permanent Chairman and the three Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of the Defence Division is also required to attend all the meetings of the Committee, subject to the authority and direction of the Prime Minister (Minister of Defence), the JCSC will be responsible, among other, for preparing joint strategic and integrated logistic plans, providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, reviewing periodically the role, size and shape of the three Services, advising the Government on strategic communications (including telecommunications), the siting and dispersion of major industries and industrial mobilization plans, and for formulating and reviewing defence plans.

Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Secretariat of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will be an Inter-Services body organized into Directorates which at present will be as follows:

- (A) Operations/Plans,
- (B) Training,
- (C) Pacts and Agreements-implementation,
- (D) E-in-Cs Branch,
- (E) Logistics,
- (F) Inter-Services Public Relations,
- (G) Personnel, and
- (H) Motivation/Patriotic Training/Discipline.

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

The main function of the Chairman JCSC, during peacetime will be planning for defence of the country including planning of war. He will not interfere with, or give directives to the Services about their normal functioning nor will he exercise any executive authority in time of peace. During war (declared or undeclared), when the Prime Minister has informed the nation that the country is at war or facing a war-like situation, the chairman, JCSC, will assume responsibilities as Principal Staff Officer to assist the Prime Minister (Defence Minister) in the supervision and conduct of war and as overall co-ordinator to the extent authorized specifically in that behalf by the Prime Minister who will continue to exercise Supreme Command over the Forces.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will normally be appointed for a period of three years and selected from any of the three Services for his competence and suitability. By virtue of his appointment, he will take precedence over all other officers of the Armed Forces irrespective of the seniority of the three Chiefs of Staff.

He will render advice on military matters to Government in consultation with the Service Chiefs. In peace-time when there is divergence of views among the Chiefs of Staff, and the Committee is unable to agree, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will present the alternatives, as formulated during discussions, and give his advice to the Defence Minister for his decision. During war, the Chairman JCSC will have to take decisions as authorised by the Defence Minister.

Role of Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Staff Army, Chief of Staff Navy and Chief of Staff Air Force will continue to be Military Advisors to the Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Defence Minister. They will be responsible for the raising, training, administration, morale and discipline of the forces under their control and for the conduct of operation. They will also continue to have direct access to the Defence Minister (Prime Minister) when required.

Role of Service Headquarters

The Service Headquarters will become part of the Ministry of Defence. The three Chiefs of Staff will, however, continue to exercise the command functions over their respective services.

The establishment of this Higher Defence Organization was announced by the Prime Minister in his broadcast to the nation on December 20, 1975. It takes into account the historical setting, experiences and national temperament of Pakistan. It is also geared towards Pakistan's future expectations as a nation which is determined to take its place among progressive, peace-loving and forward-looking nations of the world and which will suffer no usurpation of its sovereign rights. The Government is confident that the new organization will not only provide the country with an efficient machinery but will also secure an effective civilian supremacy which is in consonance with the nation's paramount aim.

The Government of Pakistan has appointed General Mohammad Shariff as the First Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee with effect from March 1, 1976.

COUP D'ETAT AND THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN

Excerpts from the judgements of the Supreme Court:

The State v. Dosso and another : 1958.

... If the attempt to break the Constitution fails those who sponsor or organise it are judged by the existing Constitution as guilty of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success. On the same principle the validity of the laws to be made thereafter is judged by reference to the new and not the annulled Constitution. Thus, the essential condition to determine whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy of the change. In the circumstances supposed no new State is brought into existence though Aristotle thought otherwise. If the territory and the people remain substantially the same, there is, under the modern juristic doctrine, no change in the corpus or international entity of the State and the revolutionary government and the new constitution are according to International Law, the legitimate government and the valid Constitution of the State. Thus, a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an internationally recognised legal method of changing Constitution.

After a change of the character I have mentioned has taken place, the national legal order must for its validity depend upon the new law-creating organ. Even Courts lose their existing jurisdictions, and can function only to the extent and in the manner determined by the new constitution.

(PLD, 1958, Supreme Court, P. 539)

Asma Jilani v. the Government of the Punjab and another: 1972.

... The observations of the Chief Justice in Dosso's case are not correct that upon the principles of international law if the territory and the people remain substantially the same there is "no change in the corpus or international entity of the state and the revolutionary government and the new state are, according to international law, the legitimate government and the valid Constitution of the State." This proposition does not find support from any principle or international law...

From the examination of the various authorities on the subject one is driven to the conclusion that the Proclamation of Martial Law does not by itself involve the abrogation of the civil law and the functioning of the civil authorities and certainly does not vest the Commander of the Armed Forces with the power of abrogating the fundamental law of the country. It would be paradoxical indeed if such a result could flow from the invocation in the aid of a State or an agency set up and maintained by the State itself for its own protection from external invasion and internal disorder. If the argument is valid that the proclamation of the Martial Law by itself leads to the complete destruction of the legal order, then the armed forces do not assist the State in suppressing disorder but actually create further disorder, by disrupting the entire legal order of the State. It is therefore not correct to say that the Proclamation of Martial Law by itself must necessarily give the Commander of the armed forces the power to abrogate the Constitution, which he is bound by his oath to defend.

... There is no provision in any law which gives the Commander of the armed forces the right to proclaim Martial Law, although he has like all other loyal citizens of the country a bounden duty to assist the State, when called upon to do so. If the magnitude of the insurrection is so great that the courts and the civil administration are unable to function, the military may exercise all such powers that may be necessary to achieve their objective and in doing so may even set up Military Tribunals to promptly punish wrong-doers but this, whether done throughout the country or in a restricted area within the country, merely temporarily suspends the functioning of the civil courts and the civil administration. As soon as the necessity for the exercise of the military power is over, the civil administration must, of necessity, be restored, and assume its normal role....

Looked at, therefore, either from the constitutional point of view or the Martial Law point of view, whatever was done in March 1969, either by Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan or General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was entirely without any legal foundation. It was not even a revolution or a military coup d'etat in any sense of those terms. The Military Commander did not take over the reins of government by force nor did he oust the constitutional President. The constitutional President out of his own free will and accord in response to the public's demand, stepped aside and called upon the Military Commander to restore law and order, as he was bound to do both under the law and under the Constitution. On the stepping aside of the constitutional President the constitutional machinery should have automatically come into effect and the Speaker should have taken over as Acting President until fresh elections were held for the choice of a successor. The political machinery would then have moved according to the Constitution and the National and Provincial Assemblies would have

taken steps to resolve the political disputes, if any, if the Military Commander had not by an illegal order dissolved them. The Military Commander, however, did not allow the constitutional machinery to come into effect but usurped the functions of Government and started issuing all kinds of Martial Law Regulations, Presidential Orders and even Ordinances.

Therefore, there can be no question that the military rule sought to be imposed upon the country by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was entirely illegal.

... The grabbing of power and installing himself as the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan by the Proclamation of 1969 having been declared by the Supreme Court to be entirely illegal. The question arose whether everything (legislative measures and other acts) done during his illegal regime, whether good or bad, can be treated in the same manner and branded as illegal and of no effect.

... There is no doubt that a usurper may do things both good and bad, and he may have during the period of usurpation also made many regulations or taken actions which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government and which may well have, in the course of time, affected the enforcement of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the settlement of estates, the transfer of property and similar subjects. All these cannot be invalidated and the country landed once again into confusion. Such a principle, has also been adopted in America in various cases which came up after the suppression of the rebellion of the Southern States and the American Courts too adopted the policy that where the acts done by the usurper were "necessary to peace and good order among citizens and had affected property of contractual rights they should not be invalidated", not because they were legal but because they would cause inconvenience to innocent persons and lead to further difficulties.

Recourse therefore has to be taken to the doctrine of necessity where the ignoring of it would result in disastrous consequences to the body-Politic and upset the social order itself but one has to disagree with the view that this is a doctrine for validating the illegal acts of usurpers. This doctrine can be invoked in aid only after the Court has come to the conclusion that the acts of the usurpers were illegal and illegitimate. It is only then that the question arises as to how many of his acts, legislative or otherwise, should be condoned or maintained, notwithstanding their illegality in the wider public interest. This principle would be called a principle of condonation and not legitimization.

Applying this test the court condoned (1) all transactions which are past and closed for, no useful purpose can be served by re-opening them, (2) all acts and legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could have been made under, the abrogated constitution or the previous legal order, (3) all acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people, (4) all acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State and all such measures as would establish or lead to the establishment of, the objectives mentioned in the Objectives Resolution of 1954.....

(PLD, 1972, Supreme Court, PP. 141, 150-1. 153-4.)

Note: This judgement was delivered by the Supreme Court four months after General Yahya Khan resigned and handed-over power to Z. A. Bhutto.

Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan : 1977.

The proclamation of Martial Law on the 5th of July 1977, appears to be an extra-Constitutional step necessitated by the complete breakdown and erosion of the constitutional and moral authority of the Government of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, as a result of the unprecedented protest movement launched by the Pakistan National Alliance against the alleged massive rigging of election to the National Assembly, held on the 7th of March 1977. It was a situation for which the Constitution provided no solution, and the Armed Forces had, therefore, to intervene to save the country from further chaos and bloodshed, to safeguard its integrity and sovereignty, and to separate the warring factions which had brought the country to the brink of disaster.

That the imposition of Martial Law, therefore, stands validated on the doctrine of necessity, and the Chief Martial Law Administrator is entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate all legislative measures which have been consistently recognised by judicial authorities as falling within the scope of the law of necessity.

That it has also become clear from a review of the events resulting in the culmination of Martial Law, and the declaration of intent made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, that the 1973 Constitution still remains the supreme law, subject to the condition that certain parts thereof have been held in abeyance on account of State necessity, and the President of Pakistan as well as the superior courts continue to function under this Constitution. In other words, this is not a case where the old Legal Order has been completely suppressed or destroyed, but merely a case of constitutional deviation for a temporary period and for a specified and limited objective, namely, the restoration of law and order and normalcy in

the country, and the earliest possible holding of free and fair elections for the purpose of the restoration of democratic institutions under the 1973 Constitution.

Before parting with this judgement, it is necessary to refer to certain misgivings and apprehensions expressed by Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, learned counsel for the petitioner, to the effect that the postponement of the elections scheduled to be held on the 18th of October 1977, has cast a shadow on the declared objectives of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. After seeking instructions from his client, Mr. A. K. Brohi has informed the Court that the Chief Martial Law Administrator intends to hold elections as soon as the process of the accountability of the holders of public offices is completed, and the time factor depends upon the speed with which these cases are disposed of by the civil courts concerned. The learned Attorney-General has stated at the Bar that, in his opinion, a period of about six months is needed for this purpose and thereafter it will be possible to hold elections within two months.

While the Court does not consider it appropriate to issue any directions, as suggested by Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, as to a definite time table for the holding of elections, the Court would like to state in clear terms that it has found it possible to validate the extra-Constitutional action of the Chief Martial Law Administrator not only for the reason that he stepped in to save the country at a time of grave national crisis and constitutional breakdown, but also because of the solemn pledge given by him that the period of constitutional deviation shall be of as short a duration as possible, and that during this period all his energies shall be directed towards creating conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, leading to the restoration of democratic rule in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution. The Court, therefore, expects the Chief Martial Law Administrator to redeem this pledge, which must be construed in the nature of a mandate from the people of Pakistan, who have, by and large, willingly accepted his administration as the interim Government of Pakistan.

(PLD, 1977, Supreme Court, pp. 721-23).

APPENDIX K

NAMES OF THE PERSONS HOLDING KEY POSITIONS IN PAKISTAN

GOVERNOR GENERALS

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah	15 August 1947 - 11 September, 1948
Khawaja Nazimuddin	14 September 1948 - 17 October 1951
Ghulam Muhammad	19 October 1951 - 6 October 1955
Major General Iskander Mirza	6 October 1955 - 23 March 1956
(Iskander Mirza was sworn-in as Acting Governor General on 7 August 1955 as Ghulam Muhammad proceeded on medical leave; he resigned on 6 October 1955)	

PRESIDENTS

Major General Iskander Mirza	23 March 1956 - 27 October 1958
Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan	27 October 1958 - 25 March 1969
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan	31 March 1969 - 20 December 1971
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	20 December 1971 - 13 August 1973
Fazal Illahi Chaudhry	14 August 1973 - 16 September 1978
General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq	16 September 1978 - 17 August 1988
Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Acting and Regular)	17 August 1988 - 19 July 1993
Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari	13 November 1993 - 2 December 1997
Muhammad Rafiq Tarar	1 January 1998 -

(Wasim Sajjad, Chairman of the Senate, served as Acting President

from 19 July 1993 to 13 November 1993 and from 2 December 1997 to 1 January 1998)

VICE PRESIDENT

Nurul Amin 22 December 1971 - 21 April 1972

CHIEF MARSHAL LAW ADMINISTRATORS

Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 7 October 1958 - 8 June 1962

General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan 25 March 1969 - 20 December 1971

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 20 December 1971 - 21 April 1972

General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq 5 July 1977 - 30 December 1985

PRIME MINISTERS

Liaquat Ali Khan 15 August 1947 - 16 October 1951

Khawaja Nazimuddin 19 October 1951 - 17 April 1953

Mohammad Ali (Bogra) 17 April 1953 - 11 August 1955

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali 11 August 1955 - 12 September 1956

H. S. Suharwardy 12 September 1956 - 11 October 1957

I. I. Chundrigar 18 October 1957 - 11 December 1957

Malik Feroz Khan Noon 16 December 1957 - 7 October 1958

General Mohammad Ayub Khan 27 October 1958 (less than a full day)

Ayub Khan, Chief Martial Law Administrator, was appointed Prime Minister on 26 October 1958, and he took the oath of the office on the morning of 27th October. The same evening, he dislodged Iskander Mirza

and took over Presidency. The office of Prime Minister was abolished. His cabinet took a new oath as the Presidential cabinet on 28 October. The Presidential system was later incorporated in the 1962 Constitution. This system continued during the second martial law period from 25 March 1969 to 21 April 1972, which was carried over to the Interim Constitution, 1972, from 21 April 1972 to 13 August 1973. The Parliamentary System of government was reintroduced under the 1973 Constitution on 14 August 1973.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 14 August 1973 - 5 July 1977

General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, imposed martial law on 5 July 1977. No Prime Minister: 5 July 1977 - 22 March 1985

Mohammad Khan Junejo 23 March 1985 - 29 May 1988

The Prime Minister was dismissed and the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by the President. No caretaker Prime Minister was appointed. The President headed the cabinet.

Benazir Bhutto 2 December 1988 - 6 August 1990

The Prime Minister was dismissed and the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by the President.

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (Caretaker) 6 August 1990 - 6 November 1990

Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 6 November 1990 - 18 April 1993
26 May 1993 - 18 July 1993

The Prime Minister was dismissed and the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by the President 18 April 1993.

Balikh Sher Mazari (Caretaker) 18 April 1993 - 26 May 1993

The Supreme Court declared the Presidential Order of dismissal as unconstitutional and restored the government of Nawaz Sharif on 26 May 1993. The Prime Minister and the President resigned on 18 July 1993 to make way for new elections.

Dr. Moinuddin Qureshi (Caretaker)	18 July 1993 - 19 October 1993
Benazir Bhutto	19 October 1993 - 5 November 1996

The President dismissed the government and dissolved the National Assembly; later Provincial Assemblies were also dissolved.

Malik Mairaj Khalid (Caretaker)	5 November 1996 - 17 February 1997
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	17 February 1997 -

THE MILITARY

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

General Mohammad Shariff	March 1976 - October 1978
General Mohammad Iqbal Khan	April 1980 - March 1984
General Rahimuddin Khan	March 1984 - March 1987
General Akhtar Abdur Rehman	March 1987 - August 1988
Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohi	November 1988 - November 1991
General Shamim Alam Khan	November 1991 - November 1994
Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroz Khan	November 1994 - November 1997

General Jehangir Karamat, CAOS, was assigned the additional charge of this post on 9 November 1997.

C-IN-C AND CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE ARMY

General Sir Frank Messervy	August 1947 - February 1948.
General Sir Douglas Gracy	February 1948 - January 1951

Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan	January 1951 - October 1958
General Mohammad Musa	October 1958 - September 1966
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan	September 1966 - December 1971
Lt. General Gul Hassan	December 1971 - March 1972
General Tikka Khan	March 1972 - February 1976
General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (Died in Office)	March 1976 - August 1988
General Mirza Aslam Beg	August 1988 - August 1991
General Asif Nawaz Janjua (Died in Office)	August 1991 - January 1993
General Abdul Waheed Kaker	January 1993 - January 1996
General Jehangir Karamat	January 1996 -

THE NAVY

Rear Admiral J. W. Jefford	August 1947 - February 1953
Vice Admiral Hafiz Mohammad Sadiq Chaudhri	February 1953 - February 1959
Vice Admiral A. R. Khan	March 1959 - October 1966
Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsen	October 1966 - August 1969
Vice Admiral Mozaffar Hassan	September 1969 - December 1971
Vice Admiral Hassan Hafeez Ahmed (Died in Office)	December 1971 - March 1975
Admiral Mohammad Sharif	March 1975 - March 1979

Admiral Karamat Rehman Niazi	March 1979 - March 1983
Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan	March 1983 - April 1986
Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohi	April 1986 - November 1988
Admiral Yasturul Haq Malik	November 1988 - November 1991
Admiral Saeed Mohammad Khan	November 1991 - November 1994
Admiral Mansural Haq	November 1994 - April 1997
Admiral Fasih Bokhari	May 1997 -

THE AIR FORCE

Air Vice Marshal A.L.A. Perry-Keane	
Air Vice Marshal R.L.A. Atcherley	August 1947 - July 1957
Air Vice Marshal L.W. Cannon	
Air Vice Marshal A.W.B. McDonald	
Air Marshal Mohammad Ashgar Khan	July 1957 - July 1965
Air Marshal Malik M. Nur Khan	July 1965 - August 1969
Air Marshal A. Rahim Khan	September 1969 - March 1972
Air Marshal M. Zafar Chaudhury	March 1972 - April 1974
Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan	April 1974 - July 1978
Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamim	July 1978 - March 1985

Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmed Khan	March 1985 - April 1988
Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah Khan	April 1988 - April 1991
Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroze	April 1991 - November 1994
Air Chief Marshal Muhammad Abbas Khattak	November 1994 - November 1997
Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi	November 1997 -

NOTES

On his retirement, General Tikka Khan was appointed Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on National Security. Later he entered politics and joined the PPP. Governor, Punjab, 1988-90

The permanent post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was created in March 1976. The first permanent Chairman, General Shariff, proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement on October 1, 1978. For some time Admiral Sharif acted as Chairman. The post was not regularly filled till 1980. In November 1997, instead of appointing a new Chairman, the Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat, was given the additional charge of this post.

General Zia-ul-Haq assumed power in JULY 1977. From July 1977 to September 1978, he was Chief Martial Law Administrator and Chief of Army Staff. He also assumed Presidency in September 1978. In order to assist him in performance of his duties as COAS, Lt. General Mohammad Iqbal Khan was appointed Deputy COAS (July 1978 - April 1980). The post of Vice Chief of Army Staff was created in 1980. The following served on this post:

- General Mohammad Sawar Khan (April 1980 - March 1984)
- General Khalid Mahmood Arif (March 1984 - March 1987)
- General Mirza Aslam Beg (March 1987 - August 1988).

Air Chief Marshal Farooq feroze Khan was given extension for one year in 1994. Before the expiry of his extended tenure, he was appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in November 1994.

On his retirement in August 1991, General Mirza Aslam Beg established a research organization called Foundation for Research on National Development and Security (FRIENDS). In August 1993, he decided to enter politics and shortly later joined the PML (J) which he left after an year or so. In 1995, he established his own political party called "Awami Qiadat Party".

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

EAST PAKISTAN

GOVERNORS

Sir Frederick Bourne	1947 - 50
Malik Feroz Khan Noon	1950 -53
Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman	1953 -54
Major General Iskander Mirza	May - October 1954
Sir Thomas Elis (Acting)	October - December 1954
Justice Shahabuddin	December 1954 - June 1955
Justice Amiruddin Ahmad	June 1955 - March 1956
A. K. Fazlul Haq	March 1956 - March 1958
Hamid Ali (Acting)	April - May 1958
Sultanuddin Ahmad (Acting)	May - October 1958
Zakir Hussain	October 1958 - April 1960
Lt. -General Azam Khan	April 1960 - May 1962
Ghulam Faruque	May - October 1962

Abdul Moneem Khan	October 1962 - March 1969
M. N. Huda	March 20-25, 1969
Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsen	1 September 1969 -28 February 1971
Lt. General Tikka Khan	9 April 1971 - 3 September 1971
Dr. A. M. Malik	3 September 1971 -14 December 1971

S. M. Ahsan handed over charge to Lt. General Yaquab Khan, Martial Law Administrator, in the evening of 28 February 1971. The Governor-designate, Lt. General Tikka Khan, reached Dhaka in a couple of days. The Chief Justice of Dhaka High Court declined to administer the oath office to Tikka Khan in view of situation created by the boycott movement of the Awami League. Tikka Khan therefore exercised the powers of the Governor as Martial Law Administrator, for which no oath was needed. The Chief Justice administered the oath to Tikka Khan on 9 April after the Pakistan Army re-established its authority in Dhaka.

CHIEF MINISTERS

Khawaja Nazimuddin	August 1947 - September 1948
Nurul Amin	September 1948 - April 1954
A.K. Fazlul Haq	April 1954 - May 1954
Abu Hussain Sarkar	June 1955 - August 1956
Ataur Rehman Khan	September 1956 - March 1958
Abu Hussain Sarkar	March 1958 - April 1958
Ataur Rehman Khan	April 1958 - June 1958
Abu Hussain Sarkar	June 1958
Ataur Rehman Khan	August 1958 - October 1958

THE PUNJAB

GOVERNORS

Sir Robert Francis Mudie	August 1947 - August 1949
Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar	August 1949 - November 1951
I.I. Chundrigar	November 1951 - May 1953
Main Aminuddin	May 1953 - June 1954
Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola	June 1954 - November 1954
Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani	November 1954 - October 1955

CHIEF MINISTERS

Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot	August 1947 - December 1948
Mian Mohammad Mumtaz Daultana	May 1951 - July 1953
Malik Feroz Khan Noon	July 1953 - May 1955
Abdul Hamid Khan Dasti	May 1955 - October 1955

(Separate province of Punjab was abolished in October 1955)

SINDH

GOVERNORS

G.H. Hidayatullah	August 1947 - April 1948
Din Mohammad	1948 - 52
Mian Aminuddin	1952 - 53
Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola	1953 - 54
Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot	1954 - 55

CHIEF MINISTERS

Mohammad Ayub Khuro	August 1947 - April 1948
Pir Illahi Baksh	May 1948 - February 1949
Yusuf Haroon	February 1949 - May 1950
Kazi Fazlullah	May 1950 - March 1951
Mohammad Ayub Khuro	March - December 1955
Pirzada Abdul sattar	May 1953 - November 1954
Mohammad Ayub Khuro	November 1954 - October 1955

(Separate province of Sindh was abolished in October 1955)

NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP)

GOVERNORS

Sir George Cunningham	1947-48
Sir Ambrose Dundas	1948-49
Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid	1949 -50
I.I. Chundrigar	1950 -1951

Khawaja Shahabuddin	1951 - 54
Qurban Ali Khan	1954 -1955

CHIEF MINISTERS

Dr. Khan Abdul Sattar Khan	Up to 22 August 1947
Abdul Qayyum Khan	August 1947 - April 1953
Sardar Abdur Rashid	April 1953 - July 1955

Sardar Bahadur Khan July 1955 - October 1955
(The province was abolished in October 1955)

BALUCHISTAN (BALUCHISTAN)

Balochistan was not a full-fledged province. It was administered by the Governor General until its integration into the province of West Pakistan in October 1955.

WEST PAKISTAN

The Province of West Pakistan was established by the integration of the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan in October 1955.

GOVERNORS

Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani	October 1955 - August 1957
Akhtar Hussain	September 1957 - May 1960
Malik Amir Mohammad Khan	June 1960 - September 1966
General Mohammad Musa	September 1966 - March 1969
Yusuf Haroon	March 20 - 25, 1969
Air Marshal M. Nur Khan	September 1969 - January 1970
Lt. General Attique Rahman	February 1970 - June 1970

CHIEF MINISTERS

Dr. Khan Abdus Sattar Khan	October 1955 - July 1957
Sardar Abdur Rashid	July 1957 - March 1958
Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qazilbash	March 1958 - October 1958
No Chief Minister	1958 - 1970

The integrated province of West Pakistan was abolished on 1 July 1970, and four provinces of the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan were re-established.

THE PUNJAB

GOVERNORS

Lt.-General Attique Rahman	July 1970 - December 1971
Ghulam Mustafa Khar	December 1971 - November 1973
Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi	November 1973 - March 1975
Ghulam Mustafa Khar	March 1975 - July 1975
Nawab Mohammad Abbas Khan Abbasi	July 1975 - July 1977
Chief Justice Aslam Riaz Husain (Acting)	July 1977 - September 1978
Lt. General Sawar Khan	September 1978 - May 1980
Lt. General Ghulam Jilani Khan	May 1980 - December 1985
Makhdoom Sajjad Husain Qureshi	December 1985 - December 1988
General Tikka Khan	December 1988 - August 1990
Mian Mohammad Azhar	August 1990 - April 1993
Chaudhary Altaf Hussain	April 1993 - July 1993
Lt.-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan (Acting)	July 1993 - March 1994
Chaudhary Altaf Hussain (Died in Office)	March 1994 - May 1995
Lt. General Raja Muhammad Saroop Khan	June 1995 - November 1996

Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim November 1996 - March 1997

Shahid Hamid March 1997 -

CHIEF MINISTERS

Malik Meraj Khalid May 1972 - November 1973

Ghulam Mustafa Khar November 1973 - March 1974

Mohammad Hancef Ramay March 1974 - July 1975

Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi July 1975 - July 1977

(No Chief Minister 1977 - 85)

Mohammad Nawaz Sharif April 1985 - August 1990

Ghulam Haider Wyne
(Caretaker and Regular) August 1990 - April 1993

Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo April 1993 - July 1993

Sheikh Manzoor Elahi
(Caretaker) July 1993 - October 1993

Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo October 1993 - September 1995

(Governor's Rule : 5 -13 September 1995)

Sardar Muhammad Arif Nakai September 1995 - November 1996

The Punjab High Court restored the government of Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo on 3 November 1996 and gave him ten days to obtain a vote of confidence on the floor of the Punjab Assembly. He resigned on 16 November and the Provincial Assembly was dissolved on 17 November.

Mian Afzal Hayat (Caretaker) November 1996 - February 1997

Mian Shahbaz Sharif February 1997 -

SINDH

GOVERNORS

Lt.-General Rakhman Gul July 1970 - December 1971

Mumtaz Ali Bhutto December 1971 - May 1972

Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur 1972-73

Begum Raana Liaquat Ali Khan 1973 - 76

Nawab Mohammad Dilawar Khan 1976 - 77

Chief Justice Abdul Qadir Sheikh (Acting) 1977 - 78

Lt.-General S.M. Abbasi 1978 - 84

Lt.-General Jahandad Khan March 1984 - January 1987

Ashraf W.M. Tabani January 1987 - June 1988

General Rahimuddin Khan
(Acting) June - September 1988

Justice Qadeeruddin Ahmad September 1988 - April 1989

Justice Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim April 1989 - August 1990

Mahmood A. Haroon August 1990 - July 1993

Hakim Muhammad Saeed
(Acting) July 1993 - January 1994

Mahmood A. Haroon January 1994 - May 1995

Kamaluddin Azfar May 1995 - March 1997

Lt.-General Moeenuddin Haider March 1997 -

CHIEF MINISTERS

Mumtaz Ali Bhutto May 1972 - December 1973

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi December 1973 - July 1977

(No chief Minister 1977 - 85)

Syed Ghous Ali Shah April 1985 - April 1988

Akhtar Ali G. Kazi (Regular) April - May 1988
(Senior Minister) (Caretaker) June-August 1988
August - December 1988

Syed Qaim Ali Shah December 1988 - February 1990

Aftab Shaban Mirani February 1990 - August 1990

Jam Sadiq Ali (died in office) August 1990 - March 1992

Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah March 1992 - 19 July 1993

Justice (Retd.) Ali Madad Shah July 1993 - October 1993
(Caretaker)

Syed Abdullah Shah October 1993 - November 1996

Mumtaz Ali Bhutto (Caretaker) November 1996 - February 1997

Liaquat Ali Jatoi February 1997 -

NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP)**GOVERNORS**

Lt. -General K.M. Azhar Khan July 1970 - December 1971

Hayat Mohammad Khan December 1971 - April 1972
Sherpao

Arbab Sikaner Khan Khalil April 1972 - February 1973

Mohammad Aslam Khan 1973 - 74
Khattak

Major General Sayad Ghawas 1974 - 76

Major General Naseer-Ullah 1976 - 77
Khan Baber

Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Khan 1977 - 78
(Acting)

Lt. -General Fazle Haq 1978 - 85

Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti 1985 - 86

Fida Mohammad Khan 1986 - 88

Brigadier Amir Gulistan Janjua June 1988 - July 1993

Major General Khurshid Ali July 1993 - November 1996
Khan (Acting and Regular)

Lt. -General Muhammad Arif November 1996 -
Bangash

CHIEF MINISTERS

Maulana Mufti Mahmud May 1972 - February 1973

Sardar Inayatullah Khan May 1973 - February 1975
Gandapur

(President's Rule : February - May 1975)

Nasrullah Khan Khattak May 1975 - April 1977

Mohammad Iqbal Khan Jadoon April - July 1977

(No Chief Minister 1977 - 85)

Arbab Mohammad Jehangir April 1985 - May 1988
Khan

Lt. -General Fazle Haq (Caretaker)	May 1988 - December 1988
Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao	December 1988 - August 1990
Mir Afzal Khan (Caretaker and Regular)	August 1990 - July 1993
Mufti Muhammad Abbas (Caretaker)	July 1993 - October 1993
Pir Muhammad Sabir Shah	October 1993 - April 1994
(Governor's Rule:	25 February-24 March 1994)
Aftab Ahmad Sherpao	April 1994 - November 1996
Raja Sikander Zaman (Caretaker)	November 1996 - February 1997
Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan Abbasi	February 1997 -

BALOCHISTAN

GOVERNORS

Lt. -General Riaz Hussain	July 1970 - December 1971
Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani	December 1971 - April 1972
Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo	April 1972 - February 1973
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti	February 1973 - January 1974
Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (The Khan of Kalat)	January 1974 - July 1977
Chief Justice Mir Khuda Bakhsh Mari (Acting)	July 1977 -78

Lt. -General Rahimuddin Khan	1978 - March 1984
Lt. -General S.F.S.K. Lodi	March 1984 -
Lt. -General K.K. Afridi	1984 -85
General Mohammad Musa (Died in office)	December 1985 - March 1991
Sardar Gul Mohammad Jogezeai	1991 - 1993
Brigadier Sardar Abdul Rahim Durani (Acting)	July 1993 - May 1994
Lt. -General Imranullah Khan	May 1994 - April 1997
Mian Gul Aurangzeb	April 1997 -

CHIEF MINISTERS

Sardar Attaullah Mangel	May 1972 - February 1973
(President's Rule: 15 February - 27 April 1973)	
Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan	April 1973 - December 1975
(President's Rule: 31 December 1975 -30 June 1976)	
Mohammad Khan Barozai	June 1976 - July 1977
(No chief Minister 1977 - 85)	
Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan	April 1985 - May 1988
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali (Caretaker)	May - December 1988
Chief Justice (Retd.) Khuda Bakhsh Mari (Caretaker)	December 1988 - January 1989
Nawab Mohammad Akbar Bugti	January 1989 - August 1990

Humayun Mari (Caretaker)	August - October 1990
Mir Taj Mohammad Jamali	October 1990 - May 1993
Nawab Zulfikar Ali Magsi	May 1993 - July 1993
Sardar Mir Naseer Ahmad Mangel (Caretaker)	July 1993 - October 1993
Nawab Zulfikar Ali Magsi	October 1993 - November 1996
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali (Caretaker)	November 1996 - February 1997
Sardar Akhtar Mengal	February 1997 -

Bibliography

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography does not include official publications (White Papers, Reports and Communiques) and Newspapers. These have been cited in the footnotes which may be consulted. The bibliography of the second edition of this book also includes useful books and articles.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Books

- Arhamsson, B., *Military Professionalization and Political Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.
- Bienen, H. & Morell, D. (eds.), *Political Participation Under Military Regimes*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.
- Bienen, H. (ed.), *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development*, New York: Russell Sage, 1968.
- Cochran, Charles L. (ed.), *Civil Military Relations*, New York: The Free Press, 1974.
- Doorn, J. V. (ed.), *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, The Hague: Mouton, 1969.
- Doorn, J. V. (ed.), *Armed Forces and Society*, The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
- Feit, Edward, *The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.
- Fidel, K. (ed.), *Militarism in Developing Countries*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1975.
- Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback*, London: Pall Mall, 1962.
- Fischer, S., *The Military in the Middle East*, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963.
- Gutteridge, W. F., *Armed Forces in New States*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Bibliography

347

- Gutteridge, W. F., *Military institutions and Power in the New States*, London: Praeger, 1965.
- Huntington, S. P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Huntington, S. P., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Janowitz, Morris, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Johnson, J. J. (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Kautsky, J. H. (ed.), *Political Change in Under-developed Countries*, New York, 1962.
- Kennedy, G., *The Military in the Third World*, New York: Charles Scribner, 1974.
- Kolkowicz, R. & Korbonski (eds.), *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982.
- Luttwak, E., *Coup D'etat: A Practical Handbook*, Penguin Books, 1969.
- McWilliams, W. (ed.), *Garrisons and Governments: Politics and the Military in New States*, San Francisco: Chandler, 1967.
- Nordlinger, E. A., *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1977.
- Perlmutter, Amos, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Welch, Claude E. (ed.), *Civilian Control of the Military*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976.

Articles

- Andreski, S., "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), 3, 3, December, 1980, pp. 3-10.
- "Back to the Barracks". Special Issue of *Third World Quarterly*, 7, 1, January, 1985.
- Ball, Nicole, "Third World Militaries and Politics: An Introductory Essay," *Cooperation and Conflict*, XVII, I, March 1982, pp. 41-60.
- Ball, Nicole, "The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How," *World Development*, 9, 6, June 1981, pp. 569-582.
- Bill, J. A., "The Military and Modernization in the Middle East," *Comparative Politics*, 2, 1, October 1969, pp. 41-62.
- Bobrow, D. B., "The Civic Role of the Military," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIX, I, March 1966, pp. 101-111.
- Dowse, R. E., "The Military and Political Development," in the Leys, C.(ed.), *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, Cambridge, 1969.
- Feit, E., "Military Coups and Political Development : Some Lessons From Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, XX, 2, January 1968, pp. 179-193.
- Hopkins, K., "Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 17, 2 (1966), pp. 165-181.
- Jackman, Robert, W., "Politicians in Uniform : Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World," *APSR*, LXX, 4, December 1976, pp. 1078-1097.
- Klieman, Aaron S., "Confined to Barracks : "Emergencies and the Military in Developing Countries", *Comparative Politics*, 12, 2, January 1980, pp. 143-163.
- Luckham, A. R. "A Comparative Typology of Civil-military Relations," *Government and Opposition*, 6, 1, Winter 1971, pp. 5-35.

Bibliography

- McKinlay, R.D. & Cohan, A. S., "Performance and Instability in Military and Non-military Regime Systems," *APSR*, LXY, 3, September, 1976, pp. 850-864.
- McKinlay, R.D. & Cohan, A.S., "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes : A Cross-national Study," *Comparative Politics*, 8, 1, October 1975, pp. 1-27.
- Perlmutter, A. "The Arab Military Elite," (Review Article), *World Politics*, XXII, 2, January 1970, pp. 270-300.
- Perlmutter, A., "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army," *Comparative Politics*, 1, 3, April 1969, pp. 382-404.
- Rapoport, D.C., "The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation," *Political Science Quarterly*, 83, 4, December 1968, pp. 551-572.
- Welch, Claude E., "Long Term Consequences of Military Rule: Breakdown and Extrication," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 1, 2, September 1978, pp. 139-153.
- Wolpin, Miles D., "Socio-political Radicalism and Military Professionalism in the Third World," *Comparative Politics*, 15, 2, January 1983, pp. 203-221.

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Books

- Azad, Maulana A.K., *Indian Wins Freedom*, Calcutta : Orient Longmans, 1959.
- Birdwood, Lord, *A Continent Decides*, London : Robert Hale, 1959.
- Bryant, Arthur, *The Turn of the Tide*, London, Collins, 1957.
- Campbell-Johnsons, A, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London : Robert Hale, 1951.
- Candler, E., *The Sepoy*, London: Johan Murray, 1919.

- Chiorl, Valentine, *Indian Unrest*, London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Choudhury Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1967.
- Collins, K. J., *Lord Wavell (1883-1941) : A Military History*, London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1948.
- Connell, John Auchinleck, London : Cassell, 1959.
- Das, T. S., *Indian Military Its History and Development*, New Delhi, Sagar Publications, 1969.
- Elliott, J. G., *A Roll of Honour*, London: Cassell, 1965
- Elliott, J. G., *The Frontier 1839-1847*, London : Cassell, 1968.
- Griffiths, Sir Percival, *The British Impact on India*, London: MacDonal, 1952.
- Gupta S. C., *History of the Indian Air Force 1933-45*, Delhi , Orient Longmans, 1961.
- Gwyer, Sir Maurice and Appadorai, A. (eds.), *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47*, 2, Vols. London : Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Hodson, H. V., *The Great Divide*, Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Ismay, Lord, *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*, London : Heinemann, 1960.
- Jackson, D., *India's Army*, London: Sampson Low, 1940
- Keith, A. B., *A Constitutional History of India 1600-1935*, London, 1936.
- Kirby, S. W., *The War Against Japan*, London: 1961.
- Lawford, J. P. and Catto. W. E., *Solah Punjab*, Aldershot : Gale and Polden, 1967.

- Lumby, E. W. R., *The Transfer of Power in India*, London : Allen and Unwin, 1954.
- MacMunn, Sir George, *The Martial Races of India*, London : Sampson Low, 1933.
- Magnus, Philip, *Kitchener : Portrait of an Imperialist*, London : John Murrar, 1958.
- Menon, V. P., *The Integration of the Indian States*, Orient Longmans, 1956.
- Menon, V. P., *The Transfer of Power in India*, London: Orient Longmans, 1957.
- Panikkar, K.M., *India and the Indian Ocean*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1945.
- Panikkar, K.M., *Problems of Indian Defence*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960.
- Philips, C.H. and Wainwright, M. D. (eds.), *The Partition of India., Policies and Perspectives 1935-47*, London. : Allen and Unwin, 1970.
- Poplai, S.L (ed.), *Select Documents on Asian Affairs India 1947-50.*, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Prasad, Bishehwar, *Defence of India: Policy and Plans*, London : Orient Longmans, 1963.
- Prasad, Nandan (ed.), *Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organization, 1939-45*. London: Orient Longmans, 1956.
- Rawlinson, H.G., *The British Achievement in India*, London; William Hodge, 1948.
- Singh, Nagendra, *The Theory of Force and Organisation of Defence in Indian Constitutional History From Earliest Times to 1947*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1969.
- Sundaram, Lanka, *India's Armies and their Costs*, Bombay, 1946.
- Superintendent Government Printing Press, *The Army in India and its Evolution.*, Calcutta, 1924.

Tuker, Sir Francis, *While Memory Serves*, London: Cassell 1950.

Venkateshwaran, A.L., *Defence Organisation in India*, New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Defence, 1969.

Yeats-Brown, F., *Martial India*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1945.

Articles

Aiyer, P.S. Sivaswamy, "A Plea for Retrenchment," *Nineteenth Century, and After*, XCII, 547, September 1922.

Auchinleck, Sir Claude, "The British Indian Army," *The Geographical Magazine*, April 1952.

Cohen, S. P., "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI, 4., Winter 1963-64, pp. 411-429.

Cohen, S. P., "Issue, Role, and Personality: The Kitchener-Curzon Dispute", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, X, 3, April 1968, pp. 337-355.

Cohen, S. P., "The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics and the Indian Army," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXVIII, 3, May 1969, pp. 453-468.

Colyer, W.J., "Tackling the Refugee Problem in the Western Punjab," *The Army Quarterly*, LVI, 2, July 1948.

Davies, C. Colin, "British Relations with the Afradis," *The Army Quarterly*, XXIII, 2, January 1932.

Elliott, J.G., "The Army in India," *The Army Quarterly*, LV, 1, October 1947.

Gale, Sir Richard, "Progress and Special Problems of India and Pakistan," *Journal of Royal United Services Institution*, XCVI, 581, February 1951, pp. 34-44.

Bibliography

Gutteridge, W., "The Indianisation of the Indian Army, 1918-45," *Race*, IV, 2, May 1963, pp. 39-48.

Hafiz, "The Indian Mutiny and After," *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, CII, 608, November 1957.

Henniker, M.C.A., "Early Days of Pakistan," *The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, XCIII, 569, February 1948.

Irwin, S. F., "The Indian Army in Partition," *The Army Quarterly*, LVI, 2, July 1948.

Jacob, Sir Claud W., "The Defence of India," *India Monthly*, 5, 5, November 1930.

Jacob, Sir Claud W., "The Indian Army and its Future," *English Review*, February 1931, pp. 169-174.

Jeffrey, Robin, "The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problems of Order, August 1947," *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 4, October 1974, pp. 491-520.

O'Brien, A., "The Reforms and the Indian Army," *The Nineteenth Century and after*, CII, 605, July 1927.

Preston, A., "The Indian Army and Indo-British Political and Strategic Relations, 1745-1947," *USI Journal (India)*, No. 421, Oct-Dec, 1970, pp. 357-389.

Sing, Jewan, "Some Aspects of the Indian Army and its Indianization," *The Army Quarterly*, XXII, 2, July 1931.

Strettel, Sir Dashwood, "The Indian Army Before and After 1947," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXV, II, April 1948, pp. 119-130.

Tuker, Sir Francis, "Defence of India and Pakistan," *Manchester Guardian*, 15th December 1949.

THE PAKISTAN MILITARY

Books

- Ahmad, Mohammad (Colonel), *My Chief*, Lahore: Longmans, 1960.
- Ahmad, Saeed (Major), *Indo-Pak Clash in Rann of Kutch 1965*, Rawalpindi: Army Education Press, 1973.
- Asghar Khan, Mohammad (Air Marshal), *The First Round, Indo-Pakistan War, 1965*, Lahore: Tabeer Publishing House, 1979.
- Attiqur Rahman, M. (Lt. General), *The Wardens of the Marches: A History of the Piffers 1947-71*, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1980.
- Attiqur Rahman, M., *Our Defence Cause*, London: White Lion Publishers, 1976.
- Attiqur Rahman, M., *Leadership: Senior Commanders*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1973.
- Ayub Khan, Mohammad (Field Marshal), *Friends Not Masters*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Brines, Russel, *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict*, London: Pall Mall, 1968.
- Chaudhury, Amjad Ali (Brigadier), *September 1965 Before and After*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977.
- Cohen, Stephen P., *The Pakistan Army*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Cohen, Stephen P., *The Indian Army*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Fricker, John, *Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965*, London: Ian Allen Ltd., 1979.
- Hussain, Syed Shabbir & Qureshi, M. Tariq, *Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-82*, Karachi: PAF Press, 1982.

Bibliography

- Khan, Fazal Muqeem (Major General), *Pakistan Crisis in Leadership*, Rawalpindi: National Book Foundation 1973.
- Khan, Fazal Muqeem, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Khan, M. Akbar (Major General), *Raiders in Kashmir*, Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1970, 1975.
- Malik, S. K. (Brigadier), *The Quranic Concept of War*, Lahore, Wajidalis, 1979.
- Moore, Raymond A., *Nation-Building and the Pakistan Army 1947-69*, Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1979.
- Musa, Mohammad (General), *My Version, Indo-Pakistan War 1965*, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983.
- Musa, Mohammad, *Jawan to General*, Karachi: East and West Publishing Co., 1984.
- Rizvi, S. Haider Abbas (Brigadier), *Veteran Campaigner: A History of the Punjab Regiment 1759-1981*, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1984.
- Salik, Siddiq (Brigadier), *Witness to Surrender*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, Nawabzada (Major General), *The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan*, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1978.
- Articles
- Alam, K.M. (Captain), "The Maritime Compulsions of Pakistan," *The Pakistan Times*, 6 September 1975.
- Alavi, Hamza, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan," *International Socialist Journal*, 3, 14, March-April 1966, pp. 149-181.
- A Staff Study, "What was the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case," *Outlook* (Karachi), 1, 32, 11 November 1972.

- A Staff Study, "The War Commission and the Surrender," *Outlook*, 3, 8, 25 May 1974.
- Bordewich, Fergus M., "The Pakistan Army: Sword of Islam," *Asia (New York)*, September-October 1982, pp. 16-23, 48-53.
- Butt, G.S. (Major General), "Role of Armed Forces in National Development," *The Muslim*, 6 September 1982.
- Chang, D.W., "The Military and Nation Building in Korea, Burma and Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 9, 11, November 1969, pp. 818-830.
- Chaudri, H. M. Siddiq (Vice Admiral), "Defence Set-up Priorities," *The Pakistan Times*, 11 February 1972.
- Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan: Army, Society and Security," *Asian Affairs. An American Review*, 10, 2, Summer 1983, pp. 1-26.
- Dar, E.H. (Major General), Pakistan Army in the Eighties," *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 4 January 1985 (Reprinted from Army Quarterly, U.K).
- Defence Journal* (Karachi): A monthly magazine dealing with strategy, security problems, defence production and regional affairs.
- Hashrni, Bilal, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State," in Gardezi H. & Rashid, J. (eds.), *Pakistan The Roots of Dictatorship*, London: Zed Press, 1983, pp. 148-172.
- Hussain, Asaf, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, XVI 10, October 1976, pp. 918-930.
- Husain, S. Murtaza, "Peace-Time Role of Armed Forces," *Dawn*, 6 September, 1972.
- Janjua, M.K., "Was the Rawalpindi Conspiracy A Myth?" *Outlook*, 1, 41, 13 January 1973.
- Khan, M. Akbar, "Pahli Jang-i-Kashmir ki Fire-Bandi aur Pindi Sazish Case," (Urdu), *Monthly Hikayat*, 5, 1 September 1972.
- Khan, Fazal Muqeem, "in the Service of the Country as Soliders," *Dawn*, 9 January 1961.

- Majeed, Tariq (Commander), "Navy in Indian Ocean Strategy", *The Pakistan Times*, 6 September 1974.
- Moore, R.A. "Military and Nation Building in India and Pakistan." *World Affairs*, 132, 3, December 1969, pp. 219-234.
- Moore, R.A., "The Use of the Army in Nation-Building: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 9, 6, June 1969, pp. 447-456.
- Moore, R.A., "The Army as a Vehicle for Social Change in Pakistan," *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 11, October 1967, pp. 57-74.
- Mujahid Shairf-al, "Pakistan Armed Forces in 1947", *The Muslim*, 6 September 1980.
- Naseeruddin, Saiyed (Brigadier), "The Muslim Soldier," *The Muslim*, 6 September 1980.
- Nur Khan, Mohammad (Air Marshal), "Organization for Higher Defence Policy in Pakistan," *The Sun* (Karachi), 21 May 1972.
- O'Ballance, E., "The Indo-Pakistan Campaign, 1965," *The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, CXI, 644, November 1966.
- Observer, "Army's Assistance in Development of Baluchistan and Chitral," *Dawn*, 6 September 1975.
- Panaforce, "Training in the Armed Forces," *The Pakistan Times*, 6 September 1984.
- Panaforce, "Armed Forces and National Development," *The Pakistan Times*, 23 March 1983.
- Panaforce, "Armed Force Role in Nation-Building," *Dawn*, 6 September 1974.
- Rahman, S.M., "Motivation: The Ultimate Weapon," *The Muslim*, 6 September 1984.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, XXIV, 5, May 1984, pp. 534-555.

- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan," in Katz, J.E. (ed.), *Arms Production in Developing Countries*, Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath & Co., 1984, pp. 265-278.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan's Security Consideration and Defence Industry," *Defence Journal* IX, 9, September 1983, pp. 25-32.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Military and Nation-Building in the Third World," *Defence Journal*, 2, 1-2, January-February 1976.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Formative Phase of the Pakistan Armed Forces," *The Journal of History & Political Science (Lahore)*, 1, 1 (1971-72), pp. 25-40.
- Sarfraz, N. (Lt. Commander), "Development of the Navy: Three Fundamental Principles," *Dawn*, 6 September 1974.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan," in Doorn, J.V. (ed.), *Armed Forces and Society*, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, pp. 274-297.
- Sieveling, O., "Pakistan and Her Armed Forces," *Military Review*, 43, 6, June 1963, pp. 91-97.
- Singh, D & Singh, K., "The Military Elites and Problems of National Integration in India and Pakistan," *Indian Journal of Politics*, VII, 2, July-December 1973, pp. 165-176.
- Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "The Military in Contemporary Pakistan," *Armed Forces and Society*, 6, 4, Summer 1980, pp. 639-653.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Afzal, M. Rafique, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-58*, Islamabad: National Commission on Historical & Cultural Research, 1976.
- Ahmad, Manzooruddin (ed.), *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society*, Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 1980.
- Ahmad, Muneer, *Aspects of Pakistan's Politics and Administration*, Lahore: South Asia Institute, 1974.

- Ahmad, Mushtaq, *Politics Without Social Change*, Karachi: Space Publishers, 1971.
- Ahmad, Mushtaq, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi: Space Publisher, 1970.
- Ali, Tariq, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*, London: Janathan Cape, 1970.
- Asghar Khan, Mohammad (Air Marshal), *Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-82*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1983.
- Asghar Khan, Mohammad, *Pakistan At the Cross-Roads*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1969.
- Ayub Khan, Mohammad (Field Marshal), *Friends Not Masters*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Aziz, K.K., *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-58*, Islamabad: National Commission on Historical & Cultural Research 1976.
- Bhutto, Z. A., *The Great Tragedy*, Karachi: People's Party, 1971.
- Binder, L., *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
- Braibanti, R., *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan*, Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1966.
- Burki, Shahid Javed & Laporte, R. (eds.), *Pakistan's Development Priorities*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Burki, Shahid Javed, *State and Society in Pakistan 1971-77*, London: McMillan, 1980.
- Callard, K., *Pakistan A Political Study*, London: George Allen, 1958.
- Caroe, Sir Olaf, *The Pathans 550 BC-AD 1957*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983, (First edition 1958).
- Choudhury, G.W., *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*, London: Longman, 1969.

- Choudhury, G.W., *Democracy in Pakistan*, Dacca: Green Book House, 1963.
- Choudhury, G.W. (ed.), *Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan*, Dacca & Vancouver, 1967.
- Edger, A & Schuler, K.R., *Public Opinion and Constitution-making in Pakistan 1958-62*, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1967.
- Feldman, H., *The End, and the Beginning Pakistan 1969-71*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Feldman, H., *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-69*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Feldman, H., *Revolution in Pakistan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Gardezi, H & Rashid, J. (eds.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship*, London: Zed Press, 1983.
- Goodnow, H.F., *The Civil Service of Pakistan, Bureaucracy in the New Nation*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Griffin, K & Khan, Azizur Rehman, *Growth and inequality in Pakistan*, London: MacMillan, 1972.
- Harrison, Selig S., *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment, 1981.
- Hussain, Asaf, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State The Case of Pakistan*, Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1979.
- Jafri, Rais Ahmad (ed.), *Ayub: Soldier and Statesman*, Lahore: Mohammad Ali Academy 1966.
- Jahan, Rounaq, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Kochanek, Stanley A., *Interest Groups and Political Development Business and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983.

- Laporte, Robert, *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Mahmud, Safdar, *Pakistan Divided*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1984.
- Mehdi, Haider (ed.), *Essays on Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1970.
- Munir, Muhammad, *From Jinnah to Zia*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1979.
- Rehman, Inamur, *Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, *Pakistan People's Party: The First Phase 1967-71*, (Monograph), Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, *Politics in Pakistan The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger, 1980.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, *The Political System of Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Siddiqui, Kalim, *Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan*, London: MacMillan, 1972.
- Syed, Anwar, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1984.
- Taseer, Salman, *Bhutto A Political Biography*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1980.
- Tinker, Hugh, *Ballot Box and Bayonet*, London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Tinker, Hugh, *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis*, Rev. Edition, London: Pall Mall, 1967.
- Von Vorys, K., *Political Development in Pakistan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Weeks, R.V., *Pakistan Birth and Growth of Muslim Nation*, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964.

Wheeler, Richard S., *The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest*, Cornell University Press, 1970.

Wilcox, W.A., *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Wriggins, W.H. (ed.), *Pakistan in Transition*, Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975.

Yusuf, Hamid, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77*, Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980.

Zafar, S.M., *Through the Crisis*, Lahore: Book Center, 1970.

Ziring, Lawrence, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980.

Ziring, L., Bruibanti, R., and Wriggins, H. (eds.), *Pakistan The Long View*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Center for Commonwealth & Comparative Studies, 1977.

Ziring, Lawrence, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-69*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971.

Articles

Ahmad, Emjuddin, "Exclusive Bureaucratic Elites in Pakistan Their Socio-economic and Regional Background," *Indian Political Science Review*, XV, 1, January 1981, pp. 52-66.

Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Revival in Pakistan," in Pullapilly, C.K. (ed.), *Islam in the Contemporary World*, Notre Dame, Indian: Cross Road Press, 1980, pp. 261-273.

Akhyar, M.A., "Pakistan: The Way Ahead From Martial Law", *South Asian Review* (UK), 3, 1, October 1969, pp. 23-30.

Alavi, Hamza, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review*, 74, July-August 1972, pp. 59-81.

Bibliography

Anderson, D. D., "Pakistan's Search for National Identity," *The Yale Review*, 55, 4, Summer 1966, pp. 552-569.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, "A New Experiment in Democracy in Pakistan," *The Annals* (AAPSS), 348, March 1965, pp. 109-113.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, "Pakistan's Economic Progress," *International Affairs*, 43, 1, January 1967, pp. 1-11.

Baxter, C., "Pakistan Votes - 1970," *Asian Survey*, XI, 3, March 1971, pp. 197-218.

Bertocci, P.J., "East Pakistan: The Harvest of Strife," *South Asian Review*, 5, 1, October 1971, pp. 11-18.

Braibanti, R., "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, LVIII, 2 (1959), pp. 258-304.

Burki, Shahid Javed, "Pakistan's Development: An Overview," *World Development*, 9, 3, March 1981, pp. 301-314.

Burki Shahid Javed, "Ayub's Fall: Socio-Economic Explanation," *Asian Survey*, 12, 3, March 1972, pp. 201-212.

Burki, Shahid Javed, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 9, 4, April 1969, pp. 239-254.

Dobell, W.M., "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, XLII, 3, Fall 1969.

Dunbar, David, "Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations," *Asian Survey*, 12, 5, May 1972, pp. 444-461.

Gorvine, Albert, "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal*, XIX, Summer 1965, pp. 321-336.

Heeger, Gerald A., "Politics in the Post-military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience," *World Politics*, 29, 2, January 1977, pp. 242-262.

Kennedy, Charles H., "Politics of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, XXIV, 6, June 1984, pp. 688-703.

- Khalizad, Zalmay, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Southwest Asia: Political Development or Decay," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1984-85, pp. 657-679.
- Laporte, R., "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation," *Asian Survey*, 12, 2, February 1972, pp. 221-230.
- Laporte, R., "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State," *Asian Survey*, 9, 11, November 1969, pp. 842-861.
- Lodhi, Maliha, "Pakistan in Crisis," *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XVI, 1, March 1978, pp. 60-78.
- Muniruzzaman, Talukdar, "National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 7, 12, December 1967.
- Morris-Jones, W.H., "Pakistan Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh," *The Political Quarterly*, 43, 2, April-July 1972, pp. 187-200.
- Mujahid, Sharif-al, "The 1977 Pakistani Elections: An Analysis," in Ahmad, M.(ed.), *Contemporary Pakistan*, Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 1980, pp. 63-91.
- Mujahid, Sharif-al, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 5, 11, November 1965.
- Mujahid, Sharif-al, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections," *Asian Survey*, 5, 6, June 1965, pp. 280-294.
- Naqvi, M.B., "Pakistan: Revolution Without a Plan," *Asian Review* (UK), 2, 4, July 1969, pp. 267-276.
- Newman, K.J., "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXII, 1, March 1959, pp. 18-33.
- Qureshi, Salem M., "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal*, XX, 4, Autumn 1966, pp. 456-472.
- Richter, William L., "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, XIX 6, June 1979, pp. 547-557.

- Richter, Willaim L., "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, 51, 3, Fall 1978, pp. 406-426.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan's Political Culture," *The Journal of History & Political Science* (Lahore), 2, 2, (1975-76), pp. 22-33.
- Sayeed, Khalid. Bin, "Pathan Regionalism," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXIII (1964), pp. 478-504.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, "Religion and Nation Building in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal* XVII, September 1963, pp. 279-291.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal*, XIII, 4, Autumn 1959, pp. 389-406.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI, 2, June 1958, pp. 131-146.
- Suhrawardy, H.S., "Political Stability and Democracy in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs*, 35, 3, April 1957.
- Syed, Anwar "Z.A. Bhutto's Self Characterizations and Pakistani Political Culture," *Asian Survey*, XVIII, 12, December 1978, pp. 1250-1266.
- Taylor, David, "The Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan," in Piscatori, J. P. (ed.), *Islam in Political Process*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 181-198.
- Weinbaum, M.G., "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost," *Asian survey*, XVII, 7, July 1977, pp. 599-618.
- Wilcox, W.A., "Pakistan in 1969: Once Again At the Starting Point," *Asian Survey*, 10, 2, February 1970, pp. 73-81.
- Wilcox, W.A. "The Pakistan Coup D'etat of 1958," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVIII, 2, Summer 1965, pp. 142-163.
- Ziring, Lawrence, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, XXIV, 9, September 1984, pp. 931-946.
- Ziring, Lawrence, "Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm," *Asian Survey*, XVII, 7, July 1977, pp. 581-598.

DEFENCE & FOREIGN POLICY

Books

- Akhtar Ali., *Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma, Energy and Security Dimensions*, Karachi : Economist Research Unit, 1983.
- Bains, J.S., *India's International Disputes: A Legal Study*, London: Asia, 1962.
- Bhutto, Z.A., *The Myth of Independence*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Birdwood, Lord, *Two Nations and Kashmir*, London: Robert Hale, 1956.
- Brown W. Norman, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Burke, S.M., *Mainsprings Of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Chaudhri, Mohammad Ahsan (ed.), *Pakistan and Regional Security*, Karachi: Royal Books, 1984.
- Chaudhri, Mohammad Ahsan, *Pakistan and the Great Powers*, Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1970.
- Chawla, S. & Sardesai D. R. (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York: Praeger, 1980.
- Choudhury, G.W., *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, New York: The Free Press, 1975.
- Choudhury, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-66*, London: Pall Mall, 1968.
- Gupta, Siser, *Kashmir: A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay: Asia, 1966.

Bibliography

- Hasan, K. Sarwar (ed.), *The Kashmir Question: Documents on the Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966.
- Hasan, K. Sarwar (ed.), *China, India, Pakistan: Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan*, Karachi. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966.
- Hasan, Masuma (ed.), *Pakistan in a Changing World*, Karachi : Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978.
- Khan, Rais Ahmad (ed.), *Pakistan-United States Relations*, Islamabad : Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1983.
- Khan, Shaheen Irshad, *Rejection Alliance: A case Study of U. S.-Pakistan Relations 1947-67*, Lahore : Ferozsons, 1972.
- Korbel, Josef, *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Palmer, N.D., *South Asia and United States Policy*, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
- Razvi, Mujtaba, *The Frontiers of Pakistan*, Karachi : National Publishing House, 1971.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, *Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan, 1971*, Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1981.
- Rizvi Hasan-Askari, *Politics of the Bomb in South Asia* (monograph), Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1975.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, *The Soviet Union and the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, (Monograph), Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1974.
- Rizvi Hasan-Askari, *South Asia and Indian Military Build-up* (Monograph), Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973.
- Siddiqi, Aslam, *Pakistan Seeks Security*, Lahore : Longmans, 1960.

Siddiqi, Aslam, *A Path for Pakistan*, Karachi : Pakistan Publishing House, 1964.

Syed, Anwar Hussain, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale*, Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, *The United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of Influence Relationship*, New York. Praeger, 1982.

Vertzberger, Yaacov, *The Enduring Entente : Sino-Pakistan Relations 1960-80*, The Washington Papers No. 95, New York: Praeger, 1983.

Wilcox, Wayne A., *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China* : New York Walker, 1964.

Ziring, Lawrence (ed.), *The Sub-continent in World Politics*, Rev. edition, New York. Praeger, 1982.

Articles

Akram, A. I. (Lt. General), "India and Pakistan : A Glorious Future," *Regional Studies* (Islamabad), 2, 2, Spring 1984, pp. 3.12.

'Ali, Meharunnisa, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties Since the Afghanistan Crisis," *Asian Survey*, XXIII, 9, September 1983, pp. 1025-1042.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, "The Pakistan American Alliances : Stresses and Strains," *Foreign Affairs*, 42, 2, January 1964, pp. 195-209.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad "Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy," *Pakistan Horizon*, XIV, 41 Fourth Quarter 1961, pp. 263-71.

Brodin, E.L., "United States Aid to India and Pakistan," *International Affairs*, 43, 4, October 1967, pp. 664-677.

Chaudhri, Mohammad Ahsen, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, 6, 9, September 1966, pp. 492-501.

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal "Pakistan's Nuclear Option," *Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies*, VII, 4, Summer 1984, pp. 52-72.

Bibliography

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal "The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, XXIII, 3, March 1983, pp. 227-243.

Cohen, Stephen P., "South Asia and Afghanistan," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1985, pp. 18-31.

Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan," in Kolodziej, E. A. & Harkavy, R.E. (eds.), *Security Policies of Developing Countries*; Lexington, Mass : D.C. Heath & Co, 1982.

Cohen, Stephen P., "U.S. Weapons and South Asia : A Policy Analysis," *Pacific Affairs*, 49, 1, Spring 1976, pp.49-69.

Franck, D.S., "Pakhtunistan-Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land," *The Middle East Journal*, VI, Winter 1952, pp.49-68.

Hasan, Zubeida, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India," *Pakistan Horizon*, XXI, 4, Fourth Quarter 1968.

Hasan, Zubeida, "United States Arms Policy in South Asia, 1965-67," *Pakistan Horizon*, XX, 2, Second Quarter 1967.

Jones, R. W. & Roberts, B., "Pakistan and Regional Security," *Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies*, VI, 3, Spring 1983, pp.3-19.

Khan, Rashid Ahmad, "Security in the Gulf : Pakistan's Perspective" in Khan, Rais Ahmad (ed.), *Pakistan-United States Relations*, Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1983, pp. 139-165.

Khan, Sultan Mohammad, "Pakistani Geopolitics: The Diplomatic Perspective," *International Security*, 5, 1, Summer 1980, pp.26-36.

Naghmi, Shafqat Hussain, "Pakistan's Public Attitude Toward the United States," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26, 3, September 1982, pp. 507-523.

Pakistan Horizon, XX, 2, Second Quarter 1967 : Special Issue on India-Pakistan Arms Race.

Palmer, N.D., "The Defence of South Asia," *Orbis*, IX, 4, Winter 1966.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Problems and Prospects of South Asian Regional Cooperation," *Regional Studies*, 2, 2, Spring 1984, pp. 13-24.

- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan : Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications," *Pakistan Horizon*, XXXVII, 1, First Quarter 1984, pp.40-61.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan's Defence Policy," *Pakistan Horizon*, XXXVI, 1, First Quarter 1983, pp. 32-56.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan: Ideology and Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 10, 1, Spring 1983, pp.48-59.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Superpowers, India, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean," *Defence Journal*, VII, 9, September 1981, pp. 7-16.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan and the Indian Ocean," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad), IV, 4, Summer 1981, pp.30-42.
- Rose, Leo E., "The Superpowers in South Asia : A Geostrategic Analysis," *Orbis*, 22, 2, Summer 1978, pp.395-413.
- Simon, S. W., "The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective," *Asian Survey*, 7, 3, March 1967, pp.176-187.
- Spain, J. W., "Military Assistance for Pakistan," *APSR*, XLVIII, 3, September 1954, pp. 738-751.
- Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Iran and Pakistan.. Cooperation in an Area of Conflict," *Asian Survey*, XVII, 5, May 1977, pp.477-490.
- Wirsing, R. G. & Roberty, J.M., "The United States and Pakistan," *International Affairs*, 58, 4, Autumn 1982, pp.588-609.
- Wirsing, R. G., "The Arms Race in South Asia : Implications for the United States," *Asian Survey*, XXV, 3, March 1985, pp.265-291.

INDEX

A

- Abbasi, S.M. (Liet General), appendix K
- Abdul Hakim, Justice, 228
- Abdul Hamid Khan, (General), 182
- Abdul Qadir, 93
- Abdul Qasim Khan, 121
- Abolition of Jagirs Act, 111
- Abyssinia, 31
- Accountability of Bhutto regime, 241, 244, 245
- Acharaya Kirpalani, 51
- Adam, Paul (General), 136
- Afghanistan, 15, 29, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 99, 151, 156, 218, 223, 230, 255, 270
- irredentist claims on Pakistan, 54, 230
- relations with Pakistan, 54- 55, 218, 230
- Soviet military intervention, 246, 255, 270, 273
- Africa, 16, 123, 259
- Afridi, K. K. (Liet General), appendix K
- Afridis, 30
- Agartala Conspiracy Case, 173, 174, 179, 194
- Agrarian Reform Committee, 110
- Agricultural Development Corporation, 114
- Agricultural Research Council, 110
- Agriculture University Lyallpur, 146
- Ahmad, Mohammed (Colonel), 77
- Ahmad, Hasan Hafeez (Vice Admiral), appendix K
- Ahmadi Community, 58, 74, 222, 248
- Ahraras, 74
- Ahsen, S. M. (Vice Admiral), 130, 182, appendix K
- Air Force, 26, 30, 33, 39, 40, 47, 49, 58, 59, 72, 130, 137, 144, 182, 224, 239, 255, 257
- Air Headquarters shifted, 214
- American assistance for, 80
- Chinese assistance for, 143
- officers retired, 212, 213, 221
- representation of East Pakistanis, 152, 155
- Akbar, (Major General), 183
- Akbar Khan (Major General), 78, 79, 169
- Akhand Bharat, 52, 53
- Akhtar Hussain, 93
- Algeria, 15
- All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Congress, 60
- Altat Gauhar, 179
- Al-Zulfikar, 254
- American Fact Finding Mission, 136
- Amritsar, 31, 49
- Anglo-Indian Press, 31
- Anglo-Indians, 45
- Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 29
- Ansari, Maulana Zafar Ahmad, 259-260
- Ansari Report, 260
- Ansars, 156, 202
- Anti-Ahmadi disturbances, 58, 74; (1974) 222
- Anwar Shamim, Mohammad (Air Chief Marshal), 240, appendix K
- Anwarul Haq, Justice, 212
- Argentina, 15
- Arif, K.M. (General), 256, appendix K
- Armed Forces, 36, 37, 47, 49, 56, 58, 70, 88, 149
- communal riots, 48-50
- division of, 35-44
- joint control of, 38
- nationalization, 17-48, 49
- politics, 70-71
- reorganization, 37, 44, 47-48
- Arms supply and embargo, 48, 80, 135-137, 142-144, 220, 255, 270
- Asghar Khan, Mohammad (Air Marshal), 130, 178
- anti-Ayub, 169, 174, 178
- enters politics, 147, 169
- letter to military officers, 237-238
- see also Tehrik-i-Istiqal
- Armed Forces Day, 144
- Army Engineers, 145, 146, 224
- Arshad Hussain, 151
- Assam, 135, 151
- Asia, 15, 16, 36, 148, 259
- Aslam Riaz Hussain (Justice), 228
- Asma Jilani Case, 209, 215, appendix J
- Ataur Rehman Khan, 83
- Attaturk, 165

- Atiqur Rahman (Lieut General), appendix K
 Attock Fort, 255
 Auchinleck, Sir Claude (Field Marshal), 42, 43
 Australia, 135, 136
 Awami League, 68, 78, 83, 132, 133, 134, 159, 162, 170-173, 190-197, 199-201, 204, 206, 207
 election campaign, 192, 195-196
 1970 Elections, 190-191
 Six-Point Formula, 162, 171, 190, 194-95, 197
 Anti-West Pakistan feelings, 174, 192, 195-96
 political negotiations, 196-98
 civil disobedience, 198-201
 Awami League Volunteers, 200
 Awami League Workers, 200, 201, 206
 Awami Tehrik, 253
 Ayub Khan, Mohammad (Field Marshal), 82-83, 96, 121-123, 126, 129, 133, 134, 142, 148, 152, 160, 182-83, 186, 193, 194, 209, 264, 272
 acceptance of parliamentary system and direct elections, 274
 agitation against, 165-175
 appointed Army Chief, 70
 causes of the anti-Ayub movement, 160-165
 Constitution Commission, 120
 Decade of Development, 163, 165
 decides not to seek election, 173, 178
 gives constitution, 121-122
 imposes Martial Law, 86-87
 last address, 175, appendix E
 letter to Yahya Khan, 176, appendix D
 political dialogue with opposition, 172, 173
 political views, 86-87
 Presidential Election, 132-33, 164
 referendum, 97, 127
 resigns, 175, 178-79
 sugar crisis, 163
 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 37
 Azad Kashmir, 53, 106, see also Kashmir
 Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference, 232, 233
 Azam Khan (Lieut General), 74-75, 106, 147, 169

B

- Baber, Naseer-ullah Khan (Major General), appendix K
 Baghdad Pact, 77, 80
 Bahria Foundation, 258
 Baluchistan, 29, 54, 122, 155, 190-92, 218, 222, 223, 227, 230, 262, 263
 anti-insurgency operation, 222, 227, 230
 Baluch activists take to guerrilla action, 227
 Mengal Cabinet dismissed, 216, 227

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

- Bangladesh, 197, 199-201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 268
 established, 206
 government in exile, 206
 Indian support for, 203-206
 political movement for, 198-202
 subservience to India, 206
 see also East Pakistan
 Basic Democracies, 97, 102, 116-120, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 160, 175, 177, 179
 Basic Democracies Act, 1959, 119
 Bay of Bengal, 144
 Begum Bhutto Case, 247, 252, appendix J
 Benazir Bhutto, 266
 Bengal, 31, 149, 150, 151, 153
 partition of, 32
 Bengali, 149, 193
 Bengali Battalion, 152
 Bengali police, 201
 Bengalis, 150, 152, 195, 201, 203, 217
 influx of Bengali refugees in India, 203
 Bengali volunteers, 202
 Bengal volunteer corps, 152
 Bhashani, Maulana, 170, 173, 175, 199
 demands independence, 199
 extends support to Mujib, 199
 preaches violence, 174-75
 Bhutto, Z. A., 111, 121, 162-166, 168, 172, 173, 207, 208, 211, 216, 217, 234-38, 243, 245, 249, 258
 after being overthrown, 243-44
 anti-Ayub agitation, 166-168, 172
 appointed minister, 166
 asserts civilian supremacy, 209, 216, 224, 229, 236, 273
 assumes power, 208, 209, 212, 230, criticism of the military, 210-11, appendix G
 differences with Ayub Khan, 166
 dismissal of Mengal's Government, 216, 227
 East Pakistan, 197-198, 207
 execution, 245, 249, 250
 failure to create viable political institutions, 230
 four fold slogan, 190
 Government, 224-27
 idea of 'People Army', 211
 inquiries instituted, 244
 interim constitution, 237
 interlude of civilian rule, 229
 Machiaevellian style, 244
 mass movement against, 234-38, 243, 271
 mends fences with military, 216, 218, 220
 military high command pledges support, 237
 murder case, 244-45
 on six point formula, 197
 partimonal system, 230

Index

- People's Party, 166, 198, 228, 229, 231
 political agitation against—, 234-36, 238, 243, 271
 refuses to attend the National Assembly session, 207
 resignation demanded, 234
 rigs elections (1977), 244
 violation of Martial Law regulations, 243
 Bihar, 31
 Birdwood, Sir W. (Field Marshal), 27
 Bogra, Mohammad Ali, 56, 63, 67
 Bolivia, 15
 Bombay, 26, 32, 151
 Bonapartism, 210, appendix G
 Bonus Vouchers Scheme, 110, 111
 Brazil, 15
 Britain, 26, 28, 29, 36; 37, 43, 48
 British withdrawal from South Asia, 268
 British Empire, 27, 29
 British Government, 18; 26-28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41, 44, 54, 149, 150
 British policy towards tribesmen, 29, 30, 34, 54
 British Indian Military, 26-34, 38-44, 45-50, 149-151
 British recruitment policy, 44, 46, 149-151
 Bureaucracy, 24, 129, 138, 141, 164, 178, 183, 186, 251, 269, see also Civil Service
 Burma, 15, 17, 18, 23, 31, 32, 85
 Burundi, 15
 C
 Cabinet Mission Plan, 37
 Cambodia, 15
 Campbell, R.D., 72
 Canal Water dispute, 51
 Cariapa, K.M. (General), 37, 46
 Central African Republic, 15
 Central Treaty Organization, 77, 80, 81
 Chad, 15
 Chamb Akhnur Sector, 140
 Chantan Weekly, 171
 Chaudhry, Hamidul Haq, 65
 Chaudhry, Mohammad Ali, 67, 68, 167
 Chief Election Commissioner, 234
 P.N.A. demands removal of, 234
 China, 31, 135-137, 142, 143, 166, 204, 205
 high powered Pakistani delegation to, 204
 border conflict with India, 135, 137
 military aid from, 143, 156
 Chitral, 29, 187
 Chittagong, 80, 96, 157
 shifting of Naval Headquarters to East Pakistan, 157
 Chishti, F.A. (Lieut General), 239
 Chundrigar, I.I., 69, 94, 167
 Civil Disobedience Movement, 31
 Civilianization of the military rule, 259-267
 Civil Service, 23, 74, 81, 92, 186, 257
 Martial Law and, 92, 131
 punitive action against, 100, 186
 recruitment of military officer to, 137, 157, see also Bureaucracy
 Combined Opposition Party, 133, 134
 Commander-in-Chief of India, 26, 28, 33
 Commander-in-Chief of India and Pakistan, 41
 Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 46
 Command Structure of the Military, Changes in, 212-214, 221, appendix I
 Commissioned ranks; induction of Indians to the, 44-46
 Commission of National Education, 108
 Commissions of Inquiry, 93-95, 103-104, 108-109, 112, 113, 120, 121, 212
 Commonwealth countries, 47, 48, 136
 Communal riots, 30, 48, 51
 Congress Party, 31, 33, 36, 38, 51, 55, 61
 Conspiracies, 32-34, 78, 79, 95, 96, 172-74
 Attock (1973), 221-222
 Haiderabad (1975), 228
 Naval mutiny (1946), 33, 34
 Poster Case (1959), 95-96
 Rawalpindi (1951), 78-79
 seditions attempts before independence, 32
 Constantine, G.B. (Justice), 94
 Constituent Assembly, 62, 64, 67, 68, 77, 102, 196
 Constitution (1956), 46, 64, 68, 91, 98, 115, 120
 Constitution (1962), 126-28, 133, 134, 157, 160, 177, 181
 Constitution (1973), 214, 215, 221, 239, 242, 247, 252, 257, 260, 263
 amendments, 242, 263, 265, 272
 Doctrine of Necessity, 247, appendix J
 formulated, 227
 military's role defined, 214-215, 221
 PCO replaces, 252
 RCO Issued, 263
 Constitution Commission (1961), 70, 97, 120, 121
 Convention Muslim League, 133, 164, 166, 174, 190, 191
 Cornelius, A. R. (Justice), 94, 186
 Council Muslim League, 134, 170, 190, 191
 Council of Islamic Ideology, 235, 247, 259
 Coup d'etat (1958), 76, 82, 85-88, 266, 268
 Coup d'etat (1969), 175-177, 179, 180, 269
 Coup d'etat (1977), 232, 239, 269
 Carnwell, 44
 Creagh, Sir O'Moore (General), 150
 Cuba, 15

Curzon, Lord, 27, 29
Czechoslovakia, 142

D

Dacca, 56, 74, 96, 109, 110, 141, 154, 156, 159, 169, 174, 183, 185, 186, 197, 199, 200, 205, fall of, 206, 212
Daud, Sardar Mohammad, 218
Defence Pacts, 77, 80, 137, 270
Defence problems and policies, 27-30, 34, 52-56, 57, 59, 79, 80, 81, 136-37, 142-43, 148, 151, 155-57, 216, 217-220, 230, 270, 273
East Pakistan, 53, 155-57, 162, post-independence, 52-56, 57, 59, 79, 70, 71, 136-137, 142-43, 148, 151, 216, 217-220, 230, 270, 273, pre-independence, 27-30, 34
Democratic Action Committee (DAC), 170, 171, 173, 174, formed, 170
Mujib dissolves, 174, objectives of—170
opposition parties in DAC, 170, 171
Dera Bugti, 223
Dera Ismail Khan, 30, 166
Dir, 186, 222
Distribution of powers between Prime Minister and President, 253
District Management Group, 257
Division of assets, 41, 51
Doctrine of Necessity, 247, 248, appendix J
Doctrine of two nations, 35, 52
Durand Line, 29, 30, 54-56

E

East Africa, 31
East and West Pakistan relations, 157, 159, 162, 192-196
East Bengal, 111, 148, 199
East Bengal Jamia Ulema-I-Islam, 60
East Bengal Regiment, 152, 201
Eastern European Countries, 143
East Pakistan, 53, 54, 65, 66, 69, 72-74, 78, 82, 83, 99, 100, 97, 107, 111, 114, 118, 119, 133, 145, 149, 159, 162, 170, 174, 183, 186, 189, 209, 211, 212, 216, 238, 273
agitation (1970), 198-201
Assembly Speaker killed, 83, 85, autonomy, 64, 170, 173, 189, 194, 195, Bengal troops desert, 159, 201
elections, 63, 65, 69, 133, 189-192, 195-197
fall of, 178, 209, 211, 226
grievances against West Pakistan and the central government, 157-158, 162, 190, 192-96

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

Indian role in civil strife, 202-105, 106
language riots, 74
military academy, 157, 158
military action, 157, 158
military action, 159, 186, 201, 207
military debacle inquiry, 211, 212
Ordinance factory, 156
Soviet blessings for India's Policy in, 204 see also Bangladesh
East Pakistan-India Border, 73, 140, 162
East Pakistan Rifles, 72, 170, 200, 201
East Pakistan WAPDA, 114
East Punjab, 49, 99
EBDO, 101, 123
EDBOed Politicians, 102, 161
Economic Reforms, 110-114, 224, 225
Education Reforms, 108, 109
Egypt, 15, 31, 85
Ehsan, Ragib, Maulana, 60
Eight Unit Scheme, 44
Elections (1964-65), 132, 133, 134
Elections (1977), 232-234, 244
Elections (1985), 242, 244, 261, 262, 263
Elections, Basic Democracies, 117, 118
Elections campaign (1970), 159, 188, 190-192, 208, 190, 195, 196
Elections, condition laid by Supreme Court, 247
Elections, direct, 170, 171, 173
Elections indirect, 126
Elections, lack of, 70
Elections MRD on, 253, 262
Elections Promise by military government, 240, 241, 245, 246, 250
Elections in East Pakistan (1954), 63, 65, 69
Elections of Constituent Assembly, (1955), 68
Elections postponed, 244, 251, reason for postponement, 246
El Salvador, 15
Emergency and Short Commissions, 45
Esher Committee, 27
Ethiopia, 15
Ecuador, 15
Ex-Servicemen, 257, 258, improvement of their conditions, 257-258

F

Fakir of Ipi tribe, 55
Family Laws Courts, 104
Family Laws Ordinance, 102-103, 165, 173
Family Planning Programme, 165
Fauji Foundation, 258
Fatima Jinnah, 95, 132-134
Fazl Haq, Maulvi, 66, 69, 167
Fazl Haq (Lt. Gen.), appendix K
Fazl Iqbal, Chaudhry, 208, 252, resigns, 252
Fazlullah, Kazi, 123

Index

Federal Capital Commission, 107
Federal Council, 259
Federal Investigation Agency, (FIA), 215
Federal Reserve Force, 266
Federal Security Force (FSF), 215-216, 230, 235, 265
Federal Shariat Court, 248
Fida Hussain, 182
Finer, S. E., 22
Five Year Plans:
First, 84, 113
Second, 113, 114, 145
Third, 185-186
Fourth, 163, 185
Food and Agricultural Council, 110
Foreign Service of Pakistan, 100, 257
France, 131, 85, 142
French Fifth Republic, 126

G

Gandhi, M.K., 19, 31, 51, 61
Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, 204, 206, 217
Gautamala, 15
General elections, see elections Ghana, 15, 19
Ghulam Jilani Khan (Lieut. General), appendix K
Ghulam Mohammad (Governor General), 63, 67, 71, 76, 77
Gibbon, C.E., 101
Goa, 52, 53, 143
Gohar Ayub, 164
Government of India Act 1919, 27
Government of India Act 1935, 18, 28, 67
Governor General, 26-28, 33, 63, 65-68, 79
Greece, 15
Guinea, 19
Gujranwala, 31, 49
Gujarat, Indian State of, 139
Gujrat, 31, 149
Gul, R. (Lieut. General), appendix K
Gulf States, 254, 258, 261
Gul Hassan Khan (Lieut. General), 213, appendix G and K
Gurdaspur, 49
Gurkhas, 40, 150

H

Habibullah (General), 164
Hamudur Rehman Commission, 212
Haneef Ramay, 229
Haq, Zahurul (Flight Sergeant), 174
Haroon, Mahmood A., 246
Hassan, Mahmood Makhdoom, 101
Hassan, Muzaffar (Vice Admiral), appendix K
Havelian, 219
Hazara, 29, 223, 224
Hijacking of the aircraft, 202, 254
Hindu, 30, 47, 52, 64, 106, 111

Congress members from East Pakistan, 64
landlords, 211
Mahasabha, 52
refugees, 106
Honduras, 15
Hong Kong, 31
Huda, Dr. N.M., 179
Hull, Sir Richard (General), 136
Hunza, 145
Hussain, Riaz (Lieut. General), appendix K
Hyderabad, 48, 57, 166, 228, 236
Martial Law imposed, 236
conspiracy case withdrawn, 228
Hyderabad State, 52

I

Ibrahim, Sardar Mohammad, 60
Ideology of Pakistan, 256, 261, 272
Iftikhar Tarri, Mian, 229
Indemnity for Martial Law Acts, 264, 265, 266, 272
Independence Day, 51, 144
India, 17, 18, 19, 26-34, 35-50, 51, 52-54, 56, 59, 60, 72, 80, 99, 106, 111, 139-144, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159, 208, 217, 218, 223, 230, 268
conflict with China, 135, 136
East Pakistan crisis, 201, 202-206, 207
invasion of East Pakistan, 205, 206
nuclear explosion, 218
relations with Pakistan, 50, 51, 52-53, 57, 80, 135-136, 139-144, 166, 190, 202-206, 217, 230
Soviet arms supply, 136, 204
Indian Independence Act, 67
India legislature, 27, 33
Indian National Army, 32, 34
Indian National Congress, see Congress Party
Indonesia, 15, 17, 19
Indo-Pak War (1965), 139-142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 155, 156, 160, 161, 162, 166, 191, 220
Indo-Pak War (1971), 205-206, 208, 209, 212, 214, 215, 220, 229
Interest-free banking, 248
Interim Constitution (1972), 226, 227
Interim Government, 37
Iqbal, Chaudry Mohammad, statement on allotment of land to military-men, 257-258
Iqbal, General Mohammad, 239, appendix K
Iran, 80, 143
Iraq, 31, 36, 85, 220
recovery of arms from embassy at Islamabad, 218
Iskandar Mirza, see Mirza
Islam, 103, 165, 190, 246, 249, 256
Islamabad, 53, 107, 214, 224, 248
Islamic Ideology, 188

Islamic Socialism, 226
Islamization, 240, 241, 247-249, 250, 251, 260, 261
Ismail Khan, Nawab, 36
Isphahani, M.A.H., 67
Israel-Arab War, 144
Italy, 31
Izhar Khan, K. M. (Lt. Gen.), appendix K

J

Jahandad Khan (Lieut. General), appendix K
Jalalabad, 55
Jallianwala Bagh, 31
Jammal-i-Islami, 134, 171, 173, 190, 191, 192, 221, 232, 250-251, 261
military and, 221, 250-251
Jamal Khan, Mohammad (Air Chief Marshal), 240, appendix K
Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadees, 192
Jamial Ulama-i-Islam, 170, 174, 190, 191, 192, 232, 253
Jamiatul Ulama-i-Pakistan, 190, 191, 192, 232, 250, 271
Jammu and Kashmir, see Kashmir
Janowitz, M., 21, 22
Japan, 31, 32, 144
Jilani (Major General), 73, 169
Jinnah, M.A., 19, 37, 54, 62, 70, 96, 269, 276
military and, 40, 70, 276
Jinnah, Miss Fatima, see Fatima Jinnah
Jirga, 104
Joint Defence Council, 41-44, 49
Jullundhar, 49
Junagadh, 48, 57

K

Kach Dam, 146
Kakul, 157
Kalat, 86, 271
Karachi, 33, 44, 74, 80, 86, 87, 89, 206, 207, 210, 155, 157, 163, 164, 166, 175, 186, 214, 236
Karakoram Pass, 137
Kargil, 140
Kazi, Fazalullah, 65
Keith Callard, 63
Khaksar Tehrik, 192, 232
Khan, Abdul Qayyum, 60
Khan, Agha Mohammad Yahya (General), see Yahya Khan
Khan, Akbar (Major General), 78, 79
Khan, A.R. (Vice Admiral), 130, appendix K
Khan, Ataur Rehman, 83
Khan, Asghar (Air Marshall), see Asghar Khan
Khan, Azam (Lieut. General), 74, 75, 106, 147, 169
Khan Brothers, 54

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

Khan, Dr., 84
Khan, Liaquat Ali, 37, 52, 54, 56, 62, 63, 78, 79, 80, 151, 269
Khan, Mohammad Ayub (Field Marshal), see Ayub Khan
Khan, Nur (Air Marshall), 130, 182, 184, appendix K
Khan, Sir Mohammad Zafarullah, 74
Khan, Umrao (Major General), 82
Khilafat Movement, 31, 32
Khawaja Nizamuddin, 67
Khawaja Shahabuddin, 63
Khuro, M. A., 64, 65
Khursheed Hassan Meer, 229
Kissinger, Henry, 205
Kitchner, Lord, 27
Kohat, 149, 166
Kohlu, 223
Korangi, 107, 222
Kosygin, 141
KrishnaK Sramik Party, 69, 83

L

Labour Policy, 204-206, 171, 184, 185, 225
Labour troubles, 74, 222
Laddakh, 135
Land allotment to military personnel, Land Reforms, Ayub Khan, 111-113, 122-123
Bhutto, 146, 225
Landi, 220, 222
Language riots in Sind, 222
Laos, 15
Lasbela, 222
Latin America, 15, 123
Law and Order operations of the military, 30, 31, 48-50, 74-75, 167, 201, 222, 236
Law Reforms Commission, 103
Legal Framework Order, 187, 188-189
Legal Profession and Martial Law, 97, 253
Liaquat Ali Khan, 37, 52, 54, 56, 60, 62, 63, 78, 80, 151, 269
Libya, 15, 235
Life Insurance Business, 225
Local Bodies polls, 241, 245, 246
Lodi, S.F.S.K. (Lieut. General), appendix K

M

Macaulay, Lord, 108
Mahbubul Haq, Dr., 163
Mohmand tribe, 30
Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Mian, 229
Mahsuds tribe, 30
Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 172
Malaya, 31
Malir Extension Scheme, 107

Index

Mamdot, Iftikhar Hussain, 65
Manavadar, 57
Mangla Headworks, 53
Manzoor Qadir, 121
Marri tribe, 223
Martial Law (1919), 31
Martial Law (1953), 74, 75
Martial Law (1958-62), 66, 122-125, 169
administration, 90, 91, 92
Basic Democracies, 116-120
challenges, 95-96
Commissions of Inquiry, 93, 94, 95
economic reforms, 110-114
imposed, 85-88
political framework, 114-122
referendum 97, 119
reforms in the society, 98-110
withdrawn, 121
Martial Law (1969-72), 178, 269
administration, 182-183
agitation against, 209
Bhutto as CMLA, 208
Elections, 190-191, 192, 206
goals, 184
imposed, 176, 177, 181
L.F.O., 187-189
negotiations with political leaders, 197-198, 200-201, 206
policies, 184-187
withdrawn, 227
Martial Law in three cities (1977), 236, 237
Martial Law (1977-85), 232, 239, 269, 271
Accountability of politicians, 243, 244-245
administration, 239-240
Bhutto's execution, 245, 249, 250
Challenges and treatment of opposition, 253-254
Chief Ministers appointed, 264
civilianization, 259-267
Elections, 240, 241, 242, 253, 245, 246, 261-263
expansion of role, 256, 257
goals, 240, 241-243
imposed, 239
indemnity, 264-65
Islamization, 237-39
plot to overthrow, 255
political orientations, 249-252
Political Parties (Amendment) Act, 264, 266
political style, 252-253, 255
Prime Minister appointed, 264
Referendum, 260-261
R.C.O., 263, 265
withdrawn, 266
Massacre of Muslim population, 48, 52
Mass Movement, Anti-Ayub (1968-69), 160-175, 179
Mass Movement, Anti-Bhutto (1977), 234-238, 247
Mass Movement, MRD strives for, 254, 255
Mawand tribe, 223
McMahon Line, 135
Mehrandra, King of Nepal, 148
Menon, Krishna, 76
Mengal, Attaullah, 217, 227
Meraj Mohammad Khan, 229
Middle East, 15, 16, 53, 254
Military, Assistance to Civilian Authorities law and order, 30, 31, 48-50, 73-75, 167, 201, 222, 223, 236, 270
nation-building, 145, 146, 222-224, 270
natural calamities, 72, 145, 222-224, 270
operation close door, 72, 73
operation jute, 72-73
operation service first, 72, 73
operation wild boar, 72
specific problems, 72-73, 224
Military and Jamaat-i-Islami, 221, 250, 251
Military and the PNA, 237, 238, 239, 249-251
Military High Command, changes in, 212-214, 221, appendix I
Military High Command advises Bhutto, 238, 239
Military High Command supports Bhutto, 237
Military in British India, 26
administration, 26-28, 33
and politics, 31-33
commissions to Indians, 44, 45
division between India and Pakistan, 35-44, 50
functions, 19-31, 34
I.N.A., 32, 34
Martial race, concept of, 149-151
Naval mutiny, 33, 34
representation of communities, 45, 47
Military Officers in civilian jobs and professions, 128-130, 147, 157, 257, 258
ambassadorial appointments, 129, 257
in Central Superior Services, 257
land allotment, 146, 257, 258
quota fixed, 129, 258, 272
Military Officers removed, 212-13, 221, 229
Military Officers retired, 255
Military Regimes, see Martial Law
Military Rule, see Martial Law
Mirza, Iskandar (Major General), 56, 67, 76, 77, 86, 87, 88, 123, appendix B
Moghal Empire, 36
Mohammad Ali Bogra, 56, 63, 64, 67
Mohammad Ali, Chaudhry, 67, 68, 167
Mohammad Ibrahim, 121
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control) Ordinance, 1970, 185

- Moplah rising, 31
 Mountabatten, Lord, 42
 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), 253, 254, 255, 261, 262
 boycotts polls, 261, 262
 condemns hijacking, 254
 demands, 253
 launches political movements, 254
 Right-Wing political parties oppose, 255
 set up, 253
 Mozaffar Ahmed, Professor, 197
 Mozaffar Hassan (Vice Admiral), appendix K
 Mubashar Hassan, Dr., 229
 Mufti Mahmood, 273, 227
 Mujahids, 156, 201
 Mujahid, Sharif-al, 132
 Mujibur Rehman, Sheikh, 96, 171-174, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198-201, 202, 207
 Agartala Conspiracy, 172-173
 arrested, 194, 201
 launches civil disobedience, 198, 199-200
 negotiations with Yahya and others, 197, 200-201
 on Six points and autonomy, 173, 194, 196
 Mukhtar Rana, 229
 Mukhti Bahini, 159, 201, 203, 204
 Murshad, S.M., 169
 Musa, Mohammad (General), 129, 147, 167, 172, appendix K
 Muslim League, 51, 61-64, 65, 68, 69, 76, 92, 269
 Convention League, 133, 142, 166, 190, 191
 Council League, 134, 170, 173, 190, 191
 demands division of military, 35, 36-37, 38
 Khairuddin Qasim Group, 253
 Pagara League, 232, 250, 251, 261
 pre-independence, 22, 33, 35, 36-38, 51, 62
 Qayyum League, 233
 Muslim massacre, 48, 52
 Muslim nationhood, 30, 51
 Muslim Officers in British India, 45-47
 Muslims, 30, 32, 35, 38, 46-49, 61, 62, 261, 262
 conscious of being a nation, 30, 51
 Muslim Sects, 248, 249
 Mutiny of 1857, 32
 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, 80
 Myres, Henry (Brigadier General), 80
- N**
 Naqi Shamsi, 60
 Narayan, Jayaparkash, 148
 Nasrullah Khan, Nawabzada, 173, 233

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

- National Assembly, 63, 66, 198-199, 209, 229
 defence affairs in, 57, 144, 157, 158
 1970 Elections of, 187-188, 189, 190, 191, 192
 1977 Elections of, 231, 234
 1985 Elections of, 261-262, 263
 National Assembly, resolution for withdrawal of Martial Law, 264
 National Assembly after the 1985 amendments, 263, 264, 265-66, 272
 National Assembly session issue (1971), 197-199, 200
 National Assembly under the 1956 Constitution, 66, 68, 69, 78
 National Assembly under the 1962 Constitution, 103, 119, 121-123, 126-28, 133, 144, 157, 158, 160-172, 165, 176, 177
 National Assembly under the 1973 Constitution, 227, 233, 244
 National Awami Party, 64, 83, 133, 170, 171, 190, 191, 192, 228, 233, 253
 Pakhtoonkhawah, 253
 National Democratic Front, 133, 134
 National Democratic Party, 232, 245, 250, 253
 Nation-building activities of the military, 72-73, 145, 146, 223, 224
 National Guards, 86
 Nationalization Committee, 37, 46
 Nationalization of
 Air Force, 47
 Army, 44-47, 48
 Banks, 225
 emerald mines, 224
 industry and managing agencies, 224
 Life Insurance, 225
 Navy, 47
 Schools and Colleges, 225
 National Security Council, 257, 265, 272
 Natural Calamities, fight against by the military, 72, 145, 222, 223, 224
 Naval Headquarters, 134, 157, 158, 214
 Navy, 26, 33, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 58, 80, 90, 118, 120, 140, 144, 152-53, 155, 157, 172, 205, 212, 214, 215, 219, 239
 Nazim-e-i-Salaat, 248
 Nazimuddin, Khawaja, 63, 67
 Nehru, J.N., 19, 51, 52, 54, 76
 Nehru Report, 27
 Nepal, 32, 40, 150, 151
 Ne-Win (General), 23
 New Education Scheme, 108
 New Karachi Scheme, 107
 Niazi, Karamat Rehman (Admiral), 239, appendix K
 Nicaragua, 15
 Nigeria, 15
 Nizam-i-Islam Party, 69, 134, 167, 192
 Nizam-i-Mustafa, 233-235
 Nkrumah, 19
 Non-Cooperation Movement, 31, 32
 Non-Muslim majority units, 38

Index

- Non-Muslims, 30, 38, 46, 47, 49, 262
 Noon, Malik Feroz Khan, 37, 66, 78, 83, 106
 North Africa, 31
 North American Countries, 48
 North-West Frontier, 29-30
 North-West India, 150, 151
 North West Frontier Province, 30, 32, 49, 53-55, 64, 72, 111, 149-151, 153, 156, 188, 190-192
 Martial traditions of, 150, 151, 153, 270
 Mufti Mahmood cabinet resigns, 227
 Nur Khan (Air Marshal), 130, 182, 184
 Nurat Bhutto Case, 247, 252, appendix J
- O**
 October Revolution, 123, 163
 One Unit Scheme, 55, 64, 77, 170-171, 173, 174, 175, appendix A
 Operation Close Door, 73, 74, 78
 Operation Fairplay, 239
 Operation Jute, 73, 74
 Operation Wild Boar, 72
 Ordnance Factories, 21, 44, 48, 58, 219-220
- P**
 Pakhtunistan, 54, 55
 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, see Afghanistan
 Pakistan-America relations, see United States
 Pakistan Democratic Movement, 134, 161, 170
 Pakistan Democratic Party, 191, 232, 233, 245, 253
 Pakistan-India relations, see India
 Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, 114
 Pakistan International Airlines, 254
 hijacking of P.I.A. aircraft to Kabul, 203, 254
 Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party, 253
 Pakistan Muslim League, see Muslim League
 Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 232-239, 243, 244, 249-251
 agitation against the Bhutto regime, 234-239, 243
 contests elections, 233-234
 demands withdrawal of martial law, 237
 established, 232
 military and, 237, 238, 239, 248-51
 supports accountability, 244
 Pakistan National Party, 253
 Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 166, 171, 190-191, 197, 198, 226, 227, 234, 243, 245, 246, 251, 255, 264
 agitation against, 234-236

- Al-Zulfikar and, 254
 assumes power, 208
 civil-military relations, 209-214, 218, 224, 229-230
 confrontation with military, 243-244, 245, 247
 criticism of military, 209-211, 229
 dominates MRD, 253
 East Pakistan, 197, 198, 208
 Elections (1970), 190-191, 208
 Elections (1977), 232, 233
 government policies, 215, 224-229, 230, 234
 launched, 166
 organizational problems, 224, 226-227, 228-229, 231, 236
 slogans, 190
 Palestine, 31
 Panama, 15
 Paraguay, 15
 Parliament, 215, 263, 264
 Parliamentary system of Government, 66, 97, 98, 161, 171, 183, 227, 263
 Partition Council, 39
 Partition of the Sub-Continent, 36, 37, 59, 151, 269
 Partition Plan, 48, 52
 Patel, Sardar, 42, 52
 Pat-Feeder Area, 222
 Pathan, Ghulam Nabi Khan, 65
 Pathans, 54, 128, 152
 Pathan tribes, 29, 34, 54, 153, 156
 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, 218
 Peerzada, Abdus Sattar, 64
 Peerzada, S.G.M. (Lieutenant General), 182
 Peoples Guards, 211, 227
 People's Party, See Pakistan People's Party
 Persia, 31
 Peru, 15
 Peshawar, 149
 Plan, First Five Year, 84
 Second Five Year, 113, 114, 145
 Third Five Year, 185, 186
 Fourth Five Year, 163, 185
 Planning Commission, 113, 185, 186
 PODO, 101
 Police Service of Pakistan, 100, 257
 Political Parties, 63, 64, 176, 245, 259, 261
 amendments in the 1962 Act, 264, 266
 registration of, 245, see also, individual political parties
 Portugal, 15
 POWS, 212, 217, 230
 PRODA, 65, 101
- Q**
 Qayum Khan, Abdul, 60
 Qayum Muslim League, 190, 191
 Qazi Courts, 248
 Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, 253

Qaid-i-Azam, see Jinnah
Quran, 165, 261

R

Radcliffe Award, 51
Radio Moscow, 55
Rahim, J.A., 210, 229
Rahim Khan, (Air Marshal), 213, appendix K
Rahimuddin, (General), 239, 256, appendix K
Rehman, Attiqur (Lieut General), appendix K
Rajasthan, 218
Rajendra Sinhi, 46, 76
Rann of Kutch, 139, 140, 144
Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, 78-79
Razee, Dr. Aleem, 158
Red Shirts, 55
Referendum: Ayub Khan, 97, 119, 127
Ziaul Haq, 260, 261
Refugees,
from Afghanistan, 255
from East Pakistan, 204, 217
from India, 49-51, 60, 106
military extends assistance, 49, 50
rehabilitation of, 106, 107, 217
Republican Party, 64, 68, 69
Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO), 263, 264
Revivalist Movement, 31
Risalpur, 157
Rotti, Kapra and Makhan, 209
Round Table Talks, 173, 180
Royal Air Force, 26
Royal Military Academy (RMA)
Sandhurst, 44, 45, 92, 183
Russia, 31
Russian, 36

S

Sandhurst, 44, 45, 92, 183
Sardar Daud, 230
Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, 60
Sarfaraz Khan (Major General), 169
Sarkar, Abu Hussain, 69, 83
Sattar, Abdus (Justice), 187
Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan, 235
offers the good office to facilitate dialogue between PNA and Government, 235
Sarwar Khan, Mohammad (General), appendix K
Sayed Ghawas (Major General), appendix K
SEATO, 77, 79, 80, 81
Self-Government in India, 18
Senate, 263
Services Reorganization Commission, 186
Shahabuddin, Justice, 94, 119

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

Shahabuddin, Khawaja, 63
Shaheen Foundation, 258
Shah of Iran, 55
Shamim, Mohammad Anwar (Air Chief Marshal), 240, appendix K
Sharia, 235
Shariat Benches, 248
Sharif, Mohammad (Admiral), 239, appendix K
Shariff, Mohammad (General), 214, 239, appendix K
Shastri, L.B., 141
Sherpao, H.M., 228
Shia Sect, 248, 249
Shoaib, Mohammad, 121
Short Service and Emergency Commission, 46
Shrinagesh, S.M. (General), 76
Siam, 36
Sikhs, 29, 47, 150
Simla Accord, 217
Simon Commission, 28, 29
Sind, 72, 92, 211, 139, 145, 146, 155, 188, 190, 191, 192, 222, 254, 262, 263
language riots, 222
militant movement, 254
Sind Awami Tehrik, 253
Sind High Court, 252
Sinkiang, 137
Sino-Indian Border, 76, 205
Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 76, 135, 143, 148
Six-Point Formula, 173, 190, 192-194, 196, 197, 198, 206
announcement of, 189, 194
Bhutto on, 197
details, 194-195
no amendments in, 196-197
Six Year Development Plan (1951-57), 113
Skeen, Sir Andrew (Lieut General), 44
Socialism, 190
South Asia, 136, 149, 217
South East Asia, 32, 53, 136, 149, 217
South Korea, 15
South Vietnam, 15
Soviet Union, 55, 78, 135, 136, 142, 143, 144, 217
arms procurement from, 142, 143
intervention in Afghanistan, 241, 246, 255
support to India on East Pakistan (1971), 204, 205, 207
Tashkent Declaration, 141, 161-162, 166, 178
Spiti area, 135
Sra Khula Dam, 146
Steel Mill at Karachi, 220
Subhas Chandra Bose, 32
Suhrwardy, H.S., 64, 68, 76, 203, 133, 167
Sukarno, 19, 148
Sunnah, 261
Sunni Muslim laws of inheritance, 103

Index

Supreme Commander, 41-43, 86, 128
Supreme Court of Pakistan, 101, 187, 215, 245, 248, 252, 253, 263
Asma Jilani Case, 209, 215, appendix J
Ban on NAP confirmed, 228
Bhutto convicted, 245
Doso Case, 91, 209, appendix J
Nusrat Bhutto, 247, 252, appendix J
PCO and oaths, 252
Supreme Headquarters, 42
Swat, 145, 187, 223, 224
Syria, 31

T

Talpur, Ghulam Ali, 65
Tariq Kamal Khan (Admiral), 239, appendix K
Tashkent Declaration, 141, 161, 162, 166, 178
Tehrik-i-Istiqal, 232, 250, 253
Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex, 220
Thailand, 15
Thaper, (General), 76
Third June 1947 Plan, 38
Tikka Khan, (General), 202, 214, 220, 221, appendix K
Killings in East Pakistan, 202
Tilak, B.G., 31
Titwal, 140
Togo, 15
Tori Khaal tribe, 30
Trials at the Red Fort of Delhi, 32
Tribal areas, 29, 30, 54, 80
Tribal Belt, 30
Tribal leaders, 54
Tribal Militia, 30
Tribesman, 29
Trouble in Pat-Feeder and Lasbella, 222
Tufail Ali, Abdur Rehman (Justice), 212
Tufail Mohammad, Mian, 221, 251
asks Bhutto to hand over power to military, 221
on Bhutto's hanging, 251
Turkey, 15, 80, 142, 143

U

Uganda, 15
Ulema, 250, 255
Umer, (Major General), 183
Umrao Khan, (Major General), 82
Union Committee, 102-104
Union Council, 102-104
Unionist Ministry in the Punjab, 61
Union of India and Pakistan, 38
United Arab Emirates (UAE), 235
United Front, 63, 65, 68, 69
United India, 53

United Kingdom (U.K.), 40, 80, 92, 135, 136; see also Britain and British Government
United Nations (U.N.), 60, 140
United Provinces, 151
United States of America (U.S.), 47, 77, 80, 92, 204, 205, 270
arms embargo, 142-143, 148, 220, 230
defence pacts with, 77, 79-80, 81
East Pakistan crisis, 205
military assistance from, 80, 135, 136-137, 255
military assistance to India, 136
University Grant Commission, 225
University Ordinance, 168
Upper Volta, 15
Ushar, 248

V

Viceroy, 26, 39
Viceroy's Executive Council, 26, 28, 33, 68

W

Wahabi-Brelvi differences, 249
Wah Ordnance Factories, 48, 58, 219, see also Ordnance Factories
Wali Khan, Abdul, 168, 171-174, 190-192, 228
Wali Tangi Dam, 146
WAPDA, 114
Waziri Tribe, 30
West Germany, 142, 144
West Pakistan, 53-55, 64, 69, 77, 84, 89-91, 107, 114, 118, 119, 129, 131, 133, 139, 140, 145, 147, 149, 152-159, 161, 162, 166, 174, 175, 182, 185, 187, 189-193, 197-201, 203, 205-208, 212
campaign against, 159, 192, 195, 196
One Unit Scheme, 55, 64, 77, 169-171, 173-175
reconstitution of four provinces, 64, 170, 171, 187
West Punjab, 49
White papers, on Bhutto Regime 244-245
East Pakistan, 189, 195, 196
Higher Defence Organization, 214, appendix I
Kashmir, 52
Woolwich, 44
World Bank, 135
World War I, 31, 32, 150
World War II, 26, 28, 31, 32, 45-47, 149, 151

Y

- Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad (General), 159, 165, 179, 180, 182-184, 204, 206, 212, 268, 272, appendix D, F, J and K
 appointed Army Chief, 128
 East Pakistan crisis, 197-205, 207, 272
 goals of, 176, 184
 imposes martial law, 120, 175, 176, 181
 negotiations with political leaders, 197, 198, 200
 orders military action, 201
 refuses to support Ayub, 178-179
 resigns, 208-209
 runs administration, 182, 184-187
 stories about the private life of, 210
 Young Turks Movement, 31
 Yusuf Haroon, 179

The Military and Politics in Pakistan

Z

- Zafar Chaudry (Air Marshal), 213, 221, appendix G and K
 Zafarullah Khan, Muhammad, 74
 Zakat, 248, 249
 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad (General), 212, 221, 228, 239, 242, 243, 249, 251, 252, 253, 255, 259, 264, 270, 273
 appendix H and K
 announces R.C.O., 263
 appoints Prime Minister, 264
 assumes Presidency, 252
 criticism of Bhutto, 244-245
 declares martial law, 239
 disclaims political ambition, 240
 elections, 240, 246, 260, 261
 Islamization, 241, 242, 247
 oath as elected President, 263
 prepared to share power, 242, 260
 referendum, 242, 260-261
 role of military, 256-257
 Zulfikar Ali Khan, (Air Chief Marshal), 214, 240, appendix K

THE MILITARY & POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

1947-1997

This book undertakes a comprehensive and documented study of the role of the military in Pakistan's society and politics with a view to explaining why and how a professional military can acquire political disposition. The major themes have been studied with reference to three clusters of factors: the dynamics of the civil society and the working of the political institutions and processes, the military establishment and its organizational resources and professional and corporate interests; and the interaction across the functional boundaries between the military and the civil and its implications for the power balance in the polity. The weaknesses of the civilian/political institutions and their inability to cope with diverse demands on the political system make it convenient for the senior commanders to expand their role and even assume power. However, military intervention is not necessarily an enduring remedy but it is a part of the overall problem of weak civilian institutions and political decay.

RS. 600.00

www.sang-e-meel.com

ISBN-10: 969-35-1148-4

ISBN-13: 978-969-35-1148-2



9 789693 511482

www.sang-e-meel.net